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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation examines the historical implications of World-War-One-Era armed 
occupations through a study of the U.S.-created constabulary in the Dominican Republic during 
the military occupation of 1916-1924, and a contextualization of those years in the wider context 
of Dominican history.  Through this historically under-studied case, I demonstrate the 
negotiations and compromise that, over the course of a long occupation, both revised the 
approaches of U.S. occupying forces and changed occupied society--fundamentally reshaping 
Dominican social class and regional power relationships through the military, unifying a heavily 
regional society, and polarizing society between military and civilian.  The occupation took place 
during a time of rapid modernization in the Dominican Republic and drastically changing U.S. 
foreign policy methods, opening the way for its events and character to play a central role in the 
development of both.  This study combines an analysis of U.S. and Dominican government and 
popular sources, including international communications, military records and newspapers from 
both countries, and private letters, to demonstrate the complex dialogue through which the new 
Dominican military and political system came into being.  This dissertation takes back to its 
origin the question of what happens in U.S. military occupations meant to export democracy, 
examining the interplay and give and take between the occupied and occupiers, and the ways in 
which the end results were an evolution of something new, built of compromise.  The society and 
military that emerged on the other side of the occupation was the result of a creative and ever-
evolving dialogue between opposing forces, an evolution that led to a product distant from the 
plans of occupiers, but also distant from the plans of resisters, one that fundamentally reshaped 
Dominican power relationships and societal structure by the occupation's end.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 This dissertation examines inter-Caribbean relations and Latin American state-building in 
the early twentieth century through a case study of the international and domestic negotiations 
that shaped Dominican society and politics before and during U.S. occupation (1916-1924).  I 
examine Dominican political culture, military institutions, and U.S.-Dominican relations from 
1880-1924, and the U.S. creation of a new Dominican military under Marine forces of 
occupation from 1916.  My research demonstrates that early U.S. attempts to build Dollar 
Diplomacy and to export democracy inadvertently sparked changes in society that led to an 
especially powerful and long-lived military dictatorship in the post-occupation Dominican 
Republic.  In creating this new military, U.S. occupation planners carried out an "experiment" 
expected to control and reshape Dominican society and provide a model for U.S. military 
interventions elsewhere.  The majority of Dominicans fought to reject the experiment.  The end 
result was a dialogue between the theoretical expectations of an occupying force and the creative 
negotiation of an occupied people who largely rejected U.S. impositions.  This set of 
international relations was central to the diplomatic and military histories of both countries.  On 
the U.S. side, it was one of the core interventions characterizing and defining U.S. diplomacy of 
the period, a key experiment in the policy of exporting democracy through military intervention.  
On the Dominican side, the major focus of this study, it completely shifted the balance of power 
among classes and--through infrastructural developments and military imposition and resistance-
-united previously regional power bases.  Dominican society was drastically changed because of 
negotiations between U.S. impositions and Dominican reactions against them.  The country's 
diverse regions were unified physically through improved roads and communications, and 
2 
 
ideologically through the growing unification of anti-occupation sentiment and action.  
Analyzing these changes, my dissertation shows how negotiation to end the occupation allowed 
the hated, U.S.-supported military to become first a tenable national force and then the backbone 
of the potent Trujillo dictatorship. 
 The history of the Dominican Republic has been influenced heavily by the symbiotic 
connection between its geographical location and its military needs and development, a fact that 
extends well beyond its relationship to the United States.  The Dominican military, in the period 
from the 1880s to the 1920s, drastically changed from an often loose coalition of regional 
military forces to a modern, centralized, national armed force.  This was a time of extreme 
change and upheaval in all aspects of Dominican society as planters and a growing middle class 
progressively entered the international economy, and the support of a centralizing government 
came to depend ever more on revenue from international trade.  Dominican national leaders 
during the late 1800s and early 1900s, most elevated through their military backgrounds in the 
wars for independence (1821, 1842-1844, 1865-1868), worked in a highly regionalized country 
to bring about some level of centralization that could increase revenue and strengthen the central 
state.  Understandably, they used the military to do so.  But the military was largely regional too, 
and local governments and merchants jealous of their autonomy struggled to retain the flexibility 
of local traditions.  The period under study was consumed by a multi-faceted struggle of 
regionalism versus centralization, an issue that many Dominican and U.S. investors and 
diplomats came to see as a question of "backwardness" vs. "modernity."  For others, among them 
the Dominican northern intellectual elite and tobacco merchants, regionalism represented 
tradition and autonomy while centralization came increasingly to represent foreign imposition--
and sometimes even theft of sovereignty.  In the Dominican experience during these decades, 
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centralization tended to benefit the sugar industry, which was progressively foreign in 
ownership.  This trend was reinforced under the rules of Dominican presidents Heureaux (1882-
1899) and Cáceres (1905-1911), and then under the U.S. military occupation (1916-1924).   
 In the pre-occupation Dominican military, the controversy of regionalism versus 
centralization manifested itself in the struggles between caudillo power and a splintered, non-
professional armed force, and in the ideal of Dominican versus foreign control.  The latter 
concern became more prominent in the early twentieth century as the U.S. government became 
more involved in Dominican politics and economy.  This dissertation focuses on the military as a 
central arena of power conflicts and a primary tool whereby Dominicans redefined their cultural 
and social national identity, in ways that reflected emerging relationships among competing 
groups.  This process occurred through imperialism and active resistance, constructive 
adaptation, and negotiation.  Concentrating on how political, social and cultural characteristics of 
the military affected social structure and nation formation from the dictatorship of Ulíses 
Heureaux (1882-1899) to the beginning of the Trujillo era, my analysis aims to demonstrate the 
complex interplay of imperial ambition and “indigenous” response in colonial settings, and how 
this interplay helped form twentieth-century Dominican national identity.   
 U.S. diplomats and occupation forces pinpointed the Dominican military as the main 
source of Dominican political problems, and thus economic problems, and sought to remake the 
military in order to restructure and revise Dominican society.  In 1916, U.S. Marines occupied 
Dominican cities and declared a military government.  The first measures of this unilaterally 
imposed government included the gradual but complete disbanding of all existing Dominican 
armed and police forces, the disarmament of the entire Dominican population, and strict 
censorship of the Dominican press.  Through eight years of occupation (1916-1924), during 
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which the U.S. government left the occupation administration largely under the control of the 
Department of the Navy and U.S. Marines stationed throughout the country, occupying forces 
placed greatest emphasis on improving the country's infrastructure, centralizing governmental 
power, and creating a new Dominican army modeled on the U.S. Marine Corps.  This military, 
U.S. forces hoped, would eventually work apolitically to bring U.S.-defined stability to the 
country.  The results of this prolonged intervention, though not those predicted either by U.S. 
forces or by those resisting them, brought major and lasting change to the Dominican military 
and way of life.   
 The occupation and the new Dominican military changed social relations, re-ordered 
social classes, and increased social mobility.  This was especially true for those Dominicans who 
lived in rural areas far away from major urban centers.  Many rural Dominicans had remained 
removed from larger national developments because they could more easily avoid obligatory 
military service; recruiters could not reach those populations that were not connected to urban 
centers by infrastructure, and the remoteness of many populations meant exclusion from the 
training and mobility that military service might provide.  Regional fragmentation and a lack of 
central infrastructure also contributed to difficulties in centralizing trade that might have funded 
a larger central government.  Despite military exclusion and regional fragmentation, Dominicans 
across the country sought news of national happenings and jealously guarded national 
independence, fearful of repetitions of the many incursions on sovereignty that the country had 
suffered since independence largely because they led to incursions on local autonomy.  
Dominican writers, even in the most remote regions, had a strong tendency toward anti-
imperialism, but also toward guarding regional and local autonomy.
1
   
                                                 
1
 See, for example: Alberto Baeza Flores, Don Federico Henríquez y Carvajal, un siglo de conducta y de valor, 
Revista de la Habana, Reimpreso del No. 50, Oct. 1946; Juan Daniel Balcácer, Lilís, cartas y comunicaciones, 
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 Internal and external developments meant that the decades from 1880 to the 1920s would 
bring sweeping change to this way of life, gradually centralizing the country and its government 
and military.  It would take forceful foreign intervention, however, to push through much of the 
change, and even then the strength of Dominicans' culture and determination led to a rapid 
evolution that deeply incorporated Dominican regional and military structures into the changed 
society that emerged to dominate in the later twentieth century.  By 1900, U.S. investors and 
gradually the U.S. government joined in the struggle to centralize and standardize the Dominican 
economy.  Their eventual decision to use the Dominican government and then the Dominican 
military, I argue, first perpetuated regionalism and civil war and then culminated in the U.S. 
military occupation and, finally, in the military dictatorship under Rafael Trujillo that dominated 
twentieth-century Dominican history for more than three decades.  This was true both because of 
the national struggle between regionalism and centralization during this period and because both 
U.S. and Dominican actors saw the military as the key to development.  Through the course of 
the U.S. military presence, however, a twofold revision of the planned occupation constabulary 
took place.  The two major revisions of the constabulary were products of the collision and 
mixing of occupation plans and Dominican realities, from tradition to deliberate initiatives, but 
also formed a portion of the broader contemporary struggle between centralization and 
regionalism as it played out in the military.   
 The first revision occurred in phases through the bulk of the occupation period as 
occupation plans were laid out, carried out, and revised by occupation realities.  In the first 
phase, the occupation constabulary was created in 1917 and the majority of Dominicans refused 
to join or support it.  In response to this unexpected turn of events and the lack of consistent 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Santo Domingo: Editora Cosmos, 1977); Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, Papeles de Pedro F. Bono, para la historia 
de las ideas políticas en Santo Domingo, (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe), 1964. 
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support from the U.S. State Department, occupation officers continually changed their plans to 
try to accommodate the problem, eventually by neglecting the constabulary and ruling the 
country through the force of U.S. Marines.  In overlapping phases after the end of World War 
One, the plans for the constabulary were repeatedly changed and often locally developed, until a 
rising set of resistance movements in 1920 brought a drastic new revision of constabulary 
initiatives.  This included the abandoning of the early occupation plan to train and eventually 
promote the lowest classes to officer positions.  It instead quickly elevated the slightly more 
cooperative middle classes directly to officer positions as the United States sought to withdraw 
its forces from deep involvement in the country.   
 The second revision, overlapping slightly with the first, began in earnest in the years 
1920 to 1924, when many Dominicans began to see that they had a clear stake in the occupation 
process and end result.  In the earlier years of occupation, the majority of the population had 
settled for resistance, often passive resistance, that sought to make the occupation government 
untenable so that U.S. forces would leave.  From 1920, many individuals and groups began to 
insert themselves into the political and military process of the later occupation.  By this time, the 
development of power dynamics with impending had changed the playing field, with many 
Dominicans commissioned in the officer corps during the changes of this period.  Others began 
to consolidate a resistance movement to try to bring about an alternative end to the occupation 
that allowed U.S. forces no say in the post-occupation military or political arenas.  As different 
forces struggled to control the terms of the withdrawal, the military government and new 
Dominican officers in the constabulary joined with a growing number of merchants and 
politicians to refocus occupation reporting and documentation.  The purpose was to encourage 
wider support for the constabulary and the post-occupation government.  Methods for this 
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refocusing included publications that discredited those still resisting cooperative withdrawal, and 
a campaign to improve civil-military relations.  This campaign brought about a revision of 
occupation military history that was a clear result, in the end, of both U.S. and Dominican 
imperatives.  While the first major revision of the occupation was more operational and cultural, 
consisting in physical reorganization and redefinition of the military, the latter revision was 
largely politico-historical.  It included a re-writing of occupation and constabulary history that 
took place through the 1920s and was intentionally carried into the post-occupation military. 
 An understanding of the complex motivations and revisions of U.S.-Dominican relations  
during this period offers a unique window into the development of U.S.-Latin American relations 
during the period of U.S. expansion and Latin American state formation.  This study takes into 
account the broader world context of foreign relations through this period, U.S. imperatives 
impelled by World War One and developing U.S. policies of “informal empire,” and how those 
contexts affected actions and decisions on the ground in the Dominican Republic as the two 
countries' politics and economies became more intertwined.  I join with the expanding group of 
scholars who seek to apply a new model to the study of U.S.-Latin American relations, one that 
combines multiple aspects of "the deployment and contestation of power," as Gilbert Joseph 
phrased it in the theoretical introduction to the 1998 anthology Close Encounters of Empire.
2
 
While avoiding a post-modern approach that excludes a close examination of the military and 
institutional development of the period, a trap into which some cultural history falls, I agree with 
this group of scholars' approach to combining historical fields of diplomacy, military and foreign 
relations, and questioning the usefulness of fixed terms such as nation and modernity.  The 
                                                 
2
 Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. Legrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds., Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the 
Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 5. 
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military in the 1916 occupation of the Dominican Republic provides a useful case study by 
which to challenge these terms and categories.   
 The developments during the occupation were complicated by multiple forces and 
definitions, both within a diverse society and from without.  The occupation was a direct U.S. 
response to long-term civil war in the Dominican Republic that, due to a combination of 
European interests and growing U.S. investments in the country, seemed to threaten growing 
U.S. hegemony.  The civil war itself was an expression in part of reaction against the foreign 
presence, magnified by Dominican sectional tension that was in this period intensified by an 
entrenched class hierarchy and a failing economy.  These problems plagued the newly 
developing country and had become more pronounced and contested since the 1890s, the very 
period when U.S. investment and U.S. naval expansion grew exponentially throughout the 
Caribbean region.  The U.S. occupation intended to create the institutional means by which 
regional differences would be managed, and thereby ameliorate the long-standing regional 
tensions by building new Dominican governmental and military structures from the ground up.  
The occupation began during World War One, and—by the time of official U.S. entry into the 
European war in April of 1917—was informed by an inconsistent commitment of U.S. resources, 
manpower, and clear direction from the U.S. State Department, on one side, and by Dominican 
rejection of foreign models on the other.  By the time the occupation ended in 1924, the dialogue 
that formed from these conflicting goals had in measurable but incomplete ways stimulated the 
process by which contending factions in the Dominican Republic began to form a more cohesive 
definition of national identity.   
 Many historical studies of U.S. imperialism in the Caribbean during this period treat the 
U.S. expansionist impulse as the primary focus in their examinations of the historical process, 
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often with an emphasis or reliance on U.S. sources.  Among these works are the groundbreaking 
studies of Peter Smith, Greg Grandin, and Mary Renda.   Their studies have contributed widely 
to an understanding of U.S. relations with Latin American countries in the twentieth century, 
revealing the general development of U.S.-Latin American relations as experimental and often 
flexible.  Peter Smith's Talons of the Eagle demonstrates that U.S. diplomacy and intervention in 
Latin American countries has maintained flexibility based on changing U.S. economic and 
security needs, which have then constrained Latin American response and action--a valuable 
work in explaining the changing face of U.S. power in the Americas.
3
  In Empire's Workshop, 
Grandin uses a variety of examples of U.S. twentieth-century interventions throughout Latin 
America to argue that over time the United States developed policy in Latin American countries 
that allowed it to perfect empire elsewhere in the world, suggesting a stronger coherence in U.S. 
policy than that put forth by Smith.
4
  Works such as Mary Renda's Taking Haiti bring a fresh 
interpretive approach to U.S. imperialism in the early twentieth century, demonstrating how 
complex cultural understandings affected imperial relations in U.S. occupation throughout the 
Caribbean.
5
  These works, however, tend to neglect the active participation of Latin American 
actors and motivations in the broader development of these international relations, and thus 
neglect deeper connections and underpinnings of Latin American contributions to U.S.-Latin 
American relations.   
 A few scholars have begun to take a more synthetic approach to the historical study of 
U.S. Latin-American relations in this period, combining both U.S. and Latin American sources.  
                                                 
3
 Peter Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
4
 Greg Grandin, Empire‟s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism, (New 
York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). 
5
 Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940, (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
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Historians such as Gilbert Joseph and Michel Gobat emphasize the "colonized" in imperial 
encounters and work to bring together a balance between U.S. and Latin American sources.  
Joseph's Revolution from Without combines U.S. and  Latin American sources to demonstrate the 
complexities of relationships and state development in U.S.-Mexican relations.  Joseph uses a 
wide synthesis of sources to demonstrate that local, national, and international forces shaped the 
course of revolution and subsequent development in Mexico.
6
  Gobat‟s Confronting the 
American Dream examines U.S. intervention and occupation in Nicaragua in terms of 
Nicaraguan response, demonstrating that Nicaraguan elites selectively accepted and even 
embraced U.S. cultural, political, and economic structures even while using those structures to 
reject U.S. imperialism.
7
  
 This dissertation follows the approach of scholars such as Gilbert Joseph and Michel 
Gobat in re-examining traditional approaches to U.S.-Latin American relations, combining 
sources, and examining the dialogue of international motivations as they shaped twentieth-
century Latin American development.  Following this model, my research demonstrates new 
avenues and dimensions that can only be revealed by a synthetic examination of U.S.-Latin 
American relations. While a synthesis of U.S. and Dominican sources for this period 
demonstrates that U.S. structures gradually came to re-shape the Dominican government and 
military, as they did in Nicaragua, the process in the Dominican Republic was unique because of 
the extensive rejection of U.S. modes among Dominicans.  The majority of Dominicans did not 
only reject imperialism, but attempted to reject the changes brought with it.  The course of 
occupation led to gradual adaptation in which--much like Gobat describes for Nicaragua--
                                                 
6
 Gilbert M. Joseph, Revolution From Without: Yucatán, Mexico, and the United States, 1880-1924, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
7
 Michel Gobat, Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2005). 
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Dominicans used U.S. structures to work to overthrow U.S. imperialism.  The adaptation in the 
Dominican Republic, however, was less intentional, and was also unique in that it centered 
around the military rather than the elites, who were gradually pushed from power in the process.  
The importance of combining U.S. and Dominican sources for a study of this occupation would 
be difficult to over-emphasize.  The modern history of the Dominican Republic, like that of any 
Caribbean nation, has been influenced heavily by its location so near the United States.  In his 
1994 study of U.S. relations with Caribbean nations, sociologist Anthony P. Maingot wrote  that 
"if one were to choose a single word to encapsulate Caribbean history, that word would have to 
be 'geopolitics.'"
8
  In 1917, as his country's government was being restructured by a U.S. military 
occupation, Dominican historian Tulio M. Cestero made a similar observation about the 
"problem" of Caribbean nations' relationship with the United States.  West Indies countries, he 
argued, were in this relationship ruled by geographical position and production.
9
  To the central 
questions of geographical location and U.S. interest in Caribbean production and goods, this 
dissertation adds the ever-influential question of the military.   
 In adopting a synthetic examination of sources from both countries and from military and 
non-military sources, I provide a case study that clearly demonstrates the problem of less-
synthetic works.  In contrast to the works of Smith, Grandin, and Renda, a synthetic study of 
Dominican and U.S. sources problematizes the approach--taken by Smith and Grandin--that U.S. 
actions are decided by U.S. needs, and provide constraints to Latin American action.  While this 
is certainly true in part, the active negotiation and re-negotiation between Latin American actors 
and U.S. actors has provided as much of a fuel for change, and sometimes more, than purely 
                                                 
8
 Anthony P. Maingot, The United States and the Caribbean: Challenges of an Asymetrical Relationship, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994), 1. 
9
 Tulio M. Cestero, Estados Unidos y Las Antillas, (Madrid: Compañía Ibero-Americana de Publicaciones, 1931), 
35. 
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U.S.-based economic or security needs.  The picture is much more complicated, as this 
dissertation demonstrates: In early U.S.-Dominican relations, the actions and active resistance of 
Dominicans decisively changed U.S. security needs in ways that a U.S.-centered study cannot 
extend.  Grandin's work, while valuable in demonstrating the over-arching goals of U.S. policy-
makers in Latin America, fails to account for the nuances of how those goals were re-shaped by 
Latin American imperatives.
10
 
The Dominican case, widely publicized in its time and instrumental in direct changes to 
U.S. policy from 1904 to the 1920s, offers a window into the types interaction that informed 
international negotiation in the Caribbean region during these years of rapid U.S. expansion.  
Largely because of military necessity, the U.S. occupation forces placed great emphasis on 
improving the country's communication and transportation infrastructure and creating a new 
Dominican army modeled on the United States Marine Corps.  The military government‟s focus 
on a new armed force was based largely on the concern about how escalating sectional divisions 
were perceived as symptoms of Dominican traditions of caudillismo and praetorianism.  While 
this perception was at least partially accurate, it failed to take into account the centrality of 
regional economic and ideological differences--the Dominican side of the story--the existence of 
which increasingly complicated occupation structures and methods that were based on military 
change.  Two key problems beset the occupation plans because of this misunderstanding: The 
first was an inability, for the first six years, to integrate economic change and development plans 
with changes to the military; the second, in the context of U.S. government interest in the 
European war, was that the new military—despite its centrality to occupation plans—was usually 
                                                 
10
 A subtlety to which, despite the acclaim of Empire's Workshop, Grandin's earlier works are more attuned.  See: 
Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); 
Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: The Latin American Cold War and its Consequence, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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understaffed, under-budgeted, and run by low-ranking and inexperienced Naval and Marine 
officers.  The significance and centrality of military culture and the wide acceptance of armed 
conflict in the previous historical trajectory of the Dominican Republic, and then its continuation 
through the U.S. occupation, meant that the re-shaping of the military would be key to the 
occupiers‟ plans for a complete rebuilding of the country.  It also meant, however, that 
Dominican historical experience would gradually allow the new military to become a vehicle for 
more cohesive resistance—both because Dominican citizens resented disarmament and because 
the fundaments of new structures and techniques were still military, and thus could be widely 
accepted as Dominican rather than foreign in their basic nature, as long as armed resistance was 
under the control of armed Dominican citizens. 
 The military government so prioritized military centralization that centralization of 
government eventually took a back seat to centralized military control.  The emphasis on 
maintaining militarily defined social order after the occupation's end contoured the withdrawal 
plan and post-occupation U.S. relations with the Dominican Republic.  The story of the 
constabulary within the U.S. occupation is therefore a vital link both to Dominican history and to 
U.S.-Caribbean relations, and provides insight into the early development of U.S. attempts to 
export democratic models to foreign countries.  Recent scholars studying democratization as a 
foreign policy have used detailed research to understand the effects of attempts to export 
democratic government.  From a political science perspective, the study has often centered in 
recent years on which aspects of foreign intervention can most aid democratization in countries 
that have struggled with either continuing civil war and or repeated autocratic regimes.  Scholars 
14 
 
such as Peter Burnell, Thomas Carothers, and Sarah Henderson, have argued that direct military 
intervention is not supportive of democracy, and often leads to autocratic regimes.
11
   
 As these scholars set their arguments and research against the arguments of both 
previously accepted political theory concerning intervention and against more recent theories, 
such as that of James Meernik and even the more moderate Mark Peceny, their central concern is 
to denote how different types of more intrusive and often violent intervention can be 
counterproductive, while arguing also that interventions can provide powerful aid to 
democratization by less-intrusive means.  Meernik follows many long-accepted and recently 
questioned ideas, stating that military intervention is, overall, beneficial to targeted countries, 
demonstrating the results of increased and longer lasting democratization in countries that have 
experienced foreign military intervention.  The crux of his argument is that democratic 
transitions are most successful when established out of war situations.
12
  Peceny complicates his 
theory in useful ways, agreeing with Meernik‟s basic premise but arguing for a much more 
nuanced interpretation.  Peceny insists that the positive results stem not from the military 
intervention itself, but from the many pro-liberalization policies that are used in conjunction with 
and supported by military force.
13
  This dissertation provides a specific historical 
contextualization for this evolving discussion, demonstrating how the complexities of 
interactions and unexpected consequences led to constant negotiation and redefinition of goals 
from both countries.  In the end, as an early attempt to export democracy through military force, 
the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic was a clear failure in many senses, leaving the 
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country with a more powerful centralized military and surveillance system that precluded the 
possibilities of democratic development that occasionally surfaced in the attempts of Dominican 
politicians during U.S. interventions in the period.  The occupation had the effect of forcing rapid 
centralization of infrastructure that united regions, developing a form of national unity that was 
long silenced by a new culture of military-civilian separation that came into existence only with 
the occupation. 
 Numerous historical studies from both the United States and the Dominican Republic 
have, especially in recent decades, examined some aspects of the major changes to Dominican 
society in this vital period, seeking to complicate the earlier dependency approach that 
dominated Dominican historical study.  Most notable among these are those that emphasize and 
analyze the extensive changes to the Dominican economy around the turn of the century.  
Dominican scholars Pablo A. Maríñez and Wilfredo Lozano have published a number of works 
examining the changes to Dominican modes of production and the Dominican export economy, 
focusing especially on the turn of the twentieth century and on the Trujillo years (1930-1961).
14
  
Lozano also provides a valuable study of the export economy and the role of U.S. interests 
during the occupation years (1916-1924).
15
  Both emphasize the interactions between the 
country's agricultural classes and elites, and the interaction of both with U.S. investors and 
government representatives.  Maríñez, especially, argues that active Dominican resistance 
before, during, and after the occupation largely shaped local policy despite the national 
predominance of sugar.  Recently, historian Michiel Baud has provided in-depth studies of the 
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changes to both Dominican sugar and tobacco, with the goal of analyzing the transition toward 
capitalist production and relations in the country.
16
  Baud, too, demonstrates the problem of over-
arching theory in attempting to explain Dominican development, showing that while central state 
policies encouraged the growth of sugar (and thus U.S. investment), the realities of other regions 
of the Dominican Republic meant that central state policy was repeatedly re-made through active 
resistance in areas outside of the capital-city region.  Through the development of the military, 
which came to form the core of attempts to centralize the national government, this dissertation 
demonstrates that the interplay of Dominican actors and regional characteristics with occupation 
forces reshaped the course of the occupation and, through it, Dominican society. 
Many historians have worked to explain the changes to the twentieth-century Dominican 
Republic through biographies of Trujillo and studies of how the Trujillo regime maintained 
power.  The son of a middle-class family trained and promoted under the occupation military, 
Trujillo rose rapidly first to the new military's commandant and then to military dictatorship.  
Important biographical studies of the dictator that appeared after his assassination in 1961 traced 
the individual development of Trujillo and his use of terror in the late 1920s and early 1930s to 
demonstrate that his regime was militarily forced on the Dominican population.
17
  Many 
complications, including the heavy scholarly emphasis on the Trujillo Era, have led to an overall 
lack of research and publications about the U.S. occupation period.  Most recently, Richard 
Turits and Lauren Derby have contributed to the historical understanding of Trujillo's long 
dictatorship by examining other aspects of his regime. Turits argues that, rather than ruling by 
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sheer force, Trujillo maintained power by building an alliance with the peasantry through which 
he was able to maintain power, an interpretation that is useful and path-breaking, but applies 
variably to different regions.  Lauren Derby's study demonstrates the complicated cultural 
aspects through which Trujillo worked to legitimate his rule, through which he promised 
modernity and infused Dominican culture with an image that tied him to a promising future for 
Dominicans.
18
  While I agree with aspects of both interpretations, I argue that neither provide  an 
explanation of the role of the occupation in reshaping Dominican institutions, a foreground 
which is vital to both of these authors' interpretations.  The infrastructure for Trujillo's 
relationship with the peasantry and cultural propaganda were built earlier, and centered around 
the military complex and politico-historical revisions begun through negotiation between U.S. 
occupation forces and Dominican resistance during the occupation. 
Despite the extent of historical and social science literature attempting to explain such 
vital historical occurrences as the Trujillo dictatorship and the role of foreign military 
interventions, the precise role of U.S. intervention in the development of the Dominican military 
and society remains unclear.  Two distinct works by Dominican historians Bernardo Vega and 
Valentina Peguero have recently located the importance of military development in the rise of 
Trujillo in ways that challenge previous interpretations and demonstrate more than ever the need 
for a closer examination of that military's origins and development in the pre-Trujillo decades.  
In 1992, Bernardo Vega's path-breaking Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas norteamericanas brought 
forth an abundance of new evidence in the historiographical quest to understand Trujillo's long-
lasting presence at the forefront of Dominican life.  His work demonstrates conclusively that the 
withdrawal of U.S. military forces in the years 1922-1924 was incomplete, that Trujillo's close 
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relationships with U.S. Marine officers not only propelled him to the top ranks of the Dominican 
military, but contributed forcefully to his ability to remain in power for so long.  U.S. officers 
who had overseen the constabulary during the occupation and often visited the Dominican 
Republic as distinguished guests also intervened on his behalf with the U.S. State Department 
and successive U.S. presidents.
19
  Vega's study demonstrates that, in many ways, the U.S.-
created constabulary therefore remained a foreign force even after the occupation ended.  This 
makes all the more urgent the question of how that military was formed, who took part, and why 
it was able to become such a powerful force in such a resistant society.  While Vega's work 
demonstrates the new military's strong break from the past, historian Valentina Peguero offered 
an interpretation in 2005 that instead stresses the continuity of military prominence in Dominican 
society.  Peguero provides an overview of the ways in which early Dominican society was 
heavily militarized, alongside a closer examination of the militarization in society under 
Trujillo's regime, to demonstrate the similarities and argue that a long pattern of militarized 
culture paved the way for Trujillo's military dictatorship.
20
   
Both of these works focus on the military and provide crucial reappraisals of the previous 
scholarship.  They also both demonstrate the overall lack of scholarship explaining the role of the 
U.S. occupation in the formation of this centralized military.  Peguero, for example, concentrates 
on the early military and compares it to Trujillo's military.  Between the two, she provides a brief 
chapter that gives an overview of major military developments during the occupation, using 
secondary literature to argue that the occupation enforced militarization in Dominican culture.  
This dissertation intends to show that it did much more than reinforce a tradition of military 
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predominance, that it instead re-shaped that tradition and much of Dominican society.  Vega's 
work, the first work outside of military publications to incorporate U.S. military sources, paints a 
picture much different from that in Peguero's work.  Through a close study of Trujillo's 
relationships with military officers beginning in the early 1920s and emphasizing the post-
occupation years, Vega demonstrates the distinct break from the past in the post-occupation 
military; the new military was propped up by U.S. officers, and for decades was heavily 
influenced by the wishes of those officers and their diplomatic support of Trujillo.  Studies of 
early Dominican history demonstrate that Dominican military leaders before the occupation, as 
well as the constituents they governed, stressed regional and national sovereignty.  The question 
remains, therefore, what forces came into play to allow such a proudly regional country to 
change drastically enough to permit the rise of Trujillo.  This dissertation examines that question, 
arguing that the delicate balance of Dominican resistance and foreign imposition, coincident with 
a crucial moment of national development, opened the way for change that could only occur 
once both Dominicans and U.S. officials reached a point of compromise and negotiation.  
 In the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo dictatorship itself silenced many who might have 
published examinations of those years, while in the United States the changes in foreign policy 
and direction in the 1920s and 1930s encouraged a dearth of literature.  Upon the death of 
Trujillo in 1961 and into the 1970s, Dominican publishers reprinted many occupation-era 
resistance writings, opening a wide variety of available primary sources, but historians were 
generally focused on examining the post-occupation years.
21
  Among U.S. sources, with the 
exception of economist Melvin Knight's critical 1928 account of U.S. economic policies in the 
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Dominican Republic, the accounts of U.S. diplomats reigned.
22
  The histories published by U.S. 
diplomats Sumner Welles and Dana G. Munro, and those officially published by the U.S. 
military, relied almost exclusively on U.S. sources and offered a generally apologetic view of the 
occupation with which Dominican scholars did not agree.
23
  These were the reference sources for 
the majority of works referencing the occupation until Bruce Calder's 1984 The Impact of 
Intervention.
24
  Calder's valuable work is the first and only U.S. monograph directly examining 
the occupation, incorporating both Dominican and U.S. archival sources to examine the 
occupation's political economy and the guerrilla resistance of the eastern provinces.  Calder 
argues that the U.S. occupation ignored Dominican realities, but that it sought to make changes 
without fundamentally reshaping the Dominican government.  This dissertation demonstrates 
that, while the U.S. State Department sought a more middle-of-the-road approach, U.S. military 
actors who were in charge of most of the occupation were in fact determined to change the most 
fundamental structures of Dominican society, government, and culture.
25
 
Since the nineteenth century, Dominican national identity has centered in large part 
around local militaries and their interactions with each other and with non-military actors.  
Dominican history during this period can therefore only be understood with an exploration of the 
redefinitions of regional divisions of power and competition among groups and ideologies that 
tended to be played out in contests for control of the military.  This dissertation traces how the 
military affected Dominican power relationships in pre-occupation years, and then closely 
examines how the U.S. military occupation of 1916-1924 changed these power relationships and 
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military institutions in Dominican society through imposed U.S. military structures and a 
militarily controlled government.  I also trace Dominican reception of these imposed structures, 
which took place through creative patterns of selective resistance and adaptation.  I argue that the 
enduring results of the occupation played into a continuing reorientation of Dominican society, 
changed the class and regional make-up of the military, and intervened in the development of 
local cultures.  The occupation military forced the centralization of government that Dominicans 
had resisted, but the strong emphasis on the military allowed the Dominican systems of 
regionalism and military culture to persist within the new centralized state.  The ongoing 
reactions of Dominicans forced significant revisions of the occupiers‟ agenda, which had been 
based on the expectation of Dominican acquiescence to foreign rule; in response to varied and 
diverse manifestations of anti-imperial sentiment from significant portions of all classes and 
regions, the military government attempted to impose a number of different models, finally 
reaching the conclusion in the early 1920s that increased knowledge of Dominican society and 
the Spanish language were crucial for leaders—thus gradually creating a new series of models 
that were increasingly Dominican in character.  For this reason, and against the expectations of 
the U.S. military government, major changes in the military were not exclusively a product of 
U.S. priorities and programs, but a vital product of Dominican and Latin American military 
tradition and the reactions of Dominicans to the foreign military presence.   
Neither the occupation nor U.S.-Dominican relations in pre-occupation years make 
coherent sense without a study of the military.  This is true because the development of the 
Dominican military became the central point of concern and focus both for U.S. policy makers 
and Dominicans during this period, and debates about control of the military occurred on many 
levels.  The struggle between resistance to centralization, on one side, and foreign military 
22 
 
control, on the other, played out through the military in distinct phases and revolved around the 
tensions between Dominican regionalism and U.S. expectations of centralization.  Foreign 
involvement, which began gradually with growing U.S. investment in the late nineteenth century 
and with U.S. national security concerns in the early twentieth, eventually became centered on 
the question of military control.  It came to include the occupation constabulary and Marine 
involvement in the post-occupation Dominican military.  Historical works correctly pinpoint 
U.S. expansionism and Dominican civil war as key factors in the onset of occupation, but have 
yet to adequately explain the centrality of the military.  In answer to how the U.S.-created 
constabulary became such a powerful force after the occupation, the historiography demonstrates 
that U.S. disarmament of the population and the new efficiency of a centralized and nationally 
controlled military gave unprecedented power to those in the military.
26
  A closer study of 
Dominican reactions to a U.S.-imposed military, however, shows that disarmament and military 
might alone were unable to bring military control and centralization, as evidenced in the 
resistance movements of 1920-1921.   
 The forces of negotiation that allowed the new military not only to be functional but even 
to change Dominican society remain unexplained.  Despite the common historical trend of 
considering the development of the armed forces and the occupation as separate from each other 
or from general Dominican history, these developments were always intertwined and cannot be 
understood without considering their mutual effects on each other.  Historical accounts such as 
the official military history of the Secretaría de las Fuerzas Armadas Dominicanas, however, 
have minimized the importance of the occupation on Dominican national development.  This 
official history skips over the occupation years completely in its timeline overview of Dominican 
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military history, picking the history back up in 1928 as though occupation events have no place 
in developing a historical understanding of the Dominican armed forces.
27
  Yet the history of the 
military during these transformational years provides a window through which to see how the 
struggle between continuity and change played out, and how it led to a creative dialogue that 
incorporated structures both U.S. and Dominican by the 1920s.   
 Through a close examination of the development of multiple Dominican military forces, 
both institutional and unofficial, this research also contributes to the unfolding debate in broader 
military history--one that is vital for understanding international military interventions--
concerning the development of changing modes of warfare.  In the study of the development of 
"unconventional" or "asymmetrical" warfare, examinations of early U.S. military interventions 
demonstrate an earlier development of new techniques for combating conventional militaries or 
insurgencies than many theorists admit.  Brian McAllister Linn, for example, applies a regional 
approach to the insurgency and counterinsurgency in the occupation of the Philippines at the turn 
of the twentieth century, demonstrating the continuous revision of both broader strategy and 
operational approaches during such unprecedented actions.
28
  While Linn's approach shows the 
ways that on-the-ground exigencies and unexpected resistance affected the Army's approach, 
Alfred W. McCoy demonstrates the long-term effects of military structures and approaches from 
U.S. intervention, arguing that structures built during the occupation led to a military police 
state.
29
  Despite the importance and influence of local initiatives by the occupied populations, 
however, neither study focuses on how such initiatives reshaped occupation plans.  The study of 
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this early military occupation and the founding of the new Dominican military provides a 
glimpse of the occupied population during an intermediary period in which warfare and military 
rules were in transition as occupied populations fought larger and more well-armed opponents.
30
  
As John Lynn argues, the differences between the theory of combat and the ways that people 
culturally conceive combat diverge, a process that shapes the way warfare affects society.
31
  An 
examination of both the actions and the perceptions of the occupied population is crucial for 
understanding the end negotiations and thus the end result of occupation. 
 As this dissertation demonstrates, the centrality of perceptions meant a persistent revision 
of approaches and re-working of institutions that made some occupation goals functional--and 
allowed combined occupation officials and resistance fighters to reject others.  Decades before 
Mao's concerted efforts to organize and define a new unconventional warfare, early interventions 
played out in struggles between the conventional and unconventional modes of western war.  
Intervening U.S. forces fought to overcome opposition through the use of superior technology 
and numbers, only to find that prolonged intervention led to the growth of new and unexpected 
alliances among broadly disparate sectors of the occupied population, who waged an 
increasingly unified war through national and international propaganda, guerrilla warfare, and 
passive and semi-passive forms of resistance.  The development stymied occupation military 
planners at the time, leading to a struggle for military control that was built largely through 
compromise and adaptation.  Occupation forces later recognized this change and the Dominican 
intervention's place in it; the Marine Corps, in 1940, looked to the experiences of the World War 
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One occupations to define its approach to evolving warfare in unconventional situations.
32
  
Trujillo's government, supported by the new post-occupation military, also defined its military 
based largely on Dominican experiences with guerrilla opposition groups fought by the 
constabulary during the occupation.  The opposing militaries' roles and development during such 
interventions provide insight into military responses to changing warfare over time.  The scope 
of dissent to foreign military rule in the early twentieth-century Dominican Republic makes it an 
especially clear example through which to study the interactions of these military developments. 
 This dissertation thus provides a case study of how U.S.-Caribbean relations were shaped 
by evolving understandings of military and defense, before, during, and after the occupation.
33
  
In addition to questions of defense and the shaping of military policy, the documents of the 
period under study provide a link to cultural clashes in the military ventures of the period.  
Conflicting understandings of society led to friction between occupying forces and Dominicans, 
but also, with time, led to compromises and adaptations that defined later U.S.-Caribbean 
relations and often challenged ideas prominent in the United States.  This dissertation, though 
primarily a Dominican history study, thus contributes to recent historiography that examines the 
cultural implications of clashes during the turn of the century interventions, portraying both U.S. 
and the Dominican reactions.
34
  U.S. officials clashed with Dominicans not only in their 
definitions of race, but in their definitions of culture and civilization.  The latter, they held as 
they worked to consolidate power in and reorganize Dominican society, should be centralized 
rather than regional, and should include a strong and apolitical centralized military.  Their 
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statements and communications also demonstrate a broad lack of understanding of the 
Dominican culture of the time.  As Robert Holden discussed for Central America, U.S. officials 
failed to understand the fundamental differences between their own country and those of the 
Caribbean region.  Holden discusses the difficulties met by U.S. officials in Latin America who 
could not understand why Latin American states did not have the kind of monopoly on violence 
that U.S. governing forces did.  Their perceptions of Latin America through the period, and those 
of the U.S. public, were based on misunderstandings of Latin American societies.  Holden argues 
that repeated reorganizations of government led to an "improvisational" nature of the state for 
Central American countries, in which it was "the primordial requirement of every new 
government to attract and hold the loyalty of the fighting forces to which it owed its accession to 
constitutional office, and the concomitant need to buy off or otherwise co-opt anyone capable of 
quickly mobilizing an opposing force of fighting men."
35
  The model holds true for many 
countries throughout the Caribbean region, and is clearly applicable to the Dominican Republic 
both in terms of the nature of the Dominican state and U.S. reactions to it.  U.S. official reports 
and decisions from the period under study demonstrate that one of the major reasons for clashes 
between U.S. officials and Dominican political actors centered around just such a lack of 
understanding.   
 While the Dominican state of the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was 
centrally weak and therefore relatively fluid, functioning through improvisation and regional 
cooperation or compromise, U.S. planners became increasingly convinced over time that an 
externally imposed centralized government and military would solve the problems of economic 
and political instability in the country.  These assumptions, and Dominican adherence to the idea 
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of a more fluid state apparatus, informed the conduct of U.S.-Dominican relations before and 
during the occupation, until both countries' need for a compromise solution allowed the pattern 
to change in the 1920s.  U.S. interventions in the country from the late 1800s therefore followed 
a path of growing interference that gradually led to the goal of complete reformation of the 
Dominican government and military.  With the advent of U.S. military occupation, and the 
rotation of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps officers through the highest posts of Dominican 
government in the years 1916-1924, foreign officers repeatedly planned to re-make the country's 
system of government.  They attempted this through reforms aiming to make Dominican 
governmental and military systems imitate those of the United States.  Not only were Dominican 
local systems incompatible with such change, and U.S. resources too inconsistent, but 
Dominicans from all sectors of society continuously resisted the change, as they had done under 
Dominican government attempts to centralize.  The result, as groups united in compromise to 
end the occupation in the 1920s, was a system that incorporated multiple elements from both 
societies.  The military was gradually strengthened, centralized, and professionalized, but 
Dominican structures within the centralized military largely remained in place.  
  The occupation did bring notable change to the country too, however.  Outside forces 
were able to bring rapid change and centralization whose attempt would have been political 
suicide for any Dominican politician.  One of the ways by which the foreign imposition brought 
drastic change was through the very unifying of resistance in 1920 that forced U.S. officials to 
change their goals and methods.  While U.S. officials  originally attempted to bring change 
through a variety of means that included takeover of offices and the restructuring of Dominican 
offices and society, the Dominican unity formed in resistance was to bring some of the most 
notable change to occur during the occupation.  In the end, when occupation methods were 
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unsuccessful, U.S. officials settled for a combination of compromise and military control, first 
through heavy Marine forces stationed throughout the country, and then through the buildup of 
the new Dominican armed force they had created.  This new armed force, called the 
"constabulary" or "guardia" throughout the occupation, was in the end to be the force that 
maintained the most drastic change to the country in the form of infrastructural centralization.  
While the constabulary was at first treated both by Dominicans and by the U.S. military as a 
joke, enlisting the least educated and poorest classes of Dominicans and disallowing Dominican 
officership, the U.S. need to withdraw from the country later brought a re-focus on the 
constabulary that improved military centralization and infrastructure and elevated the Dominican 
middle classes for the first time to the highest officer positions in the Dominican military.  This 
change, accelerating as U.S. forces worked toward withdrawal and a growing number of 
Dominicans settled for compromise to see the occupation end, was reinforced by continued U.S. 
military involvement in the years after the occupation's end in 1924, as Vega's history 
demonstrates.  This dissertation demonstrates that the end solution for the United States was 
military, and that the prestige of the military in Dominican culture eventually allowed for a 
military solution on the Dominican side as well.  
 The development of this occupation, which over time became more and more about a set 
of compromise agreements and systems, was crucial to the development of the militaries of both 
the Dominican Republic and the United States.  U.S. officers' ideas of foreign occupation were 
re-shaped, and enlisted men were exposed to drastically distinct ways of life and military service.  
Among Dominicans, the occupation did not only reinforce the emphasis on military power, as 
Peguero argues, but also reshaped society and reinforced an already strong culture of resistance 
to foreign rule.  In the end, the conduct of eight years of contentious occupation created such an 
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anti-imperial atmosphere that the U.S.-military-trained Rafael Trujillo was able to use anti-
imperialism, by promising a military that would be able to maintain sovereignty, to increase 
acceptance of centralization.  In other words, the fear of and distaste for foreign rule was so 
strong by occupation's end that Trujillo was able to reach back to and claim continuity with 
Dominican military culture from the late nineteenth century, contrasting his rule with that of the 
occupation so effectively that, despite continued U.S. military involvement and backing, his 
regime's promise of continued independence allowed the tempered change toward centralization 
to continue successfully for decades. 
 A close study of the U.S.-created constabulary in the years before 1922 is difficult for 
two primary reasons that help to explain the lack of in-depth research to date:  The first is that 
many of the records are missing from the Dominican archives, some lost over time, but many 
probably intentionally removed during the Trujillo regime.  For example, most of the records 
covering the constabulary's development in the Department of the South, and especially in the 
units in which later military dictator Trujillo began his military career, are missing.  Much of the 
information about the overall numbers for such statistics as recruits and desertions in the 
constabulary has therefore to be pieced together from reports for the Department of the North 
and overall constabulary development.  The second difficulty with the research is that the 
haphazard and often un-monitored development of the constabulary for its first four years of 
existence meant that no standardized records were kept; this is especially true for outlying 
regions during the intermediate years of occupation, when  the type of regional solution 
described in Chapter Four was most prominent.   
 Locating the history of those who fought in armed resistance to the occupation was and is 
especially tricky due to the nature of the sources and the nature of the armed resistance.  
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Resistance was scattered and generally disorganized, and many criminals and opportunists who 
were not revolutionaries were hunted by the Military Government under the collective label of 
"bandits," so that constabulary records seldom distinguish between those fighting the occupation 
and those otherwise taking advantage of the political and social chaos that reigned through so 
much of the occupation's tenure.  Many of these were fugitives long before the intervention 
began, but their names were often mixed in the official occupation sources.  Many armed 
resistance leaders were also illiterate and lacked supplies or the ability to keep records of their 
members.  The records are further complicated by an intentional revision of the history discussed 
in the conclusion.  Dominican governments had a long tradition of de-emphasizing the political 
nature of any armed resistance by calling revolutionaries "gavilleros" or bandits.  Occupying 
forces who worked with Army manuals for intervention, which did much the same, quickly 
adopted this mode and often reinforced by middle- and upper-class Dominicans who sought to 
demonstrate their ability to come to a solution through diplomacy and without violence.
36
  
Generally, the occupation forces seem to have listed armed resistance leaders as one of two 
categories--"fugitive" or "bandit"--often using the two interchangeably without reference to the 
actions for which they were being pursued.
37
  Furthermore, the spelling of the names of many 
constabulary men during the occupation are incorrect and confused due to the illiteracy of the 
recruits and the lack of Spanish among Marine-constabulary recruiters, a problem that continued 
through the early years of the constabulary until Marines began to promote Dominicans to lower 
officer ranks in 1919 and 1920.   
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 Because the story of the constabulary during the occupation has not been told, one of the 
goals of this dissertation is to provide that story, as much as the sources will allow.  In addition 
to demonstrating the fundamental changes that took root in the Dominican military and state 
through the military during occupation years, I work to trace the way that the changes affected 
Dominicans from all sectors of the population.  The constabulary, whose history began as an 
offshoot of U.S. interference and attempts to control and remake the Dominican government, 
brought under-represented segments of the population gradually into a military tradition that had 
customarily been a step toward limited social mobility.  For those who joined in the early years, 
enlistment was often a product of financial desperation or even a way to avoid local legal 
persecution for acts committed before the occupation.  Recruits did not gain literacy, and were 
often ostracized by other Dominicans in their communities who sought to proscribe the 
constabulary and reject the occupation, but they did gain financial support, housing, some 
physical mobility, and the hope of future social mobility.  Over time, the struggle to develop the 
constabulary was greatly affected by U.S. motivations and fluctuating commitment of resources, 
but also by continuous and varying Dominican resistances.  In the end, only a heavy commitment 
of resources and strong compromise from both Dominican and U.S. groups allowed the 
constabulary to be even a tenable force in society.  The occupation commitment of resources to 
make it so in the final years of occupation gave it a place of utmost priority, and finally brought 
about the military centralization so long planned.   
 Chapters One and Two provide a background to the militarism and regionalism of the 
country, and to the growth of U.S. interference over time in Dominican politics, arguing that 
gradual and steady increases of U.S. influence led to a deterioration of the military as well as a 
growth of anti-Americanism in the country over the decades of 1890-1916.  Chapter Three 
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demonstrates the early failures of U.S. creation of a constabulary.  The constabulary was a failure 
primarily because of the clash of U.S. expectations versus Dominican realities, in which U.S. 
officers expected easy centralization and Dominicans fought to retain a regionally autonomous 
system of rule, and because of the international changes and atmosphere in the early years of 
intervention.  Mistakes made during the foundational year of the constabulary, in which Marines 
and U.S. Navy administrators struggled to control the situation in the country without having a 
firm basis for understanding it, were so deep-seated that they were detrimental to later attempts 
to improve or build up the constabulary.   
 Chapters Four and Five discuss the intermediate years of occupation and the ways that 
the new constabulary inserted itself into local politics and power structures.  Chapter Four argues 
that the mistakes of the early occupation led to the gradual Dominicanization of the constabulary, 
in which through compromise constabulary leaders accepted the traditions of regional power 
relations, and in which Dominicans brought many of their own traditions to bear in the struggle 
to make the constabulary function.  Chapter Five demonstrates that, despite regionalisms in both 
culture and the military, widely similar and often identical complaints stretched from province to 
province, almost all centering directly or indirectly around the constabulary through the 
intermediate years of occupation.  Despite the fact that regional structures and censorship kept 
complaints regionalized, common grievances from region to region demonstrated the deeper 
problems with the occupation constabulary and would provide a strong fuel for resistance when 
it could be united. 
 Chapter Six argues that 1920 was a major turning point for the occupation and the 
constabulary, as local and international events coincided with military centralization to bring 
together a unified resistance.  Resistance concerned Marine constabulary planners and caused 
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them to redouble their efforts to improve and strengthen the constabulary, but their efforts--
focused on centralizing the country militarily, provided the inspiration and infrastructure that 
aided the unification of resistance.  Chapters Seven and Eight demonstrate how this hated 
constabulary became a tenable national armed force after such resistance.  Chapter Seven, 
covering the final years of occupation, demonstrates how political compromise and the gradual 
withdrawal of Marines led to a breakdown in unified resistance that--alongside serious efforts to 
improve the reputation of the constabulary and gradually place it under Dominican leadership--
allowed the constabulary to consolidate and focus on increasing its military strength.  As the 
chapter also demonstrates, political compromise and the nationalists' struggle against 
compromise agreements gradually opened a door for the constabulary to step in as a legitimate 
Dominican force, even while it was still backed by a U.S. military presence.  Chapter Eight 
concludes with a brief discussion of how the post-occupation constabulary became a major force 
for societal control under U.S.-trained officer Rafael Trujillo, who was able to use the 
atmosphere surrounding the occupation's end to rise to leadership of the constabulary, overthrow 
the government, and begin a thirty-one-year dictatorship propped up by the U.S.-created military.  
I argue that all of the tools for Trujillo's rise to power were in place by 1924, products of a 
unique combination of Dominican tradition and occupation-inspired compromises and 
negotiations.  
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Chapter ONE 
Seeking Modernity: Between Regional Military Tradition and the Search for a New Republic 
 
 
 The first Spanish colony in the Americas, the land on Hispaniola that would become the 
Dominican Republic was early neglected as a colony.  A difficult terrain divided by mountains to 
which slaves frequently escaped, the colony was neither as easily ruled nor as lucrative as that of 
Cuba.  As sugar cultivation was introduced in both island colonies, and production and slave 
control proved to be easier in Cuba, Spain gradually allowed Hispaniola to fall into deep neglect.  
When Spain tried to regain political control over the colony's population in the late sixteenth 
century by re-concentrating the entire population to the south, they further devastated the 
population.
1
  Over the centuries, due to Spanish neglect, many Spanish elites in the colony 
moved to Cuba, leaving a small number of families with little Spanish regulation on the eastern 
two thirds of Hispaniola.  The Dominican Republic gained its independence from Spain in 1821 
on the heels of other Latin American independence movements.  No sooner had the elites 
remaining in the former colony extended their offer to become part of Gran Colombia, and 
thereby gain its protection, was their new country overrun by Haitian forces under President 
Jean-Pierre Boyer.  Boyer sought to change land tenure, and officially end slavery (which had 
long been in decline as an institution), and increase the power and potential of Haiti as a country. 
 Haiti ruled the Dominican Republic from 1822 to 1844, just after it gained independence 
from Spain.  In the early 1840s, especially after devastation from an 1842 earthquake, 
Dominicans fought a new independence war to free themselves from Haitian rule--a war against 
Boyer in which they allied with Haitian anti-government forces before breaking free in 1844 and 
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declaring Dominican independence.
2
  Because the country's development from that time was 
formed against the backdrop of fear of another Haitian invasion, and because so many were 
elevated in early Dominican society through military experience and the status of heroes of 
independence, military experience was highly emphasized as vital to good government.  The 
regional character of the Dominican Republic and the glorification of and need for the military 
created pockets of local military-run autonomy with which central governments had to contend.  
Regional separation and regional military forces perpetuated a system in which local caudillo 
leaders furthered traditions of largely military-based regional and local economies, often at odds 
with each other and with non-military entrepreneurs in the struggle to control the work force and 
define the country's future.  Various definitions of modernization would combine with struggles 
for regional autonomy to contribute to incessant friction between different groups in society.   
 The long history of neglect of centralized governmental infrastructure through the 
colonial period and the nineteenth-century in the Dominican Republic contributed to a militant 
regionalism that left early twentieth-century Dominicans struggling to define a form that 
"modernization" could reasonably take.  By the late nineteenth century, some began to work 
toward consolidation of power either to protect Dominican autonomy against foreign powers or 
to expand the capacity of the economy.  Frequent revolutions and political upheaval in the 
previous decades made it clear to many that change was needed were the Dominican Republic to 
be successful in the world market or to overcome the violence of its past.
3
  The powerful and 
militarily backed autonomy of provinces and regions led state builders to seek a solution that 
accommodated caudillistic regional tradition with the growth of a modern state.  Neither the state 
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nor the military were centralized by 1900, even after dictator Ulíses Heureaux's 1891 re-
organization of the army and repeated attempts to centralize and improve the national military.  
Instead, regional power structures allowed many peasants outside the region of the capital city to 
avoid national and impersonal military service by pledging themselves to the service of local 
elites and caudillos who protected them.  The final decades of the nineteenth and early decades 
of the twentieth century were therefore a moment of crisis in the country as many different 
groups struggled to define modernity for the country.  Because the regionally divided military 
units of the country seemed to perpetuate civil war and what many saw as "backward" traditions, 
a growing camp of Dominicans pushed for change in government that became increasingly 
centralized in the latter half of the nineteenth century.    
 
 
Dominican Regionalism and the Early Military 
 
 Dominican geography so divided the regions of the country that even during the colonial 
era the Spanish attempted to control it by keeping all of its population concentrated in one central 
location.  The dominant geographical characteristic contributing to regional separation was the 
Cordillera Central, a large mountain range that runs from the western Dominican Republic down 
to the southeast, dissecting the country.  The centrality of this mountain chain, the highest in the 
Caribbean, led to a growing north-south division of the eastern side of Hispaniola from the time 
of Spanish colonial possession and well into the twentieth century.  Due to colonial neglect, land 
tenure through most of the territory remained legally undefined, and largely unmonitored, and 
the population spread out before and after the sixteenth-century to pursue cattle ranching and 
small agriculture.  The result was that from the sixteenth century on the territory's regions 
increasingly became autonomous units ruled by local elites or left to the care of ranchers and 
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subsistence agriculturalists.  Over time, as many ranchers turned to growing sugar in the south 
and tobacco in the north, regional elites and regional cultures defined the makeup of law and 
order.  The north-south division contributed to the growth of two distinct cultures and 
hierarchies.  The concentration of official institutions in an area around the capital city led to 
further regional divisions on top of that of north and south, as the areas bordering Haiti 
developed distinctly.  As the capital city lay about two hundred miles from the Haitian border at 
its closest point, and Dominicans feared another Haitian incursion on their jealously guarded 
sovereignty, central governments needed strong military forces on the border both north and 
south of the Cordillera Central.  As they lacked the state apparatus and revenue to fund and 
monitor such forces, they depended on local elites to be able to field forces there.  This in turn 
encouraged a strengthening of the regional caudillo system, with central governments paying 
local military leaders to recruit local militia or guards.
4
  Well into the twentieth century, the 
divisions that grew from this system of regional support meant a lack of infrastructural 
development connecting the provinces.  One U.S. observer remarked as late as 1919 that "the 
interior of the country is practically unknown," that there were "practically no roads, and the 
northern and southern parts of the Island are like two different countries."
5
  
 Due to regional patterns of rule and a lack of infrastructure, the only way that national 
leaders could maintain power was through the placement of popular military-political leaders as 
vice presidents with their offices in the Cibao Valley.  Leaders from the traditionally liberal 
Cibao, however, ruled differently from those in the traditionally conservative South, augmenting 
the widening north-south division of the country.  Cibaeños often saw their generals and elites as 
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more enlightened leaders, preserving a way of life superior to that maintained by military 
repression in the south, and many nineteenth-century presidents only maintained a national base 
of support by allowing vice presidents to rule the Cibao differently and separately.
6
  In 
conjunction with the lack of roads and the difficulties of traveling in the 1800s, this led to a 
political system based largely on compromise between distinct regions.  Within the North-South 
divisions were born other regional divisions created by the distinct needs of disparate and largely 
unconnected provinces.  As Bruce Calder points out, “the geography, the life-style, the customs, 
and the speech of the east, the southwest, and the north each exhibited uniqueness, and even 
within these regions there were strong contrasts.”7   
 The country's first national leaders, north and south, were clear examples of the period's 
Latin American caudillos, military leaders and men on horseback who rose from regional to 
national prominence through charisma and military prowess.  They retained political power 
through the building of strong support networks through patronage, and bribing and supporting 
local military leaders to guarantee the success of far-flung provinces along the border and in the 
north.
8
  Because of the extensively regional character of the Dominican Republic, caudillismo 
persisted there when its prominence was fading throughout much of Latin America.  Regional 
approaches to governing meant a central government inability to monopolize power through the 
nineteenth century, so that the government and party structure‟s survival “depended on gaining 
the consent or temporary submission of popular regional leaders, the caudillos, whose authority 
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ultimately rested on their military skills.”9  National presidents, usually military generals, ruled 
the south by the placement and support of regionally prominent generals while they maintained a 
careful balance in the Cibao by allowing its citizens to elect prominent Cibaeños to the vice 
presidency.  As a result, despite the existence of a national military that retained the right to 
conscript men throughout the provinces, the majority of recruits for the south came from the 
south, and the majority of those defending the Cibao came from the valley.
10
  This pattern did 
not end until well into the U.S. occupation, despite government attempts to centralize.  The army 
was split into two major battalions that were physically separated between north and south.  The 
origins of national army recruits in the south in 1904 came not only from the south, but primarily 
from near the capital city.  From Santo Domingo Province and the areas just to the north, west, 
and east came a total of 158 recruits.  From other regions there were a total of 44 recruits from 
the eastern provinces, one from the west, and one left blank in the record.  Recruits from the 
north, recorded separately and employed in guarding the north, included 84 men, most from 
Puerto Plata.  In addition to the geographical regionalism, division in the Dominican Republic in 
the nineteenth century was fed by partisanship; the country shared the Liberal-Conservative party 
divisions common through nineteenth-century Latin America.  Over the decades following 
independence, the Conservative parties were made up primarily of the southern caudillos and 
commercial class and the bureaucracy of the capital, whereas the Liberal parties were made up 
primarily of northern politicians and caudillos and the small but growing middle class.
11
   
 Dominican society was also heavily defined by class distinctions and class relations.  In 
all regions, urban society was divided into what is often called a caste system, separating the 
population between the elites, or gente de primera, and the gente de segunda. The elites were 
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defined by their descent from the early elite Spanish families, while the latter were those from 
urban families that had gained some education and prominence in society, but whose lineage did 
not allow them entry into the ranks of the gente de primera.  Outside of the cities, with the 
exception of the penetration of some elite landowners and some gente de segunda who had 
gained rural prominence as merchants, the peasants formed the majority.
12
  From before 
Dominican independence, the large and vital peasantry was essential to the nation's development.  
As historian Richard Turits explains: 
 the peasantry forged an essentially agro-pastoral and autarkic economy across  
 this relatively large Caribbean colony.  And it secured and valorized land access  
 and subsistence production within an ethos of freedom, self-determination, and 
 opposition to slavery and, subsequently, to dependence on the uncertainties of  
 wage labor and commercial production.  Also, the peasantry‟s relative autonomy  
 from Spanish and urban control and its own minimal racial segmentation impeded,  
 it seems, the establishment of metropolitan racial groups, identities, and, to some  
 extent, hierarchy and furthered the possibilities for a common, protonational  
 sense of local or creole culture in the Dominican countryside.
13
   
 
Both Turits and Baud describe the peasants' way of living as one formed in resistance to urban 
domination.
14
  This pattern encouraged the development of local and regional caudillos who 
could protect the population from urban forces of regulation and military recruitment.    
 The extent of peasant autonomy was also tempered by region, however, depending on the 
character of local rule.  The peasant autonomy described by both Turits and Baud applies most 
accurately to the northern regions of the country, and is not representative everywhere. The 
history of larger landholdings in the south and east led to a larger conservative elite class, while 
                                                 
12
 Harmannus Hoetink, The Dominican People, 1850-1900: Notes for a Historical Sociology, (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University, 1982), 165-171; Baud, Peasants and Tobacco, 5-21, 109; Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 
xxvi.  Juan Bosch also discusses the social consequences of this class/caste system throughout Trujillo: causas de 
una tiranía sin ejemplo.  
13
 Turits, Foundations of Despotism, 49-50.  For a discussions of race in politics in the Dominican Republic, see: 
Ernesto Sagás, Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2000) .  For 
contemporary takes on Dominican race from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see: Silvio Torres-
Saillant, "The Tribulations of Blackness: Stages in Dominican Racial Identity," Latin American Perspectives 25:3 
(May, 1998), 127-129. 
14
 Turits, Foundations of Despotism, 50; Baud, Peasants and Tobacco, 8,41-42. 
41 
 
the historical lack of regulation in the north allowed for a proliferation of subsistence 
landholdings.  Along the Haitian border in the northwest and southwest, too, power dynamics 
were different.  These regions grew in relative isolation from the capital, their economies 
connected more closely to foreign trade with Haiti or through their own ports than to Santo 
Domingo or the Cibao's primary cities of Santiago and Puerto Plata.  They developed distinct 
cultures as well as economies, often centered around fluid border populations that  defied central 
government interests from either country.  With a general lack of infrastructure connecting these 
regions to the major cities, and a sometimes prosperous border trade, these regions began to fall 
under the leadership of caudillos who built growing landholdings and oversaw local government.  
This was especially true in the southwest, which was most far removed from urban centers and 
was increasingly ruled by large landowning caudillo families.
15
  
 In all regions, the differences between urban and rural society were notable, and those 
elite families who owned rural land were close to cities, where they had access to formal 
education.  In the countryside, especially in the north, peasants worked on shared lands called 
terrenos comuneros and shared state lands for their agricultural needs--a tradition that 
encouraged peasant autonomy.  Even as they entered the world market through the growing of 
tobacco, they maintained their subsistence plots and their autonomy in the countryside into the 
twentieth century.
16
  In the south and east, as sugar began to dominate, communal landholdings  
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came into conflict with expanding sugar plantations and Dominican peasants became agricultural 
laborers competing for work; the seasonal nature of sugar production meant high 
unemployment.
17
  Unemployment in the sugar regions always spiked when the sugar harvest was 
over.  Regionalism cut across class lines, however, often being the most divisive factor in 
Dominican life.  For regional leaders, the division often centered around the rivalry between the 
Cibao and the south.  With the growth of sugar in the south and the connections of tobacco to the 
world market in the north, the rivalry between north and south only grew in the late nineteenth 
century.
18
   
 Among the elites, most of whom lived in the cities, the growing connections of 
Dominican production to the world market in the late 1800s presented a new set of complicated 
questions that also tended to be defined by region.  By the 1890s and early 1900s, many 
Dominican groups and individuals were interested in pushing the country forward into what they 
saw as the modern era.  Definitions of modernity, too, were regional.  The decades of capitalist 
expansion in the Americas around the turn of the century increased the fluidity of Latin 
American elite groups in other countries.  In the Dominican Republic, it allowed major changes 
in society and a strong preference among many for a new and more "modern" way of life that, in 
the south, emphasized the growth of sugar to strengthen the export economy and increase 
revenue to the state.
19
  As the Dominican government lacked the revenue to fund or protect large 
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sugar enterprises, this effectively meant that a growing presence of foreigners accompanied the 
growth of sugar.  Sugar thereby fueled change in the south, but also fueled the continued general 
impoverishment of the population.
20
  By the late 1800s, the majority of commerce in the country 
was controlled on some level by foreigners, a condition that furthered debates about the meaning 
of Dominican modernization.
21
  The situation in the late nineteenth century came to resemble 
what Fernando Ortiz described for Cuba, in which sugar represented standardization, vertical 
labor relations, large business, mechanization and the foreign.  Tobacco, mainly cultivated in the  
Cibao, boasted native origins in its culture and production and, at least according to many, 
protected a more Dominican way of life.
22
  By the late 1800s, though, even the tobacco sector of 
the Dominican economy was heavily dependent on European and U.S. markets for both exports 
and imports.
23
  The customs houses at the country's borders and ports early became central points 
of contention, in fact, as most revenues of the state came from import and export duties. 
 In the north, where peasants and elites contended with a growing intermediary merchant 
class to define the character of social relations and change, resentment of foreign control in the 
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export economy was especially strong, and the aversion toward internal regulation was equally 
strong.
24
  The rising merchant class in the region, which first cooperated with government 
attempts to bring technological advancement, found itself losing its position of authority to 
foreign buyers and the southern bureaucracy, and attempted to resist the changes as the 
nineteenth century wore on.
25
  As elsewhere in Latin America, the elite class was fluid as a group 
during this period, and elite definitions of the path to modernization were "widely divergent," 
regional groups struggling to control the state and native landowners competing with foreign 
landowners to control labor while traditional elites resisted change.
26
   State efforts to control 
peasantry often were inconsistent, and "regional elite groups lived close to the peasantry and 
often functioned as buffers against an encroaching state."
27
  In the Dominican Republic, this was 
especially true in the north, where elites were conservative small landholders and merchants 
were often foreign mediators or Dominican gente de segunda.  
 As the struggle to define modernization grew, Dominican society was imbued with 
militarism and violence that hindered the centralization of a state military or government.  The 
constant threat and fear of renewed Haitian intervention required all men of fighting age to take 
up arms in defense against the Haitian military (and, of course, to protect the central and regional 
governments from internal overthrow).
28
  Theoretically, fighting age was generally defined as 
between fifteen and eighteen years of age to forty or fifty years.  Among those many who 
avoided official military service, younger men were often drawn into unofficial or local military 
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duty, working with local patrons to defend crops from revolutionary groups or foreign invaders.  
Despite the lack of efficient centralized recruitment, therefore, most Dominican men had military 
experience at some point in their lives.
29
  Further, those too old to serve in the military were 
obligated, up to the age of 60, to serve in the Civil Guard, as were foreigners who had lived in 
the country for over three months.
30
  The Dominican military of the mid- to late-1800s was still a 
clearly direct descendent of the army of liberation. From 1844, despite wide, popular 
glorification of military service, many in the ranks of the Liberation Army were mutinous and 
desertion rates were high despite penalties as severe as death for shirking the obligation of 
military service.  Systems of patronage and compadrazgo meant protections from military 
conscription for many.  The widest population with no such protection was the poorest classes of 
peasants, who therefore served in large numbers in the lowest ranks of the early military.  Those 
who could not gain the patronage of elites so as to avoid conscription often moved farther away 
from the roads that the military traveled, creating new agricultural plots further up in the 
mountains, so that they would not be impressed into service.
31
  This process was common in the 
north, south, and east, and disrupted trade and the growth of an export economy because peasant  
movement away from roads and urban centers encouraged the centrality of subsistence 
agriculture.  Peasants living closer to population centers were therefore more likely either to be 
conscripted into the military or to develop closer patron-client relationships with local elites.  
Those who developed such relationships, however, were not necessarily free from military 
service, as they were obligated to aid those regional elites and might be called up for local 
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military defense (or revolution) at any time.
32
  As Robert Holden describes, the "enormous 
potential for violence embedded in patron-client politics is so great that it overshadows ideology 
or class interests, or regional, familial, or ethnic identity, as independent sources of public 
violence."
33
 In the Dominican case, the dominant role of patron-client politics exacerbated inter-
regional violence and was one of the main contributors to continued regionalism. 
 Recruitment into military service was conducted through forays organized under local 
governments to help maintain regional order.  Those who did not have patrons were impressed as 
“volunteers.”34  They were “uprooted, armed with antiquated weapons but with no discipline or 
cause to guide their newly acquired power, the recruits often deserted to become gavilleros 
(bandits), guns for hire, leaders or followers of rebels who promised material gain”—and those 
who did not desert were forced into battle and lacked medical examinations or adequate clothing 
and supplies.
35
  The subject of whether such recruits had a "cause" to guide them is worth 
drawing out.  Goldwert's impression that the Dominican "peasants" were uninterested in a larger 
national cause, an impression that comes from the reports of U.S. occupying forces in 1916-
1924, contains some accuracy.  While some historical moments such as independence drew wide 
voluntary recruitment, warfare or armed struggles between regions were so common in the late 
nineteenth century that peasants tended to keep themselves removed from the political arena and 
work to maintain relative autonomy.  While many volunteered to fight for an end to Haitian rule, 
one of the strongest motivations to do so was that the Haitian state attempted to interfere with 
land tenure and to regulate the peasants.  Once the independence war was won, peasants tended 
to be interested in returning to their agricultural plots.  The extensive warfare and civil strife of 
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the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were incredibly destructive to peasant agriculture 
due to the high number of deaths among grown men.
36
 
 Despite the hardships for peasant families, the original call for military service after the 
1844 independence drafted over eight thousand men in the defense against potential Haitian 
invasion, so that the number of men with military service and military titles was extremely high 
throughout the country.  Serving in the military was seen as a great source of pride, and central 
governments gave military ranks and titles as awards for service in lieu of wealth they did not 
have to offer.
37
   Military service was made obligatory in July of 1845, but many military leaders 
were able to build strong units through systems similar to those of patronage common in the 
countryside, and fielded large numbers of loyal forces.
38
  The number of men serving in the 
military began to decline in the 1850s, only to increase again when Dominican president Pedro 
Santana tried to deal with his government's severe shortage of funds by annexing the country to 
Spain's renewed colonial leadership in 1861.  A combination of wide popular disapproval of 
annexation and Spain's refusal to appoint prominent Dominican officers in the Spanish Army led 
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to an extensive war for the restoration of sovereignty that lasted until 1865 and brought a new 
generation into extensive war experience.
39
   
 Peguero provides a useful vignette of the officer corps of the late-nineteenth-century 
military.  Social class distinctions were evident.  The officer corps and government consisted 
almost exclusively of members of the upper class, while general troop enlistments were made 
almost exclusively from among the illiterate peasants, who often fought without uniforms, and 
even barefoot and with inadequate arms.  Most president-generals in the nineteenth century came 
from large landowning families and were well-educated and often well-traveled men.  Social 
mobility through the military, however, was not unheard of.  From 1879 on, several important 
presidents rose from much lower ranks in society and became important political leaders.  
Presidents Guillermo (March-July, 1878), Luperón (1879-1880), and Heureaux (who ruled from 
1882 to 1899) all reached power through social mobility within the ranks, and all acquired 
considerable wealth.
40
  It bears mentioning that, as later dictator Rafael Trujillo would learn in 
the late 1920s, social mobility through the military was limited.  While it was possible to become 
more important in society and politics through the military, and even to rise to such distinction as 
to be able to take the presidential office, this mobility was partial; it did not mean entry into the 
category of gente de primera.  Even the few who rose to higher political office and gained great 
prestige in the military were excluded from the clubs and general social life of the elites.
41
   
 Such mobility was made possible, as Peguero notes, by the ubiquity of the military in 
Dominican society.  Many aspects of Dominican culture contained military elements or foci from 
the country's founding.  In addition to obligatory military service and large numbers of  recruits, 
                                                 
39
 The contemporary and modern literature about the Restoration War is extensive.  For a short overview, see Moya-
Pons, The Dominican Republic, 204-218.  Moya Pons provides a thorough bibliographical list on pages 473-476. 
40
 Peguero, The Militarization of Culture, 25-26. 
41
 This phenomenon is discussed further in Chapter Six. 
49 
 
regional leaders were usually military commanders.  The country was divided into twelve 
provinces under the control of provincial governors who answered to the president in the south 
or the vice president in the north.  Because the office of governor was a military as well as 
government post, both civilian and military local authorities reported to the governors.  One of 
the effects of this system, especially in conjunction with the country's regionalism, was to make 
the political system of the country more of a loose confederation of provinces in some ways than 
a united nation.  Travel from the Cibao to the capital by horse back as late as the early twentieth 
century took three days during the rainy season, making communication between the two 
difficult and maintaining the segregation of regions; as one U.S. diplomat observed, "national 
feeling . . . was subordinated to local prejudice."
42
  The lack of sufficient transportation 
contributed to economic as well as cultural isolation, so that regions were sometimes more 
closely tied to foreign countries through trade than they were to other Dominican regions.
43
  
Because of the lack of roads between the provinces' capital cities through most of the nineteenth 
century, provincial isolation and the lack of a strong central state institution lent the office of 
provincial governor great local power.
44
  Further aspects of societal organization encouraged this 
emphasis on military strength, as Peguero describes in her work.  In 1854, for example, all 
members of the adult male population were ordered to report to local military stations for weekly 
training so as to be prepared to replace those who finished their military terms of service.  
Throughout the provinces, military force was widely accepted as a part of government.
45
  Despite 
Peguero's characterization of this force, however, the reality was much less clear or centralized 
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than it was in theory.  In many regions, especially those most removed from urban centers, 
military service was seen as a part of local government, and even as a way to ensure local 
autonomy.  The result was a less, rather than more, centralized military, as local caudillo patrons 
often called upon their clients to resist impositions from the central government's military 
forces.
46
   
 In addition to regional militaries with forced recruitment and obligatory service, the 
Dominican independence movement formed a naval force to turn the campaign against Haiti 
from a defensive to an offensive war and to increase the efficiency of the military in national 
defense.  The navy had ten ships by 1845, though it lacked qualified sailors.
47
  Within a short 
time, however, as peace with Haiti became more assured, the central government used the small 
navy more to transport troops against uprisings in its own territory than for any other purpose.  
This was its primary use from the 1870s to 1915, when the navy provided a vital link between 
the north and south, transporting troops and transmitting information faster than any could by 
foot when trails through or around the Cordillera Central were impassable.
48
  The navy's 
movement of troops was one function of attempts to centralize the military and cope with 
regionalism.  When northerners rose against presidents in the south, and staged revolutions from 
the north, the president's ability to get his own troops to the north quickly was vital in his 
maintenance of power.  The entire system, however, was fragile.  Any mixed loyalties could lead 
troops to join in the revolution, and the need to keep troops in the capital for defense meant that 
                                                 
46
 Documentation of these patterns for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is widespread.  See 
individual military orders throughout: "Correspondencia," 1891-1914, Guerra y Marina, Dep. 08, I.T. 004610, AGN.  
See also the descriptions of local military politics in: Troncoso Sánchez, Ramón Cáceres, Introduction and chapter 
One; Rufino Martínez, Hombres Dominicanos: Deschamps, Heureaux y Luperón, (Santo Domingo: Sociedad de 
Bibliofilos, 1985). 
47
 Peguero, The Militarization of Culture, 19-20. 
48
 Orders and Communications, "Correspondencia," 1891-1914, Guerra y Marina, Dep. 08, I.T. 004610, AGN. 
51 
 
most presidents could not overcome military revolutions from the north during the nineteenth 
century. 
 The inherent structural weaknesses of the regional system and regionalized military led 
many over the course of the late nineteenth century to attempt reform that would attract better 
officers and help centralize the military.  In 1860, for example, President Pedro Santana founded 
a national military academy; the annexation to Spain, however, and the Spanish disinterest in 
Dominican officers, ended the academy's short run.
49
  By the 1870s, the power of regional 
militaries and the fragility of the central Dominican state society was clear. From 1876 to 1878, 
the Dominican Republic had eleven different governments in the space of two years—during 
which Conservative president Buenaventura Báez ruled for the fifth time from 27 December, 
1876 to 2 March, 1878.
50
  Báez, in this last of his five terms in the presidential office, established 
a dictatorship and worked to reform the military so that it was more directly answerable to him.  
He worked to establish a permanent national force that would be maintained separately from the 
provincial forces, staffed at 1,200 men under four-year terms of enlistment, and carefully 
appointed high-ranking and loyal military men to civil positions throughout the country in an 
attempt to control regional and provincial forces.  This approach marked an official recognition, 
however, of the distinction between national and provincial armed forces, reinforcing the 
regional approach to government.
51
  Báez's manipulation of the military and of provincial 
loyalties could not maintain him in power, as he had lost too much popular support first by 
accepting the Spanish annexation, and then by continuously courting U.S. annexation of the 
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country.
52
  Opposition groups united loosely to overthrow Baecismo and restore the country to a 
more liberal constitution.
53
 
 General Gregorio Luperón of Restoration War fame took power in 1879 through a 
provisional government.  The various branches of the military, at the time that Luperón came to 
the presidency, were most often used to fight opposition to the regime in power and maintain 
order through caudillo-based rule of isolated regions.
54
  Pinpointing the previous conservative 
constitution and the lack of military organization as the main sources of tyranny and civil 
disorder in the previous decades, Luperón envisioned modernization as centralization and liberal 
politics, and worked to usher in a more liberal era by creating a new constitution and reforming 
the military.  His provisional government and the subsequent liberal presidency of Father 
Fernando Arturo de Meriño at first seemed set to bring powerful change to the country.  As 
provisional president, Luperón oversaw the creation of the new constitution in 1880, initiating 
major liberal reforms that centralized government agencies and, especially, education.  His 
government began new construction throughout the provinces, improved existing military 
buildings, and paid public employees and soldiers for salaries long in arrears.
55
  Luperón strongly 
emphasized military reform, hoping to build a small and well-trained centralized national 
military; building on previous military traditions, he attempted to mandate three-year military 
service, obligatory for all men between the ages of eighteen and fifty.  He also ordered the 
establishment of permanent schools and academies in military garrisons, making education 
mandatory for all enlistees and officers in an effort to make all military men literate.
56
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 In short, Luperón  authored the beginnings of Dominican military professionalization of a 
sort that was occurring throughout Latin America in that period.  He himself explained his desire 
to create and re-organize a permanent armed force based on the need for social order and security 
for governments and economic and public interests, arguing that the country's current state could 
not guarantee individual liberties or the evolution of government.  Stronger centralized armed 
forces under the flag and regulating the functions of state, Luperón held, would work together 
with the citizenry and government for the common good rather than continuing to be a threat.
57
  
The new constitutional government took office in September of 1880 under Father Fernando 
Arturo de Meriño.
58
  The Dominican Church traditionally was associated with the Dominican 
military,
59
 and Restoration War heroes worked closely with Meriño in attempting to reform the 
country.  Meriño continued the reforms begun by Luperón and attempted to stave off rebellion 
by the opposition by decreeing the penalty of death for anyone who took up arms against the 
government.
60
  Over the course of 1880-1881 Luperón continued to work on the 
professionalization of the armed forces, bringing in improved arms, and, on 15 Feb. 1881, 
creating a new set of rules for the Policía Municipal de la Capital, fitting them neatly into the 
newly centralized military chain of command--an illusion of municipal power that sought to give 
way to greater military centralization.  The 1881 laws reorganizing the military also regulated the 
conduct of the military in an attempt to improve civil-military relations, disallowing them to 
frequent taverns while in uniform, for example.
61
  In June of 1881, Congress established a 
Cuerpo de Policía y Seguridad Pública under the national military chain of command, originally 
set at 113 men.  In the powerful position of Minister of War under Meriño's government, named 
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with reassurances of confidence by the widely trusted Luperón under whom he had fought in the 
Restoration War, was Ulíses Heureaux.
62
   
 The reforms were not, of course, without opposition by conservative generals and 
regional caudillos whose power was threatened, and the military strength of opposition caudillos 
and generals severely threatened the liberal and military reforms that Luperón was  
installing.  Undeterred by the penalty of death, many took up arms against the central 
government in late 1881 and early 1882.  The situation during Meriño's presidency was so 
precarious that the government could not keep up.  Military units were in a general state of 
abandonment, and men deserted widely.
63
  From the field of battle in 1882, Heureaux wrote 
desperate communications asking for reinforcements; upon one garrison dispatch of rebel troops 
from Santiago he complained that all of his men had deserted, leaving him with only twenty-two 
soldiers and four rifles.
64
  Heureaux responded to the difficult situation by having all captured 
rebels shot.  Meriño, too, came to fear that the new constitution was too liberal, and through 
1882 he and Heureaux worked together to centralize government control by authoritarian means.  
Despite frequent difficulties with a lack of supplies and inability to move troops quickly, the 
repressive violence of the temporary authoritarian government combined with reforms of armed 
forces from Santo Domingo to halt the uprisings from the Cibao.
65
   
 As civil fighting and Meriño's term in office came to an end, Heureaux was elected into 
the office of the presidency.  He took office in September of 1882 with the strong backing of 
General Luperón.  Luperón trusted his former subordinate and recommended him largely based 
on his military service, but Heureaux was maneuvering for power.  Heureaux, popularly known 
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as "Lilís," courted powerful men from the ruling party and the opposition party alike and 
elevated himself to an ever more powerful position in politics and the military, becoming a 
growing adversary of Liberal reform.  When his two-year presidential term ended, he created a 
puppet government under Francisco Gregorio Billini through fraudulent elections in 1884.
66
  
When his chosen puppet president proved unsatisfactory after a short time in office, Lilís 
pressured him to resign.  He was succeeded by his vice president, Alejandro Woss y Gil in May 
of 1885.
67
  From that time until his assassination in 1899, Heureaux widely controlled 
Dominican politics.  As in his capacity of Minister of War during 1882, he maintained power by 
means of many forms of manipulation and strong-man rule despite the country‟s regional 
fragmentation.  Having no effective centralized government, Heureaux bribed local leaders.  If 
that failed, he put down local or regional dissent through means of military force.   
 
 
Dictatorship, Centralization, and Foreign Encroachment Under Heureaux, 1886-1899 
 
 Heureaux's rule, which lasted nearly two decades, provides a clear demonstration of the 
ways in which attempts to modernize and centralize the economy and state clashed with regional 
and caudillo rule.  Heureaux continued Luperón's attempted improvement of the military while 
also encouraging the continuation of caudillo rule through the provinces, reforming the national 
military while falling back to the old traditions of paying off regional bosses to keep the peace.  
Heureaux was aware of the power of both caudillismo and the military, and had full confidence 
in military rule.  While he founded the Segunda Academia Militar in May of 1885, it was an 
officers' school through which a five-year education could bring its members to the rank of 
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second lieutenant.
68
  While Heureaux himself was one of a few rare examples of men who rose 
up through the ranks despite having a lower social-class background, he did not attempt any 
change to the system in which the elites officered the military.  His government did not take up 
Luperón's programs to teach literacy to enlistees; some have suggested that as the dictator 
consolidated his control over the country he purposely used the recruitment of illiterate and 
landless peasants to more easily guarantee the loyalty of his forces.
69
  Merchants and elites, of 
course, were also better able to resist conscription or to gather forces to oppose the government. 
 Active and indirect support for Heureaux's government came in large part from a 
flourishing of civil society during the 1880s, brought about with the liberal reforms begun under 
Luperón and augmented by the lack of civil strife under the heavy-handed rule of the decade.  
Heureaux at first allowed these developments as part of his program to unite the widely 
dispersed loyalties throughout the provinces.  This was the period of Puerto Rican educator and 
author Eugenio de Hostos's broad educational campaigns through the country, and the spread of 
Dominican literature and poetry, of the opening of newspapers across the country.  Many of the 
period's publications were written by officers and heroes of the Restoration War.
70
  Dominican 
poetry and theatre also thrived through the 1880s.  Despite the mounting authoritarian rule under 
Heureaux, the years 1879-1886 allowed an extent of liberal rule that encouraged growth, and 
Heureaux's interest in increasing military efficiency and revenue from exports aided in the 
building of roads and the country's first small railroads.  His government's interest in improving 
the economy led government offices to focus on an increased centralization of the state, the 
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founding of the first National Bank, and the beginnings of telegraph lines connecting the 
Dominican Republic to other countries.
71
  
 From 1887, Heureaux's dictatorship was increasingly defined by manipulation and 
coercion, and he adopted a new constitution at the time of the 1888 presidential election that 
would extend the president's term of office from two to four years.
72
  He now ruled, however, 
with a military that had some of the characteristics of a professionalized army.  After his 
extensive work toward military improvement in the previous years, he could now boast a semi-
regular force, or set of forces, with adequate numbers, modern equipment, and some instruction 
and--an important change from earlier militaries--one that was regularly paid.  Even then, 
however, its units answered to regional commanders despite the facade of centralization.  
Heureaux and his Minister of War, General Miguel Andres Pichardo, brought European 
instructors and technicians to the military academy.
73
  In July of 1887, Heureaux extended his 
military rule to the careful protection of agriculture and the national economy through the 
creation of a specialized corps called the Policia Gubernativa or Guardia Civil.
74
  A U.S. traveler 
in 1891 described these Dominican police as "very neat looking" and overseeing a population so 
"peaceful and good natured" that the police had little work in keeping order.
 75
  Heureaux played 
on the population's fear of Haitian invasion to maintain such order and to justify ever-increasing 
expenditures and focus on the military, a tactic that helped him to maintain power in later 
years.
76
  For the elections of 1888, Heureaux used his improved military forces to carry out a 
campaign of repression and persecution.  Most voters abstained from voting, and the election 
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campaign had allowed him to identify his opponents, who his military harshly persecuted after 
the election.
77
  To those members of opposition groups who would cooperate went high 
government posts and financial favors such as tax exemptions.
78
  
 By the time that Heureaux began to consolidate power in the mid-1880s, the Dominican 
Republic had clearly arrived at a moment of change, but definitions of modernization varied 
widely.  Heureaux's interest in increased revenue and the growth of an export economy 
conflicted with many interests throughout the country.  Among Dominicans, distrust of too much 
foreign economic power was widespread, while German buyers and U.S. or Caribbean investors 
demanded more control of their investments in the country.  While the country's growing class of 
entrepreneurs and merchants welcomed some form of modernization, and cooperated with the 
first attempts to bring technology and investment, they were disillusioned to find that these 
encroachments came with planned state regulation of their enterprises.
79
  Efforts at 
modernization also stressed the building of infrastructure that the increasingly corrupt 
government could not afford to build, and the creation of a strong export economy that met a 
great deal of resistance from the traditionally autonomous regions and peasantry.  Either of these 
changes would have required political centralization of a sort that conflicted with continued 
strong military regionalism.  Heureaux's response, ultimately, was to prop up the sugar economy, 
thus facilitating foreign investment and loans, while military strongmen maintained order 
through the provinces as in the past.  The result of Heureaux's growing support for sugar was not 
a broad centralization of the country, either economically or otherwise.  His continued 
manipulation and support of caudillo politics, and his continued inability to mediate between 
southern interests and those of the various regions, actually fueled regionalism.  
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 Heureaux also worked from as early as 1883 to play foreign powers against each other in 
an attempt to the benefit of the Dominican economy and to his own political advantage, 
especially against his mentor Luperón, whom he saw as a potentially dangerous political rival.  
To U.S. diplomats, he claimed that he supported the leasing of the widely desired Samaná Bay to 
a U.S. company while Luperón supported leasing it to a French Company.  Through his first 
years in office, Heureaux set the strong precedent of favoring the United States to improve his 
revenue, and negotiated a reciprocity trade agreement with the United States.
80
  To gain favor 
with foreign governments and investors, he attempted to use the same system he used at home: 
he offered incentives and financial favors to those businesses and industries that seemed most 
potentially beneficial.  For example, as the sugar industry seemed the most lucrative, he 
exempted sugar machinery from import duties.
81
  He also offered concessions to U.S. citizens for 
the building of railroads, the establishment of a national bank, and construction of public 
utilities, bringing an increase over time in U.S. investors.  The actions and attitudes of these 
investors, however, did little to increase Dominican support for U.S. investment through most of 
the country.  Most serious investors took their money to other countries and territories, such as 
Cuba, that they considered more stable.  Among those who did come to the Dominican Republic, 
American Consul Astwood called them “adventurers who are dissipated, dishonest, and immoral, 
who come to have a good time generally, spending freely in the gambling dens and drinking 
saloons the hard earned cash of some capitalist, and who return to the United States bankrupt 
with some exaggerated statement detrimental to the interest of both countries to cover up their 
own debauchery.”82  In an attempt to gain control over the Cibao, whose staple product was 
tobacco, Heureaux also encouraged a reorientation of the tobacco trade from German to U.S. 
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buyers.
83
  The population there, heavily dependent on German buyers, resisted changes, resisted 
control, and objected to rumors about the leasing of Samaná Bay to a foreign navy.
84
  Many had 
objected, in fact, even to the proliferation of German buyers in the region, and they saw U.S. 
buyers as more potentially threatening to regional sovereignty.
85
  Only through careful, regional 
military control did Heureaux allay fears well enough to maintain a tenuous balance through the 
same system used in the past, with strong vice presidents ruling the Cibao. 
 Heureaux's long dominance through regional military forces was an expensive system, 
however, that could only be maintained by such overtures to foreign investors and even 
extensive borrowing from Dominican private banks.  Many U.S. observers felt that the 
conspicuous spending of Heureaux's regime indicated a move toward "modernity," a 
"progressive spirit of material go ahead."  Encouragement of foreign investment during the last 
decades of the nineteenth century did, in fact, contribute to the extensive building of 
infrastructure, from the beginnings of a telegraphic cable laid out by a French company to the 
inception of internal railroads to bring goods to the coast.
86
  The price of this development, 
however, was more than the struggling central government could pay, and was financed by 
repeated loans and by allowing foreign merchants to conduct illegal activity in the Republic.
87
  
The price for the Dominican people was not only the deep financial debt into which these loans 
and activities plunged the central government, but also the tightening of military control to 
enforce the government's power.  In short, Heureaux's method of rule depended on growing 
military expenditures and the wide use of expensive bribes to maintain order.
88
  The dictator's 
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personal lifestyle was likewise expensive, and also drew from the public treasury and 
international loans.   
 As the first decade of his rule wore on, Heureaux found it more and more difficult to 
balance his interests and spending against Dominican popular opinion.  His solution to the 
problem of growing unrest was to work harder--also through loans--to augment the central 
government's military might.  The Westendorp Loan of 1888, for example, was negotiated by 
one of Heureaux's most trusted generals, Generoso de Marchena, to buy new arms and uniforms 
for the army and to build new warships to more quickly transport national army troops around 
the country to put down uprisings.  At the same time, it increased dissatisfaction by allowing 
foreign intervention into the collection of Dominican customs revenues as a guarantee against 
the loan.
89
  It also set a precedent for a series of similar loans, in 1890 and 1892, that Heureaux 
allowed to be bought by a U.S. company when the original loaning company began to fall into 
bankruptcy.  This was the founding, in 1893, of the highly controversial U.S. San Domingo  
Improvement Company (SDIC), whose investors included a number of high U.S. government 
officials who extended continued loans to Heureaux's government in the 1890s.
90
  Alongside 
continuous internal borrowing, Heureaux's dependence on loans to prop up his military might 
throughout the regions of the country led to a floating debt that threatened the stability of the 
country's economy and government.  Falling into the same trap of many heads of state before 
him, Heureaux re-initiated the divisive idea of negotiations for the temporary leasing of Samaná 
Bay to the U.S. in exchange for a large loan.
91
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 Heureaux's early successes in government were largely attributable to his calls for an end 
to civil strife through a combined rule of the parties that had struggled for supremacy in previous 
decades.  In reality, his system shut out the major opposing party by placement of supportive 
generals in major positions of power, but in the beginning he was able to build a reputation as 
both a respected general and a key player in the end to civil strife.
92
  By the 1890s, reactions 
against his repeated persecutions and repressions of opposition, and his manipulation of the 
political system to retain power, combined with concern about his overtures toward U.S. 
investors to bring about a growth of movements against his regime.  Heureaux responded, in 
1891, by using money from loans to again attempt to overhaul the military and improve 
recruitment.  Realizing the centrality of his provincial governors in recruitment, and perhaps by 
now more assured of their loyalty, he increased the military power and prestige of provincial 
governors, who were responsible for recruitment of local commandants and the creation of local 
military stations that included doctors.  Demonstrating the need for regional compromise and 
strong official support for the class nature of conscription, the law made enlistment exceptions 
for those with large amounts of land under cultivation or those who practiced scientific 
professions.
93
 
 
 
Crises of Finance and Modernization, 1899-1905 
 
 While the military might of Heureaux's government grew, the government declined 
economically into a continuously deeper state of crisis through the 1890s.  His attempts to 
modernize and centralize the country were frustrated by his emphasis on the provincial and 
regional based military growth needed to maintain control.  Modernization was also frustrated, of 
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course, by a lack of agreement about how change would look and how it would be funded, a 
struggle between ideas that were often regionally defined.  As Baud describes, "the insolvent 
government needed to stimulate productivity to acquire the financial means to promote" growth 
of investment and therefore increased revenue from more exports.  Politicians reduced taxes to 
increase foreign investment for development, but this cut the revenue gained from private 
enterprise, leading to fluctuating commitment to state intervention in the economy.
94
  The search 
for funding and the need to attract foreign investment, of course, also met with resistances to the 
growth of foreign economic power on Dominican soil.  While in the north many resisted too 
much power by any particular group of foreign buyers by working to diversify their markets and 
resisting centrally imposed laws, the growth of sugar continued uncontrolled in the south during 
the last decades of the nineteenth century.  State laws such as tax exemptions, created to benefit 
sugar in the south existed throughout the provinces, where they made less sense and often 
harmed local economies.
95
  By the late 1890s, toward the end of Heureaux's rule, many of these 
laws were defined by U.S. investors, whose vision of modernization differed widely from that of 
most Dominicans.  Attempts to unite or combine the definitions of Dominicans and U.S. 
investors were practically nonexistent, but Heureaux's government was a slave to its expanding 
debt.  Many Dominicans argued for an alternative form of modernization that allowed regions to 
autonomously enter the world market economy while retaining the ability to create local laws to 
protect their provinces from subservience to it.  Heureaux, however, continued to allow the SDIC 
to continuously issue new bonds without recalling or redeeming old ones.
96
 
 The deepening extent of U.S. investment, featuring some prominent members of U.S. 
government, bound Heureaux's government to close negotiation with U.S. officials.  The U.S. 
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government pushed for a reciprocity trade agreement, for example, that was only halted by 
European investors' reactions against it.
97
  The 1895 English seizure and naval occupation of 
Nicaragua's Pacific seaport at Corinto also increased U.S. public concern about European 
interference in the region.
98
  By 1898, foreign and domestic creditors were demanding repayment 
on loans for which the government did not have funds, and many government employees were 
also demanding payment for salaries months in arrears.
99
  In desperation for funds, Heureaux 
again approached the United States about Samaná, and by mid-1899 even proposed a 
protectorate to the American minister.
100
  When Cibaeño revolutionaries Ramón Cáceres and 
Jacobito de Lara assassinated Ulíses Heureaux in Moca on 26 July of 1899, the country's 
economic entanglement was so deep that a firm solution was not to be found; the situation 
formed under Heureaux led to a series of negotiations and efforts that tied the United States and 
the Dominican Republic ever closer to each other economically, and would come to form the 
justification for repeated U.S. military interventions. 
 Upon Heureaux's death, his elderly vice president General Wenceslao Figuereo took over 
the government and immediately attempted reprisals against those responsible for the 
assassination while negotiations with the U.S. government begun the year before continued.
101
  
Both because of popular dissatisfaction with Heureaux's government and because of the 
traditional system of regional support and alliances, but also fearing the military, Dominicans 
were unwilling either to directly support or to turn in the conspirators.  The result, in the midst of 
continuing economic crisis, was a brief period of struggle in government between military 
caudillos and short-lived governments during which the centralizing military built under Luperón 
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and Heureaux rapidly declined.
102
  Central government leaders of the period depended, as had 
Heureaux, on the bribery or blackmail of adversaries who often held more prestige and 
commanded more military might than those in power in the capital.  As historian Miguel Angel 
Cordero points out, both before and after Heureaux's administration, provincial governors and 
politicians could only maintain power by naming military men to protect them, which led to 
frequent local overthrows in the provinces and an increased fragmentation in society, a process 
that was accelerated after the dictator's death.
103
   
 After the initial months of confusion following the assassination, those most closely 
responsible for Heureaux's death initiated a rebellion under popular general Horacio Vásquez.  
The rebellion gained quick popular support throughout the Cibao, forcing the resignation of 
General Figuereo within months and installing a provisional government under Vásquez.  Under 
broad support, the country elected popular merchant Juan Isidro Jiménes as president with 
Vásquez as vice president, and the new government took office on 15 November of 1899.  In line 
with tradition, the president was stationed in Santo Domingo, where he governed the south of the 
country, and the vice president held headquarters in Santiago and governed the north.  In effect, 
as Tulio Arvelo describes it, this solution effectively created two different governments with two 
differing agendas.
104
  From the beginning, this and subsequent governments struggled with the 
debts brought about in the past decades and with the continuing presence of generals who had 
supported Heureaux and sought to find their way back into government office.
105
  Jiménes and 
Vásquez worked to bring order and control to the military, but their attempts were largely 
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unsuccessful.
106
  Uprisings, general lack of unity and the country's financial situation 
complicated attempts at military reform.   
 Only with Heureaux's death was the full extent of financial crisis realized, and when 
European powers threatened to take control of Dominican customs houses to force payment of 
debts, the Jiménes government found itself attempting negotiations with the SDIC.
107
  The 
Dominican Republic over which Jiménes and Vásquez came to preside in 1899 was much 
changed from the one that existed before Heureaux, both because of changes in the world and 
because of changes initiated by the dictator at home.  U.S. expansionism and an increasingly 
global market for goods, as well as industrialization that meant new ways of producing and 
manufacturing, had changed the face of the Caribbean on many levels.  But Heureaux had played 
a direct role in on-the-ground change too.  U.S. interests had been allowed increasing dominance, 
and support for the sugar industry had transformed the south and east from a primarily wood-
exporting and cattle-raising economy to one dominated by sugar production for export to the 
United States.  The Cibao had expanded its production of cacao and coffee, and the cities of San 
Pedro de Macorís and Sánchez had rapidly transformed from small fishing villages to important 
export centers and commercial cities.
108
  The treasury was in complete financial ruin, and foreign 
creditors were still clamoring for payment of debts.   
While the Jiménes government struggled to solve the financial problems, negotiating with 
the SDIC and the U.S. government, it also sought to maintain order through the time-honored 
tradition of building up the military.  Growing regional opposition to the government, especially 
the leadership of Jiménes in the south, led to press censorship and repression by military 
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forces.
109
  The government still lacked funding for infrastructure.  As under Heureaux, the 
majority of the national budget was the national military budget was slated to pay military 
personnel.  The military budget in 1902 accounted for 71.7 % of the government‟s expenditures, 
and in 1904 it accounted for 72.6%.
110
  The increasingly unstable Jiménes-Vásquez government 
was fighting outbreaks of open hostilities, especially from the outlying provinces, throughout the 
country in 1902, in which provincial governors gathered forces and took up arms against the 
government.  These uprisings were exacerbated by the continuation of tensions between north 
and south, and the inability of Jiménes and Vásquez to agree on the proper form of government 
for the republic.  The tension finally brought the uneasy regional alliance to a breaking point 
when, in March and April of 1902, an uprising in the southwestern provinces of Azua and 
Barahona caused Jiménes to send an armed force of around 2,400 men to the area to end the 
rebellion.
111
  Vásquez asked for permission to send out an armed force to put down rebellions 
along the border, but Jiménes did not trust him, and denied the permission.  In April of 1902, 
feeling threatened, Vásquez armed troops and rose against the Jiménes government, marching on 
the capital in early May and forcing the president into exile.
112
  The result was a further division 
of the country's many military officers; camps supporting either Jiménes or Vásquez were added 
to the discontents who still sought a return to those who had served in Heureaux's government.  
The resulting civil war consisted of factions that, again, were largely regionally based, with 
Jiménes finding greatest support in port cities and the capital city of Santo Domingo and 
Vásquez holding the greatest support base mainly in the interior and southwestern provinces.   
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Regional loyalties were based on much more complicated realities than simply those that 
emphasized individual leaders.  Again, many aspects of the civil war reiterate the questions and 
concerns over rapid modernization that had plagued modernizers and those seeking change for 
years.  Vásquez, aware of the concerns among many Dominicans about rapid change, called on 
nostalgia in his proclamation of rebellion against the Jiménes government, emphasizing the "July 
Revolution" of 1899 against Heureaux in which he claimed that Dominicans had joined across 
region and class to form a common government.  Drawing on common concerns that fretted 
about lack of unity in the face of foreign encroachment, he argued that Dominicans had in 1899 
proven their ability to bring about a revolutionary unity.  Vásquez declared that    
In that solemn moment, perhaps the most striking in the history of our Nation, 
all Dominicans, thirsting for liberty, cherished the greatest hope and believed  
that the moment had arrived when they might see the realization of their  
aspiration for national prosperity, confident that with the arrival of a new era,  
the august majesty of law, the sacred principles of right, the efficacy of justice,  
and honesty in administration, would become an impulse toward salvation. . . .  
In that moment of supreme elation, the Dominican people, who for so long  
had suffered every class of outrage, put aside old passions, political antipathies,  
personal prejudice and sordid rancor, to commence with joy and to undertake  
with an enthusiasm which can never be forgotten the task of redemption  
proclaimed throughout all portions of the Republic.
113
 
 
After months of fighting, Jiménes's forces lost, and Vásquez presided over a new provisional 
government.  His government was quickly recognized by the United States, whose officials were 
eager to work with a stable government in bringing about negotiations to end the confusion 
surrounding the SDIC and foreign investments in the country.
114
  Despite his strong unitary 
rhetoric, like Heureaux, Vásquez immediately fell to persecution of those who had resisted his 
government's rise to power.
115
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 Despite rapid U.S. recognition, therefore, the Vásquez government was quickly faced by 
new regional rebellions by generals supporting Jiménes, especially in the Northwest.  When his 
armed forces attacked the forces of rebellion there and arrested dissident General Andres 
Navarro, they still struggled with an eight-month guerrilla war led partially by General Desiderio 
Arias, which was complicated by an outbreak of malaria, and a new set of uprisings in the central 
provinces of Moca and La Vega.
116
  A growing number of uprisings and a continued inability to 
solve the country's financial problems threatened the Vásquez government from all sides until it 
was overthrown by Heureaux's supporters in March of 1903, in part because overcrowding in 
Santo Domingo prisons and Vásquez's pre-occupation with traveling throughout the country to 
stop revolutions in other provinces allowed Heureaux's followers easy access to many potential 
supporters.  Some of the rebellion's leaders, in fact, proclaimed their revolution from inside the 
prison building in the Fortaleza Ozama in Santo Domingo.
117
  In the end, to bring about stability, 
the United States aided the insurrection, helping to place Heureaux supporter General Woss y Gil 
in power.
118
 
 Woss y Gil‟s government faced the same problems as previous governments, however.  
Foreign governments clamored for payments on long-standing Dominican debts, the treasury 
lacked money, and the new president had no way to pay his troops, or even to buy them rations.  
In late 1903, he was quickly overthrown by Jimenista General Carlos Morales Languasco.  
Morales's control too, however, was precarious, his government also beset by repeated regional 
uprisings that frustrated any attempts to improve the financial situation or even maintain order.  
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Only through increased U.S. intervention did Morales maintain power for a short while.
119
  The 
budget continued to collapse, however, and the military deteriorated dramatically through 1904 
despite U.S. support.  Diverse communications detail the extreme vulnerability of remote areas 
to revolutionary activity, and the inability to right the problem due to lack of funds for men or for 
general military resources.  Local political leaders loyal to the government through all of the 
country's provinces implored it for aid for general defense.
120
  Patients of the military hospital in 
Santo Domingo petitioned repeatedly for attention or treatment, which were lacking, and the 
medical director wrote a series of unanswered letters to the Minister of War and Navy that his 
employees lacked salaries, food, and the medical instruments necessary to care for patients. 
Urgent surgeries were on hold because of the lack of medicine.  The hospital was charged with 
holding prisoners, and had sixty-one, but did not have the funds to hold them.
121
  Many among 
the merchant and upper classes and some in the military seem to have been willing by mid-1904 
to at least give this government an opportunity to improve the country's conditions.  Petitions and 
letters to the government increased through 1904 as Dominicans in various sectors and regions 
requested funding and specific improvements from the government, apparently based on the 
assumption that the financial agent's control would increase government funding.
122
  Much of the 
correspondence of the second half of 1904, when finances were becoming more regular, 
demonstrate that despite the apparent hope for improvements, the incredibly small amount of 
revenue that reached the Dominican government was simply not enough to support even the 
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capital city's military.  The head of the military hospital in Santo Domingo, for example, wrote 
about the need to remove prisoners from the hospital and increase its budget so that it could treat 
patients.  His repeated efforts to improve the resources for care of military patients were echoed 
by a petition signed by the hospital's patients informing the government that they lacked 
attention or treatment.
123
  Despite his entreaties and those of his patients, his letters become more 
and more desperate throughout the year; by late September, urgently needed surgeries were 
unperformed due to lack of surgical supplies.
124
  The pattern of budget crises, military 
deterioration, U.S. intervention, and short-lived governments was the rule of Dominican politics 
until Vice-President Ramón Cáceres ascended to the presidency when unpopular President 
Morales fled into exile in December of 1905. 
 
Conclusion: Ramón Cáceres, the Military, and Centralization as Modernity 
 Within the period of nearly incessant civil war and revolutions that characterized 
Dominican politics from 1899 to 1916, the years 1906-1911 stood out as an exception, a brief 
return to civil order and military and state development and coherence.  The exception, however, 
was not especially different from the historical precedents.  The presidency of Ramón Cáceres 
during these years brought stability and development through the traditional means of careful 
balance of regional interests and strong military control in the provinces.  The major difference, 
under Cáceres, was that like Heureaux, he distinctly and unapologetically took the side of 
centralization of the state and armed forces in the modernization debate.  While his presidency 
retained many state military methods of control from the past, such as the maintenance of power 
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in the provinces through strong local military governors, and the allowance for private guards on 
plantation lands, he worked to centralize the national military in ways that no previous statesmen 
had done with the possible exception of General Luperón.  This centralized effort and 
development, alongside a charismatic character and reputation as a militarily distinguished 
member of the Cibaeño gente de primera, allowed him to take clear advantage of the 
population's readiness for political stability. 
 The presidency of Ramón Cáceres is well covered in the historical literature from the 
Dominican Republic.
125
  The methods and effects of his presidency were and remain 
controversial because of his strong use of the military and military centralization of the state.
126
  
He was able, however, to bring a balance between the arguments for regional autonomy and 
centralization in the years 1906 to 1911, when he was assassinated.  When Cáceres came to the 
presidency, the Dominican Republic and the United States were already closely tied through 
financial agreements that kept U.S. naval forces close and closely supervising the Dominican 
political situation.
127
  He did not have to explain to his constituents why or how he had allowed 
U.S. penetration, because it was already a strong force in society by the time he ascended to the 
office of president.  Instead, he balanced the ever-present U.S. interests with other aspects of 
Dominican development.  This was probably made easier, too, by his prominence and popularity 
in the Cibao, where his family was a respected element of Cibaeño society, the son of a 
hacendado merchant and previous vice president.  The neglect the Cibao suffered under 
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Heureaux's dictatorship was not likely to repeat itself under Cáceres.  With careful attention to 
the needs of both southern sugar and northern tobacco, Cáceres maintained a steady balance 
through most of his presidency. 
 Cáceres also took unprecedented steps toward centralization, breaking with much of what 
was traditional in Dominican politics in his effort to bring stability and national unity.  He 
maintained order, however, through the military, using censorship and strong force when 
necessary as per tradition.  Cáceres's military was different mainly because he accepted the need 
for eventual centralization, but he also strengthened the tendency toward regional military 
solutions, encouraging the development of local military leadership--especially on plantation 
land--so as to allow himself time to consolidate more general military reforms.
128
  Immediately 
upon his ascendance to the presidency in late 1905, and his election in 1906, Cáceres worked 
against what he saw as the most divisive factors of Dominican politics and society.  His program 
of centralization aimed at the realms of politics, the military, and the economy.  Politically, he 
worked to do away with the office of the vice presidency, that historical answer to geographical 
division that he felt had long encouraged the dual character of the republic, the political division 
that had led to repeated revolutions.  Despite his popular mandate, this call to reform provided 
justification for other military men who wanted to rebel against his government, most prominent 
among them General Desiderio Arias and other proponents of the opposing popular party in the 
Northwest.
129
  To respond to such threats, Cáceres responded with military force, driving the 
attackers into prolonged guerrilla warfare and eventually concentrating the population of the 
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Northwest.
130
  He declared martial law there in 1906 and his repression proved generally 
effective.  In 1908 he was able to unite a sufficient number of Dominicans behind the revision of 
the constitution that did away with the vice presidential office.
131
 
 Such military actions against his government, which had long caused difficulty for 
Dominican central governments, indicated the strong need to do what Luperón had advocated: 
truly centralize the military.  As Cáceres's presidency coincided with a growing explosion of 
foreign investment and development in agriculture, one of the keys to his extended centralization 
reforms was improved revenue that allowed military building.  His initiatives were also aided by 
the military support of his presidential mandate, which came both from his family background 
and his emphasis on using resources to improve and expand the military.
132
  Believing that 
stability and socio-political and economic improvement would only come to the country through 
a strong, institutionalized national military, Cáceres set to work immediately to institute many 
military reforms and to build on those begun when he was vice president in 1904-1905.  He used 
the Dominican navy to consolidate the fight against forces that had been in rebellion against the 
central government since then.
133
  He supported the civilian function of a strong military force 
emphasized by a June 1905 law, created the position of Inspector General of the army in 1906, 
and created the Guardia Republicana as the central national armed force, combining the earlier 
Guardia Rural and Policía Gubernativa in June of 1907.
134
  He continued to support the free 
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growth of the sugar industry too, pushing for modernization through economic improvement.  He 
followed Heureaux's practice of not taxing sugar, and passed regulation to begin partitioning 
traditional communal lands, but raised taxes in other sectors.
135
  He also formalized the practice 
of allowing agricultural land owners to hire and maintain their own armed guards through the 
Guardia Campestre, though he attempted to centralize the practice by placing authority for it 
under the new Guardia Republicana.
136
 
 Once he had eliminated the obstacle of a geographically remote vice presidency in 1908, 
Cáceres was able to take actions toward transforming some of the traditions that had kept the 
country's provinces militarily autonomous and splintered.  His effort was aided by the fact that 
rebellions, like most loyalties, tended to remain local.
137
  His government removed many military 
provincial governors who had held wide power in the administration of their provinces, and 
replaced them with civil governors; with this change, he mandated, military affairs would be the 
exclusive realm of the military in the form of the Guardia Republicana.
138
  To guarantee the 
smoothest transition possible and keep the new army under direct control of the presidency, he 
augmented historical precedent by setting aside a portion of the national budget for what was 
effectively bribery.  Generals who had previously commanded much control in society were to 
receive a national pension in return for political neutrality and transferred to other areas those 
who could not be retired from the military.
139
  The goal was to completely eliminate the old 
caudillo rivalries and rebuild the military anew, expanding and empowering it under central 
control of one president.  The result was not always as clean, however, as he had envisioned it.  
In his military reorganization, for example, Cáceres promoted the young Cibaeño general, 
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Alfredo María Victoria, to the position of chief of the army in Santo Domingo, passing over 
others who by tradition and rank expected to be promoted to the position.  Governor of Santo 
Domingo province and son of the Minister of Foreign Relations, Luis Tejera and his supporters 
saw this as a snub.  Despite echoes of past rivalries and difficulties with centralizing that 
complicated his presidency, Cáceres was able to maintain control and continue reforms for a 
long period for a combination of reasons that included improved economy and the military that it 
allowed him to build.  As late as the first months of 1911, Cáceres was actively carrying out 
fundamental reforms to the system of Dominican government from the ongoing effort to break 
up communal lands to laws that mandated improved arms use and hygiene among the country's 
police forces.
140
   
 Nevertheless, the depth and wide breadth of reforms and the growth of the economy 
under his presidency were unable to turn around many of the problems of the Dominican state 
and military that had caused political and military instability in decades past.  In the end, much 
of what Cáceres accomplished was to pass into the same sort of confusion that had swallowed 
previous reform efforts.  In November of 1911, Ramón Cáceres was assassinated by a group of 
Dominican opposition members led by none other than General Luis Tejera, whom Cáceres had 
passed over when promoting General Alfredo María Victoria.  The actions of Tejera, and those 
such as Arias in the northwest who represented the continuation of military and party rivalries 
through the diverse provinces, also demonstrated the continuation of many deeply divisive issues 
that had complicated nation building in decades previous.  The uprisings and the assassination of 
Cáceres, which plunged the country into the most devastating period of civil war yet, also 
represented resentment tied to varying regions and economic sectors, especially as they fought 
against centralization that favored U.S. interests and sugar.  Further, they demonstrated the 
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essential lack of change among those in the military.  Like military reforms before his time, those 
initiated by Cáceres did not bring about broad or lasting change to the regional or elitist 
structures in the military despite centralization.  Santo Domingo and the south, especially as the 
center of a new sugar economy, still sustained privileges in comparison to other regions of the 
country, and over time a growing number of groups and individuals came to see his reforms and 
cooperation with U.S. interests as antithetical to their interests.
141
  Although his reforms worked 
to re-distribute wealth and people throughout the country, and to centralize a presidentially 
mandated civilian rule in the provinces, his presidency did nothing to change or reform the 
system by which the gente de primera held the highest positions in the government and military 
and used locally recruited military forces to challenge centralized power in their realms.
142
 
 With civil war that exploded upon the assassination of Cáceres, many of his reforms were 
rapidly undone.  The same tensions that brought about his assassination brought a pattern of civil 
struggle that continued for years.  Old generals, both those who had fought against his 
presidency and those who had stayed more removed from politics, were called upon or 
volunteered their service to return local military order in the various provinces, and gradually 
replaced the civil governors.  Again, regional militarism and the distinct interests of the 
provinces, influenced by U.S. interests and the need for government revenue to pay past debts 
and reform institutions and infrastructure, perpetuated caudillismo.  It was a system that 
combined with conflicting ideas as to how to "modernize" the country, creating political, 
economic and military power vacuums into which foreign powers--especially the United States--
increasingly stepped.  Cáceres, until his death, finally appeared to have managed a balance of 
U.S. encroachment with military control and centralization while supporting a sufficient amount 
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of regionalism.  It was a tenuous balance, however, and fell apart at his assassination.  
Controversies about how to modernize and whether to centralize, and long-standing political and 
military rivalries, stemmed largely from the regional character of the country and complicated 
efforts at change in the late 1800s and early 1900s.  Repeatedly, the Dominican response was to 
force change, or enforce the status quo, through military force.  This approach, and the specific 
methods associated with it, created a rotating system of government into which the expanding 
U.S. investors and forces could more easily insert themselves.  
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Chapter TWO  
Sovereignty in the Caribbean at the Height of U.S. expansionism: Intervention and Military 
Deterioration 
 
 
 Accompanying and ever entwined with the Dominican question of modernizing and 
centralizing was the continuous question of U.S. influence and, increasingly, interference.  U.S. 
involvement in the Dominican Republic was always multi-faceted and, until 1916, ambiguous.  
For Dominican policy makers, it represented two sides of a new coin of modernity, both closely 
related to the international economy: foreign investment, which many sought, and foreign 
interference in government, which was anathema to most Dominicans.  Unlike in Haiti, no 
Dominican laws specifically forbade foreign ownership and encroachment.  The rules of conduct 
for foreign business and investment were generally less well defined, despite the strong pride in 
Dominican sovereignty that had been reinforced in repeated nineteenth-century wars to gain and 
maintain independence.  Caribbean nations' development was destined to play a role in U.S. 
development, and grew in the shadow of an economically expansionist United States.  Until the 
1890s investment interest was intermittent, but lack of regulation from either country during this 
expansive period led to a growth of private investment in Dominican industry and infrastructure 
that, by 1900, seemed to demand the involvement of U.S. naval and government officials.  While 
regional military and intellectual leaders in the Dominican Republic struggled with defining 
modernity around the turn of the century, therefore, they were faced with the continual issue of 
foreign encroachment.  Successive political leaders attempted to manipulate the market, 
investment forces, and U.S. government and naval interests to gain or maintain power or to 
weaken political opponents.  Their efforts were frustrated, however, by exploding anti-U.S. 
sentiment, continued traditions of military regionalism, and the distinct priorities of U.S. actors.  
80 
 
Dominicans' entry into the international market and attempts to build a modern national 
government formed an internal crisis that coincided with a growing U.S. naval and economic 
presence in the Caribbean.  This meant a buildup of tension between conflicting interests and 
definitions beginning in the 1860s and bringing relations between the two countries by the early 
1900s to crisis.  
 Attempts to define a U.S.-Dominican diplomatic relationship began in the late 1860s, 
when the governments of the two countries began making overtures toward each other regarding 
possible annexation of the Dominican Republic to the United States.  State Department officials 
and travelers to the Caribbean remarked about the rich value of the island's resources, and the 
two countries signed a commercial treaty in 1867, and many U.S. investors and government 
officials became interested in annexation.  None championed the idea at the time more strongly 
than President Ulysses S. Grant.  Grant's 1870 message to Congress urging annexation provides 
insight into the concerns and interests that would define prolonged U.S. interest in the country.  
He argued that the acquisition of Santo Domingo was desirable both for its geographical position 
commanding the entrance to the Caribbean Sea and because of its rich soil, “most capacious 
harbors, most salubrious climate and the most valuable products of the forests, mines, and soil of 
all the West Indies islands.”  He held that its possession would be of immense value to U.S. 
trade, and would help equalize U.S. imports and exports, as well as giving the U.S. an advantage 
in the case of a foreign war.
1
   
 Dominican reactions to this idea of annexation were mixed, but having just rid 
themselves of the control of yet another foreign government after the annexation to Spain and the 
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Restoration War (1863-1865), the majority were strongly opposed.  Dominican president Báez, 
in fact, carried out most of his negotiations secretly so as to avoid political fallout.  One of his 
primary goals in seeking annexation to the United States, or even selling the Samaná Peninsula, 
was to increase his government's revenue and power, a political decision that led to strong 
opposition and his eventual overthrow.
2
  In the end, the proposed annexation failed when the 
U.S. Congress closely rejected it.  The annexation vote was doomed by a combination of 
Dominican public opposition, U.S. fear of embroilment in foreign affairs, and U.S. concerns 
about Dominican racial composition.  The congressional commission of inquiry into the country 
found that Dominicans were widely against the idea of annexation.  In December of 1870, U.S. 
Senator Charles Sumner argued that “the island of San Domingo, situated in tropical waters and 
occupied by another race, never can become a permanent possession of the United States.  You 
may seize it by force of arms or by diplomacy. . . but the enforced jurisdiction cannot endure.  
Already by a higher status that island is set apart to the colored race.  It is theirs by right of 
possession, by their sweat mingling with the soil.”3  While politics Dominican popular resistance 
and conditions in the United States temporarily made plans of closer ties unattainable, the idea 
continued to attract some planners over subsequent decades.
4
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 The pattern set during these negotiations and the resultant Dominican political crisis 
continued on and off through the last decades of the nineteenth century.  It was a pattern of 
cautious U.S. interest in Dominican economic development and the acquisition or control of 
strategic bases, and of Dominican politicians' strategic courting of or rejecting of that interest.  
Dominican politicians continued to fear foreign military incursion from Haiti or Europe, and 
therefore many in the government occasionally considered the advantages that U.S. aid would 
afford them against current and future foreign aggression.  As important was the constant need 
for revenue, aggravated by the political system in which heads of state paid local leaders to 
maintain order.  U.S. loans and investment might help modernize Dominican industries, improve 
revenue, and allow governments to maintain power.  Dominican intellectuals and the growing 
merchant class, however, rejected what they saw as too much foreign involvement, and 
politicians sought a balance between foreign investment and constituents' fears of foreign 
encroachment.  These conflicting concerns were to form the backdrop of much of the turmoil 
surrounding Dominican reaction to U.S. influence over the course of the next few decades, up to 
the U.S. military occupation of the country in 1916.  In both countries, those interested in 
Dominican development--which included a growing number of private U.S. investors--settled for 
a less defined international relationship.   
 U.S. imperatives, on one side, were increasingly built around a late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth-century interest in finding expanding markets for the exploding industrial production 
of U.S. cities, as well as the need to expand naval protection as U.S. interests in the Gulf of 
Mexico and Caribbean grew.
5
  During the same years, as Dominican businesses and 
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governments struggled between centralization and regionalism, many Dominican actors saw U.S. 
interest in their country's development as a key to modernization.  Because the country lacked a 
reliable source of revenue, its governments funded almost exclusively by customs revenues, 
international business held powerful sway.  U.S. businesses were willing to invest in expanding 
sugar, which brought increased revenue, and government after government in the Dominican 
Republic struggled to encourage such investments while balancing the spread of foreign 
influence with popular resistance to it.  Resistance, often framed as the fight for national 
sovereignty and regional autonomy, was propped up by strong patron-client relations that 
guaranteed the continuation of regional cultures and industry.  Through the analysis of a 
combination of primary documents and secondary literature, I argue that Dominican politicians 
and regional leaders took advantage of U.S. involvement, either using it to gain and maintain 
power or denouncing other politicians for working with U.S. forces.  The result was that U.S. 
involvement in the Dominican Republic during the late 1800s and early 1900s contributed 
significantly to political and military deterioration over time, creating a power vacuum into 
which U.S. forces gradually stepped despite a long-term growth of Dominican anti-imperialism.   
 
 
U.S. Encroachment and Dominican Politics, 1870-1905 
 As Bruce Calder and Dana Munro pointed out, much of the character of early U.S. State 
Department approaches to diplomacy with the Dominican Republic can be ascertained by the 
fact that the U.S. did not establish a permanent diplomatic mission to the Dominican Republic 
until 1889; instead, the U.S. Minister to Haiti, who spent most of his time in Port-au-Prince, 
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served as minister for both countries.
6
  The State Department therefore had little up-to-date 
knowledge of events within the Dominican Republic, and the situation was complicated by 
historic tensions between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.  Not until the increased U.S. 
investment in the country during the 1880s was the Dominican government, under dictator Ulíses 
Heureaux (1881-1899), able to push effectively for a U.S. minister.  Frederick Douglass was 
appointed in 1889, arriving in early 1890.
7
  Before then, U.S. interest had waxed and waned, 
from the annexation question of the 1860s to navy planners' vacillating claims as to whether the 
Dominican bay of Samaná was or was not the best location for a coaling station for the U.S. 
navy.  By the time of Douglass's appointment, U.S. private and corporate investment were 
widening the diplomatic channel between the two countries.  Investments augmented the interest 
begun during the question of annexation, when Frederick Douglass and others went on an 1871 
commission of inquiry to the country; one of the commission's major goals was to discover the 
country's agricultural and resource potential.
8
   
 Already at the time of the commission of inquiry, U.S. interest had a military component, 
and was led by Grant's personal secretary General Orville Babcock.  In fact, the period brought 
major changes in both U.S. and Dominican militaries, and therefore serves as a good point of 
departure for the examination of both in the early 20th century.  In both countries, military 
matters were central to change in the period.  As early as the late 1800s, U.S. planners and 
analysts focused on the military aspects of Dominican-U.S. relations.  They argued that the 
United States held a natural role as protector of Caribbean nations, that only the U.S. Civil War 
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had stopped it from helping Dominicans regain their independence from Spain in the 1860s.
9
  
This was, of course, distinctly 1890s thinking.  Ideas of the U.S. government's role in the 
Caribbean had changed drastically in these decades, and a wider movement and capability to 
define and make use of the Monroe Doctrine began to form in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century.
10
  While Andrew Johnson‟s Secretary of State William H. Seward (1861-1869) worked 
to revive the antebellum interest in pursuing West Indian naval stations, his pursuit had a military 
focus, and failed politically.
11
  By the 1890s, however, new perspectives on the role of the U.S. 
military and economy in the hemisphere were reshaping political thought.  Further, many private 
citizens took actions that were disconcerting for Dominicans.  As early as 1860 some U.S. 
citizens aroused concern among Dominicans when they landed on a southwestern Dominican 
island and planted a flag, claiming the territory and its guano deposits for the United States.
12
   
While the question of annexation fell out of favor in the United States with the failure of 
the vote in the Senate, political and economic representatives in both countries repeatedly 
returned to the notion.  Five-time Dominican president Buenaventura Báez, for example, 
struggling with revenue and defense, first asked for a protectorate or annexation from Spain after 
the U.S. vote failed, and then again solicited US. aid against Haiti in 1877.
13
  Báez's solicitations 
were, of course, only the beginning of a long trend in such political approaches toward the 
United States.  The Dominican elite and intellectual response to this was to disparage the 
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politicians seeking such foreign aid.
14
  The U.S. government response remained ambiguous, 
while the U.S. navy became increasingly interested in the country.  The dictatorship of Ulíses 
Heureaux (1882-1899) brought sufficient political stability and U.S.-friendly economic 
development to deepen and complicate the relationship between the two countries.  Heureaux's 
government brought some change and more open economic opportunity for foreign investors 
even as the United States embarked on a period of economic and naval expansionism.  The rapid 
economic growth and industrialization in the decades after the U.S. Civil War created a 
government and business sector that looked increasingly outward for markets in which to sell its 
goods, even while geographical and industrial expansion meant a growing need for cheap raw 
materials to fuel growth and industry.
15
 
 U.S. investment in the Dominican Republic was also complicated by global trends toward 
capitalization and empire as European powers, too, expanded further in their search for raw 
materials and markets.  This led to competition and friction between some European powers and 
certain sectors of U.S. government.  The latter, especially the State Department, framed their 
argument for U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere in terms of "informal empire," and set 
their own expansion against that of Europeans, who they argued had more territorial aims.
16
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Seeking to justify their expansion, U.S. philosophers, politicians, and teachers propagated the 
ideal that their motivations for intervention were different, a product of the desire to improve the 
world through a spread of U.S.-style democracy and economic methods.  Even as U.S. 
administrations moved ever more toward the use of the military to intervene in Latin American 
politics, especially as World War One unfolded, many within the United States would hold that 
U.S. aims and approaches were drastically different from those of "Old-World nations."
17
  U.S. 
observers from the late 1800s to the onset of U.S. occupation called for evangelical and 
economic missions from the United States to promote stability and modernity.
18
 
 With the late-nineteenth-century reform spirit that sought to spread democracy and U.S. 
financial institutions came a strong historical moment of military reform, often of an 
expansionist nature.
19
  The influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan's theory of U.S. naval 
predominance in the Caribbean region became increasingly popular.
20
  The U.S. acquisition of 
rights to the Panama Canal in 1902 was both a product of this set of expansionist impulses and a 
major contributor to them.  Mahan's theories and the Panama Canal led to increased discussion 
of naval expansion as both coastal defense  and defense of the Caribbean region as a U.S. 
territorial water.  These developments, in the late 1890s and early 1900s, also brought about 
growing tension between the power of the U.S. Department of the Navy and Department of 
State--a problem which was to complicate U.S. relations with Caribbean-region nations because 
of the conflicting goals of the two departments.  When the State Department hoped to oust 
dictator José Santos Zelaya in Nicaragua, for example, the Navy Department members who met 
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with Zelaya complained that they were not well informed of State Department policy.  The State 
Department, in turn, argued that navy officials were there to uphold policy, not to make it.
21
  The 
expansion and shifting of U.S. naval power that occurred with the Spanish-American-Cuban-
Philippine War (1898-1902) also complicated tensions between departments and throughout the 
region, increasing the naval desire for advance bases and coaling stations.  
 For Dominican governments, this U.S. naval expansion in Dominican waters was both 
potential boon and potential danger.  Heureaux sought to balance these two possibilities, courting 
U.S. and European powers in attempts to consolidate his own power and fund his military 
dictatorship.  By the 1890s, when opposition to his regime was strong but his military was 
stronger, he found himself subjugated by the need for funds, and drove the Dominican 
government into a growing debt from which it could not surface.  This began in earnest when, in 
1893 he allowed U.S. investors to buy out Dutch loans his government had contracted in 
previous years.  The U.S. investors, forming the San Domingo Improvement Company (SDIC), 
included some U.S. government officials.
22
  Many apparently envisioning a growth of U.S. 
control over the country, or even eventual U.S. annexation of the country, the leading investors 
of the SDIC extended repeated loans to Heureaux's government in the 1890s.  When payments 
on these loans became more difficult to make, and his military more difficult to maintain as 
opposition grew, Heureaux unsuccessfully offered the lease of Samaná Bay to the U.S. navy.
23
  
The U.S. State Department was hesitant to further involve U.S. forces in the tangled politics of 
the Dominican Republic, but investments and loans continued as the SDIC funded the early 
building of railroads and infrastructure as well as extending  loans to Heureaux's government.  
U.S. investors continued to expand through Dominican sugar regions.  In 1897, Heureaux made 
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another agreement with the SDIC, allowing it to issue new bonds in order to consolidate the 
foreign debt, but did not recall or redeem the old bonds.  Heureaux blamed the SDIC as the crisis 
worsened in the following year and Dominican creditors demanded payment.
24
  Because of the 
financial entanglements and the downward spiral of Heureaux's ability to cope economically, the 
U.S. government was to become more willing to interfere in Dominican politics in an attempt to 
solve the problem.
25
  As Heureaux was traveling through the country in search of merchants 
willing to lend his government more money in 1899, he was assassinated in Moca.
26
   
 Heureaux's assassination, inspired largely by the extreme financial crisis especially in the 
Cibao by the late 1890s, did not bring an answer to the financial hole he had created.  The only 
organizations profiting from Dominican revenues upon Heureaux's death were the SDIC and 
sugar companies, most of which were under foreign ownership and enjoyed exemptions from 
taxes or state regulation.  Revolutionary forces struggled immediately upon taking power with 
the need to rebuild a military whose members had deserted en masse due to the dictator's 
inability to pay them.  But the new government was not in a financial position to immediately 
reform it.
27
  The most pressing matter facing the new government and those that followed it was 
the question of how most immediately to deal with the national debt.  Anti-U.S. sentiment was 
strong among multiple sectors of the population by 1900, much of it surrounding the extensive 
economic power of the controversial SDIC.  Many Dominicans felt that the company was the 
main source of their economic troubles.
28
  New government heads also saw the dangers of 
continued control by this powerful U.S. company, to which they learned all of Dominican 
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customs revenues were mortgaged since the mid 1890s.
29
  Because of the indebtedness of the 
government, their attempts to buy out the company were unsuccessful.   
 In 1900, European bondholders pressed their governments to send warships to demand 
payment from the Dominican government.  Under pressure from U.S. Minister Powell, and with 
U.S. warships arriving near the coasts of the Dominican Republic, President Juan I. Jimenes 
negotiated a new contract with the company.
30
  The contract was controversial in the Dominican 
Congress and among the population, and with the remaining European creditors who held 
Dominican bonds, but the SDIC carried out its terms anyway.  The new contract, to appease the 
SDIC and permit the payment of European creditors, allowed the company to use customs 
revenues to pay the European bondholders.
 
 The new arrangement only increased popular anti-
U.S. sentiment and distrust of the SDIC.
 31
   On 10 January of 1901, the Dominican government 
and courts worked together to declare the National Bank as bankrupt, seeking to bar the SDIC 
from collecting revenues needed by the national treasury.  The company appealed to the U.S. 
government.  Jimenes sent his Minister for Foreign Affairs to Washington, and despite the 
political power of some of the SDIC's representatives in Washington, the U.S. State Department 
at first refused to intervene officially in the dispute.  Its members were hesitant here, as 
elsewhere, to overtly challenge European powers when it came to collection of debts.  In this 
early stage of defining its expanding role in the Caribbean, the U.S. government settled for 
arbitration, seeking to negotiate a way for the Dominican government to buy out the SDIC's 
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interests.
32
  Negotiations between the company and the Dominican government failed, however, 
and Jimenes even sought money from European creditors to buy out the company.
33
   
 During arbitration, the Dominican government became split by regional and caudillo 
rivalries that returned the country to civil war and a rapid turnover of governments.  Presidential 
rulers in the south governed differently from vice-presidential rulers in the north, and the 
rivalries between the two led political leaders to ally against each other.  Old generals who had 
supported Heureaux allied with President Jimenes, but the large military force fielded by his 
enemies in the north was more powerful.
34
  Jiménes's opponents were able to field such a force 
against him largely because of his agreement with the SDIC and because he allied with 
Heureaux's generals, both of which made him widely unpopular in the Cibao.
35
  When Jiménes's 
vice president Vásquez ousted him from the north, however, he too proved willing to work with 
U.S. ministers to try to consolidate his government's power.
36
  His and successive Dominican 
governments began to work more and more closely with U.S. ministers, but the opposition 
denounced such cooperation. The final protocol of arbitration between the SDIC and the 
Dominican government on 31 January of 1903, especially, brought a storm of public protest in 
the Dominican Republic because it settled upon a board of arbitration that included one 
Dominican representative, one U.S. representative, and--failing agreement--another who would 
be appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
37
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 Such controversial decisions demonstrating apparent cooperation with U.S. interests 
provided repeated fuel for groups in opposition to standing governments in the years 1900 to 
1905, and then complicated government attempts to consolidate power.  Insurrections were also 
aided by the continued crisis of Dominican government finances.  Prisons in Santo Domingo, for 
example, were over-crowded with political prisoners who could be drawn in to support 
opposition groups, and no national military could field sufficient forces during this period to 
guard the capital as well as the other provinces.  When the bulk of the military left the city to 
fight insurrection, the opposition could take advantage of the unprotected capital city and declare 
government overthrow.  In 1903, shortly after coming to power, Vásquez was overthrown by 
such a revolution led by one of Heureaux's generals.
38
  When Vásquez used the traditional 
system of enlisting the aid of provincial governor generals to gather troops and march on Santo 
Domingo April, foreign consuls in the city called upon their governments for help.  The crisis 
brought a combination of German, British, Italian, and Dutch ships to the harbor, and the U.S. 
navy quickly landed troops from the U.S.S. Atlanta, ostensibly to protect U.S. sugar interests.
39
  
U.S. properties were not endangered, however, and U.S. Minister Powell's communications 
demonstrate that the decision was based on working to gain broad support from the Dominican 
government.  Powell wrote that without interference Vásquez would probably take the city, and 
that U.S. aid from the Atlanta was making the population friendly to the United States.
40
  The 
presence of U.S. troops provided aid to the insurrection as long as Vásquez was not willing to 
attack and risk endangering the foreign troops.  Vásquez withdrew to Santiago and resigned the 
presidency.
41
  The rapid changes of governments over the next few years, however, continued to 
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contribute to growing confusion as to the official Dominican position in regards to relations with 
the United States, the SDIC, and U.S. investors.   
 For the United States, the years 1902-1904 were a defining moment in international 
relations, which was to have a strong impact on the course of Dominican politics and history.  
The U.S. navy, and the desire to uphold the Monroe Doctrine and support U.S. hegemony in the 
Caribbean, necessitated the reshaping of U.S. approaches to Caribbean diplomacy.  The 
Venezuelan Crisis of 1902 was therefore a major historical turning point in U.S. relations with 
European powers and Latin American nations.  U.S. military and economic expansion 
throughout the Caribbean, including maneuvering to gain control of a future Panama Canal site, 
shifted the focus of U.S. security considerations.  These U.S. interests coincided with an increase 
in European demands for overdue debts from a number of Caribbean countries.  When Germany 
and England sent warships to intimidate Venezuela's president to pay his government's debts, 
U.S. President Roosevelt at first attempted an approach of watchful waiting.  He could not 
possibly insist that European powers stay out of the Americas when debts remained unpaid.  
Germany and England, careful not to strain relations with the United States, notified Roosevelt's 
government of their plan to force collection of debts, and promised that they had no plans to 
seize territory.  Roosevelt and Secretary of State John Hay agreed to support the European right 
to use force as a last resort, but their concern about German motives was clear when they 
mobilized the U.S. navy in the Caribbean.  When the German and English blockade of 
Venezuela led to an exchange of fire between Venezuelan shore batteries and European ships, 
the U.S. public reacted against the show of European power so close to its borders.  The U.S. 
exerted diplomatic pressure in an attempt to help arbitrate the crisis, the blockade was lifted in 
February of 1903, and the crisis was submitted to the Hague Court.  The court ruled in favor of 
94 
 
the European powers.
42
  This precedent might encourage European use of force in the Americas, 
however, and Roosevelt and Hay were among many who saw the need for a more permanent 
solution to the issue of uncollected debts to European powers among Latin American countries.  
 Combined with the crisis in Venezuela and its eventual result, the deteriorating political 
situation in the Dominican Republic led Roosevelt and Hay to work toward a solution throughout 
1903 and 1904.  U.S. sugar planters who had built extensive wealth during Heureaux's 
dictatorship, and who were essentially autonomous units on Dominican soil due to all the 
exceptions he had provided their industry, contributed to the discussion, demonstrating concern 
about what they now saw as chronic instability in the Dominican system.  Many wrote to the 
U.S. government to encourage varying levels of intervention that they thought might bring about 
sufficient political stability to protect their interests.  In December of 1903, for example, the 
owner of one of the country's largest sugar plantations urged U.S. Minister William Powell to 
sent "at least three men-of-war" to the Dominican coast with the announcement to the contending 
factions in the civil war that "upon the first promiscuous use of firearms order will be maintained 
by foreign force."  In subsequent communications he tried to encourage such a U.S. show of 
force by playing on U.S.-German tensions, informing Powell that certain Dominican authorities 
were pro-German, cruel, dictatorial, and unfriendly to U.S. nationals.
43
  Others who feared that 
the civil war would affect their investments wrote directly to the Secretary of State or President 
Roosevelt, accusing the U.S. government of abandoning its citizens and their interests.
44
  As the 
numbers of such complaints and concerns increased, Roosevelt and Hay decided upon the need 
to take a more coherent and collective stance regarding the Dominican Republic and other 
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Caribbean-region countries.  Arguing that U.S. political and military interventions in Cuba since 
1898 had set that country on a path toward U.S.-style government, many angled for increased 
U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.
45
   
 Dominican concerns about modernity, change, and sovereignty clashed with U.S. ideals 
and expectations, a clash that was exacerbated by U.S. understandings of Caribbean cultures and 
government.  As Anthony Maingot points out, U.S. opinion:  
 tended to be premised on a misreading of Caribbean society and, thus, of how it  
 related to the U.S.  It confused the Caribbean peoples' historical capacity and  
 propensity to be morally indignant at injustice with a propensity for revolution.  
 Applauding and celebrating every revolution and pseudo-revolution which came  
 along, these [U.S.] authors overlooked the fact that the central thrust of Caribbean  
 life has been the pursuit of progressive ends through moderate or conservative  
 means.
46
   
 
While the struggling governments of the Dominican Republic worked to overcome the financial 
hole into which the country had been dug during the Heureaux dictatorship, and to create a new 
central government that would align the country with modernizing trends in the international 
economy, many U.S. nationals saw it as a backward territory in need of tutelage and ripe for 
economic investment.  As they did elsewhere during this era of U.S. economic expansion, 
various investors argued that U.S. economic influence would uplift the Dominican Republic and 
its people.
47
  The result, through these years, was increasing U.S. intervention in Dominican 
politics, and a growth in Dominican reaction against that intervention.  For example, the more 
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frequent appearances of U.S. ships off the Dominican coast in these years reinforced rumors that 
the U.S. had territorial aspirations in the Dominican Republic, augmenting widespread rejection 
of Dominican governments' agreements with U.S. forces.
48
 
 Dominican governments had no choice but to closely deal with the United States, and 
struggled to temper this reality with widespread reaction against it.  When the Belgian 
government turned to the United States for help in collecting debts, and the provisional 
Dominican president in mid-1903 found himself under extreme pressure, he first returned to the 
discussion of leasing Samaná and possibly Manzanillo Bays to the United States but then 
declared the ports free--probably to calm fears of loss of sovereignty throughout the Dominican 
public.
49
  When he also tried to refuse to appoint a Dominican arbiter in discussions about the 
SDIC's claims, arguing that the Dominican Congress had not ratified the January protocol, the 
U.S. Minister forced the issue by briefly breaking relations with the Dominican government.
50
  
Despite his agreement to restore relations, this provisional president could not maintain power 
with no money in the treasury to pay or provide rations for his troops as many opposition groups 
vied for control over the government.
51
  In late 1903, General Carlos Morales Languasco 
launched another successful revolution from the north, imprisoning the vice president and 
quickly taking power.
52
   
 Again, the results of the revolution were largely decided by U.S. action.  When the 
constitutional president did not have sufficient funds to fight the rebellion, U.S. Minister Powell 
informed the U.S. government that the bankruptcy of the country and its current political 
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condition were a threat to the United States, especially due to a growth in European demands for 
payment.
53
  As European naval forces landed and revolution continued to split the government 
throughout the provinces over the subsequent months, the U.S. Minister kept the State 
Department closely informed.  The power of generals to recruit forces through the provinces 
proved to be stronger than any forces a constitutional government could muster, but these forces, 
too, quickly deserted when governor generals could not pay them.
54
  Morales, who controlled the 
small Dominican navy, continued to maintain a thin veneer of power from Puerto Plata into 
1904.  When a strong revolutionary movement threatened his power, however, gathering large 
forces from throughout the country, the U.S. intervened to support Morales in an attempt to help 
reestablish political stability.
55
  Morales unabashedly asked the U.S. Minister and U.S. forces for 
help, trying to stave off both revolution and the demands of European creditors.  Following quick 
recognition by U.S. Minister Powell, the Roosevelt administration recognized Morales's 
government on 20 January 1904 and expanded its naval presence to help intimidate rebel forces.  
While the U.S. president and State Department were hesitant to intervene, Powell's quick 
recognition of his government and Morales's open cooperation with U.S. interests forced the 
issue.
56
   
 Further, U.S. navy forces in the area involved themselves in the struggle.  Commander 
Dillingham of the U.S.S. Detroit, for example, reported on 17 January 1904 to the Secretary of 
the Navy that he had landed Marine forces in order to prevent fighting on the streets of Puerto 
Plata, helping to defeat the revolution there.
57
  After direct verbal intervention by Commander 
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Dillingham and Admiral Sigsbee, commander of the new Caribbean Squadron, resistant generals 
allowed the U.S. navy forces to install a customs collector in the port of Monte Cristi, which the 
navy argued would remove a potential source of funds for revolution.
58
  In February, a U.S. 
cruiser bombarded rebel forces besieging Santo Domingo from the Ozama River who they said 
had shot on a U.S. launch and killed an engineer.
59
  American war vessels landed marines 
throughout the area of the capital, occupying the neighborhood of Villa Duarte and causing a 
renewed outburst against Morales‟s government.60  On 11 February previous Dominican minister 
Federico Henríquez y Carvajal sent a letter of grievance to the U.S. State Department about this 
action, and included the complaint that U.S. war vessels had prevented the privately owned 
Clyde Liner steamship New York from landing munitions at Monte Cristi, and had forced them to 
land instead in Puerto Plata to support Morales.
61
  Commander Dillingham bragged about his 
role in the conflict and its controversial resolution, stating that the U.S.S. Detroit was a factor in 
all events, and argued that he was "entirely responsible for the placing of Morales in power," 
which he believed was in everyone's interests.
62
   
 In exchange for all of this U.S. support, while only controlling a few small parts of the 
country, Morales opened discussions about leasing Dominican bays for the U.S. navy, agreed to 
the U.S. desire to build lighthouses along the Dominican coast to facilitate the navigation of 
ships toward the Panama Canal, and made it clear that he wanted to place control of Dominican 
                                                 
58
 Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, 1964, 101-102.  In March of 1904, too, U.S. Navy Captain James M. 
Miller invited an opposition general aboard his ship to warn him that the revolution had to end, as the United States 
could not allow any other foreign power into the Dominican Republic.  Rippy, "The Initiation of the Customs 
receivership," 432. 
59
 Moya-Pons, The Dominican Republic, 292. 
60
 Welles, Naboth‟s Vineyard, 612-613. 
61
 Rippy, “The Initiation of the Customs receivership,” 444. 
62
 Ibid., 444. 
99 
 
customs under the control and management of U.S. government agents.
63
  Popular general 
Desiderio Arias was among many military leaders who increased his resistance to Morales when 
the latter began to work so closely with the United States.  He called upon his constituents to 
expel the foreigners from the country, "without paying any attention to the Consuls or to the 
Americans."
64
  U.S. interest in the Dominican Republic had increased through this warfare.  In 
addition to defensive interests, U.S. capitalists and investors already by 1904 held a large amount 
of interest in the country, a combination of factors that pulled the U.S. State Department 
increasingly into the quagmire of Dominican politics and finances.
65
  In June of 1904, in addition 
to these multiple calls for more tangible control of Dominican affairs, the arbitration board called 
for by the Protocol of 1903 began arrangements for the U.S. financial agent to collect customs 
revenues for repayment of debt.
66
   
 U.S involvement was a constant thorn in the side of any government that came to power 
in the Dominican Republic, not only because of the prominence of anti-American sentiment 
throughout the country, but also, as an extension of that sentiment, because of the way that 
opposition groups could so easily seize and capitalize upon any apparent readiness of the 
government in power to surrender part of national sovereignty.  Morales‟s government, coming 
to power largely through U.S. support and in a time when U.S. interest in so many forms had 
increased, was no exception to this rule.  Even with U.S. support, his government was enforced 
by compromise—Monte Cristi remained the last stronghold of the most powerful opposition 
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group against his government, and its leaders were appeased by the placement of Desiderio Arias 
as governor of the province, where he carried out a largely separate rule.
67
 
 
U.S. Financial Control and Military Change: The Customs Receivership 
 A number of works have discussed the financial aspects of the U.S. customs receivership 
in the Dominican Republic, which was one of the key factors leading to U.S. military occupation 
of the country in 1916.
68
  After a brief overview of the events leading up to the receivership, and 
the terms of the agreement between the two countries, this examination combines the 
understandings formed in that literature with a discussion of the role of the U.S. navy and the 
changes to the Dominican military that came with the receivership.  The prominent role of U.S. 
government actors and the U.S. navy in the shaping of negotiations and politics first had what 
appeared to be a consolidating effect on the Dominican government following the establishment 
of the customs receivership.  That appearance of consolidation proved to be illusory, however, 
due to the changing U.S. policies of the period and some aspects of the receivership that have not 
been examined in the historiography.  The experiment with the receivership was supposed to 
bring stability to Dominican politics and economy, protect U.S. investors in the country, and 
improve U.S.-Dominican relations so that the two countries could continue to work closely 
together.  Instead, largely because different individuals defined the U.S. role in the Dominican 
Republic differently, it led to further deterioration of Dominican sovereignty and government.  
With the assassination of the president in 1911, this deterioration would reach the proportions of 
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a civil war bloodier than any the country had before experienced, and U.S. intervention 
surrounding the receivership was instrumental in prolonging that war. 
 The extent of U.S. intervention in supporting Morales's government led to some definite 
changes in the political situation of the country through 1904.  Most immediate was the initial 
support of U.S. forces for the new regime, which caused the opposition to become violently anti-
American and even to approach Haitian and European governments in attempting to bring about 
the overthrow of Morales.  In addition to the recognition of Morales's government, the 
opposition was angered when some officers of the U.S. navy attempted to direct the 
developments through their own influence, tending to favor increased U.S. control.  Rear-
Admiral W.C. Wise wrote to the Secretary of the Navy on 30 March, 1904 that the United States 
would eventually “have to assume a grave responsibility on the island in order to work out the 
solution of a stable government.”  On 26 June, Rear-Admiral C.D. Sigsbee called for drastic 
action, mentioning three points for naval bases and recommending intervention, especially due to 
his perception of the races of Hispanic America as primitive and unable to self-govern.
69
  These 
goals among officers of the U.S. navy did not change over the course of the following decade, 
and were directly influential in the eventual U.S. occupation of the country. 
 By mid-year, Morales was able, through negotiation and diplomacy among Dominican 
provinces and with the U.S. Minister, to begin to strengthen his government's power.  As the 
United States became more directly involved in Dominican government, he negotiated with U.S. 
representatives in an attempt to solve the financial crisis that had plagued the country since the 
dictatorship of Heureaux.  In June of 1904, based on the protocol signed in 1903, the arbitration 
board designed the year before temporarily put a U.S. financial agent in place to collect 
Dominican customs revenue and repay foreign debts and counsel Morales's government on 
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financial matters.  Dominican reaction was widely against this action, especially because the 
financial agent chosen was an official of the SDIC, but the growing presence of U.S. warships 
kept the opposition groups from openly rebelling in early 1904.  In the meantime, Morales 
diligently fostered his relationship with U.S. representatives.
70
  He took advantage of both the 
controlled revenue, which gave his government some money, and the enforced peace, building 
up his military and improving military buildings and communications through 1904.
71
   
 The troops that he formed to begin to garrison key areas of the country, especially along 
the coasts, often lacked resources, but were a notable improvement over the military of the 
previous years.  Important generals who supported his government, even tentatively, aided in this 
consolidation of military power, informing the government in the capital of which regions were 
least protected or most susceptible to potential revolution.  General Ramón Cáceres, his 
government's vice president (Special Delegate to the Cibao Valley), wrote in May about the need 
to increase troops in the northwest, where Governor General Desiderio Arias and other openly 
hostile individuals held a strong potential revolutionary base.
72
  In April, President Morales 
responded to these concerns by blockading the port of Monte Cristi.
73
  Uprisings therefore 
remained minor and localized through the rest of the year, unable to unite.  Despite this, 
uprisings continued, and demands for troops were continuous in some areas throughout the year.  
Opposition groups capitalized on any apparent readiness to surrender part of national sovereignty 
under Morales‟s government, a common problem by now for any Dominican government that 
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might otherwise more readily cooperate with the United States.
74
  Uprisings, contained though 
they were, continued to disrupt trade and drain resources.
75
 
 In the period during which this financial agent was in place, it became progressively 
clearer to both Dominican and U.S. government representatives that a long-term solution was 
needed to fix the Dominican debt and financial crisis.  To investigate conditions and report on 
the situation, President Roosevelt sent a commission to the Dominican Republic under Assistant 
Secretary of State Francis B. Loomis, who had experience in the diplomacy surrounding Panama, 
and Admiral George Dewey.  During the investigation, Commander Dillingham of the U.S.S. 
Detroit, still heavily in favor of full U.S. military control of the island, wrote to Loomis in 
August of 1904 about what he saw as hopeless conditions in Santo Domingo, claiming that 
insurgency had become an institution, and that if the United States did not take over, another 
foreign power would.
76
   Loomis returned arguing for more direct intervention.  During his 
investigation he had spoken to a limited audience, consisting of supporters of Morales's 
government and a small portion of the upper-class, all in the north—he stated that: 
The conservative, property-owning, and industrious people of the country, irrespective of 
nationality. . . talk seriously and with evident favor of annexation to the United States.  
General Morales and the politicians of his following suggest, with much force, that peace 
of a permanent nature would be secured if the administration of the customs-houses of 
the country were undertaken by the Government of the United States….” 
 
He held that the agricultural classes would “probably” favor it, and that the only groups that 
would not were “the rather small contingent of military-political freebooters who have nothing to 
lose and much to gain by maintaining a state of anarchy in the country.”77  Loomis also wrote in 
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a private memo to the president that “The frequent and sometimes bloody civil wars in the 
Dominican Republic. . . are shameless sordid struggles for the privileges of controlling 
customhouses and disposing their revenues.  The country is largely in the grasp of desperately 
selfish irresponsible brigands.”78  Roosevelt hesitated, however, postponing final negotiations 
until after November's presidential election, though he ordered U.S. war vessels to remain in the 
area to guard against insurrections.
79
  
 Because of U.S. navy interests, its vessels did more than guard.  With many of its 
commanding officers in the area believing that the country needed firm, foreign control, and 
reporting this to the Secretary of the Navy, they intervened directly whenever they perceived a 
threat to Morales's power.  When in December discussions again ensued for creating a financial 
agreement between the two countries, the Dominican press carried out a vigorous campaign 
against Morales as negotiations for financial control began again late in 1904.
80
  Commander 
Dillingham was sent as representative to the Dominican Republic as part of the group that 
arranged the agreements, much to the dismay of many Dominicans who had experiences with 
him during the war of the previous year.  Ministers in Morales's Cabinet insisted upon the 
addition of a clause to the agreement in which the U.S. government agreed to respect the 
"complete territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic."
81
  The negotiations continued into 
1905, but Morales's open support for the agreement under negotiation led to floods of 
denunciations; despite U.S. assurances that they harbored no wish to gain Dominican territory, 
the events of the Panama Revolution and even of the U.S. seizure of territories in the war of 1898 
were fresh in many minds.  The Haitian president, too, was concerned about the amount of 
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power such an agreement might give U.S. representatives on the island, and in March his 
delegate in Santo Domingo threatened to support Morales's opposition if he went ahead with the 
plan.
82
   
 Dominicans had other practical reasons to be concerned about U.S. motives.  A growing 
number of U.S. investors or their investigating lawyers went to the Dominican Republic in late 
1904 and especially early 1905 to study the island's resources.  Travelers had long written about 
the country's promise for tourism, development, and "improvement," and argued that the country 
only required U.S. intervention or stable government to become modern and productive.
83
  The 
trend increased as the safety of U.S. investment seemed more secure.  One such representative, 
lawyer Henry J. Hancock, belittled the majority opposition to the government, calling the 
country's insurrections "more theatrical than real" and arguing that revolution in Santo Domingo 
did not stem from differences in political principles, but simply plots to seize customs houses for 
self-enrichment.
84
  He stated that political disorder had prevented U.S. capital development in 
agriculture and mining that would improve the country.  He worked with Admiral Sigsbee and 
Commissioner Dillingham, interviewing some of Puerto Plata's elites who supported Morales, 
and informed U.S. readers that the majority of Dominicans were in favor of an agreement such as 
the receivership.
85
  The navy officers with whom Hancock was directly dealing during his visit 
were even more suspect among Dominicans.  Despite Hancock's rosy picture of Dominican 
approval for the plan, Admiral Sigsbee in late January of 1905 requested seven more warships 
for Dominican waters, and the Navy Department reported to the U.S. Secretary of State strong 
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opposition to the occupation of the customs houses by an agent of the SDIC.
86
  Negotiations, 
meanwhile, were kept largely secret, and Dominican popular protest centered around fears not 
only of U.S. control of customs houses, but the possibility that Morales and U.S. representatives 
were discussing the leasing of Samaná Bay.
87
 
 In February of 1905, the agreement reached by Morales's and Roosevelt's representatives 
was therefore a compromise between the many contending groups, and also largely a product of 
force and intimidation.  The agreement was signed on 7 February, and stipulated that the 
Dominican government would agree to give U.S. financial agents complete control of incoming 
revenue by ceding control of the customs houses, creating a customs receivership.  The agents of 
the receivership would use five percent of incoming revenue to fund their operation, give forty-
five percent to the Dominican government to fund all government operations, and use the 
remaining fifty percent to consolidate and pay off the extensive Dominican debt.
88
  Roosevelt 
addressed the U.S. Senate on 16 February of 1905 in an attempt to gain approval for the plan, 
explaining the continuing financial crisis of the Dominican Republic and the danger of its debt to 
European powers.  Roosevelt argued that profiting from the Monroe Doctrine also brought a 
responsibility when other powers lent money to countries in the Western Hemisphere, pointing 
out that foreign creditors must have the right to demand loan repayment of debtor nations--and 
that the Hague Convention gave them that right.  If the United States did not want European 
powers to step in and seize territory or customs houses, then it was obligated to do whatever it 
must to guarantee those payments.  Summarizing the complaints of U.S. investors and the 
implications for relations with European powers, Roosevelt emphasized the obligation of the 
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United States to intervene in the issue, and cited the example of the Platt Amendment in Cuba as 
proof that the U.S. had no permanent territorial interests and that U.S. intervention had a positive 
influence on the creation of stable Caribbean states.
89
  His argument coincided with that of 
Secretary of State Elihu Root, who followed the theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan and opinion of 
many when he argued that “the inevitable effect of our building the Canal must be to require us 
to police the surrounding premises.  In the nature of things, trade and control, and the obligation 
to keep order which go with them, must come our way.”90   
 When neither the Dominican Congress nor the U.S. Senate immediately passed the 
resolution, Roosevelt instituted a temporary modus vivendi agreement that would put the 
receivership into place for the next two years.  President Morales forced the protocol in the 
Dominican Republic through a decree on 1 April of 1905, and the receivership became 
operative.
91
  As a trial period, its first two years made it seem promising, the experiences with 
which led to initiatives to champion for similar receiverships in other countries.  The Dominican 
Republic's finances improved, foreign creditors began to receive payment, and the new 
government consolidated power more solidly over time.  Even when Morales was overthrown in 
favor of his vice president, Ramón Cáceres, the transition of power was relatively painless in 
comparison to the wars of previous years:  In December of 1905, as Cáceres and the Horacistas 
supporting him gradually unified their effort to throw him out, Morales attempted to maintain his 
office by calling on forces of U.S. marines to intimidate rebels in Santo Domingo.  This 
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intimidation was ineffective in restoring his power, however, and he was forced to hand over the 
Army to Horacista general Luis Tejera, and to hand over other important government positions.
92
  
When Morales fled the capital to gather troops and fled upon finding no support, U.S. Minister 
Powell offered him safe passage out of the country, and Cáceres formally took power on 29 
December of 1905.
93
  With the receivership now in place and legally binding, it is likely that 
U.S. representatives were less concerned than before with keeping Morales in power around the 
nearly absolute lack of support he enjoyed throughout the country. 
 As described in chapter One, Cáceres was able to form a strong government and, with the 
financial help of the receivership, finally to put the most immediate aspects of the Dominican 
debt crisis behind him and create reforms toward the future.  His government, which maintained 
power until late 1911, built a strong national military based in the capital and encouraged the 
development of strong regional militaries.  He encouraged industries that brought higher 
revenue, most central of which was the sugar industry of the south, but also attempted to balance 
this with the needs of the North.  He did this in part by allowing foreign investors into other areas 
of the country, and in part through the beginning of an extensive reform that would build the 
country's infrastructure, from telegraphs to roads.  He also had a wider popular mandate because 
he had been openly against the customs receivership when it was signed under Morales.  As 
president, he now enjoyed the popular approval of having rejected it even while his government 
benefited from the increased revenue and end to European demands for debt repayment.
94
  
Cáceres cautioned the U.S. government through its minister about the need to develop 
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agriculture wisely, and spoke before the Dominican National Assembly where he promised to 
protect the country and its constitution.  He promised to keep railroads under the control of the 
presidency even if they were built by foreign private investment "in order not to put into the 
hands of foreigners with these mighty civilizing agents the power of regulating the progress of 
the Republic."
95
 
 During his relatively long tenure in power, however, the politics of U.S.-Dominican 
relations were evolving below the surface in ways that would severely complicate later relations 
between the two countries.  The balance of power, while it appeared to fall centrally on Cáceres, 
was leaning more toward the U.S. forces in the country, who had ultimate control of finances, 
increased their military presence in Dominican waters over the years, supported Cáceres's 
government against insurrection, and gradually inserted programs that supported their goals into 
the internal politics and workings of the country.  The customs receivership itself created a 
number of institutions that, while they were officially part of the receivership, had direct effects 
on the politics and military development of the Dominican Republic.  One of these centered 
around the amount of protection to the sitting Dominican government that was afforded due to 
the U.S. presence.  First, warships from the U.S. navy's Caribbean Squadron often patrolled and 
protected the waters around the port cities, and guards protected the customs houses, which 
through seizure had traditionally provided the largest source of funding for revolution or 
government overthrow.  The U.S. navy maintained an average of eleven warships in Dominican 
waters during the early period of the receivership, and some of these were financially maintained 
solely by the U.S. navy.
96
  Second, in addition to this U.S. military presence and the protection it 
afforded, U.S. Customs  even provided the Dominican government with a "revenue cutter 
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service."  This provided four steel cutters that the receivership maintained and made freely 
available to the government to transport officials, mail, and troops as it saw necessary.
97
  In the 
context of a regionally divided country that required transports to move troops around from city 
to city to combat revolution, this provided a strong backing for the government's military power, 
especially when compared to the small Dominican navy of two (sometimes three) ships that had 
transported Dominican troops in the past. 
 Another advent of the receivership that was to have a powerful effect on later Dominican-
U.S. relations was the creation of the Customs Frontier Guard which evolved through the years 
of the receivership.  The Frontier Guard had two major effects in the years leading up to the U.S. 
occupation of the Dominican Republic.  First, it provided even further military protection to the 
Cáceres administration, as the Haitian border ranked with the customs houses and ports as one of 
the major traditional routes to revolution.  It also provided U.S. military and government forces 
with an unprecedented (and, officially, largely undefined) power in some of the interior military 
workings of the country.  In so doing, it formed the precedent for U.S. plans and desires to 
control the Dominican military, which were to come to the forefront in 1914.
98
  The Frontier 
Customs Guard, or Frontier Guard, stemmed from the mid-1905 establishment of border customs 
receivership houses along the Dominican-Haitian border in the towns of Comendador, Tierra 
Nueva, and Dajabón--the locations of most overland trade.  They were organized by the 
receivership "as a customs adjunct to prevent smuggling along the Haitian frontier and to assist 
in the collection" of land-port customs duties.  From the start, customs agents at these posts were 
mounted and armed, and paid from the five percent of Dominican customs revenue that funded 
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the receivership, and September of 1905 saw the official creation of the Frontier Guard.
99
  Upon 
its establishment, the border customs administrator was authorized to hire one-hundred-twenty 
Dominicans, sixty of them mounted, to act as frontier police under the command of U.S. customs 
officers.
100
  In its primary role of policing trade along the border to combat smuggling, the 
Frontier Guard met a great deal of resistance from both Dominicans and Haitians along the 
border, and its agents often fell under fire from local forces from both countries.
101
  When 
Cáceres was elected to a full six-year term in July of 1908 the Guard was turned over to the 
Dominican government, though it still worked closely with the receivership and would be 
returned to U.S. customs control in 1913 when, during civil war, its posts were abandoned.
102
 
 The Dominican-American Convention was officially signed on 8 February 1907, after 
being passed by the U.S. Senate and a Dominican Congress under pressure by the executive, 
making the Dominican Republic a virtual U.S. protectorate.
103
  For the first years of the 
receivership, and especially after the election of 1908, the country seemed to enjoy relative quiet 
and reform.  As 1911 dawned, the Dominican Republic seemed on the surface both politically 
stable and progressive.  Cáceres welcomed change and investment, and set up an ambitious 
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restructuring of the military and programs to improve infrastructure throughout the country.  He 
also worked closely with the United States, however, including in controversial agreements such 
as the prohibition of the sale of arms into the Dominican Republic--part of his plan to reform the 
country through a program of disarmament.
104
  This sort of cooperation with U.S. goals, when 
combined with the presence of U.S. marines in Santo Domingo or U.S. customs agents 
commanding Dominicans along the border, inflamed anti-U.S. sentiment and led to growing 
opposition to his presidency and growing U.S. influence over the years.
105
  In the end, the 
Dominican-American Convention did a much better job of covering up problems in the 
Dominican Republic than it did of solving them.  It did little to repair the social and regional 
divisions that had widened through the course of civil wars, despite extensive planning for 
infrastructural reform, and the extensive military consolidation and growth therefore fell apart 
rapidly upon the assassination of Cáceres in November of 1911. 
 
Sovereignty Stalled: Civil War and Marine Invasion 
 On 19 November 1911, a revolutionary group led by General Luis Tejera fatally 
wounded President Cáceres during an attempted kidnapping, plunging the Dominican Republic 
into civil war.  The assassination ended the extensive reforms and reorganization carried out and 
begun under the Cáceres presidency, and elevated the power of Chief of the Army General 
Alfredo Victoria, who carried out an immediate wave of repression throughout the country.
106
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The year 1911 saw not only the assassination of a change-oriented Dominican president and the 
return of factional war, but also an increasingly interventionist and determined U.S. government.  
Cáceres had generally excelled at balancing nationalist sentiments at home--sometimes with 
strong, military repression--with U.S. demands for stability and protection around sugar lands.  
His long presidential tenure allowed him to build up and restructure the military, more along the 
lines of what previous Dominican planners had attempted than along those that the U.S. 
recommended, but well enough that he was able to offer enough protection for the development 
of sugar, which he always promoted.  This friendly atmosphere meant that U.S. investments and 
entrepreneurs continued to flow to the island in the years leading up to his 1911 assassination.
107
  
Then-U.S.-President Howard Taft, an advocate of "Dollar Diplomacy," approved of the measures 
taken by the Cáceres administration.  The assassination, and the descent of the Dominican 
government into a war of factions led by opposing generals, led U.S. investors to again call to 
their government for pre-emptive interventions in case the civil war were to affect their 
production or shipments.
108
   
 By 1912, U.S. involvement in Dominican politics became so omnipresent and influential 
that it perpetuated intense civil war.  Regional military and political bosses manipulated popular 
anti-American sentiment and U.S. support in the years 1912 to 1915 in such a way, in fact, that 
continued U.S. intervention virtually guaranteed continued civil struggle.  Any political leader 
who accepted and used U.S. help, or cooperated with the United States, was branded by many as 
a traitor, but without U.S. support, no regime could last long.
109
  While regional government 
                                                 
107
 Letter of Minister Russell quoted in: Inman, Through Santo Domingo and Haiti, 51-52. 
108
 Letters between U.S. president Taft and Dominican president Nouel printed in: United States Department of 
State, FRUS, (1913), 417-418. 
109
 Communications between the U.S. Minister and the U.S. State Department in: United States Department of State, 
FRUS, (1913), 418-421; publications in El Radical, Nov-Dec. 1913, calling for the censure of the government for 
creating "humiliating" pacts that allowed continued U.S. interventions. 
114 
 
continued to be the rule throughout the provinces, the struggle for control over a changing central 
government bathed the Dominican Republic in years of conflict that devastated the infrastructure 
and military built up under Cáceres.  Dominican politics of the time was a complex game.  Anti-
American sentiment had grown exponentially in the previous two decades, especially in 
provinces such as those of the Northwest, or in the northern Cibao Valley, where tobacco 
planters often saw themselves as at odds with the growing sugar industry of the South.  Such 
regional struggles represented much more, however, than a contest between U.S. and European 
interests or between sugar plantations and small farming.  Increased U.S. intervention was 
especially volatile because it coincided with a moment of powerful and fundamental change in 
the entire Dominican social and economic system, one that had been under way for decades by 
1911 in the centralization of sugar and the progressive insertion of the Dominican economy into 
international trade and its gradual reorientation toward U.S. markets.  These trends encouraged 
the growth of large sugar plantations and damaged other small industries, thereby fueling the 
conflicts that followed the death of Cáceres.  Some have argued that those elements of 
capitalization and modernization that the country had maintained outside of U.S. control were 
destroyed in the civil war, opening a hole for U.S. businesses to further their control.
110
  While 
the economic effects and their role in the civil war and occupation continue to be debated, this 
model of deterioration describes what happened with the Dominican military during the years of 
civil war. 
 Victoria and Tejera had already been strong rivals when Cáceres chose Victoria over 
Tejera as head of the Army.  Upon the assassination, Victoria ordered the capture and execution 
of those responsible for the assassination--Tejera and his followers--and opposed the candidacies 
of the two popular prospective presidential candidates.  Victoria, firmly controlling the Guardia 
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Republicana forces in Santo Domingo, pressured Congress instead to elect his uncle Don Eladio 
Victoria as first provisional and then constitutional president.
111
  President Victoria, a puppet 
president to his nephew General Alfredo Victoria, carried out waves of repression and quickly 
sought to reform and organize the army.  He created a military commission to draw up plans for 
army reorganization, adopting a coat of arms for the country in February of 1912 and issuing a 
law to reorganize the army in July.
112
  One of the major goals of this reorganization was the 
training of recruits under a new corps of instructors.  Another was clearly to distribute and 
improve communications with those most loyal to him.
113
  Some in the officer corps had good 
reason to be loyal to him.  They had worked under him for years while he was Secretary of War 
under Cáceres, and many were paid well.  Military men were paid, during this presidency, in 
three-month periods, with sergeants making between $84-$185 per pay period.  Low-ranking 
officers made around $120-$240 for the same period, but a number of those most loyal or with 
the longest service records made twice as much.
114
 
 Victoria at first enjoyed the support of the U.S. representatives in the country, who hoped 
to see his government maintain relative calm.  Navy officers communicated with him throughout 
the year about the movement and placement of U.S. warships, and the U.S. Secretary of State 
helped through the Dominican Minister Plenipotentiary to Washington, Francisco J. Peynado, 
giving him the maps of Santo Domingo prepared by the U.S. War Department in 1904 and 
1907.
115
  They also handed the Frontier Guard over to the Dominican Army when potential 
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threats of Dominican conflict with Haiti loomed in 1912.
116
   The Dominican Legation in Port-
au-Prince sent Peynado official communication, in July, outlining the way that U.S.-led 
negotiations about the Haitian-Dominican border were causing tensions in Haiti; his observations 
were that the Haitian government might have been interested in starting a war with the 
Dominican Republic by convincing the Haitian population that Dominicans were preparing for a 
frontier war.  The letter was explicit about the danger of such a confrontation with civil war 
breaking out throughout the Dominican Republic; the Dominican Minister stated that the Haitian 
government clearly wanted to take as much Dominican territory as possible, and would aid 
rebels to see it happen.  One indicator, he pointed out, was the increase in disappearances of 
Dominicans along the border.
117
   
 Indeed, Haiti was not the only problem facing Victoria's government, and Victoria had 
good reason to fear that Dominican rebels might try the traditional route of allying with the 
Haitian government to supply a revolution from over the border.  Shortly after Victoria took 
office and began to carry out a campaign of repression, popular Jimenista General Desiderio 
Arias organized a new rebellion in the hopes of imposing a politically friendly president.
118
  
Armed rebellion also erupted throughout the provinces in support of the two popular candidates, 
Horacio Vásquez and Juan Isidro Jimenes.  Reforms grinded to a halt, and by mid-year the 
country's institutions were in disarray, and the Dominican military--even the Guardia 
Republicana--was fractured by camps opposing or supporting Victoria.  Victoria's July Ley 
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Orgánica for the Army was presumably a response to this explosion of uprisings and the strains 
it placed on the military system.  The year in which he was in power, 1912, later became known 
as El Año Rojo, the red year of the civil war, when Horacista generals and followers allied with 
Jimenista general Desiderio Arias in an attempt to overthrow Victoria.
119
  In August, acting 
Chief of the U.S. War Department's Bureau of Insular Affairs and Colonel in the U.S. Army 
wrote to Minister Francisco Peynado to offer the service of Major George B. Bowers in a 
proposed plan to reorganize and train the police force of Santo Domingo.  Bowers had ten years 
of experience doing the same in the Philippines, and believed that his services would help the 
Dominican government to bring order and stability.
120
 
 The large set of difficulties facing the Dominican government were augmented by the 
death of Haitian President Jean-Jacque Leconte in August of 1912.  President Victoria quickly 
set to work sending communications of sympathy to the Haitian government as soon as he heard 
about the explosion of the president's palace.
121
  In the United States, the Washington Post 
reported that 400 were dead or injured in the blast, and that the two countries had been 
dangerously close to border war as "Santo Domingo seethes with revolt."  The U.S. ordered a 
navy gunboat to the scene, where the population of Haiti was "in a state of panic."  While the 
Haitian Consul reported that the explosion was an accident, U.S. officials reported that it was a 
plot by Haitians and perhaps also Dominicans, simultaneous as it was with reports of 
"revolutionary outbreaks" along the border directed against the Dominican government of 
Victoria.
122
  The Washington Herald reported that, due to the current state of war between the 
two countries, U.S. government representatives feared that the situation would only get worse, 
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and that this along with revolution in the Dominican Republic that had caused attacks on the 
customs land-port of Dajabón they might be "compelled to land an armed force in that vicinity in 
order to protect Dominican customs-houses."
123
  U.S. Minister in the Dominican Republic 
William Russell traveled to the border to try to work out the arrangement of a boundary 
settlement and try to calm tensions there.
124
  The situation within the Dominican Republic, 
however, was only worsening, the Dominican government claiming (probably accurately) that 
Haitian forces had done much to aid the Dominican revolutionary forces.
125
  The treasury was 
bankrupt due to the costs of fighting so many revolutionary forces, and salaries of public 
employees were no longer being paid.
126
 
 Finally, in September of 1912, U.S. President William Taft began to consider direct 
military intervention.  When U.S. investors in the sugar areas wrote to his government asking for 
intervention before the civil war reached their lands and affected their business, he sent a 
"pacification commission" with 750 marines to Santo Domingo in September of 1912 to try to 
end the civil war and fix a provisional border with Haiti.
127
  The commission carried out these 
orders with the proviso that failure might mean direct military intervention, and cut customs 
funds to the government, making certain demands before they were reinstated.  Primary among 
these was the resignation of President Victoria and the appointment of a mutually agreeable 
interim president until it accepted the U.S. solution to the border dispute, which delineated a 
provisional U.S.-defined border.
128
  The U.S. commission and Dominicans quickly agreed on 
popular Archbishop Adolfo Nouel as interim president, and he took office on 30 November of 
                                                 
123
 "President Killed and 400 Injured in Haitian Plot," Washington Herald, 9 August 1912, page 1. 
124
 "Correspondencia," 1912-1921, RE Deposito 07, I.T. 007952, AGN. 
125
 "President Killed and 400 Injured in Haitian Plot," Washington Herald, 9 August 1912, page 1. 
126
 Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic, 306-308. 
127
 Domínguez, Historia Dominicana, 182. 
128
 José Miguel Soto Jiménez, Las fuerzas militares en la República Dominicana: Desde la Primera República hasta 
los comienzos de la Cuarta República.  Ensayo sobre su evolución institucional (Santo Domingo: Ediciones Grupo 
5, 1996), 126-132; Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 5; Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic, 307. 
119 
 
1912, from which he was to organize elections for the next year.  Nouel immediately found 
himself incapable of running the government, trying to please all of the opposing forces and in 
the end pleasing none.  From the beginning of his government, General Desiderio Arias--whose 
faction then controlled a good portion of the country in the Northwest and the North--declared 
rebellion against the government and made an evolving series of impossible demands upon 
Nouel to try to place his constituents in the most powerful positions of government.
129
   
 When Nouel resigned in early 1913, U.S. representatives tried to convince him to stay in 
office, offering him a loan to consolidate his government's power.  The U.S. Navy's later official 
version of his resignation held that he resigned because he "realized" the hopelessness of 
Dominican government “due to the inability of the professional politicians to accept anything 
except personal success in the shape of appointments and patronage.”130  When Nouel resigned, 
the Dominican Senate found itself unable to agree on a new provisional president, as its members 
supported three opposing factions (the Jimenistas, the Horacistas, and a new group following 
Federico Velásquez).  They settled instead on Senator José Bordas Valdez, who took office in 
April of 1913 with the task of setting up elections.  Bordas quickly demonstrated his desire to 
maintain himself in power, however, and began to put into place a system by which he could 
gain support in the country's diverse regions through regional military governors.  He appointed 
Arias Special Delegate to the government in the Cibao, giving him control of the North and its 
railroads, and appointed General Luis Felipe Vidal as Special Delegate in the Southwest.  When 
the Horacistas rose up in revolt against his provisional government, U.S. representatives stepped 
in.  They informed the Horacistas that a government brought to power through revolution would 
receive no recognition from the U.S. government, and therefore no customs revenue, and 
                                                 
129
 United States Department of State, FRUS, (1913), 419-422; Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic, 308. 
130
 United States, "Senate Inquiry," 92. 
120 
 
promised free elections.
131
  Bordas, enjoying the military support of Arias and the diplomatic and 
economic backing of the United States, carried out clearly fraudulent elections; popular rejection 
of this fraud on all sides stalled the election, which was delayed.
132
 
 U.S. president Woodrow Wilson's election in 1912, and his presidency beginning in 
1913, only increased U.S. interventionism.  Wilson believed firmly in the maintenance and 
expansion of U.S. influence overseas, and the ability of U.S. forces to help bring U.S.-style 
democracy to other countries.  He therefore gave wide powers of intervention and involvement 
to the naval authorities in the Caribbean.  Wilson also named the controversial and widely 
disliked James Sullivan as U.S. foreign minister to the Dominican Republic in 1913.  Wilson's 
increasing concerns about war developing in Europe, and about German expansion into the 
Americas, caused his decisions regarding the Dominican Republic to be made with an eye to 
U.S. military security and economic interests; to this end, his representative Sullivan was given 
extremely wide powers within the Dominican Republic.  Sullivan proved to be corrupt and 
opportunistic, and to have little respect for Dominicans, a situation that augmented the rising 
tensions between Dominicans and U.S. investors.  Further, Dominican politics were by now 
complicated by the extent of U.S. interventions, as all factions and groups within the country 
made decisions based on expectations of U.S. involvement.  David Healy describes a similar 
pattern with U.S. intervention in Cuban politics; in 1906, when Liberals struggled against 
Estrada Palma's administration there, both sides of the conflict knew that any action would cause 
some form of intervention.  Politics became a guessing game, Liberals causing uprisings to bring 
intervention because they thought it would bring U.S. forces guaranteeing free elections, and 
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Estrada Palma causing chaos because he though U.S. forces would help maintain him in power 
as the constitutionally elected governmental head.
133
  As in Cuba, Dominican political decisions 
had become part of a guessing game, with the potential U.S. response always at issue. 
 The guessing game about U.S. possible actions was complicated, too, by the rapid 
evolution of U.S. motivations during these years.  This was especially true for the motives of the 
U.S. navy.  With expansion of U.S. interests abroad, the navy developed a system of advance 
bases to protect interests in foreign locations through use of trained marines.  The USMC 
Advance Base School was established in Philadelphia in July of 1912, and in 1914 Admiral 
Colby N. Chester declared that policy requirements compelled the United States to supervise 
circum-Caribbean nations.
134
  Later in the same year, Marine Corps Commandant George 
Barnett, who had been the brigade commander of five foreign expeditions that included Cuba, 
issued a memorandum regarding the growing need for advance bases both permanent and 
temporary, for defense of widespread U.S. interests.
135
  Barnett later admitted that one of the 
most pressing reasons for the development of advance bases was that they afforded the marines a 
way to give their officers "tropical" experience.
136
  As war in Europe unfolded, and the U.S. 
Navy played a growing role in operations in the Atlantic, officers became more and more 
interested in developing advance bases and finding foreign training locations for officers and 
men.
137
  President Taft, meanwhile, had used limited military force to achieve national goals, and 
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the Marine Corps conducted more and more foreign landings through the course of his 
presidency, often as demonstrations of force.
138
 
 While the navy and marines were expanding advance bases and foreign experience, U.S. 
support was vital to maintaining Bordas in power in the Dominican Republic for a brief period as 
provisional president.  The U.S. State Department's financial aid to Bordas and its refusal to 
recognize any revolution allowed Bordas to remain in power until his term as provisional 
president was set to expire in July of 1914, by which time new elections were to have decided 
the next president.  In exchange for the money it advanced his government, however, the 
Receivership insisted that Bordas agree to the appointment of a U.S. "financial expert" to 
supervise government spending.
139
  The Dominican Congress refused to accept this expert.
140
   
 In addition to the imposed financial expert, the State Department demanded the 
placement of a U.S. official in the position of Director of Public Works, paid by the Dominican 
government but not liable to dismissal by it.
141
  Finally, Wilson's administration demanded in the 
infamous "Nota Número 14" that the Dominican government give U.S. forces complete control 
of the Dominican military.  In official letters, inter-governmental communications, and the press, 
Dominicans argued that U.S. intervention would lead to a U.S. take-over of their country, that--
despite claims to the contrary from Presidents Roosevelt to Wilson--the real aim behind U.S. 
interference was to gain territory for naval bases and to augment the territorial size of a growing 
empire.  By 1915, they pointed to instances of racism in the United States, and violence in U.S. 
interventions in Mexico, Cuba, and Haiti, to argue that increased U.S. control would lead to the 
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collapse of Dominican sovereignty and subjugate the Dominican population under the hands of 
racist oppressors.  Those such as Archbishop Nouel who tried to mediate U.S. demands with 
popular pressure against them were ousted from government or resigned in frustration.  U.S. 
representatives added pressure to the demand that Dominicans accept a U.S.-controlled military--
a demand that Dominicans in both government and press vehemently refused, as a sovereign 
nation, to accept.   
 The constant tension between U.S. and widely divergent Dominican goals during these 
months brought the country deeper into severe crisis; the receivership demanded reforms of 
Bordas, and threatened to cut off customs funds if he did not accept the reforms.
142
  The internal 
conflict in the country became so extensive that those regional leaders Bordas had placed in 
power increasingly revolted against his government.  U.S. Navy forces moved to the locations of 
rebellions to "protect the lives and property of Americans, and others as circumstances may 
require," and to inform rebelling governors that their actions would not be tolerated by U.S. 
forces.
143
  The state of the country in June was such that elections still could not be held.  When 
Bordas's term expired in June of 1914, therefore, the country was left without a president, but 
fighting continued.  After the expiration of his term, on 24 June, Bordas even sent the Dominican 
navy to bomb the city of Azua in response to the rebellion of General Vidal in Azua province in 
the Southwest.
144
   
 Intense fighting throughout the country in July convinced the U.S. State Department that 
U.S. forces should intervene again, forcing the contenders to agree on a truce with new 
mediation commission from Washington and a truce proposal drawn up by President Woodrow 
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Wilson; the commission came with the threat of intervention by U.S. Marines from Guantánamo 
“to protect U.S. interests” if the truce was not accepted.145  The new U.S. Minister James 
Sullivan and U.S. navy commanders worked in the country to call for an armistice and then 
organize elections for a new provisional president, who was in power until December of 1914.
146
  
But controversy rose widely, too, around Minister Sullivan, who worked most closely with 
institutions representing U.S. financial interests in the country and increased anti-U.S. 
sentiment.
147
  Dominican newspapers through the second half of 1914 and into responded widely 
to both bullying and corruption by many U.S. representatives, calling on patriots to fight against 
the incursion of colonialism that U.S. demands indicated.  One author published an open letter to 
Sullivan explaining that the population of the cities was in an uproar because the peaceful and 
orderly elections Sullivan had arranged may well have been peaceful, but were not legal.
148
  In 
late 1914, reporters for El Radical published growing numbers of accounts of demands made by 
U.S. representatives to cede control of Dominican institutions, from finances to communications.  
Professor Moises García Mella of the National University in Santo Domingo later pointed out, 
too, that Sullivan's interventions in the revolutionary activity of 1914 were against a number of 
Dominican laws, and were only accepted by force and at the threat of invasion; Báez was only 
president as an imposition by U.S. representatives.
149
 
 When elections were finally held in October of 1914, Jimenes won, and took office in 
December.  His election did not unite the country.  It could not, in part because of rivalries 
formed by regionalism and in part because of consistent and unpopular attempts at imposition by 
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U.S. representatives.  His Congress was divided, and consisted of many supporters of Arias, 
which led Jimenes to appoint Arias Secretary of War.
150
  While the U.S. Minister immediately 
began making demands on Jimenes, Arias worked over time to consolidate his power throughout 
the provinces, writing letters to his many constituents in preparation for any potential eventual 
conflict.  Arias's wording is sometimes vague, but over time becomes more direct, as he writes to 
citizens and military officials throughout the provinces about the need to improve government 
and economy and consolidate  and build patriotism against foreign and internal threats to 
order.
151
  U.S. demands on Jimenes began with the State Department's insistence that he formally 
approve the demands of Nota Número 14 that the Dominican Congress had rejected earlier in 
1914.  Jimenes again submitted the issues to the Congress, where they were again rejected.  The 
State Department then imposed a comptroller by force, issuing him control of the signing of all 
checks to the Dominican government and for the payment of public expenditures, and made 
further demands for control of the armed forces.
152
  The tone of news headlines became bolder 
and more concerned, and the country's leading newspapers printed such front-page headlines as 
“U.S. Threatens on All Sides.”153  Newspapers were resurrected or brought into print specifically 
to address the issue of U.S. intervention and to allow the public to follow its developments.  
Most prominent among these were La Bandera Libre and El Radical, which published updates 
and protest articles throughout 1915-1916, especially drawing attention to the corruption of U.S. 
foreign minister Russell and closely watching any suggestions of Dominican government 
compliance with U.S. demands.  
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 Through 1915, the U.S. State Department increased its demands, insisting on increased 
power for the financial advisor and eventually even demanding that Jimenes agree to a U.S. 
disbanding of all Dominican armed forces and creation of a U.S.-controlled constabulary in the 
country.  Jimenes, of course, could not accede to these demands; even the imposition of the 
comptroller had led many to begin movements in 1915 toward impeaching him, and Arias and 
his followers to begin making secretive plans to begin a rebellion against the government.
154
  In 
the East, local generals of importance also rose up against the government.
155
  As rebellion and 
open conflict increased, Arias revolted against the government, with the support of many of the 
army's forces in the capital.  U.S. Marines offered assistance to Jimenes, who stated that he 
would accept arms and munitions but could not accept the landing of marines or any other force 
that would fire on Santo Domingo.
156
  When officers insisted on landing marines anyway, 
Jimenes resigned the presidency and marines invaded and occupied the country, first from the 
capital, and soon after from the northern port cities.   
 U.S. Minister Russell, recognizing the secretaries of state as an extension of the Jimenes 
government, declared the country without a government.  A commission of Dominican political 
representatives from the Cibao came to the Marine-occupied capital to request the chance to elect 
a president.  After their meeting with U.S. representatives under U.S. Navy Admiral William B. 
Caperton, it was agreed that the legislative bodies--who had not resigned--could elect a 
provisional president.  They quickly elected Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, who would head 
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the provisional government for six months.
157
  Minister Russell and Admiral Caperton, however, 
had insisted on the right to approve the elected candidate before extending recognition.  Soon 
after Henríquez y Carvajal's election, when the new president would not accept the demands set 
forth in Nota Número 14, U.S. representatives refused to extend recognition to his government 
and began withholding customs revenue.
158
  Unable to pay the army without treasury funds, the 
president discharged unit after unit, and unpaid provisional governors began to take possession 
of the belongings of local comandancias so as to liquidate them to cover their own pay; some 
also paid their men, while others disbanded their militaries during the months that marines 
moved inland from north and south.
159
   The invasion, and armed resistances it met in Puerto 
Plata and through the interior, solidified the interest of U.S. Navy officials in long-term 
occupation of the country.  In marine reports, Dominicans were "enemies."
160
  Any illusion that 
marines might, as promised, move in as friendly occupying forces were quickly erased as local 
populations clashed with marines in a number of violent battles throughout the country.
161
  On 26 
November, U.S. president Wilson reluctantly accepted the calls of his military for a formalized 
military intervention to bring an end to the situation.
162
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Conclusion 
 
 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic followed a distinct trajectory in which U.S. 
government and navy planners increasingly argued that more U.S. control would be beneficial to 
all involved parties.  The United States, heavily involved and concerned with the rise of 
European war, gradually turned control of the Caribbean situation over to the Secretary of the 
navy, whose officers had the goals of the navy in mind.  Many U.S. actions in the Dominican 
Republic in the years leading up to November of 1916, therefore, were more informed by U.S. 
military than U.S. government or economic interests.  The Dominican Republic, meanwhile, 
already struggled in these decades to find its place in the world economy while successive 
governments worked to define the country's future.  For government after government, the two 
apparent forces that might have the power to save political leaders and their plans for modernity 
seemed to be foreign investment and a strong military; in the end, both turned out to be the 
downfall of Dominican sovereignty, largely due to the confluence of the Dominican path with 
that of the U.S. navy.  Dominican regionalism, persistent despite Cáceres's reforms, quickly 
resurfaced with his assassination and subsequent heavy U.S. intervention.   
 Any hope of containing regional dissent and salvaging Cáceres's political and centralizing 
gains, many of which focused heavily around the military, were lost to the combination of U.S. 
interference and growing anti-U.S. sentiment in the country.  Disgusted with a years-long 
inability to "fix" the Dominican situation, and desirous of guaranteeing firm control and 
advantage in the Caribbean during World War One, the U.S. navy became more and more 
interested in simply controlling the situation--through military force, if need be.  U.S. military 
leaders and planners, inspired in large part by racism and a belief in the superiority of American 
institutions, but also by an organized military ethos, believed that if only given the power to do 
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so they could step in and right all of the country's problems.  By 1915, when the takeover of 
Haiti and other countries seemed more productive and efficient for U.S. causes than diplomacy 
had been, they simply intended to do the same with the Dominican Republic.  By that time, the 
only options open to Dominican government officials--who were unable to balance Dominican 
popular opinion with U.S. demands and thus helpless to maintain themselves in office--were to 
sign over sovereignty or watch it vanish anyway.  Precedent told them that the U.S. government 
would wait until it had some agreement, but no Dominican government would or could agree to 
U.S. control of a Dominican military.  Precedent also told them that international law was on 
their side as long as they did not sign an agreement.  While Dominican statesmen struggled to 
salvage their state and resist U.S. advances, however, the U.S. forces became ever more 
determined, an explosive combination of motivations that guaranteed a continuing degradation of 
an already fragmented political and military system. 
 The deterioration of the Dominican military and the increase in the U.S. military presence 
and interventions in the country, from the assassination of Cáceres to the formal U.S. military 
occupation that began in late November of 1916, was critical in the development of both 
countries as well as their relations with each other.  For the Dominican Republic, it was not only 
a time of destructive civil war, but was also the culmination of a time of rapid change and 
movement in the country.  From the growth and expansion of sugar plantations to the increase of 
foreign capital investment in the previous decade, and from the changes initiated by President 
Cáceres, the country was both stepping and being pushed into a new era.  What it would look 
like upon stepping out the other side was a mystery.  Various groups and individuals vied to 
become part of the decision-making process that would shape the country, some fighting for a 
return to a Dominican society that was passing, and others hoping to use the atmosphere of 
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change and development to "modernize" the country based on their varying definitions of 
modernization.   
 The U.S. presence, in the frequent involvement of U.S. navy and marine personnel and in 
the person of Minister Sullivan, both perpetuated and worsened the Dominican civil war and 
military deterioration from 1911 to 1916.  The types of actions taken and demands made by 
multiple U.S. forces guaranteed continuing and worsening conflict between the different camps 
in the war, and gave repeated justifications for war to Dominican generals either anti-imperialist 
or opportunistic enough to use them.  During this time, those Dominicans such as Archbishop 
Nouel who worked to balance U.S. demands with Dominican needs were unable to allay 
Dominican fears of a foreign takeover while still meeting unrealistic U.S. requests.  Presidents 
Taft and then Wilson tended to receive partial reports of the events in the Dominican Republic, 
and at first generally worked to stave off a full military intervention.  U.S. investors, however, 
often argued that U.S. military control would be preferred to Dominican sovereignty, and U.S. 
Naval planners had their eyes on control of Dominican territory, a goal that would only be 
realized if conditions in the country deteriorated to a point justifying a military occupation.  
Naval control of the island, they argued, would provide an important base for U.S. hegemony in 
the Caribbean, strategic coaling stations, and tropical experience for their men.  Furthermore, 
Secretary of Navy Josephus Daniels was eager to carry out an experiment in governing foreign 
countries, to demonstrate that with a sufficient amount of autonomy the navy could establish 
"quiet, stabilizing conditions" in areas of interest to the United States.
163
   
 Intervention increased anti-U.S. and anti-imperialist sentiment among many sectors of the 
Dominican population.  It then increased reactionary elements, and led to a politics that pitted 
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those who would obtain power by gaining U.S. support (at the expense of popular Dominican 
support) against those who would obtain power by emphasizing nationalism and playing on anti-
U.S. sentiments.  The chapter follows this power-play as it unfolded in a Dominican political 
arena dominated by a periodically deteriorating military.  The assassination of Cáceres, itself, 
provides a window into both the state of the Dominican military and the partisan and regional 
conflicts that affected the country.  Even before the assassination, and especially after it, the 
increases in U.S. intervention were highly influential in Dominican politics.  The widespread 
anti-U.S. sentiment and anti-imperialism described in chapter One played a decisive role in the 
politics during this time.  It could not have been otherwise.  On the Dominican side, as elsewhere 
in the Caribbean, the expectation of U.S. intervention by all actors affected decision-making and 
outcomes, whether generals and politicians intentionally worked to bring about such intervention 
or whether they made decisions specifically attempting to avoid it.
164
  This trend only grew as 
U.S. intervention became more common and comprehensive.  During this period, as Louis Pérez 
Jr. describes it, the U.S. outlook changed, so that "what was at one time the defense of the region 
as a means of hegemony became hegemony as a means of defending the region."
165
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Chapter THREE 
Threads of Power, Fraying Ends: The Occupation Constabulary, 1916-1918 
 
  
 The U.S. military occupation of the Dominican Republic officially began on 29 
November 1916, when U.S. Navy Captain Harry S. Knapp read out his proclamation.  He stated 
that the occupying forces would take control of the Dominican government and create a new 
Dominican military to ensure domestic tranquility.  The proclamation spelled out the terms of an 
unprecedented full military occupation of a foreign country that was not at war with the United 
States, and whose government had signed no treaties or agreements allowing the occupation.  
Unlike in the Philippines, where a treaty from a formerly controlling colonial power ceded the 
U.S. right to rule, or countries such as Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua, which were occupied after 
U.S. forces pressured treaty agreements, this occupation had no international legal basis and 
retained no native puppet government.  It was, instead, a full military occupation of Dominican 
government and armed forces imposed unilaterally by the United States and not recognized 
throughout the international community.
1
  Having also taken place during a time of expansive 
growth in U.S. naval power, the Dominican occupation provides key insight into the 
development of U.S. policies of expansion and foreign occupation--the then-new Wilsonian idea 
of exporting democracy to foreign countries to promote “peace and stability” throughout regions 
bordering the United States.  In 1916, exportation of democracy was not much more than an 
idea, especially among the branches of the U.S. military: the Navy and Marine forces in charge 
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of the 1916 intervention had only U.S. Army field notes and the U.S. Army "manual of interior 
guard duty" from which to draw,
2
 and most lacked relevant training and experience.  The 
occupation that began in 1916 was to be an “experiment” in the exporting of U.S.-style 
democracy by use of military force.  
 In this period of U.S. naval and economic expansion, military and government planners 
were exploring methods to ensure markets, political stability, and friendly relations with 
neighboring countries.  The preferred method in 1916 was to gain as much control of relevant 
foreign countries as possible through diplomatic representatives placed in positions of authority 
in those countries.  Those diplomats were to encourage restructuring of the countries'  
governments and militaries to more closely resemble those of the United States.  When 
diplomatic channels failed to achieve the desired result, military force would take their place.
3
  
The latter method centered on the creation of new, professional, and apolitical native militaries 
patterned after the U.S. Marine Corps.  As proposed vehicles of democracy, these native 
militaries were to be purely volunteer forces.  Planners called them constabularies, stressing their 
roles as peacekeeping forces in regions the U.S. government and military saw as plagued by 
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chronic disorder and political instability.  As in the contemporary occupations of Nicaragua 
(1912-1933) and Haiti (1915-1934), one of the primary goals of the occupation in the Dominican 
Republic was the replacement of all armed forces with such a peace-keeping constabulary.  
Because the United States had by 1916 overextended its resources, because the occupation 
coincided with World War One, and because of unexpected levels of Dominican resistance, the 
new Dominican constabulary was not created right away as had been planned.  When it was, 
contemporarily with U.S. entry into the war in Europe in April 1917, the military government 
lacked manpower and resources for training, arms, and even basic provisions.   
 Dominican memoirs and writings from the time also allow the analysis of what this early 
occupation meant to the inhabitants of the occupied country, how they cooperated, resisted, and 
renegotiated identities to cope with the overwhelming foreign presence on sovereign national 
territory.  Dominican resistance to the occupation was widespread, and grew extensively during 
occupation years.  Not limited by class, gender, or region, it found adherents throughout all 
segments of the Dominican population, and grew rapidly in the first two years.  The new 
constabulary was an axis around which many of the early failures of the occupation centered.  
This was true in large part because occupation forces heavily prioritized the constabulary and 
planned to use it as a measurement of occupation success.  They argued that the cooperation of a 
force of armed Dominicans would increase support for their goals.  The new, U.S.-officered 
Dominican constabulary was also central to occupation failures because it became one of the 
occupation impositions against which Dominicans reacted most strongly.  So negative was the 
Dominican experience with  the constabulary during the early years of the occupation that it 
quickly became one of the strongest points of Dominican resistance.  In many ways, the 
successes and failures of the eight-year occupation of the Dominican Republic were decided in 
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the first two years.  The 1916-1918  period was a tense historical moment, one during which 
occupying forces would only gain cooperation from Dominicans by seeking to disprove 
Dominican conceptions of U.S. forces as violent, racist occupiers seeking territory and monetary 
gain.  The confusion and disorder of the first two years were unable to prove any such thing, and 
in fact seemed to prove to many Dominicans that their preconceptions had been correct.  
 The creation of the constabulary was first delayed for over four months.  When it was 
finally created, enlistment was low and desertion rates were high, problems that continued to 
plague planners; most Dominicans were unwilling to enlist in the foreign-officered military 
despite the promise of stable pay, forcing recruiting marines to continually lower recruitment 
standards.  Occupation forces' lack of consistent resources and manpower also meant that 
promised training programs were not initiated, a situation that combined with general resistance 
to make the constabulary a mercenary force of Dominicans who were often illiterate, lower-
class, unhealthy, or previous criminals, whose power was backed by the force of the marines.  
The high level of tension at the beginning of this “experiment” magnified the intensity of 
dissatisfaction among both Dominicans and occupiers, both of whom came to see the failures of 
the new military as central.  To Dominicans, it was a sign that promises of reform had been lies 
and, for many, proof that the United States meant to colonize the country for its own benefit.  To 
those who made up the occupying forces, the failures in the military were a powerful source of 
frustration in an already frustrating situation.  This set of circumstances produced growing 
tension between Dominicans and occupiers that changed occupation priorities, increased 
resistance, and seemed to guarantee the failure of occupation efforts to build a new, respectable 
Dominican military.  The historical record of the early part of this occupation provides a glimpse 
of the experiences of Dominicans who encountered the constabulary, an encounter that occurred 
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at many levels of Dominican society.  Extensive military records, as well as the writings of many 
Dominicans who wrote in protest of the occupation, left behind detailed traces of those 
encounters to alert the world to what was being done in the Caribbean.  The hopes and 
frustrations of government and military planners, both U.S. and Dominican, permeate the records 
from those early years, and the experiences of individual marines and individual Dominicans in 
their encounters open wide a window onto a relevant historical situation that has been lost in 
what Michael Taussig calls the “politics of epistemic murk.”4 
 This chapter traces the early development of the constabulary, a period of military 
evolution that provides a central insight into the process and growth of an imperial project yet in 
its infancy.  Its story is one of dialogue between the theoretical expectations of an occupying 
force and the creative negotiation of an occupied people who largely rejected U.S. impositions.  
Outlining the goals set by occupying forces in creating the constabulary, I examine the 
theoretical underpinnings of its organization, and how individual Dominicans and U.S. forces 
shaped its character in its first two years.  This chapter situates the early occupation within the 
contemporary growth of military theory of exporting democracy, examining U.S. attempts to 
create a native, volunteer constabulary as the central goal in the promotion of U.S.-defined 
stability.  The application of this developing theory, as the situation unfolded, forms the major 
content of this chapter.  Even in the highly structured confines of the military arena, occupation 
did not equal control.  Dominican response and management of occupation structures and 
relations on the one hand, and lack of clear definition or consistent support in the military 
government on the other, forced the planned constabulary to be much more versatile and 
adaptable than its proponents had expected, resulting, by late 1918, in its revision.  The result of 
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the revision, and the changed constabulary that was formed at the end of 1918, only somewhat 
resembled the force planned by occupiers in 1916.  It also significantly resembled military forces 
planned and created by Dominicans in years before the occupation, and incorporated Dominican 
military laws and traditions from as far back as the late nineteenth century.  In other words, 
despite the original expectation of occupation planners that they could create and impose a native 
constabulary whose ideals and structure were an implantation from the United States, the 
exigencies of the situation and the reality of context meant that constabulary had to become a 
blend of Dominican and U.S. military traditions and goals.  In an analysis of how and why 
priorities were later so drastically revised, I follow the constabulary's actual development over 
time, and its interplay with the civilian portion of the Dominican population from its foundation 
to the fundamental restructuring in December, 1918, at the end of two years of occupation.  The 
first years of occupation set precedents of violence, resistance, and tension that the later years 
could not overcome, even when tactics and governing approaches were radically revised.  Anti-
U.S. sentiment grew, and tensions between Dominicans and occupiers became so strong that 
many could not be overcome without an end to the occupation. 
 
 
In Theory 
 The beginnings of the occupation and the early failures of occupation goals, and the ways 
in which Dominicans negotiated the experience, provide a concrete historical example 
demonstrating the problems and difficulties of the U.S. intention to militarily export democracy 
in those early years.  A question that remains prominent in the literature today is whether 
military interventions and occupations can successfully bring U.S.-style democratic government 
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to foreign countries, countries that have histories and cultures different from those under which 
U.S. democracy developed.  Specific historical examples provide a vehicle by which scholars 
can examine the causes and results of successes and failures in such attempts.  The first two 
years of the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic demonstrate the gap between reality and 
contemporary U.S. theories of nation-building and the exportation of democracy.  This 
occupation began when those theories were still in early development, when economic and naval 
expansion were unprecedented in growth and the Navy was under pressure to develop quickly 
due to the unfolding of World War One in Europe and the Atlantic.  By the time of U.S. 
intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1916, the Caribbean had become a central focus of 
U.S. foreign policy and concern:  not only did naval and government planners stress the need for 
forward bases and fueling stations for their forces, but they feared that regional political 
instability and German expansion would combine to allow Germany a naval foothold into lands 
situated in U.S. coastal waters and much too near the Panama Canal for comfort. 
 This set of concerns escalated after 1914 when war became a reality in Europe.  The 
European war augmented U.S. interest in naval expansion that had begun in the 1890s, and sped 
the growth of that expansion throughout the Caribbean.  The period also saw significant change 
in the roles of the U.S. service branches.  By 1914, the role of the U.S. Marine Corps had 
undergone drastic change in its relations both to the Navy and to the State Department.  
Developments in technology and changes in U.S. foreign policy in the preceding decades had 
gradually erased the earlier amphibious assault role of marines in sea battles.  By 1914, the 
marines' primary role was that of colonial infantry, focusing on the seizing and control of 
forward bases and on expeditionary duty in foreign countries.
5
  This role was new.  In this early 
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stage of democratization through use of an occupying military, parameters for such duties 
remained undefined.  The shift in roles meant that military actions carried out by the U.S. Army 
in the earliest stages of this "experiment," such as in the Philippines, would now be realized 
through the navy and marines.  Furthermore, the coincidence of the interventions in this period 
with World War One meant that the U.S. State Department accorded them a secondary priority 
as World War One escalated.  With an expanding Navy and increasing concerns about national 
security in the Caribbean, this shift of emphasis to navy and marine occupying forces made sense 
to policy makers. It led to a confusing struggle for power between departments, however.  From 
the military government's beginning, it was under the charge of three different U.S. 
governmental departments: the Department of War, the Department of the Navy, and the State 
Department.  This was a major source of confusion and lack of coherence in the administration 
of the occupation, leading to an intermittent power struggle between the latter two departments 
that led to the delay of many occupation promises, and was one of the major reasons for the 
postponement of the new constabulary's creation.
6
 
 At the time of occupation in 1916, the Marine Corps also lacked a definition or training 
for this type of operation.  Not until decades after the occupation of the Dominican Republic 
(1916-1924) did the Marine Corps develop a unified set of guidelines and definitions for such 
operations.  Finally published in full form in 1940, the Small Wars Manual for the first time 
offered a comprehensive definition of what the Marine Corps termed “Small Wars,” and 
provided instruction in a number of aspects learned from the earlier occupation "experiments."
7
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The term “Small Wars” was, even in 1940, defined as largely indefinable:  
 The term “Small War” is often a vague name for any one of a great variety of military 
 operations.  As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under 
 executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the 
 internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or 
 unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the 
 foreign policy of our Nation.  
 
The lessons illustrated in the manual are indicative of the results of those early experiments; as 
they were gleaned from experience in locations such as the Dominican Republic, their emphases 
provide a broad  outline of the most prominent problems the marine units faced in the occupation 
under analysis.  After laying out a definition of “Small Wars," the manual emphasizes the 
following aspects of training needed for expeditionary forces:  1) Strategy for such 
unconventional “wars” and interventions.  2) Sections about psychology and military-civil 
relationships, or what would later be termed “Civic Action.”  3) Relations with the State 
Department in such circumstances, the lack of definition for which caused extensive problems 
during the early years of the Dominican occupation.  4) Organization and logistics, including an 
overview of the chain of command in such situations--another major point of contention in the 
Dominican occupation in the years 1916-1918.  This occupation was indeed an “experiment,” as 
professed by many in the navy at the time.
8
   
 U.S. planners did not intend the occupation to be limited to military experiment, 
however.  The ambition of the new foreign policy as it applied to this specific case can be seen in 
the words of Military Governor Knapp, who stated in a letter to the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps in 1917 that one of his officers was “carrying on a great experiment in the Dominican 
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Government.”9  This was a field test of the plan, consolidated under U.S. President Woodrow 
Wilson, to guarantee stability in the Caribbean by exporting (read: imposing) U.S. forms of 
government on the countries that made up the region.  Political science studies in recent years 
offer a frame for debate about the realism and possibility of exporting democracy.  The debate 
centers primarily on whether U.S.-style democracy can be exported to or imposed upon other 
countries, and--if so--which methods are successful and which are not.  Mark Peceny statistically 
analyzes a large set of U.S. military interventions occurring in the years 1898-1982 to 
convincingly argue that military interventions have not had a positive impact on democracy.  
Conversely, Peceny argues that active support for democratic elections often has a strong, 
positive impact on democratization.
10
   
 Peceny‟s conclusions mesh well with an analysis of military intervention and desires to 
promote democratic government in the Dominican Republic in the early years of the occupation.  
It was exactly the use of military force, which often discouraged active democratic participation, 
that would become a problem in later attempts to turn the occupation and Dominican society 
toward democratic government.  Military force, in this historical case, led to disillusionment with 
the U.S. system, and ultimately led to a three-decade military dictatorship in the Dominican 
Republic.  Because of the challenges of the occupation, the perceived need to increase military 
control and censor the Dominican press in the first two years re-wrote occupation priorities in 
ways that discouraged participation and encouraged government by force.  This, in turn, led to a 
result opposite the plans of the occupiers: shortly after withdrawal of occupation forces in 1924, 
the Dominican military would be the strongest force in Dominican politics.  
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Warp and Weave: Foundations of the new constabulary 
 To many Dominicans and U.S. planners, the new Dominican constabulary already existed 
three years before its 1917 inception.  Both the constabulary and Dominican protest against it 
were conceived in theory in 1914.  It existed then only as a concept, but as a heavily charged 
concept, it was a powerful agent in the Dominican history of the years 1914-1917.  As discussed 
in Chapter Two, it began, on the U.S. side, with the unfolding of the experiment to promote U.S.-
friendly stability in the region, and on the Dominican side with an increasingly bloody civil war.  
Through years of growing U.S. involvement in Dominican financial and political affairs leading 
up to the official occupation, the concept of the constabulary and the resistance to it formed from 
the time of the publication of Wilson‟s “Nota Número 14,” or the Wilson Plan, in July of 1914.  
This plan included continued and expanded U.S. control over Dominican administration, but also 
demanded the disbanding of all Dominican armed forces, to be replaced by a constabulary 
controlled by an appointee of the U.S. president.  When the Dominican government refused, the 
plan was repeatedly presented, eventually backed by the threat of full occupation.
11
  Dominican 
resistance to the idea, and fears about U.S. imperial goals, only increased under such threats to 
national sovereignty.  The U.S. invasion and occupation in 1916 did not improve the Dominican 
popular impression of U.S. intentions.  Occupation forces, entering the country with the belief 
that only a few “handfuls” of rebels opposed the occupation, encountered a population that 
heavily protested it.  Commanding marine officer Brigadier General J.H. Pendleton wrote in a 
letter to Marine Corps Major General Commandant as late as 18 December 1916 that ninety-five 
percent of Dominicans “have wanted just what they are now getting but have been afraid to say 
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so, fearing the small percentage of politicos and professional disturbers.”12   
 Dominicans throughout the country, however, felt much differently.  Historian Bruce 
Calder sums up, for example, the public “day of mourning” that accompanied the U.S. invasion 
in the capital city, and the abundance of popular and scholarly publications in protest of the 
occupation.
13
  The general Dominican lack of cooperation with the occupying government 
continued.  Dominican Cabinet members refused to accept a military governor and continued to 
uphold constitutionally-elected president Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, and were pushed out 
of power by the occupying forces.  In fewer than two months from Knapp‟s proclamation on 
November 29, occupation forces had disbanded the Dominican Congress by fiat, replaced the 
Dominican president with a military governor who was a U.S. Navy officer, began to heavily 
censor the Dominican press, and fought armed resistance with the force of superior weaponry.
14
  
The difficulties facing both occupying forces and Dominican officials and citizens were 
extensive, to say the least.  The occupiers knew virtually nothing about the Dominican land, 
people, or society.  Despite Knapp‟s assurance that Dominican civil courts would remain in place 
as long as they did not conflict with occupation objectives,
 15
 few among the occupation forces 
knew Spanish, and none understood the Dominican justice system (which was based largely on 
French codes of law).  They were critical of, and interfered summarily with, the Dominican court 
system.
16
  This tendency and their encounters with a resisting population led them to increasing 
use of military provost courts staffed by marine officers and run under navy courts-martial rules.  
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These courts held wide and vaguely defined powers of arrest and detention of suspects, and also 
enacted "surveillance and espionage" against Dominicans.  These marine-run military courts 
were also the only legal body through which complaints against American military personnel, 
members of the constabulary, and local officials could be examined.
17  
The seeming arbitrariness 
of the courts' functions, and the mistakes of provost court judges who were usually marine 
captains or lieutenants and lacked training for the post, led to Dominican charges of illegal 
conduct.
18
 
 As U.S. navy and marine forces gradually established the occupation government and 
spread throughout the country, they encountered widespread resistance and lack of cooperation 
from Dominicans of all classes and segments of society.
19
  They found themselves unprepared to 
deal with the intense anti-U.S. and anti-imperialist sentiment that had by then become a powerful 
feature of Dominican society.  The moment of the proclamation of 29 November 1916 was a 
telling one: Those Dominicans who had offered some cooperation in the hopes that the military 
intervention would be temporary were dumbfounded, many withdrawing from cooperation.  
Those who had attempted to stave off a complete occupation by remaining in government 
positions for nearly seven months with no pay stayed in office even after the proclamation; they 
continued working to create a constitutionally viable and sovereign Dominican government, as 
though in denial of what was going on outside their cabinet offices.
20
  Dominican diplomats and 
officials protested widely in Washington and abroad: on 4 December 1916, Dominican Minister 
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in Washington Armando Pérez Perdomo presented his official protest about the occupation's 
illegality to the State Department;
21
 on 16 January 1917, Dominican Chargé de Affaires in Cuba 
Manuel M. Morillo was removed from his post for calling a meeting and publishing a protest 
against the occupation.
22
  Then and throughout the occupation, President Francisco Henríquez y 
Carvajal published and organized extensive resistance abroad.  Dominican artists, authors, and 
newspapers decried the occupation as illegal, some blaming Dominicans for being so disorderly 
and others blaming the United States for being imperialist, but in wide agreement that Knapp‟s 
announcement was a moment of extreme national crisis.  Renowned teacher, educational 
reformer and feminist Ercilia Pepín, for example, went on a speaking tour beginning in January, 
vehemently denouncing the occupation.  In cities throughout the country, as widespread as Santo 
Domingo, La Vega, and Puerto Plata, audiences received her speech with tumultuous applause.  
Pepín continued to speak out against the occupation through the rest of its tenure.
 23
   
 Dominicans abroad, from those in official positions to those living abroad in Cuba or the 
United States, wrote tracts decrying the occupation.
24
  Dominicans throughout the provinces, 
especially outside of the cities, sabotaged transportation and marine communication networks.
25
  
Despite months of a “pacification campaign” carried out by marines since May of 1916, others 
revolted militarily in protest to the proclamation.
26
  Armed resistance in the form of guerrilla 
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warfare and intermittent sniper fire in the interior was so persistent and strong that the U.S. flag 
was not raised over the fortaleza in Santiago until nearly six months after the arrival of the U.S. 
invasion force.
27
  This resistance arose throughout the Republic in the first days and months of 
the occupation, though most strongly in the interior and the northern city of Puerto Plata.  While 
Dominican civil governors were to be kept in place under the authority of the military 
government, Governor Lico Pérez of Pacificador Province led an armed revolt upon hearing of 
Knapp's proclamation, making himself an "outlaw" by the definition of the occupying 
government.
28
  In the ensuing conflict, seven marines were wounded and eleven Dominicans 
killed and six wounded.
 29
  Marine reports in January of 1917 also warn that Emiliano Camarena, 
the head of the Monte Plata church, should be considered an agitator.
30
  Even the popular 
archbishop of Santo Domingo, who had in years previous attempted to mediate between the 
Dominican population and U.S. officials, soon traveled internationally to protest the occupation.  
 It was against this background that the occupying forces attempted to set the Wilson 
Plan‟s priorities in motion.  Primary among these were the disbanding of all Dominican forces, 
the disarmament of the population, and the creation of a new constabulary to help maintain social 
order.  The creation of the constabulary, occupation officials believed, could not begin until 
better-trained Marines had been able to disarm the majority of the population and bring about 
what they defined as social order.  It was therefore postponed for the first months of occupation 
while the occupying forces attempted to consolidate power, both over the government and over 
                                                 
27
 Charles H. Noxon, "Santo Domingo, Ward of the Marines," 3. 
28
 Military Government Executive Order 3; communications, File "Secretaría de Estado de Justicia e Instrucción 
Pública 1916,” Box 64, “Gobierno Militar Americano,” (1916-1920), AGN; C.A.E. King, "Report of Operations," 3 
December, 1916, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," Geographical Files,1916, USMC Historical Division, Quantico.   
29
 Unsigned and undated report, "Synopsis, Santo Domingo," Geographical Files, 1916, USMC Historical Division, 
Quantico. 
30
 "Report of Operations" from Captain R.E. Adams to "Commanding Officer, SD," 5 January 1917, file "1917," 
"Geographical Files," "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico. 
147 
 
the rest of the population through force.
31
  Many other factors contributed to the difficulties that 
occupiers faced in gaining Dominican loyalty, and that Dominicans faced in coping with and 
responding to the occupation.  Prominent among these was the prevalence of racism among U.S. 
officers.  Many of the officers staffing the military government in the first months, even those 
such as Knapp who attempted to include Dominicans in an advisory capacity, approached the 
issue with an air of superiority.
32
  In official communications, they commented that Dominicans 
were childish and naïve, overly violent and emotional, racially inferior, and unable to govern 
their country without U.S. tutelage--all approaches that were common to the U.S. thinking of the 
time, and thus to the entire experiment in exporting democracy in those early decades of the 
twentieth century.  The combination of this approach with Dominican resistances led to a 
repressive occupation force, one that seemed to prove to Dominicans that their suspicions had 
been correct.   
 The difficulties and tension of the early months of the occupation were in large part 
responsible for the population‟s continued unwillingness to accept the new U.S.-created 
Dominican constabulary.  The postponement of the new constabulary meant a period of pure 
U.S. military rule through most of the country that lasted until April of 1917.  With the long 
postponement of the constabulary and the disarmament of the population, marines were 
responsible for even basic policing action throughout the country.  This increased tension 
between occupying forces and Dominican citizens, and also fueled Dominican suspicions that 
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the occupation was a pure military takeover of their country.
33
  The buildup of tension during  
this period led many Dominicans to see the constabulary as a Dominican arm of the oppressive, 
foreign forces, even months before the constabulary became a physical reality.  Among 
occupiers, the difficulties and resistances facing the military government and marines during this 
time reinforced their opinion that the only way to bring “order” to the country would be through 
a wide restructuring of Dominican power structures.  U.S. officials staffing the occupation 
government sought, by early 1917, to restructure Dominican society and government, beginning 
with a "reorganization" and "stabilization" of the activities of governmental departments and a 
"general improvement of the country," all by U.S. definition of course.  These changes included 
dismissing respected Dominican elites from cabinet and government positions.
34
  The 
controversial changes were to be enforced by Marines and members of the new Dominican 
constabulary. 
 One major change envisioned by the occupation government was an ambitious 
restructuring of social power that would move the old Dominican military elites out of power 
and gradually replace them by the integration of new Dominicans.  Occupiers argued that 
Dominicans without previous strong loyalties to the government could be more easily trained in 
marine methods, allowing them to build a new Dominican government that would be more 
cooperative toward the United States.
35
  The most likely place to begin restructuring was with the 
military, one of the sectors of Dominican society that had traditionally held much of the power 
and influenced decisions in government, and one that occupiers expected to more easily control 
through structured training.  Occupation forces, lacking knowledge about Dominican history and 
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society, worked from conclusions formed through their recent experience with the country.  They 
looked to influential Dominicans such as Minister of War during the civil war, General Desiderio 
Arias, and made sweeping generalizations about the type of power that was most successful in 
Dominican society:  U.S. planners conceived of Dominican society as one in which simple 
Dominicans who were incapable of self-government could only be controlled by military force, 
in which generals who lacked professional military training and sought self-gratification battled, 
with no overlying structure, for control of a malleable and easily exploitable Dominican 
population.
36
  Marine Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Davis, for example, stated that "the 
Dominican is himself indoctrinated with one thing--respect for FORCE," and that the Dominican 
"does not want to be patted on the back and told he is an equal.  He has had a master his entire 
life; he recognizes the necessity of a master, and he wants a master."
37
  As discussed in Chapter 
Two, occupiers' conception of the old Dominican military was also an extreme over-
simplification.  Military forces had traditionally held a great deal of influence in Dominican 
politics, but in complex ways that the occupying forces did not understand.  National militaries 
had tended to be largely ineffectual outside of the area of Santo Domingo; elsewhere, throughout 
much of the country, civilian government was run by caudillo-style generals and politicians who 
accepted pay in return for maintaining social order in their provinces.  Other armed forces, such 
as property guards and border guards, answered directly either to landowners or local authorities.  
It was a complicated and adaptable system, and one that had long served the necessary 
government functions of an intensely regional country.   
 With over-simplified assumptions and the argument that Dominican officers and officer-
politicians had sought and maintained power with an eye to personal gratification, occupying 
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forces saw them as one of the major sources of civil disorder in the Dominican Republic.
38
  
Marine Major Charles F. Williams stated that Dominican officers lack responsibility toward the 
government, have a "very cloudy idea of discipline and sanity," and have to be supervised by 
Marine officers "to guard against pillage and possibly murder."
39
  Occupying forces also held 
that officers of the previous military owed too much allegiance to individual leaders from the 
time of the civil war, for which reason one of their first priorities in creating a new military was 
to weed out old military families and replace them with new recruits.
40
  These new recruits 
would come from the lower classes and from regions previously un-integrated into the military, 
those less likely to be loyal to previous elites and military leaders.  The integration of remote 
regions was gradual and slow due to lack of infrastructure and sufficient manpower, however, 
and the incorporation of lower classes was also problematic.  Occupiers' arguments for the need 
to incorporate the uneducated, lower classes were a clear indicator of their lack of faith in the 
previous Dominican education or political systems, and that they intended to try to remake 
aspects of Dominican society by beginning with a clean slate.  They did not, however, account 
for how the lack of education and experience would affect the actions of these recruits, believing 
as they did that a training program could be set in place, and they did not account for popular 
reaction to such recruitment.  Though occupying forces publicly argued that this incorporation of 
the lower classes was meant to promote democracy, Dominicans could look to the history of 
dictator Heureaux and recognize the pattern as one of control.  Heureaux had recruited illiterate 
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and landless Dominicans, using them to defend the power of wealthy planters.
41
  As the years 
1917 and 1918 unfolded, educated Dominicans and those who remembered Heureaux's 
dictatorship could easily make this connection.   Largely unaware of that history, occupying 
forces sought to use this method both for control and to recreate the military force of the 
Dominican Republic, to buy its loyalty through steady pay.  They argued that the Marine-
equivalent pay of seventeen U.S. dollars per month would seem a "princely sum to peasants 
accustomed to working 12 hours a day on a sugar plantation" for twenty-five cents or less per 
day.
42
  They underestimated the difficulties facing them in such an enterprise. 
 Although a few of the U.S. navy and marine officers in the Dominican Republic in the 
early months of the occupation had some minor experience with foreign interventions--in the 
Philippines, Mexico, or Haiti--most did not, and marine officers governing local populations had 
neither experience nor training for governing.
43
  In addition to lacking training and clear goals, 
they lacked funding, especially for military needs that had not been figured into the occupation's 
original objectives such as prison administration and guarding.  Commander Arthur Marix sent 
an urgent request for funding to the Military Government in December of 1916.  District 
Commander at an interior post at La Vega, he informed the government that after years of civil 
war the local prison in the Fortaleza was “worthless as it is absolutely insecure and insanitary 
[sic.] to the extreme, the rooms small and frequently packed from pit to dome with prisoners.”  
He requested $1,750 for repairs, but was told that there were no public funds for such an 
improvement.  Nearly three months after his request, he was finally sent less than one third of the 
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requested funds.
44
  Such denials for funds or troop increases were common despite the extensive 
damage and lack of repair to police and military facilities from over five years of civil war.   
Initial occupation plans included neither budget nor manpower for such needs as local policing 
and prison-guarding.  With the population legally disarmed and all autonomous Dominican 
forces disbanded, however, such duties had to fall to the marines throughout the country.  
Without funds or manpower, their ability to carry out these duties was limited, especially in 
regions of heavier Dominican resistance.  The result was that many facilities continued in a poor 
state, damaging the reputation and efficiency of the occupying forces as well as the authority and 
capability of the new constabulary when it was created.
45
  This was especially true of prisons and 
medical facilities.  Prisons tended to be poorly ventilated and crowded, damaged, and to lack 
drainage, and medical facilities lacked supplies until late 1918 and early 1919.
46
   
 Despite the goal of general disarmament and the disbanding of all Dominican armed 
forces, the difficulties facing the military government caused them to at first maintain a small 
remainder of the Guardia Republicana (G.R.) under the command of marines.  By the time of 
Knapp‟s proclamation, the old G.R. was already a small force.  It had been gradually reduced in 
the years of the civil war and officer pay had decreased over the years.  Finally, when 1916 
brought severe budget constraints and then the U.S. intervention withholding of all government 
funds, desertions from the G.R. skyrocketed.
47
  In the last months before Knapp's proclamation, 
President Henríquez y Carvajal was frantically ordering reports of how many G.R. members and 
arms remained in the provinces around Santo Domingo, by then the only remaining site of 
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official government military forces.
48
  Upon Knapp‟s proclamation, the decimated forces fell 
under the control and direction of the marines.  Marines gradually began disbanding the 
organization, maintaining the most cooperative officers for assistance in civil and armed 
resistance situations, translations, minor intelligence gathering, and communications with 
Dominican civil administration.  By March of 1917, shortly before the constabulary was formed, 
the entire force of the G.R. stood at only 178 members.
49
  Many U.S. officers serving in the 
occupation estimated that the old G.R. had been more a threat than a support to the stability of 
government.  The Marine Corps history of the occupation argues that the G.R. men “had been 
ragged and untrained, their officers ignorant and corrupt.”50  Yet in the early months of the 
occupation, the remaining G.R. members were recorded to have served occupation forces well, 
aiding in the gathering of intelligence, fighting against resistance, and the disarming of the 
Dominican population.  The marine inspector who oversaw them in those months, Thomas E. 
Watson, reported a lack of discipline or drill, but that the men were clean and able, and did not 
complain despite lack of basic provisions such as clothing.
51
   
 At the beginning of April 1917, four months after Knapp's proclamation, occupation 
forces were still fighting armed resistance and working to set up viable military headquarters 
from which the Marines could operate in more remote regions of the country.  Logistical and 
administrative problems meant that the constabulary had yet to be formed.  The military 
government still lacked translators, manpower, and cooperation from much of the local 
Dominican population and civil government.  Lieutenant Pimental of the G.R. reported in 
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February, for example, that when the G.R. members came to town one Jefe Comunal told all of 
the Dominicans who had arms to hide in the bushes until the soldiers left.
52
  Some local 
authorities refused to carry out orders of arrest, or hesitated due to conflicting orders between the 
marine and Dominican authorities.
53
  Facing such challenges, occupation forces felt that some of 
the remaining G.R. officers were still vital to the realization of occupation goals, and temporarily 
retained them in service; the official disbanding of the G.R. would wait until later that year.  
Even four and five months after the new constabulary was formed in April 1917, a number of 
G.R. members were still working alongside marines, and distinguishing themselves in fighting 
armed Dominican resistance.
54
  In the very month that would see the final creation of the 
constabulary, for example, and in what occupying officers would classify as the “most important 
of major contacts with bandit forces” for the year, a mixed force of marines and G.R. fought a 
day-long battle against armed resisters.
55
   
 In addition to using the G.R. officers to supplement their own military forces, occupiers 
employed them in intelligence gathering and the recruitment of members of the new 
constabulary.  G.R. officers knew the country and worked as interpreters scribbling pencil 
translations at the bottoms of communications within the military.  They knew the backgrounds 
of men who might be interested in enlisting in the new constabulary, and of men who were 
fugitives from the previous government.  The continued use of Dominican officers from the 
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previous military gave the impression that some of the officer corps might be Dominican.
56
 
Gaining the cooperation of these officers by promising them transfer to the future Dominican 
constabulary, the military government would use them for recruitment and then weed them out 
of the military once the new force was viable.  The occupying forces‟ employment of G.R. 
members from the pre-occupation military was, for their purposes, double-edged: On the one 
hand, it meant that at least some Dominicans briefly remained in the lower-level administration 
of the occupation; they worked with marines for months and, with the promise that they would 
be able to remain in the military, were one of the few sources of Dominican cooperation.  On the 
other hand, the ability of these officers to impress Dominicans or improve the reputation of a 
U.S.-created constabulary was hampered by their willingness to serve with occupation forces in 
the disarmament and repression of the Dominican population, and because respect for them 
among Dominicans was already mixed; many remembered the G.R. as an object of repression in 
the recent past.
57
    
 Since the Military Government had decided to exclude previous military officers and 
replace them with a set of new and previously untrained and inexperienced recruits, the question 
remained of how to push these officers out of the military once the new constabulary was 
formed.  Methods varied, and the process--meant to avoid engendering hostility from these 
powerful figures in Dominican society--was gradual.  The primary method was to retain a small 
force under the name of the old military while beginning recruitment for the new constabulary in 
April, 1917; the promise of eventual transfer to the new constabulary was enough to maintain the 
cooperation of those who wished to continue their military careers.  Only when the said transfer 
came were the officers informed that they would only be able to join the new constabulary at the 
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lowest rank--a pay decrease that most could not afford, and a prestige decrease that most were 
not willing to accept.  There is a note of incredulity in some of the letters of resignation from 
those men who had been offered the chance to transfer into the new constabulary as privates.  
One officer in the G.R. wrote to Marine Corps Colonel McKelvey that, although he was a 
“faithful friend of the military government,” he was also the father of a family, and could not 
afford to enlist in the constabulary as a private.
58
  Others left only curt resignations through the 
months of May and June as the disbanding of the G.R. was gradually finalized.
59
 
 One of the more distinguished men in the pre-occupation military, Colonel Buenaventura 
Cabral, was in a command position as a G.R. officer working with the constabulary until late 
1917 and commanding forces fighting resistance alongside the marines.
60
  In late 1917, he was 
made governor of Azua.
61
  Grandson of former Dominican president Buenaventura Báez, Cabral 
was a long-time member of the Dominican military, a captain at a young age at the beginning of 
the Heureaux dictatorship (1889-1899) and a commanding officer through the years of the G.R.
62
  
Just as occupation forces convinced Cabral to peacefully resign from the military by giving him 
a governorship, they worked to diplomatically discourage the enlistment of old G.R. members.  
Many were eventually discharged for “health reasons” or placed in minor political positions.  
Many, interested in continuing their military careers, protested.  Selecting a literate 
representative among them, a group of such men wrote up and signed a petition protesting their 
discharge from the military in May of 1917:  
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 Señor, the undersigned members and agents of the Guardia Republicana. . . Respectfully  
 write to you with the objective of bringing to your attention the fact that we have been 
 disarmed and retired by the new Jefe Comunal, in the moment that he took office, 
 without knowing the reason. . . We have been faithfully compliant in service every time 
 the case has required it of us.  Believing that the said power does not have the authority to 
 impoverish us  without cause… 
 
With these words, and signed “your subalterns,” they addressed their petition to the military 
government.
63
  They addressed the petition directly to G.R. Captain Manual Batlle, still in a 
position of some authority in the military government‟s intelligence structure, who forwarded it 
on to the Secretary of War and Marine.   
 Many of the discharged also sent petitions over the next four months, some writing more 
than once, that they had not been paid for their last weeks of service to the military 
government.
64
  Communications within the military government demonstrated the reasoning 
behind the discharges.  One, for example, communicated concern about G.R. officer Captain 
Manuel Batlle, who had cooperated with occupiers, had been moved from El Seybo Province to 
the more central location of Santo Domingo, and seemed prepared to move to the new 
constabulary: “Captain Batlle is one of the Guardia Republicana and is not desired in the new 
organization.”65  The military government held firm to its goal of completely remaking the 
military from the ground up, and of transplanting a structure based on the Marine Corps, one that 
would not incorporate elements of Dominican military tradition, and one that would not be 
compromised by previous Dominican loyalties.  The military government also maintained the 
claim that its purpose there was due to Wilsonian Progressivism and the need to create 
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democracy, and the old military was associated with undemocratic militarism.
66
   
 Some officers from the old military who served with the marines in early 1917 saw the 
remaking of the military as an opening, a possibility to see conditions in the military improved, 
and an enterprise in which they might take part.  They wrote letters with suggestions, based on 
their extensive experience in the Dominican military, to help the military government in its goals 
to make the new constabulary less corrupt and more efficient.  Colonel Cabral wrote to marine 
Colonel George Thorpe in May suggesting a list of G.R. members who would make good 
additions to the constabulary.
67
  G.R. Lieutenant Pedro Richardo, who served with the marines in 
Azua, wrote a three-page plan for the new organization.  He states that he had proudly served 
with the marines to maintain order, that as a Dominican officer he shared the stated interests of 
occupation forces.  Richardo criticized some aspects of the G.R., that it was sometimes infamous 
among the population for arbitrariness and "innumerable abuses."  For the new constabulary to 
avoid such issues, he argued, it must emphasize the health and training of its members.  Training 
should focus on teaching recruits the Dominican Police Law, reading, writing, arithmetic, 
hygiene, and "civic and moral instruction."  Setting himself and the class of Dominican officers 
apart among the population as "belonging to honored family," Richardo uses the first person 
plural in his discussion of building a new military.
68
  His investment in the reform, like that of 
other officers, was clear.  His letter, like others, was politely answered with an emphasis on 
appreciation for his cooperation, and its suggestions filed and ignored.
69
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 Some officers of the G.R. thus made up one of the few groups willing to support the 
military government.  Yet, by the end of 1917, they were effectively pushed out of military 
decision making and most positions of importance, and completely removed from the military.  
Attempts to balance military control with some pretense of democratic government became 
increasingly problematic in early 1917, however.  With no Dominicans in high office in the 
government or in officer ranks in the new constabulary, maintaining a pretense of democracy or 
even strong Dominican involvement was impossible.  As occupation forces attempted to 
understand and reorder the Dominican governmental system while also fighting resistance and 
working to build infrastructure, the confusion and intermittent reports of corruption in the 
remaining forces of the old G.R. seemed just another problem.  The irony, then, was that while 
intellectuals, politicians, the upper class, large segments of the lower classes, and much of the 
middle class (excluding foreign landowners) were resisting the occupation, military government 
forces alienated the one educated group from which they had consistently received support. 
 
 
World War One and the Guardia Nacional Dominicana 
 U.S. entry into World War One on 2 April 1917 had immediate and major effects on 
Dominican military development.  It effectively ended the power struggle between the Navy 
Department and the State Department, the latter of which, preoccupied with the European war, 
ceded authority over the situation to the former.  This meant that many of the administrative 
difficulties surrounding the occupation administration and the creation of the constabulary could 
be set aside.  Officers in the Department of the Navy quickly began to consolidate their 
administrative control and emphasize their own priorities, and to clarify and attempt to realize 
occupation goals.  U.S. entry into World War One also forcefully rearranged priorities, meaning 
160 
 
that the constabulary's creation could no longer be delayed.  The constabulary was to serve as 
one answer to the many challenges of administration that were brought about by the war.  Most 
immediate among those challenges was decreased attention to the occupation from the United 
States.  The State Department was preoccupied with an issue that policymakers prioritized as 
more important and urgent than its continuing occupations of the Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua, and Haiti.  One of the central motivations for those occupations had, after all, been 
concerns about European--and especially German--influence and expansion in the Caribbean.  
This meant the almost immediate withdrawal of more experienced U.S. officers and a decrease 
of U.S. troops and funds in the Dominican Republic.  The few officers who did have some 
previous experience with foreign occupations were removed, and the marine provisional 
regiment stationed throughout the Dominican Republic found itself increasingly understaffed.
70
  
Marine strength, numbering well over 2,000 personnel at the time of Knapp's proclamation on 29 
November 1916, dropped to 1,683 within a month of the U.S. declaration of war.
71
  Dominicans 
and U.S. investors alike protested the removal of experienced troops, knowing that the 
occupation already stood on precarious ground, and that such a withdrawal of experienced forces 
would further hinder the military government‟s ability to cope with its many duties.72   
 The decrease in marine strength took place concurrently with rising Dominican 
resistance--resistance that increased in part due to a declaration of war that put the occupied 
Dominican Republic in an ambiguous foreign relations position.  In an attempt to appease 
Dominican popular opinion, the military governor claimed that the military government was 
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neutral in World War One while occupying marine forces were not.
73
  Dominicans were not 
appeased; newspaper front-page headings lamented that “La República Dominicana ha entrado 
sin querer en la Primera Guerra Mundial.”74  The attempt also caused further confusion over who 
should be taking orders from whom.  Further, the war affected actions on the ground: marines 
persecuted Germans throughout the republic, interning them and divesting them of their land.
75
  
Rufus Lane described the extensive presence and influence of Germans, and stated that the 
ignorance among the Dominican population made them highly susceptible to widespread 
propaganda that he felt Germans must be spreading to encourage Dominicans to resist the 
occupation.
76
  Communications about this concern demonstrate the ways that World War One 
affected decisions made in the Dominican Republic, the increase in repression and censorship, 
and occupiers' low opinions of Dominican capabilities.  Throughout 1917 and 1918, they spelled 
out the impossibility of inferior Dominicans carrying out such a successful resistance against 
"superior" U.S. forces, and claimed that Germans must be organizing and supplying the 
resistance.  George Thorpe wrote, for example, that  
            The general opinion here is that whoever is running this revolution is a wise man: he         
            certainly is getting a lot out of the niggers. Somehow or other he has indoctrinated the  
            gabilleros [guerrillas] and really made them revolutionaries, and he has gotten spirit into      
            them.  It shows the handwork of the German as certain as can be.  There is no doubt in    
            my mind that a German is commanding the enemy‟s campaign.  They are really working  
            tactics on us showing the cardinal activity on or at widely separated places on succeeding  
            days, to keep us jumping from the north to the south and from the east to the west, and  
            vice versa.
77
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They even explained Haitian cooperation with Dominican resistance by placing the blame on 
elusive German organizers; Pendleton wrote that “their German assistants and backers have not 
been asleep and are using every effort to reinforce and keep alive this lively insurrection by 
scraping together criminals from all parts and utilizing Haitians laid off from sugar centrals 
during the inactive sugar season.” 78  
 Despite the clear consolidation in armed resistance described by Thorpe, other resistance 
efforts suffered from the shift of world attention to the European war.  International resistance 
gained little interest during those years, and the military government used that lack of attention 
and the claims of German subversion to pass strong censorship laws.
79
  Pendleton justified the 
use of force and arbitrary arrest against the population, arguing that the "bandit situation" was 
not representative of public sentiment, but "simply vagabonds bought up by German interests."
80
  
Military decisions made during 1917 and 1918 were, therefore, much more influenced by World 
War One interests and concerns than by concerns about improvement of the Dominican 
Republic.  Even military infrastructural and legal improvements demonstrated this set of 
priorities.  Knapp had to maintain an artillery company for defense against raiders in the port 
cities, Pendleton explained to marine Commandant George Barnett in a letter on 9 April, 1917: 
"even a submarine could shell this city," he noted.
81
   Executive orders through 1917 emphasized 
war concerns too.  Executive Order 102 of 8 December 1917, for example, attempted to set laws 
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to control the passing of information.  Anyone not in the service of the military government or 
U.S. government, or "of a nation holding friendly relations with" the United States, was 
forbidden "to send, take out of, bring into, or attempt to send, take out of, or bring into" the 
Dominican Republic any "tangible form of communication" except through government-
controlled mail service.  Doing so was prosecutable by military courts with up to $5,000 fine 
and/or years in prison. 
 Those U.S. officers left in the Dominican Republic to deal with the situation meant to 
answer it by hurrying the constabulary‟s creation to make up for the lack of troops.  The move 
was also meant to calm increasing tensions, and to improve relations between Dominican 
civilians and the armed forces of occupation.
82
  This need became all the more urgent with 
occupation forces undermanned and understaffed.  They hoped that the Dominicans constabulary 
might fill the gap in manpower, give them first-hand knowledge of the land (especially in remote 
regions), allay Dominican fears of U.S. imperialistic goals, and put up the appearance of a united 
front in which Dominicans were working with marines.
83
  On 7 April 1917, only five days after 
the U.S. declaration of war, military government Executive Order 47 finally ordered the 
recruitment of a “native constabulary” with a budget of $500,000 for the remainder of the 
calendar year.
 84
  Planners emphasized that it must be a purely volunteer force, manned by 
Dominicans but run by officers from the United States; the commanding officer to decide the 
rules and organization of the constabulary must be a U.S. citizen.  As with forces being created 
in Nicaragua and Haiti, occupiers named it with emphasis on its capacity as a national, civil 
guard.  The new "Guardia Nacional Dominicana" would replace all previous Dominican armed 
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forces, including the Dominican Army, Navy, and police forces, already disbanded, and the 
Guardia Republicana and Frontier Guard.
85
   
 From the beginning, however, the exact nature of this experimental force was in dispute.  
Governor Knapp argued that “Dominicans are capable of producing a body of excellent trained 
police, and in my opinion police are what are needed in this country, not an army,” presumably 
because he thought that an organized police force scattered throughout the country would be less 
susceptible to dictatorial control.
86
  In the face of such a threat, Knapp argued that small 
Caribbean countries were better off without militaries, that their proximity to the United States 
meant they did not need forces to protect national sovereignty.  Pendleton, however, felt that the 
Dominican Republic needed an army, and chafed at the idea that U.S. forces should constantly 
be responsible for the sovereignty of nearby nations.
87
  The question remained contentious 
throughout the occupation, and after initial discussions was never precisely answered.  Rufus 
Lane, one of the most prominent functionaries of the military government, described the result:  
military by organization, it was a body whose police duties were secondary and subordinate; it 
was “never large enough to discharge the military functions incumbent on the national army and 
was too military to devote itself, except spasmodically, to its police duties.”88  Pendleton, too, 
called it a "hybrid and emasculated body," lamenting this problem extensively in his personal 
and professional communications and stating that the delays and failures of organization and 
clarity in the new constabulary were a direct product of Knapp‟s refusal to allow the creation of a 
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national army.
89
   
 This problem severely damaged the efficiency and reputation of the constabulary during 
1917 and 1918, especially when joined with the undefined and widely diverse functions that 
would fall under the constabulary‟s duties.  From the beginning, the exact authority and duties of  
the constabulary were unclear.  With the policy of disarmament and the disbanding of armed 
forces in the first months of occupation, marines were by April of 1917 patrolling the country, 
fighting armed resistance, working to disarm the population, policing cities, guarding prisons and 
effecting arrests, all while still trying to establish headquarters and military substations.
90
  The 
new constabulary would join in all of these duties, and were also required for such unplanned 
needs as the escorting of local government functionaries.  Marine Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. 
Miller described some of the confusion reigning in regard to the constabulary's powers of arrest: 
"The [constabulary] was not authorized to arrest persons for violations of municipal ordinances.  
This was rather vividly illustrated by [constabulary] orders which directed that the organization 
would restrict its operations within municipal limits to assisting local authorities when the latter 
were unable to cope with a given situation, and to guard against any interference in strictly 
municipal or communal affairs," though they were required to execute warrants.  Miller also 
pointed out the damage to the constabulary's reputation caused by the use of its members to 
make arrests regarding censorship laws and for verbal insults against members of the 
occupation.
91
  
 Unclear mandates regarding the administration of civil law, combined with the 
                                                 
89
 Various correspondence, “Pendleton Papers,” Box 2, USMC Archives and Special Collections, Quantico.  
Pendleton wrote to Marine Corps Commandant George Barnett on 9 April, 1917 that Knapp could not make up his 
mind, and that by delaying the formation of the Guardia, Knapp was also increasing the duration that the Marine 
Corps would need to remain in the country.  Barnett wrote back on 30 April that he would try to push a rapid 
decision, and try “to have the Guardia a military affair.”  
90
 George C. Thorpe,  “American Achievements in Santo Domingo, Haiti, and the Virgin Islands,” in George H. 
Blakeslee, Mexico and the Caribbean, (New York: G.E. Stechert and Company, 1920), 234. 
91
 Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," (May, 1935), 55. 
166 
 
difficulties of travel and communication, confusion of differing orders emanating from the 
military governor and the marine commander, and widespread lack of cooperation from the local 
population to complicate the broad job of "restoring order."
92
  In the end, the constabulary was a 
somewhat anomalous force.  Despite the final decision that the constabulary would be a police 
force, in deference to the desire of Governor Knapp, those carrying out the organizing of the 
force were Marines under the command of Joseph Pendleton.  The constabulary was thus 
patterned after the Marine Corps, its structure mirroring that of the marine brigade stationed 
throughout the country, one company planned to be stationed in each province.
93
  Planned 
training and discipline also mirrored those of the Marine Corps.
94
  Even the new constabulary 
uniforms, where they were actually supplied, consisted of a marine-style uniform with khaki 
shorts, further reinforcing the image of the constabulary as an arm of the foreign force.
95
 
Each company was headquartered in the available military structures, meaning that the 
constabulary's companies were stationed in the Dominican fortalezas that had long served as 
military headquarters and prisons in previous Dominican militaries.  Not until five weeks after 
the executive order that authorized the constabulary was even the most basic part of the 
command structure laid out.  A decree of 14 May 1917 finally set out the authority of a 
constabulary commander and his subordinates throughout the provinces, including a command 
structure for “requisitions, pay lists, and local expenses.”96  Knapp fixed the original strength of 
the constabulary at eighty-eight commissioned officers and 1,200 enlisted men, placing it under 
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the command of a marine officer within the Second Brigade.
97
 
 The greatest problems plaguing the new military, after the official command structure 
was laid out, continued to be the lack of definition about its duties and the need for extensive 
manpower for policing and fighting resistance combined with the relatively small size of the 
constabulary.  These problems led to regional variations as figured out by marines commanding 
local contingents of the new constabulary, a process that meant gradual development over time, 
rules made up based on local necessities, and an organization that lacked central unity.  Further, 
from the beginning, more was expected and needed of the units than they could possibly achieve.  
The primary results of this were: 1. Marines often had to carry out the duties ascribed to the 
constabulary.  2. The duties of constabulary members varied widely from site to site, depending 
on the most pressing needs of any given location.  3. Constabulary duties were flexible as needs 
changed, which often meant that their authority was unclear and their training and experience 
was incomplete.  4. Especially with the manpower shortage in the occupying forces that 
accompanied the withdrawal of many U.S. troops to Europe, systematic training of the 
constabulary recruits was simply impossible. 
 During World War One, the lack of budgetary and supply resources meant that recruits 
lacked arms, clothing, and sometimes basic provisions.  Especially in the more outlying regions, 
both Marine occupiers and constabulary recruits tended, in 1917 and 1918, to "appropriate" 
mounts, food, and other supplies from a local population already suffering through a difficult 
economic time,
98
 an action that could only increase tensions between the civilian population and 
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the Marines and Dominicans of the constabulary.  Further, many of the U.S. officers who were 
drawn away from the occupation were replaced by new marine recruits who had joined the 
military in the hope of fighting in the European war--men who resented being sent to the  
Caribbean, and who would resent being kept in service in a foreign country after the armistice 
was signed in Europe.
99
  More experienced men were sent to Europe, and World War One 
draftees were rushed into occupied territories, lacking sufficient training: "One detachment of 
these men in bandit territory, on their first night in the camp, mistook the flare of lighted 
cigarettes for enemy rifle flashes.  They blazed away with their own weapons, and only their 
poor marksmanship prevented them from mowing down the battalion commander's escort."
100
  
Edward A. Craig, a temporary captain of one company in early 1919, said that not only were his 
men poorly trained, they were "practically mutinous" to the point that he felt the need to sleep 
with a weapon.
101
  The unhappy and poorly trained marine recruits and the prevalence of racism 
among U.S. occupying forces only served to further break down Dominican-marine relations, 
and Dominican relations with their countrymen who worked for marine officers.  The influx of 
poorly trained marines, which extended over the period 1917-1919, made more difficult the 
justification of having only marine officers, and further decreased the possibility of training in 
units outside the major cities.   
 The combination of conflicts led to marine and constabulary violence against the 
populace.  George C. Thorpe, as Chief of Staff, wrote to Pendleton on 30 May, 1918 that a 
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marine named Hatton had been left in charge in El Seibo Province,  Thorpe reported that upon 
the escape of a guerrilla leader, Hatton summarily executed eleven Dominicans in the prison and 
then “for some time conducted a campaign of severity in Seibo province, burning houses, 
treating the inhabitants arbitrarily, taking horses, etc.  In short, the inhabitants suddenly felt a 
great change in the conduct of the 11
th
 Co., and a number of unsteady ones" joined the armed 
resistance campaign.
102
  He further reported that Hatton was not alone among marine officers 
leading the constabulary, that before that marine Thad Taylor “misconceived his function,” 
arresting indiscriminately and leaving people in jail where they “rotted. . . pending investigation 
or search for evidence”; “In Macoris people were deadly fearful of being arrested because of the 
uncertainty of getting a hearing."
 103
  He also reported corruption among marine officers and U.S. 
civilians: Taylor‟s American friends used his name to gain unwarranted privileges, “as did one 
American woman on several occasions in her dealings at the Market in Macoris where if she did 
not obtain unwarranted concessions as to the place she should take in the line of food applicants 
or the quantity of food she was to receive would threaten to report to Captain Taylor and have 
the official arrested who tried to enforce his proper orders”; marine captain McLean told him that 
it was common for any enlisted man to arrest civilians, and their hearing might be delayed 
indefinitely; Captain Morse arbitrarily arrested but commanded no respect, even allowed a native 
to disarm him.  This concern further affected treatment of Dominicans outside of the 
constabulary: Thorpe reported that several times in Seibo Province was that some police 
officials, commissaries, etc., were armed with pistols while others were not allowed to carry even 
a machete. . . The excuse for not allowing these police officials arms is that they might allow 
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bandits to disarm them.”104  Violence and arbitrary treatment from the constabulary, of course, 
further distanced marine and Dominican constabulary members from the possibility of popular 
approval.    
 Furthermore, issues that had long plagued the Dominican military continued to be 
problematic for the constabulary.  These problems, unforeseen by inexperienced occupying 
forces who did not know the terrain or geographical particularities of the country, centered 
around lack of communications and travel infrastructure in a mountainous country whose heavy 
seasons of rainfall washed out trails.  The commander of the Southern District described the 
problem of communication in these years, and its implications:  
 The only communications between troops and various headquarters from 24 January 
 1917 to 6 July 1918 was by messenger mounted on horses or on foot.  No means of 
 checking up either positions, efficiency or conduct of patrols and patrol leaders existed.  
 Patrols were sent out at various times and were frequently not heard of for three weeks. . . 
 No telephone, telegraph, radio or other field communications existed for civil or military 
 usage prior to July 1918. . . In Seibo, (nearly as large as Porto Rico) not one kilometer of 
 road on which an automobile could travel existed prior to July 1918.
105
  
 
Another long-term problem, and one that had been a major issue for the previous Dominican 
military, was the inability to adequately supply its force.  Revenue from the state was simply not 
enough to provide modern arms and the other requirements of an efficient military.  This 
continued to be the case during the occupation, and the occupation government was also 
diverting funds in its attempts to improve sanitation and health and to build a workable 
transportation and communication infrastructure throughout the country.  During the early 
occupation years, when the military government had less support from a U.S. State Department 
preoccupied with World War One, arms confiscated from the local population often proved the 
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only arms they could afford for distribution to the new constabulary‟s forces.106  Many in the 
constabulary thus ended up charged with going into battle against well-armed resistance forces 
carrying only rusted machetes and other crude weapons--conditions that led to higher desertion 
rates, especially in areas of higher violence.
107
  The guerrilla movements actively recruited men 
from the constabulary, and because desertion made them outlaws, many other deserters moved 
directly to the ranks of the resistance--a problem that continued for years.
108
  
 Many other instances of confusion resulted from the widespread lack of definition that 
plagued the constabulary and its planners.  Some stemmed from occupation goals.  For example, 
the disbanding of Dominican armed forces caused problems and confusion: Dominicans resented 
the rapid and sudden changeover of all armed authority to foreign representatives.
109
  Civil unrest 
continued throughout 1917-1918, especially in areas into which the occupation forces were late 
in expanding, which had a long tradition of guarding large landholdings--especially sugar 
estates--by privately hired armed guards.  Occupying forces found it necessary to make 
numerous exceptions to protect (usually foreign) landowners‟ assets, allowing dispensations for 
arms for local forces and guards.  With the many different allowances, most unclearly defined by 
law during 1917 and much of 1918, numerous controversies arose about under whose authority 
such armed Dominicans should fall.   
 
 
                                                 
106
 Letter from H.S. Knapp to Pendleton, July 1917, “Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo,” file 1916, “Geographical Files,” 
USMC Historical Division, Quantico. 
107
 A.M. Norris, "Weekly Report," 27 February, 1921, Box 3, File "1921, 18," "Ejército Nacional," AGN1. 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 One major source of such controversy was in a site that seldom required the use of arms: Executive Order 19 did 
away with Comandancias de Puertos, leaving the powers of arrest in ports to customs collectors there; this led to a 
controversy in November of 1917, when one such customs collector arrested a Dominican man, demonstrating a 
power that many felt he should not have.  Box #64 (1916-1920), File: “Secretaría de Estado de Justicia e Instrucción 
Pública 1917.”  Various Correspondence, “Gobierno Militar Americano, ”AGN1; for Dominican reaction, see 
Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, El Antiimperialismo, 59. 
172 
 
The Fabric of Failure: Recruitment and Retention, 1917-1918 
 When enlistment to the constabulary opened in April of 1917, marine officers were 
optimistic.  Their use of officers from the previous Dominican military, the promise of a 
democratic future, and the pay rate they established--equal to that of marine recruits--seemed to 
spell out the conditions for an enthusiastic rush of willing recruits despite the widespread lack of 
approval for the occupation as a whole.  The constabulary's planners, who were mostly 
headquartered in Santo Domingo, continued to hold, after all, the belief that most Dominicans 
wanted the reform and were simply afraid to speak up.  The use of Dominican officers did 
provide some inroads:  Despite the desire to find all new recruits, some of the first to enlist came 
from the recommendations of officers such as Batlle and Cabral, who actively worked to recruit 
a reliable force.  This was especially important in regions to which the marines had not yet 
spread, such as in the east, where local G.R. officers were the major recruiters for the new 
constabulary in its first months.  At the moment that enlistment opened, reactions to the 
constabulary in some areas were still mixed, and the fact that so much recruitment was done by 
G.R. officers who were known and often respected must have greatly affected the ability to gain 
recruits.  One can readily imagine the reaction of these recruits--enlisted for three years of 
service--when the G.R. officers were suddenly replaced by foreign military officers.  Many of 
those recruited by G.R. officers in the early months were among the early deserters from the 
constabulary, and a number of them--thus outlaws--joined the armed resistance.
110
 
 In the first months of 1917, G.R. officers were still autonomously effecting arrests and 
then reporting them to the marines or military government; they were also still the major go-
between for civil authorities, especially in areas that the marines had not yet occupied, but also in 
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areas in which marines were stationed.
111
  While this in-between state lasted, it solved some 
problems for marine recruiters even while it was being phased out without a solution to replace 
it.  It also caused problems: The organization and paperwork for this improvised solution was 
problematic.  For example, many of the G.R. members were illiterate, some unable to sign for 
checks, and the haphazard ways in which occupation forces employed their services left reigning 
confusion about who had been issued checks or cash.
112
  Much of the administration of the 
constabulary in its early months went through G.R. officers, with no clear line drawn as to how 
this should be organized, causing a great deal of confusion in the records, especially concerning 
pay and equipment; many letters complained that no salaries had been paid to certain groups.
113
  
Using the G.R. was also more or less successful depending on region, in large part due to 
corruption in the G.R. and to the difficulties in the command structure caused by communication 
and travel difficulties.  Batlle, in the capital, received letters complaining about how G.R. 
officers working with marines in the early months did not appear for work, or did not cooperate 
with (now officially disarmed) local authorities.
114
  The command structure was unclear, with 
multiple letters from civil administrators and governors asking whether the G.R. officers were 
under their orders or not, as they continuously failed to report to those civil authorities.  These 
letters also reported, especially in areas in which the marines had not yet extended their authority 
such as el Seibo, that G.R. members were committing crimes against the citizens.
115
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 Notably, the tone of complaints, petitions and letters in the months of April-June remains 
hopeful that the military situation might improve or at least that they might gain some individual 
benefits.  The military band in Santo Domingo, for example, produced and signed a carefully 
written petition, which they addressed to the military government through G.R. Captain Manuel 
Batlle.  In it, they solicited the military government for an increase in salary, lamenting the 
impossibility of continuing to sustain themselves and their families on their very small salaries.  
Most, they reported, were fathers, and they justified the military government's attention to them 
because they were "respectable men," a clear appeal to the interests of a growing middle class.
116
   
The military government received many such petitions during early and mid-1917, 
demonstrating the hope that many still held out that the occupation might bring about changes 
and improvements.  Requests ranged from petitions for pensions, better medical care for the 
military, and some even requesting jobs with the military government.  Most appealed to the 
human element, carefully explaining the need for a better salary to support families, and 
emphasizing the extreme financial difficulties shadowing the capital city of Santo Domingo at 
that time.  The occupation military, usually through G.R. officers, received many such petitions, 
especially from members of the budding middle class in Santo Domingo City.
117
  The 
proliferation of such petitions in those months add a very human element to the historical record; 
they also provide some insight into why some cooperated with the occupation at first, at least in 
minimal ways.
118
  Finally, they create a backdrop against which to envision the process of 
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increasing disillusionment among middle-class, urban Dominicans as problems as racism, abuse, 
and sometimes chaotic conditions unfolded in early occupation years.  As the G.R. officers were 
replaced by marine occupiers and Dominican constabulary men, and conditions worsened rather 
than improving, the majority of such letters stopped.  
 Even with the help of Dominican officers, early enlistment in the constabulary was 
sparse, especially in certain regions.  In El Seibo province, where the civil war continued in 
1917, reports from the first opening of recruitment to the constabulary noted that only eight men 
had come to enlist, and they were all previous G.R. members.  It was no wonder, however, that 
more men were not coming out to enlist; in addition to the mixed reactions to joining the foreign 
military, the letter reported that although these men were enlisted and serving in the new 
constabulary--and in the area suffering the most violence in the country at that time--the men had 
no clothes to wear, had not received their last months' payment, and could not get meals on 
credit.  This letter, from G.R. 2
nd
 Lieutenant Julio Cortes, was the second letter reporting these 
conditions, which had still not been addressed.
119
  In addition to these conditions, another letter 
from Julio Cortes complained, later in the month, that one of his men had been arrested by civil 
authorities and sentenced to a year in prison for what he dubbed an “insignificant crime,” further 
demonstrating the confusion of authority in such removed regions.
120
   
 To increase enlistment, authorities in the military government sent a notice through the 
local newspapers announcing the opening of recruitment and the “great care” that would be taken 
to recruit the best of men.  The notice mentioned that there would be “excellent opportunities for 
promotion,” a promise that quickly proved to not be true.  The continuing problems of the new 
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constabulary was hinted in the notice's announcement that, despite the opening of recruitment, 
the exact organization of the new constabulary had still not yet been determined.  Recruitment 
opened anyway, and would take place only in locations that held a U.S. medical official.  In the 
beginning, this meant that the majority of recruitment was concentrated around the major cities 
of Santo Domingo and Santiago as recruitment for Dominican national militaries traditionally 
had been.
121
  The notice also laid out enlistment standards: men interested in enlisting were to be 
Dominican citizens between the ages of 20-35 years, fully literate in Spanish, and of “good 
morality”--excluding any with records of arrest for serious “non-political” crimes.122   
 As marines spread to more remote provinces and established recruitment centers through 
1917, and found few Dominicans willing to enlist, recruitment standards were often relaxed in 
practice.  One of the first major recruitment efforts, in May of 1917, turned out 54 men, only 35 
of whom were accepted; the rest were rejected for various health reasons and “deficient 
mentality.”123   The majority of those willing to defy the wishes of their communities and join the 
armed force were those who were desperate for jobs, or interested in using the military position 
to improve their own standings at the cost of social acceptance.  The result, with the lowering of 
recruitment standards, was that the majority of constabulary members were illiterate, had 
criminal records, and came from "the laboring, or "peon" classes.
124
  Marine Lieutenant Fellowes 
estimated that "our first enlisted men were the most ignorant and crude specimens possible, as 
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far as intelligence was concerned," the "scum of the Island," that the constabulary was in the 
beginning a "harbor of last resort for natives who were too lazy to earn their living in any other 
way."
125
  His estimation demonstrates the racism that affected marine attitudes toward recruits; 
he argued that "as a general rule, the degree of intelligence increased with the decrease of the 
ebony tinge.  The blacker recruits were generally simple-minded giants who did what they were 
told," while "those who were of a clearer complexion usually were more intelligent, and could be 
trusted with responsible jobs."  Fellowes emphasized the preference in the officer corps for those 
of Puerto Rican descent, rather than Dominican, or those who "had a larger proportion of 
Spanish than of negro blood in their veins."
126
 A later military governor, Samuel S. Robison, in 
1921 was still passing on unofficial instructions to recruiting officers to try to “lighten” the body 
a bit.
127
   
 This attitude comes as no surprise.  After all, the only guide occupying forces had to the 
Dominican Republic was rife with the racism and environmental determinism in the period‟s 
thinking, informing them that “the inhabitants as a whole are quiet, lazy and shiftless. Life in the 
tropics is easy, necessities are few, the climate is enervating and the lower classes manage to 
exist with very little effort and that effort is made only when necessary.”  The guide further 
stated that the racial “blood mixture is responsible for the complex and unreliable nature of the 
Dominican.”128  Marines arriving in the Dominican Republic thus came armed with the idea that 
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the population was racially unreliable.
129
  If the problem was inherent in the "race" of the 
populace, it was harder to take resistance seriously, harder to imagine promoting Dominicans to 
officer positions.  Policies encouraging "whitening" existed throughout the occupation‟s 
administration, not just in the military.  For example, immigrant workers who were considered to 
be “of the Caucasian race” were given precedence over any workers whom occupying forces 
classified as "non-white"; any categorized by occupation forces as other than "Caucasian" were 
required to get a work permit within four months or leave the country.
130
  Ironically this might 
have worked in their favor with Dominican elites, if other conditions had been improved, as one 
of the common publicized Dominican complaints against the constabulary was that it tended to 
be composed of the darker elements of the population.
131
  For the occupiers, however, other 
concerns about race came into play.  Extensive communications with the officer corps of the 
constabulary and the administration of the military government comment on the dangers of 
blacks in the United States hearing of negro men being promoted to officer positions in the 
Dominican Republic while it was under U.S. control.
132
   
 Many of the Dominicans who did at first join, especially as the Dominican officers of the 
G.R. were phased out, faced so much persecution in society that they deserted.
133
 In his memoir 
of the early days of occupation, resistance fighter Gregorio Urbano Gilbert emphasizes the 
pressure that young men felt not only to avoid siding with the occupation forces, but even to join 
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the resistance.  The population around them angry at the illegal and violent occupation of the 
country, many encouraged young men to fight and resist; sixteen-year-old Gilbert felt that young 
Dominican women would not respect him if he did not rise up against the occupation, and also 
cites a sense of nationalism that required action of him.
134
  With the difficulty of recruitment and 
retention, lack of marine manpower, and problems of discipline, in addition to the lack of 
education among recruits and the inability of most Marine commanding officers to speak 
Spanish, the most common use for constabulary recruits in 1917 and 1918 was as a pure 
supplement the sheer manpower force of marine regiments.  Despite the plan to spread the 
constabulary through the provinces, they were at first placed instead wherever marines needed 
more manpower.  In December of 1917, more than half a year after recruitment began and the 
constabulary was issuing general orders, only 28 constabulary enlisted men were stationed in the 
Department of the South, versus 784 in the Department of the North.
135
   
 The lack of interpreters continued to be a problem, too, both in recruitment and in the 
relationship of marine officers with Dominicans in and outside of the constabulary; the problem 
increased with the phasing out of G.R. officers.  Needing interpreters for the constabulary posts 
in Barahona and Azua in June of 1917, the regimental commander there hired a man who was 
willing to come from Santo Domingo city to do the work; he came with this dubious 
recommendation from a superior officer: “this man is not considered a competent interpreter. . . 
But would be acceptable if no one else can be found.”136  Many of the surviving documents in 
the archives include both the originals, in whichever language they were written, and the 
translations, and clearly demonstrate the poor quality of translation.  Even when letters were 
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written in impeccable Spanish, the English translation is difficult to read through grammar and 
spelling errors.  In light of problems such as officers' inability to speak Spanish, a promotion of 
Dominicans into the officer corps might have seemed appropriate and desirable.  In fact, one of 
the more powerful reasons that Dominicans tended toward increasing resentment of the Guardia 
was U.S. officers‟ absolute refusal to have Dominican officers in the constabulary--Colonel 
Thorpe described how one marine officer of Mexican parentage, who spoke Spanish fluently and 
"did not look at all like an American" was popular with Dominicans "because he was not a real 
American."
137
   
 Marine refusal to promote Dominicans, and Dominican resentment of the fact, caused 
consistent problems within the organization and the Dominican population.
138
  Captain A.M. 
Norris, for example, reported that resentment about this issue was so high that many 
constabulary members deserted, and others rebelled in minor ways within the organization.
139
   
Valentina Peguero states that the refusal to promote Dominicans with the displacement of 
Marines to World War One "meant contempt and disrespect for la Guardia [the constabulary], 
and Dominican soldiers were infuriated and humiliated."
140
  With the shortage of enlistment, this 
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also led to problems with the constabulary‟s size that were chronic through 1918.  Military 
Governor Knapp pondered the issue in a letter he penned to Pendleton in July of 1917:  
 As no Dominican commissions have yet been issued to Guardia [constabulary] officers, 
 and as the details of organization are in our hands here, I see no reason why a first-
 lieutenancy in  the Guardia should not be filled by a selected [Marine] non-com. . . I hope 
 the day will come when the Dominicans can fill these places, but it isn‟t here now, 
 apparently; and I see no reason to keep up the experiment that retards development.  A 
 year or so of training and indoctrination may bring the [Dominican] second lieutenants to 
 a point where they may merit promotion, and I hope it will.
141
 
 
He suggested filling constabulary first lieutenant vacancies with marine non-coms to avoid the 
promotion of Dominicans into the constabulary's officer corps.  This line of reasoning became 
less and less tenable, however, when Knapp‟s proposed training never happened.  Instead, 
military exigency led occupation forces to a need for expediency, and this meant the continued 
ruling by force with the constabulary men as untrained, hired arms.   
 So strong was the desire to keep Dominicans out of officer positions that a company 
commander fighting resistance in the east had only two lieutenants for 150 enlisted men, and 
when he had to relieve one of the Marine lieutenants from field duty for misconduct, he pressed a 
Navy medical officer into temporary troop command rather than to temporarily promote one of 
his more experienced Dominican men.
142
  As late as 1920, all but thirty-three of the sixty-nine 
officers were still Marine officers and NCOs, “who accepted GND [constabulary] commissions 
in return for extra pay authorized by an act of the United States Congress. . . Under the Executive 
Order of 1917, captaincies in the GND were open to veterans of the old [U.S.] forces and U.S. 
citizens, as well as Marines.”143  Among the thirty-three who were not marines, the majority 
were North Americans with previous experience in the U.S.-run Dominican Frontier Guard or 
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other police agencies.  Even as late as June of 1920, over three years after the founding of the 
constabulary, there were still no Dominicans above the rank of second lieutenant; it would be 
another year before any Dominicans were promoted above the rank of first lieutenant.
144
  In his 
brief summary of the constabulary, Calder connects this issue to general recruitment as well: 
“The military government compounded the problem by making a feeble to nonexistent 
recruitment effort and by reserving all ranks above lieutenant for North Americans, thus assuring 
officer cadets that there was little chance for promotion.”145  He points out that those who were 
willing to join the constabulary, forced to be commanded by marine sergeants, corporals, and 
even privates who were first lieutenants in the constabulary, tended to come from the "lower 
middle social stratum, men whose inferior social positions and general lack of opportunity 
caused them to accept this chance to gain status and a decent income."
146
 
 In addition to problems of enlistment and race relations, retention was a serious issue 
throughout the occupation.  Despite the early optimism of occupation forces, the constabulary 
never attained the numerical strength to act on its own before 1922--the year in which gradual 
withdrawal began.
147
  As the constabulary‟s reputation continued to deteriorate, and as 
conditions within that military stayed the same or worsened through 1917 and 1918,
148
 desertion 
rates were high.  Those who remained in the constabulary did so for a variety of reasons: Some 
had better experiences, depending on the command of regional marine officers and the 
availability of supplies.  Desertion rates were much lower, for example, in Santo Domingo and 
Santiago, the country‟s two largest cities, where weather and supplies caused fewer difficulties 
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for enlisted men.  Many remained in the constabulary because they were not willing to become 
outlaws by deserting, especially in such urban areas over which marines had better consolidated 
control, and the records show many who deserted, realized the consequences of it, and returned.  
One such enlisted man informed the court “I did it because I didn‟t know any better.”  
Authorities were well-disposed to believe any act that implicated Dominican ignorance; this 
man, Epifanio Sánchez, received two months confinement and a loss of pay of $15, and was 
maintained in the constabulary.
149
   As so much of the recruiting in the first year was from 
elements of the population that had traditionally held little or no power, many would stay even 
through difficult conditions to retain that power, possibly with hopes of future advancement.  
Early recruitment ended up emphasizing, after all, the lower and landless classes in ways that 
most previous national militaries had not done, and continued to promise eventual promotion.  
As marine outposts and doctors for medical examinations spread into the more remote provinces, 
occupying forces were especially distinct from previous national militaries in their ability to 
recruit men who came from more remote regions of the country, incorporating families and 
communities that had previously tended to be excluded from any except local guards.
150
   
 Desertion and retention in the constabulary were not, of course, the only problems to 
come of lowered recruitment standards.  Both the inexperienced backgrounds of the majority of 
the enlisted men and, most likely, the incredible pressure under which they were working in this 
hated force, led to violence against the populations they were policing.
151
  The military 
government, upon publishing Executive Order 54 in late 1917, laid out extensive regulations 
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about the discipline and treatment of crimes by constabulary members.  Its writers began the 
order with the statement: “It is not the intention of the Military Government to relieve the 
personnel of the Guardia from the obligation of obeying Dominican laws.”  Because the 
population had grown accustomed to seeing the marines as forces “outside” the law, it was 
natural that members of their extension arm might enjoy the same immunities.  Actual events 
confirmed these suspicions for many, when constabulary members often were not prosecuted for 
crimes that incited loud resistance by local populations.  In one infamous incident in October-
November of 1917, dubbed the “Higuey Incident,” Dominicans protested the treatment of 
civilians by constabulary members guarding prison workers.  The instances around which 
protests formed included torture of prisoners and suspects and disrespect in the handling of dead 
bodies being carried to the local graveyard.
152
  Commanding officer Thad Taylor explained why 
the constabulary men were not prosecuted: “To try these guardias would create a diminution of 
courage, and ill-will and a distressing moral effect on the personnel of the Guardia Nacional, 
which would require considerable time and effort to overcome."
153
  Prosecutions and punishment 
were minimized or avoided where possible in order to uphold the already tenuous grasp on 
morale among enlisted men.   
 The effect of such policies was to further distance constabulary members from the rest of 
the Dominican population and reinforce their image as oppressors backed by marines.  Despite 
regular reports to the Department of the Navy claiming that the constabulary was improving and 
efficient, and that armed resistance had ended, the constabulary was in fact no closer to being 
organized or efficient in 1918 than it had been in 1917, and armed resistance was again on the 
rise: reports demonstrated that in January 1918 the fight against armed resistance was still being 
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waged unsuccessfully, and that "to cope with it the brigade was still mainly on its own, since the 
Guardia [constabulary] was as yet only half organized."
154
  The extent and continuation of armed 
resistance, combined with insufficient marine manpower and insufficient funding, continued to  
make further organization impossible.  Most available arms and men were required to fight 
resistance, especially in the east.  Through 1918, the constabulary was primarily dedicated to  
pursuing some six-hundred guerrillas in the Eastern District and other provinces.
155
  Further, 
even by mid-1918 marines said that much of the 1918 increase in armed reaction, or 
"disturbance," was in reaction to "troops, particularly the Guardia [constabulary], taking their 
horses, and also sometimes dealing arbitrarily with the populace."
156
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 By the end of 1918, Dominicans had formed an opinion of the constabulary that was 
certainly not favorable or respectful, usually approximating that written in 1946 by Emilio 
Morel: The constabulary was “the ridiculous armed institution that the occupying power had 
formed of the subjects that it had at its reach: Haitians, barloventinos [mixed-race island 
workers], Puerto Ricans, blacks, and native mulattos,” that it was a “promiscuous heaping of 
adventurers drawn from the most obscure zones of the population.”157  Dominicans saw it as a 
force of armed ruffians from the worst classes and segments of the Dominican population turned 
traitor, or men who were already outsiders: marines, U.S. citizens, and seasonal workers from 
other countries.  It was in many cases all of these things, as well as a force that often resorted to 
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stealing from, abusing, and even torturing the locals, a force already disliked for upholding, by 
force, foreign military officers who were imposing an unwanted occupation on the populace.  
The only real reforms that marines had enacted in the country by the end of 1918, reforms that 
had pulled funds away from the constabulary, had been through the resurrection of  public works 
planned and begun under Ramón Cáceres but interrupted by civil war.
158
  Neither promised 
reforms toward achieving U.S.-style democracy nor even a restoration of civil order had come to 
fruition, and the touted constabulary was increasingly the enemy of the Dominican populace and 
of order itself. 
 By the end of 1918, therefore, occupation forces reassessed the constabulary and its role 
in the occupation.  They did so due to the wide failures of the constabulary and its poor 
reputation among Dominicans, but also because of a number of internal and external changes 
affecting the administration of the military government.  The first was the ending of World War 
One.  The signing of the 11 November 1918 armistice allowed many departments to rearrange 
priorities, and the State Department again became directly involved in occupations throughout 
the Caribbean region.  The end of World War One also saw the replacement of Military 
Governor Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp with Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Snowden, a man who 
was to take a drastically different approach to the administration of the occupation.  The end of 
World War One also meant an increase in the wide Dominican and Latin American protest 
against the illegal occupation, and an increase in those who were willing to listen.  Further, the 
armed resistance within the country had steadily increased, enjoying a resurgence after every 
triumphant marine claim that it had finally been ended.
159
  Fuller and Cosmas point out that 
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constabulary troops continued to lack training because, due to steady armed resistance, they had 
to enter combat as soon as they were enlisted; Marines, too, were too low in numbers to take 
time from "their many other duties."
160
  This was, of course, a major concern to those trying to 
administer the military government and the marine forces and constabulary, and made difficult 
any claim of progress.  
  Such indicators as the continuance of major guerrilla warfare therefore combined with 
global change to force a reappraisal of the entire approach toward the Dominican military.  With 
all of these changes came, too, a reorientation of both resources and public interest from the 
United States.  The result was that, after exactly two years of occupation, the constabulary was to 
undergo a major overhaul.  Occupation forces would finally address, in concrete ways, the many 
problems that had plagued the constabulary since its foundation.  A change in public reception of 
the constabulary, and in the constabulary itself, was desperately needed by the end of 1918 if the 
new force was to hold any authority at all with the population.  Resentment of and disgust with 
the constabulary had grown so much by late 1918 that the force could hardly carry out any duties 
anymore without concern about widespread resistance.
161
  Late 1918 saw a scramble among 
occupying forces to undo the damage that had been done in 1917-1918, to re-make the 
constabulary.  The changes they made, however, reflected Dominican suggestions from previous 
years and aspects of the pre-occupation Dominican military.  They also reached back to the rules 
they had made for the organization in its original planning, restating them.  For example, the 
constabulary commandant in October 1918, Charles F. Williams, stated in General Order No. 32 
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(1918) that "only those applicants who are considered exceptionally desirable," that "new" 
enlistment requirements include literacy in Spanish and that recruits be Dominican citizens.
162
  
 They emphasized that “there has, in the past and since the organization of the 
[constabulary], been reported to these Headquarters several cases of disorder, including 
drunkenness and street fighting in which members of the [constabulary] have been the chief 
leaders and participants.”  The new constabulary must be a selected body of men and not a body 
of men who “at the least provocation, disturb the peace and cause unnecessary disturbance in the 
community.”  Therefore all organization commanders were ordered, in October of 1918, to 
assemble their commands and explain this to the men, explain that the constabulary was now at 
authorized strength--partially because of the arrival of World War One draftees--and intending to 
“weed out members who are always causing trouble for themselves and for the Guardia as a 
whole.”  All "undesirables" were to be discharged and replaced by men who "can fulfill their 
duties."  Finally, the new general order spelled out that “at least twice a week the police law of 
the DR will be read and explained to all organizations”--a technique that came almost word for 
word from the original suggestions of those Guardia Republicana officers who had submitted 
suggestions in April and May of 1917.
163
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Chapter FOUR 
The Osmosis of Tradition: Regional Negotiation 
 
  
 While many earlier complaints against the constabulary and the conduct of occupation 
were universal across regions, the inefficiency of transportation and communication, combined 
with censorship and local military control by marines, made resistance and response regional in 
nature from 1917 to 1920.  Regional resistances waxed and waned depending on changes in the 
economy and local events.  The regionalism of both the country and the constabulary meant that 
resistances could continue to be local and distinct, that constabulary forces could, and did, 
continue to keep opposition localized.  Yet incessant problems with the occupation and 
constabulary, including a chronic lack of money and necessary resources, had plagued 
occupation planners and Dominican towns for the first years of the occupation.  By late 1918,  
occupation government and general civil stability were tenuous at best.  The need for solutions 
was apparent to both Dominicans and occupation forces by late 1918.  Many national-level 
reforms, targeting problems identified from previous years, fell flat because the military 
government and constabulary leaders did not address fundamental problems and did not 
sufficiently address new, distinct problems arising in 1919 and 1920.  Much of the planned 
reform of the constabulary, in the form of orders from the military government and constabulary 
central command, was ineffectual in military units throughout the country.  In 1918, occupation 
planners worked to gain Dominican cooperation with occupation initiatives, so as to allow 
occupation administrators to carry out infrastructural reform planned first under the Cáceres 
administration (1905-1911) and then under the initial occupation government in 1916. 
 I argue that the period from 1918 to 1920 brought major change to the occupation 
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military approach.  Dominicans and occupation forces during this period realized the need to try 
to be more flexible through local and regional negotiation, allowed the comingling of Dominican 
regional traditions and U.S. occupation plans.  By late 1918, the official occupation was two 
years old, and marines had been a strong presence throughout the country for nearly three years.  
A process had begun by which Dominican society was adapting to the new realities and the 
occupation methods were adapting to Dominican society.  While many Dominicans continued to 
demonstrate strong resistance to the occupation and the principle of foreign intervention on 
which it was founded, the invasive nature of the foreign presence could no longer be ignored or 
seen as transitory.  New forms of cooperation and negotiation, which varied from population to 
population, began to develop and take definite shape during these intermediate years.  Because 
the form of foreign intervention was military, power negotiations during this period tended to 
develop through and around military units, both marine and constabulary, in negotiation and 
conversation with civil society and government.   
 Marine officers leading the constabulary began to adapt their units to meet the exigencies 
of the situation.  Because the broader institutional changes in the constabulary in this period 
seldom addressed the current problems, the military conduct of the occupation only functioned 
successfully through experimentation with local and individual negotiations.  Occupation 
officers created such regional compromise by stepping back from original plans that had 
assumed a unified country.  Through individual leaders, new compromises embraced the 
regionalism of the country as an answer to continuing problems of communication, 
transportation, funding, and regional resistance in late 1918 to mid-1920.
1
  Marine officers and 
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eventually Dominican officers attempting to lead constabulary forces in distinct regions far 
removed from the capital city, lacking sufficient manpower, resources, or civil support, 
developed local and regional responses.  Dominican officials and populations also responded 
differently in distinct regions as the occupation wore on, and began to develop diverse modes of 
cooperation or resistance and, in the end, negotiation with the constabulary run by foreign forces 
that were beginning to seem a more permanent feature of society than most had expected in 
1916.  The gradual development of local and regional solutions in these years was carried out 
through an evolving dialogue between constabulary-marine forces and Dominican civilians, 
negotiations and relationships that made each local or regional response and solution both 
strongly Dominican and strongly influenced by U.S. forces and plans.  Although the process 
created a precarious balance between the civilian and military, the occupation government and 
Dominican civil society, marine and constabulary units employed local solutions until 
consolidation occurred later in the occupation.  In the wider context of the U.S. occupation, this 
was a significant step in the process of the new military's adaptation, one that allowed increasing 
Dominican character into the constabulary even while the majority of Dominicans continued to 
reject the constabulary as a foreign imposition.  It also set regional tones for civil-military 
relations that were based as much on Dominican regional traditions as they were on marine-
patterned power structures. 
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 Until late 1919 and early 1920, constabulary units were mostly in communication with 
headquarters through the use of mounted units who brought orders and took reports.  When they 
were cut off from central command supplies and orders, such as in the extremely rainy seasons 
of late 1919 or after the hurricane of 1920, or because of surges in guerrilla activity, their 
commanders had no choice but to improvise solutions to regional problems.  These marine 
constabulary commanders, more familiar with their respective regions and men than a central 
command that failed to understand the regionalism, sometimes made on-the-spot decisions based 
on local realities even when they were not out of communication.  This was especially true 
because many of the orders of the central military government did not take into account the 
intense regional differences throughout the country.  Before the late 1919 minimal improvements 
in roads and railroads, even when conditions were good, general orders from the military 
government often took days or even weeks to reach marine outposts throughout the country, and 
the many marine groups actually administering the occupation outside of the capital often had to 
act without orders from above, outside of regional command, when situations warranted quick 
action.  By the time general orders or responses arrived, these isolated units had developed their 
own strategies.   
 Due to the autonomy of constabulary units in provinces outside of those housing the 
major cities of Santo Domingo and Santiago, marines took many initiatives on their own by use 
of constabulary units.  In addition to charting and keeping patrols, many worked to improve local 
civil-military relations, often gaining cooperation by setting themselves apart from the central 
organization of the widely hated military government.  By 1918 and 1919, the experiences of 
marines who stayed in the Dominican Republic for longer periods had clearly demonstrated that 
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regions varied greatly in culture due to long traditions of regionalism and isolation, and many 
innovative initiatives were formed on this basis.  Some marine constabulary leaders had been 
able to build local acquaintances to aid them in the gathering of information.  In the years leading 
up to the final reforms that came with withdrawal initiatives in 1921-1924, often the only 
possible solution to the many discrepancies in military government theory versus practice was 
for constabulary leaders to create separate systems that varied by location.  To combat 
frustrations and often violent clashes, and to increase morale, the military government and 
constabulary commandants generally encouraged individual and regional initiatives by 1919.
2
   
 Until central training and unit rotations began in late 1921, most constabulary members in 
any given unit with exception of the eastern provinces served in or near the locations at which 
they enlisted, working with populations in their areas of origin.  Despite the fact that 
constabulary units throughout the provinces did have a semblance of central organization, and 
were modeled after marine-style military structure as though the constabulary were a mini-
Marine Corps brigade, geography meant that more isolated units had to develop differently 
despite the shared character of being commanded by marines.  As described in Chapters One and 
Two, previous Dominican national militaries had been strongly regional;  the country's heavy 
geographical fragmentation, and the lack of transportation and communications infrastructure, 
continued to oppose military government attempts to unify the military until very late in the 
occupation.
3
  As with Heureaux's military in the 1890s, and that created under Cáceres in the 
following decade, the isolation and autonomy of Dominican provinces necessitated regional 
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solutions.  By late 1918, constabulary units had largely settled into regional patterns in which 
company commanders, all marines in this period, had broad power for on-the-spot decision 
making and recruited mainly from the landless, illiterate classes in the countryside who guarded 
the areas around which they had enlisted.  The pattern and power relations at work in the system 
were highly reminiscent of the Dominican tradition of maintaining control through outlying 
provinces by giving authorities to caudillo generals who ruled by force and decree and recruited 
from the rural, illiterate populations in their regions.
4
   
 The country's top one-hundred or so elite families had traditionally controlled politics and 
the military, and Dominicans of other social classes negotiated empowerment through the 
establishment of patron-client relationships with elite families and military leaders.  In the 
intermediate years of the occupation, the local negotiations of all classes with occupation forces 
opened to the gente de segunda the choice of allying with either the elite families, who widely 
opposed the occupation, or with the foreign power.  In the first years of the occupation, most had 
sought to maintain neutrality or negotiate between the two, but during this intermediate period, 
the occupation seemed to settle into a certain permanency.  By late 1918, when it was clear to 
Dominicans that the course of the occupation was to play a role in deciding what the post-
occupation Dominican Republic would look like, some began to ally strongly with one side or 
the other.  In a clientelist society, in which the rising gente de segunda  would normally turn to 
the prominent elites for patronage and power, it was not surprising that some allied themselves 
with the military government forces through this period.  Both Ducoudray and Calder list some 
of those who came to collaborate with the military government, which increasingly seemed a 
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source of protection and insurance or, as Calder points out, a patron, source of jobs, and even a 
potential customer or an ally in settling grudges against other Dominicans.
5
   
 Despite the similarities to the pre-occupation system, the military could boast one major 
difference during the middle years of the occupation: the leading "caudillo" figures heading local 
and regional military units during this time were foreigners, most of whom spoke little to no 
Spanish.  This meant that the enlisted men who had traditionally been powerless in such 
structures were empowered as go-betweens and negotiators, as they were the only ones able to 
communicate effectively with local populations.  Both the language barrier and the anti-U.S. 
sentiment through most of the country meant that marine constabulary commanders were 
distanced from populations, leaving constabulary men with some power to take initiatives in 
local communications. The results varied by region.  Some enlisted men and Dominican non-
commissioned officers in 1919 and 1920, used this empowerment to better their own social 
positions or enrich themselves, while others used it to lessen the impact and intrusiveness of the 
foreign imperative.  Some used the position of relative power to aid guerrilla and anti-occupation 
forces.  As with the roles of the constabulary, Dominicans' use of this power to insert themselves 
in negotiations also became largely regional in character by 1920.   
 From the beginning of the occupation, the military government commanders divided the 
country into the Department of the North and the Department of the South, separating the 
military administration much as previous Dominican governments had done, bowing to the 
natural geographical division caused by the Cordillera Central that dissects the country.  In 1918, 
a further military division was created with the formation of the Department of the East to 
designate the area of the eastern provinces as militarily exceptional, due to the extent of guerrilla 
warfare there.  The constabulary was built with regional headquarters for each Department.  
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Within these largely superficial designations, however, were sub-regions that were not officially 
recognized by the organization of the constabulary, but which had rather different cultural and 
economic concerns, different reactions to occupation initiatives, and constabulary companies 
with different approaches.  They were not militarily unified until the changes of late 1920 and 
1921.  I have divided the regions by groups of provinces based on widely shared social, 
geographical, and agricultural characteristics.
6
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Dominican Populations by Region in 1920.
7
 
 
 Region and Provinces    Total Population % urban population 
Capital region; Santo Domingo      146,652     4.3% 
Southwest; Barahona and Azua      149,326   1.05% 
Northwest; Monte Cristi         67,073     0.6% 
Interior; Santiago and La Vega      229,285     1.7% 
North coast; Puerto Plata, Espaillat, Pacificador       188,085     0.8% 
Samaná peninsula; Samaná         16,915     0.7% 
Eastern region; El Seibo, San Pedro de Macorís      97,329   1.55%   
  
 
 Strong regional variation had long been a character of the Dominican political, economic, 
and cultural landscape, reinforced through successive governments and militaries before the 
occupation.
8
  In the first years of occupation the military government was unsuccessful in 
creating a new, unified and monolithic central government backed by a powerful national 
military; they met the same difficulties with communications, transportation, regional 
allegiances, and regional cultures with which previous governments had struggled.  When the 
apparent military solution was to place individual commanders in the various regions and give 
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them wide autonomy, the pattern was reinforced--a step intended as a temporary measure to 
allow the occupation to gain the control it had failed to achieve in the early occupation.
9
  Marine 
constabulary commanders developed different regional methods to improve civil-military 
relations and to attempt to improve the efficiency or reputations of their constabulary units in 
their given regions, methods that varied greatly by region in both approach and result.  Much of 
the rule in intermediate years was like that in Haiti, consisting of "military control of the 
occupied towns and cities [that] varied in style and emphasis according to the personalities of 
local commanders."
10
  One type of major initiative undertaken by constabulary commanders, for 
example, was using constabulary units to provide civil infrastructural improvements or general 
aid to areas under their command, so as to show general improvement of living standard through 
the constabulary while simultaneously facilitating military control.  Dominicans in some regions 
such as the east and the northwest frequently resented such initiatives as unwarranted imperial 
impositions.
11
  Dominican intellectuals and community leaders in the interior and north, for 
example, began a campaign against marine health initiatives introduced to combat disease.
12
  
Many resisted attempts by the marine-officered constabulary to reform sanitation and public 
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health, and even used such efforts as rallying cries against foreign attempts to restructure 
Dominican society.
13
   
 In addition to the varying reactions of regional populations, other, more military issues 
contributed to the distinct regional characteristics of the constabulary.  Armed resistance was 
more of a problem in the Southwest and the East through 1919, and the need for constabulary 
prison guards was much more demanding in the Departments of the North and the South.  In the 
Department of the East, constabulary and marine planners did not trust native Dominicans to 
guard civil prisons, and prisoners were often moved from those areas to be housed near the much 
more well-guarded capital and away from resistance leaders.
14
  Because resistance leaders were 
housed in prisons around the capital city, most marine prison guards were employed there, while 
most of the constabulary guards guarded prisons in the Northern District.
15
 
 
Santo Domingo 
 The province housing the capital city of the Dominican Republic was, of course, 
exceptional in that it housed the majority of military government administrators and marine 
forces in the country during the entirety of the occupation, contained the most advanced and 
well-kept roads, was widely connected by telephone and telegraph, and was the primary site of 
most large, national initiatives taken such as the development of the national penitentiary.  It 
was, therefore, a region that was closely monitored by marines.  Because of the heavy marine 
                                                 
13
 Communications and public statements, “Gobierno Militar Americano,” Box 43, AGN1; such attempts included 
local laws about disposal of waste that were to be enforced by constabulary units--a power that went well beyond the 
stated occupation goals in Knapp's proclamation of 1916, which had promised to leave local, civil government to 
local Dominican officials.  Some of these resistance initiatives were formed by local governments, and others by 
intellectuals or the general population.  These initiatives are discussed further in Chapter Five.   
14
 General Order Number 24 of 3 July, 1918 guaranteed the availability of constabulary units for prisoner transfer as 
necessary. 
15
 "Percentage of Men Employed as Guards in Civil Prisons," File, "Secretaría de Estado de Justicia e Instrucción 
Pública 1920," Box 64 (1916-1920), Gobierno Militar Americano, AGN1. 
199 
 
presence, the constabulary was thin and less influential in Santo Domingo; constabulary units in 
the province were often relegated in this region to garrisoning the capital city or patrolling the 
province's border with the Department of the East.
16
  In addition to being one of the first and 
most thoroughly occupied locations in the Dominican Republic, it was also an area easily 
monitored by a military presence because it had been the traditional seat of the national militaries 
of the past, and the province that had supplied the majority of recruits to the national militaries.
17
  
Within the capital city, marine and constabulary units met much less direct opposition to military 
rule.
18
  In more urban areas such as Santo Domingo, more plentiful and immediate resources and 
funds also meant more emphasis on public instruction and civil improvements.  But constabulary 
and marine units, in the absence of municipal police during the early years of the occupation, 
also had to carry out policing functions, and those constabulary units that were stationed in the 
crowded city spent much of their time attempting to reinforce military government initiatives to 
improve sanitation.
19
 
 
The East: El Seibo and Macorís 
 In large part because of history and social science interest in the modernization of 
agriculture juxtaposed with the rise of guerrilla insurgency there, many studies have examined 
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the eastern provinces of El Seibo and San Pedro de Macorís.
20
  This region, before the 
occupation and even before the civil war of 1911-1916, was the site of intense friction between 
those who wanted to retain communal landholdings and caudillo rule and those who hoped to 
invest or enrich themselves in large-scale sugar plantation wealth.  U.S. interest in the growing 
Dominican sugar trade was augmented by the growing U.S. ownership of such plantations.  
During the occupation, marines cooperated widely with the owners of sugar centrales, both 
Dominican and American.  Many sugar planters, both foreign and Dominican, had invested their 
fortunes in the rise of sugar during the previous decades since its growth under dictator 
Heureaux, and were therefore already pitted against the regional caudillos who openly rebelled 
against the central government in 1915.
21
  Sugar plantation owners felt that the autonomy of the 
region depended on capitalism and a form of modernization that moved the region away from 
traditional power relationships and the type of communal property holding that was still 
widespread outside of the plantations.  This made the east distinct from the rest of the country, a 
region that even Dominicans saw as a separate political and developmental sphere.
22
   
 The description of the area by marine forces and those heading the constabulary 
demonstrate both their lack of understanding about the state of the region, and the fact that their 
intelligence there came almost exclusively from the wealthy planters.  Thorpe, for example, 
described the area as being from the beginning of the occupation full of thousands of "murderers 
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and fugitives."  His descriptions demonstrate his lack of understanding about the civil war 
preceding the occupation.  For marines officering the constabulary, these "bandits" "made a fine 
nucleus for insurrections; with slight aid from corrupt politicians or other interests opposed to the 
military occupation, they could easily form a raiding party that terrorized the inhabitants of a 
section.  They knew the innumerable mountain and forest trails and so could cover themselves 
from pursuit."
23
 As a purely military problem, in the eyes of marines, this situation of guerrilla 
warfare was one that should be handled through pure force.
24
  From the beginning, however, they 
found that the creation and maintenance of constabulary units in the region was either impossible 
or difficult.  As described in Chapter Three, Dominicans in the region were less likely to join the 
constabulary in the beginning, leaving most of the guarding of vital sugar properties to marines 
and individually hired guardacampestres.  With the gradual disarmament of the population, 
marines sought to  use constabulary units to guard plantations.  They quickly found that the 
majority of the population cooperated with the guerrillas, and saw even Dominican sugar 
plantation owners as traitors to the country if they cooperated with foreign armed forces.
25
  Many 
of the U.S. planters, too, resented the intrusion of marines and constabulary into their affairs 
because they had so long functioned with near autonomy from Dominican governments before 
the occupation.
26
  Such constabulary members as did join to work in the East were targeted for 
abuse by the general population and assassination by both guerrilla leaders.
27
   
 Many of those who did join the constabulary there in 1918 and 1919 seem to have done 
so to get personal revenge on other Dominicans and even foreigners who they felt had wronged 
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them, which in itself made the interaction between constabulary and civilians brutal.
28
  Some 
Dominicans secretly agreed to act as guides to the constabulary in isolated regions with terrain 
and politics unfamiliar to constabulary units and marines.  As soon as they were seen working 
with constabulary units, however, they became targets.  Guerrillas advertised their involvement 
with the constabulary, publicizing constabulary actions that led to the deaths of women and 
children during constabulary arrests, and working to assassinate such guides.
29
  Many of the 
guides, too, quit working for the constabulary once they realized the brutalities that were being 
carried out by the organization.
30
   
 Reports also show that deaths of and violence against constabulary enlisted men in these 
provinces were more common, and that those who did enlist in the constabulary in this region 
were more likely to desert.
31
  Whereas constabulary members in other areas might desert and join 
resistance, or simply not re-enlist, tensions were so high in the east that there is at least one 
recorded incident of a constabulary members in uniform firing on a marine in San Pedro de 
Macorís.
32
  This level of tension is not surprising.  In addition to the guerrilla warfare and the 
already tense character of the rapidly evolving provinces of the east, constabulary units lacked 
training or sufficient incentive, and, as they were locally recruited in the years leading up to 
1920, faced strong pressure from families and acquaintances.  Their main duties, after all, were 
carrying out arrests and raids on local populations; arrests tended to become violent, and a 
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number of constabulary members were killed in shootouts with local guerrilla forces while 
attempting to search homes.
33
  Further, constabulary units here were especially undersupplied for 
the work they were attempting to carry out.  Until well into 1919, none of the companies 
operating in the field here had field radios.
34
  Patrols were ineffectively planned and coordinated, 
and often regional commanders, both marine and constabulary, had little knowledge of where 
their patrols were.  Fuller and Cosmas point out that "sometimes patrols from two or three 
commands might be operating in the same area, totally unaware of each other's presence.”35 
 Internal conflicts in the region increased in the first years of the occupation both because 
many U.S. planters resented marine and constabulary interference and because arming 
Dominicans--even constabulary members, might mean arming some who would serve as double 
agents for the resistance.  At first the military government tried to solve this problem by allowing 
plantation owners to hire and arm their own forces from among local populations.  Many such 
men were subsequently found to be, or accused of, working with resistance leaders, especially by 
helping guerrilla fighters get supplies and arms or by giving them information about marine and 
constabulary whereabouts.   These difficulties were answered by a combination of force and 
torture and by the hiring of foreigners to guard plantation lands as guardacampestres, whose pay 
and orders came from plantation owners.
36
  La Romana, for example, in 1919 employed two 
hundred Puerto Rican "ex-policemen" as factory and plantation guards in addition to being 
guarded at all times by a force of marines.
37
  The struggle between Dominicans in the region led 
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to an intensity of conflict that pitted more and more Dominicans against each other as time 
passed.  Local doctors or store owners with supplies or medicines that could be used by the other 
side was suspect, and some were tortured or killed based only on this possibility.
38
  Both 
Dominican and U.S. plantation owners found themselves in the middle of a power struggle 
between guerrilla forces and marine-constabulary forces; many, unwilling to trust either the 
constabulary or local civil authorities--who might be working with guerrillas--sent their 
complaints directly to the military government offices in the capital.
39
 
 From 19 August of 1918, as measure against guerrilla warfare, then-constabulary 
commandant George C. Thorpe issued the order for the constabulary and marines to begin a 
concentration of inhabitants; this often brutal campaign included the burning of homes and crops 
of non-combatants as insurance against the resupply of guerrilla fighters.
40
  The camps used in 
this campaign in San Pedro de Macorís and El Seibo moved populations of entire towns at the 
threat of force and violence; Dominicans are reported to have starved in these camps for lack of 
food, while towns ceased to exist in some areas.
41
  Local populations began to flee their homes 
because of the destruction of land and crops and the twin dangers presented by marine-
constabulary forces and guerrilla forces.  Soldiers from both sides were known to accuse neutral 
residents of being secretly allied with the other side, and to torture or kill the residents based on 
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these accusations.
42
  Those who fled, however, were seen as suspects by marine constabulary 
officers.  Families who fled the area to hide in the bush and hills were chased down by 
constabulary forces.  Patrol reports include numerous stories of women and children in 1919 and 
1920 who, after fleeing from the marines and constabulary, were shot and killed in hidden camps 
that were found to harbor no arms or guerrillas.
43
 The military government did not officially halt 
the concentration system until 1921, when the U.S. Senate Inquiry brought the U.S. public's 
attention to the atrocities being committed in the Dominican Republic under this campaign.  
Even when it was halted, many of the practices carried out under it were revived through 1921 
and 1922 as the guerrilla campaign and the marine-constabulary campaign against it "took on a 
new intensity and cohesion."
44
  To aid in the concentration of civilians, constabulary officers and 
their units employed the help of the Marine First Air Squadron based between Santo Domingo 
and the eastern provinces.  At the direction of the constabulary, marines in airplanes dropped fire 
bombs on hamlets and villages and shot at fleeing Dominicans in the countryside.
45
  The Air 
Squadron first directed attacks against human targets in the east in July, 1919, and in 1920 was 
moved to another improvised air field near Santo Domingo and re-equipped with more versatile 
and maneuverable planes to facilitate its missions in guerrilla combat.
46
  In addition to carrying 
out mapping services, being used in attacks, and even carrying mail, the planes were used to drop 
messages from the air to remote patrols and thereby keep marine and constabulary patrols in 
communication with headquarters, or to carry troops over mountainous areas in orientation 
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flights that would help them later patrol the areas by foot.
47
 
 Finally, in 1920, constabulary commanders decided that they would have to bring in 
constabulary units recruited from distant locations, who would not have personal ties to the 
problems of the east; a rotation system that they would use throughout the country beginning the 
next year to attempt to increase control.   Trujillo serves as a good example of such recruits in the 
East.  From west of the capital, where he had previously served as a guardacampestre, he was 
brought to the east in 1920 and succeeded there despite repeated disciplinary actions against him.  
He did so by being efficient, often through brutality, and by cultivating friendships with marine 
officers.
48
  As Trujillo's involvement and action in these years demonstrate, a successful career in 
the constabulary in the eastern region, unlike elsewhere, would generally be formed through 
efficient brutality.  These constabulary members' cultivation of such friendships with marine 
occupiers would not have endeared any Dominican to the general population any more than did 
the brutality.  For the purposes of marine attempts to end armed resistance and speed up the 
construction of infrastructure against the backdrop of continuous resistance, however, such 
members were seen as necessary.   
 
 
The Southwest:  Barahona and Azua 
 The large southwestern region, comprising the provinces of Barahona and Azua, was as 
remote and isolated during the occupation as it long had been.  Based largely on small plantation 
agriculture producing sugar and coffee, the region had seen little change since the nineteenth 
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century, and was not an area of major and rapid foreign investment.  The only exception was its 
far eastern reaches, which abutted the capital city and had seen some development in sugar 
plantations.  Azua and Barahona, long separate in administration from the central government, 
and seldom heavily involved in factional conflicts pitting Santo Domingo against Santiago, were 
traditionally run by wealthy planter families headed by generals in the old military.  One of the 
most prominent planters in the region at the time of occupation, Wenceslao Ramírez, remained 
one of the region's more powerful influences, and serves as a useful example of how power 
relationships were negotiated during the occupation years.
49
  Like in the East, though to a much 
lesser extent, the Southwest had become a political battleground between those who supported 
traditional landholding patterns and those--like Ramírez, who allied with Heureaux and 
plantation owners and encouraged the western-style "progress" of the region.  Because the 
Southwest did not suffer the results of rapid change that overtook the East, some local leaders 
such as Ramírez were able to balance many occupation priorities with local approval by 
maintaining the local populations' priorities and interests during the years leading up to 1920.  
Importantly, the occupation penetrated selectively through this region; it was not high priority for 
the building of infrastructure, either for economic advancement or military control.  As before 
the occupation, the region remained mostly neglected by the central government, making the 
regional power negotiations for men like Ramírez much less complicated than they were in the 
East, where such a planter would be condemned by guerrilleros for aiding occupation forces.   
 Life-long resident Victor Garrido, who was the Inspector of Public Instruction in Azua 
from July 1918, and later served as Trujillo's Secretary of State of Education, described the area 
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during the occupation as being in a state of economic, social and cultural crisis.
50
  The 
Americans, he states, did not tie people to the tails of horses or burn them with hot irons as they 
did in the East,
51
 nor did they name anyone governor based on the promise that said governor 
would assassinate enemies of the military government.  Yet Garrido lamented what he saw as the 
decline of this region through the occupation.  Men of high social position and respect such as 
José Alfonso Lagranje and Abigaíl Díaz were reduced to "sweeping the streets," or to carrying 
back cans of water on their heads from the river for constabulary and U.S. troops because they 
had been accused of concealing or owning firearms, whether proven or not.
52
  Respected General 
Juan Bautista Ramírez of the old military, Garrido's brother-in-law, even committed suicide in 
Bánica rather than endure the humiliation of such treatment.
53
  Garrido also reports that when Dr. 
Armando Aybar of Azua refused to carry heavy items for constabulary troops, the commanders 
forced him to carry a sack of one hundred books from one site to another with a bayonet at his 
back.
54
  What Garrido describes and laments is not only the brutalities of the occupation and 
constabulary, but the overturn of society and social classes in the region.  While some prominent 
leaders in society were able to maintain their status even when they lost their military titles 
during the occupation, the majority were unwilling to compromise their arms, their honor, or 
their standards, and were thus treated poorly by occupation troops and the constabulary.  Others 
rose to higher social prominence by cooperating with occupation and constabulary forces; 
Miguel Angel Roca, for example, cooperated and did well for himself as Governor of the 
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province of Azua.
55
  The regionally widely loved popular intellectual and professional General 
Carmito Ramírez, however, was imprisoned in Azua for nine months on unproven accusations 
that he had received arms shipments from Germany, before he was released by the testimony of 
his father-in-law Wenceslao Ramírez.
56
 
 In addition to the broader changes reaching the region through occupation and a push 
toward modernization in agriculture, some constabulary initiatives did directly affect the region.  
They were all highly controversial.  The highest priority for the constabulary in the region, and 
one that was not new, was the desire to bring more efficient control and policing of the long 
border that the southwestern provinces shared with Haiti.  While the Border Patrol established in 
pre-occupation years had long worked to build such a policing authority, the creation of 
constabulary units in the provinces of Azua and Barahona, with high priority on 
"dominicanizing" the border, changed the power dynamics of the enterprise.
57
  Instead of a 
mostly removed, rural force maintained in border outposts away from the cities, the border 
would be policed by constabulary units whose headquarters were in the towns and who 
encouraged certain types of development along the border.   
 As armed resistance in the interior of Haiti grew from 1915 to 1918, the desire of U.S. 
officials to better police the border grew exponentially.  The urgency of this prioritization of the 
border was doubled not only by the increase in resistance over the border, but by the continued 
growth and prosperity of the peasant religious movement under "Dios" Olivorio that had long 
prospered in the region.  The movement, begun in the years of turmoil and change before the 
                                                 
55
 Ibid., 108.  Miguel Angel Roca later served as president of Trujillo's Cámara de Diputados, until the latter 
imprisoned him. 
56
 Ibid., 109-110; Lundius and Lundahl, Peasants and Religion, 95-97.  By the final years of the occupation, José del 
Carmen "Carmito" Ramírez would come to work with occupation officials and the constabulary, negotiating, like his 
father-in-law, between their desires and local priorities.  He became the most powerful man of the Ramírez family 
between the occupation and the Trujillo era.  Lundius and Lundahl, 134-137. 
57
 Garrido, En la ruta de mi vida, 118-121. 
210 
 
occupation, drew followers from provinces around the country, and emphasized tradition and the 
power of communal landholdings and communal prosperity.  In short, it was a largely anti-
capitalist movement that sought to undo rapid change in the area.
58
  With wide rural support and 
an extensive network throughout the sparsely-populated southwest and the mountains that 
bordered the north of the region, the movement was seen as a high-priority problem by 
occupation and constabulary officials.  Characterizing Olivorio and his followers as "common 
bandits" trying to take advantage of the rural populations--despite the lack of violence of those in 
the movement--the constabulary hunted Olivorio's followers with the same zeal that they did the 
followers of guerrilla leaders such as Vicentico and Chachá in the East.
59
  The similarities 
between those movements in the East and Olivorismo in the Southwest were, with the exception 
of some of their root causes, actually different in most ways.  The movement enjoyed strong 
support from the oligarchy, including the powerful Ramírez family, from its inception around 
1912.  This support that continued illicitly throughout the occupation to the death of Olivorio.
60
  
Meanwhile, much of the time and manpower of the constabulary was spent on trying to root out 
those regionally supported followers of Olivorismo, with whom constabulary members often 
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exchanged fire, and on patrols for whom more than half of constabulary units at any time were 
operating in the years 1919 to 1922 through these provinces.
61
 
 Because of the focus of constabulary units on pursuing Olivoristas and patrolling the 
border, the majority of enlisted men had little contact with the region's urban populations.  
Constabulary men were therefore often generally isolated, housed in barracks outposts created in 
previous years for various border guards, and interfering less overall in civil government than 
they were in any other region in the country.  The higher ranking members of these units, 
marines during these years, spent much more time at the urban headquarters.  Until after 1921, 
these commanders were known among the population for their abuse of power and willingness to 
commit illegal acts that would not be prosecuted or even investigated by a central command.
62
  
Furthermore, they were at the head of the few initiatives that affected the rural and urban 
populations in the region, among which the most controversial was an initiative to improve 
irrigation throughout the region.
63
  This particular action was especially controversial both 
because it involved strong interference in local, civil laws, and also because it favored the U.S.-
owned Barahona Company.
64
  The constabulary through the Southwest thus consisted mainly of 
an interfering and locally disliked Marine officer corps in the cities and a constabulary enlisted 
corps whose majority was preoccupied with patrols focusing on Olivorismo, isolated mountain 
populations that were difficult to monitor, and the policing of the long Haitian border, for which 
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the Southwest inherited much of the structure of the pre-occupation U.S. Customs Border 
Patrol.
65
 
 
The Northwest: Monte Christi 
 The Northwest, centered on the Province of Monte Christi and the mountains to its south, 
had long presented problems to the creation of a unified, central government or military.  The 
region, home of pro-German and anti-U.S. caudillo and former Minister of War Desiderio Arias, 
boasted the tradition of hosting and supplying both anti-U.S. and anti-government movements.  
Containing a growing port and the most-used border crossing with Haiti, it was a province that 
had long functioned as largely separate from central governments and even those northern 
governments based in the city of Santiago.
66
  Mostly self-sufficient due to unregulated border 
trade with Haiti, and the enterprising and cattle ranching of a mixed Haitian-Dominican 
population that stretched back in development for more than a century, the dry northwest was 
growing economically in the years leading up to the occupation.  Growth also came from rapidly 
increasing international trade through Monte Cristi's port, most of which was oriented toward 
Germany.
67
  This trade had changed the landscape of the province's smaller towns, leading to a 
growing entrepreneurial population that benefitted from trade with Germany and fiercely 
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maintained its independence and autonomy.
68
  At the time of the pre-occupation civil war, Monte 
Christi was still recovering from President Ramón Cáceres's concerted effort to violently force 
the region's caudillos to conform with centralization of the country, an effort that had forcefully 
depopulated many of the Northwest's rural areas and left much of the countryside devastated.
69
  
When marines invaded the country in mid-1916, the population of the Northwest was one of the 
areas that offered the most armed resistance to the marine presence, including the two major 
battles at Las Trencheras and Guayacanes.
70
 
 The military government's major concerns in Monte Cristi from 1916 to 1920 were the 
presence of so many anti-government and anti-U.S. people of influence and monitoring the two 
major ports of entry into the country.  As the military government found marine and constabulary 
forces often spread too thin to efficiently police both the border and the port, the occupation 
administration gradually re-routed port traffic toward Puerto Plata and Santo Domingo.
71
  The 
changes in the early years of occupation thus brought economic decline for many of the families 
that had newly risen to the middle classes in the region.
72
  Like the Southwest, the Northwest 
region also presented the constabulary with the problem of policing the border.  Unlike the 
Southwest, however, the border region here was less remote.  Populations had long settled along 
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both sides of the border at the towns of Dajabón and Restauración, and the more heavily 
populated area was easier to police than the overgrown and more mountainous southwestern 
border.  The open border here meant that Monte Cristi was distinct not only as a traditional 
hotbed of resistance movements and pro-German merchants, but also a province that contained a 
variety of  admixtures of cultures and languages.  Vodún, seen by occupation forces and many 
Dominicans from other regions as backward and repulsive, thrived in the northwest border 
region.
73
 
 Constabulary commanders worked to police the border to stop Haitian revolutionaries 
from crossing into the country, and enlisted men spent much of their time guarding and deporting 
Haitian prisoners.  The border was seen as an especially central problem in Monte Cristi because 
of the traditional character of the Northwest as a center of resistance, and the proximity of its 
towns to the parts of the Haitian interior that harbored the most Cacos in their rebellion against 
U.S. occupation forces in Haiti.  Constabulary emphasis on the policing of the border increased 
during uprisings of Caco revolution or violence on the Haitian side.
74
  As early as 5 July 1918, 
military government General Order No. 25 emphasized the importance of ensuring that all 
constabulary enlisted men stationed on the border scrupulously respect the Haitian boundary 
line, an order that was both needed and difficult to enforce because of the long local traditions of 
an open, cross-border culture.  The frequent military government closings of the border meant 
that roads were cordoned off by constabulary units.  The recurrent isolation of the Northwest due 
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to rains and lack of roads, combined with the closings of the border that was the livelihood of 
Monte Cristi Province, affected the population harshly.  Border closings, which included 
forbidding constabulary or Marine officers to cross, left the people in the northwestern towns 
wanting for food.  The problem of hunger in the region from border closings was exacerbated 
when the Masacre river along the border overflowed, which it often did, pushing caimanes up to 
kill hogs and cattle on both sides of the border.
75
  It is therefore not surprising that constabulary 
units along the border met high armed resistance in the areas surrounding the city of Monte Cristi 
and  clashed often with the local populations in Dominican towns.
76
  Isolated as the constabulary 
commanders here often were from central command, reports were irregular until 1920, and 
accountability for such actions low. 
 The violence and accusations of banditry that plagued the East and even the Southwest, 
however, did not make their way to Monte Cristi, where the balance was much more tenuous 
between marines and constabulary or those likely to resist or aid resistance.  The region lacked 
foreigners who might collaborate, and it lacked powerful merchants who supported U.S. aims.  
This reality, and the dangers that the border and Cacos rebellions presented to the military 
government in Monte Cristi Province, were clear by the time the constabulary was settled there 
in 1917 to 1918.  Unable to answer dissatisfaction and threats of subversion through brute force 
or heavy surveillance and censorship, due to the lack of resources or collaborators in the region, 
the constabulary took a much more careful approach.  Marine constabulary commanders seem to 
have been much less likely to instigate trouble or steal from the local populations than they were 
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elsewhere.  Gregorio Urbano Gilbert, who hid in the province from August of 1917 until his 
arrest in February of 1918, describes an encounter in which a U.S. officer asked to borrow a 
horse he was keeping, and Gilbert declined to help.  When questioned as to why he said no, 
Gilbert claims that he admitted his refusal to "associate with any Yankee."  According to 
Gilbert's account, the soldier then left without objecting.
77
  The refusal to help alone would have 
been enough to have earned Gilbert the status of collaborator with "bandits" in both the East and 
the Southwest.  Instead of the approach in those regions, the 4th Company in Monte Cristi 
Province relied heavily on surveillance, including keeping some enlisted men in plain clothes to 
help search for resistance or illegal activity.
78
  They were used in this capacity, for example, to 
track ex-civil official Josefa Almonte of Monte Cristi, who had been removed from his post by 
the military government, had fled to Haiti, and returned to Monte Cristi.
79
 
 Low-ranking Dominican constabulary officers, too, seem to have worked outside of their 
commanders' orders to allow them to work more closely with the local population.  When 
merchants refused to supply constabulary members or threatened to report their locations to 
resistance leaders, as they did elsewhere, some Dominican constabulary enlisted men made deals 
such as allowing illegal activities among merchants in exchange for supplies or anonymity.
80
  
The most common such activity was gambling.  Since gambling in many forms was customary 
throughout the country, and traditionally supported many community services through a lottery, 
the military government laws outlawing it were both widely hated and very difficult to enforce.  
Constabulary officers reported that, in their capacity as the force policing this law, enlisted men 
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frequently ignored gambling and other minor infractions of military government law in exchange 
for both information and the ability to conduct business.
81
  Another major point of contention, 
and one that demonstrates a divergence between military government laws and the actions of 
Dominican constabulary officers and enlisted men, was the issue of vodún in the area.  Military 
government efforts to ban any practice of vodún or any related ceremony met, in the Northwest 
as in the Southwest, with the realities of a culture that was heavily saturated by such traditions.  
Dominican constabulary members, who were from the area, seem to have taken a much more 
realistic approach to the banning of vodún.  Furthermore, the desire of local populations to 
maintain their culture would have provided an opening for constabulary members and other 
Dominicans either to gain some pull with the population or to take advantage for their own 
benefit.  The result was a back-and-forth set of power relationships.  Civil government officials 
in Restauración, for example, gained revenue by charging groups to let them hold vodún 
ceremonial dances.  When a 4th Company first sergeant at the local outpost reported them to 
Company headquarters in Monte Cristi for holding the forbidden dances, the local government 
stated that Dominican officer Lieutenant Reyes had allowed the behavior.  Constabulary 
investigators, faced with conflicting such reports throughout the area, tended to blame the civil 
government and only superficially investigate accusations of this behavior by the constabulary.
82
  
Because civil officials offered strong resistance and lack of cooperation with military 
government and constabulary officials throughout the country, this one-sidedness was easy to 
explain or excuse.  In defending cooperative constabulary men at the expense of minor laws, 
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commanders of the Monte Cristi constabulary such as Harry Hurst were able to maintain a 
balance that kept constabulary units functional in the region.  It also meant, of course, a relative 
empowerment of constabulary men to take initiatives in civil-military relations.  
 
The Alliance of the North and the Interior  
 The interior, comprising the fertile Cibao Valley and the second major city of the 
Dominican Republic, Santiago, often allied itself closely with the northern coastal region 
centered around the major port city of Puerto Plata.  Traditionally the home of the country's 
liberal intellectuals, this region supported a growing middle class and booming tobacco economy 
at the time of occupation.  When the mountainous division of the country in decades before the 
occupation had forced the division of administration between north and south, Santiago and the 
interior were the seat of the country's vice presidents.  Vice presidents ruled, in the years before 
Cáceres, as regional presidents, and often called up their own armies--to fight revolutionary 
movements in the Northwest, for example.  Dominican politics in the decades leading up to the 
occupation had been held together by a precarious balance of the South versus the North or, 
more accurately, military might in Santo Domingo versus the intellectual center that was 
Santiago.  The system worked, almost as a federation of two states might work, but it broke 
down when one of the two interfered with the other.  Liberal President Ulíses Francisco Espaillat 
(1876), whose government was based out of Santiago, was forced to resign due to rebellion 
against his government from the military in the south.  Espaillat himself had come to power 
through a revolution originating in the North and Interior.   When President Buenaventura Báez 
fled the country in 1878, the country was temporarily split by two governments, a military junta 
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in Santo Domingo and a separate provisional government based in Santiago.
 83
  When dictator 
Heureaux (1889-1898) used his military to attempt to enforce changes in policies to favor the 
growth of foreign investment in the North and Interior, a combination of groups resented his 
interference in the region and assassinated him in the wealthy interior city of Moca.
84
  One of the 
two chief assassins in this Moca plot, Ramón Cáceres, would himself become president on a 
platform of reform in 1905.  He was assassinated by the Santo Domingo military in 1911, the 
event that directly preceded the civil war that was used to justify U.S. intervention.
85
 
 The interior around Santiago, and Puerto Plata with it, therefore had a long tradition of 
opposing military-run governments out of Santo Domingo.  Its intellectuals and political leaders 
made no exception for the U.S. military government, and held the authority of the military 
government officials in open disregard.
86
  These regions put forth determined and violent 
resistance to both initial and ongoing marine occupation.  As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
marine landing in Puerto Plata in 1916 met a powerful, armed resistance from local military 
forces.  Five years later, the population of Puerto Plata was still seen by constabulary leaders as a 
hotbed of anti-U.S. sentiment, and one that was especially unfriendly toward the constabulary 
that upheld military government law.
87
  In the interior cities of Santiago and San Francisco de 
Macorís, too, many inhabitants carried out intermittent guerrilla attacks against marines in the 
early occupation.
88
  Scattered armed resistance throughout the Interior lasted until 1918, and 
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began again in 1920, targeting both Marines and constabulary.
89
  As armed resistance in Puerto 
Plata and the Interior was met with force and arms, most resistance settled into a regionally 
traditional pattern of resistance through publications, speeches, and meetings of organizations.  
During the intermediate years (1918-1920), intellectual and community leaders in the interior 
and northern provinces supported the majority of the most notable non-violent resistance efforts 
against occupation.   
 Most of this resistance came in the form of publications that defied increasing censorship 
in their attempts to enlighten the population about constabulary and occupation activities in other 
areas of the country.  Newspaper after newspaper was suspended because of writings that 
military government officials saw as "incendiary," a category that was left open to definition by 
any military court that decided to prosecute an editor.  La Bandera in San Francisco de Macorís 
printed patriotic poems and editorials from such Dominican intellectuals as Fabio Fiallo, 
Americo Lugo, and Max Henríquez Ureña.  When patriotic articles were printed in the capital, 
those in the interior reprinted them.
90
  Despite the growth of censorship through occupation 
years, such publications only increased as the occupation wore on and the constabulary grew.     
El Anuncio, also based out of San Francisco de Macorís, repeatedly published reports and rumors 
specifically about the constabulary.  One in March of 1921, for example, published a 
condemning report about the constabulary, including an account of a constabulary member 
having assassinated a Dominican citizen.
91
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 Intellectual and political pressure against aiding the military government and 
constabulary in the region was strong.
92
  By 1920, it included the formation of secret patriotic, 
anti-U.S. societies throughout the region, reported in Santiago, La Vega, Salcedo, San Francisco 
de Macorís, Pimentel, Villa Rivas, and Matanzas, patterned and named after the secret society 
"El Trinitario" that had been formed in the interior town of La Vega in 1844 in the fight for 
independence from Haiti.
93
  Constabulary reports throughout the region from 1918 through 1920 
demonstrate a strong preoccupation with the influence that these groups and local publications 
had on the loyalties of constabulary members, especially in the province of Moca.
94
  Although 
publications criticized the constabulary, other patterns of resistance in the interior were 
especially aimed at marines.  The predominant tendency was to demonstrate anti-U.S. and anti-
occupation sentiment through sabotage of marine equipment or attacks on marines--for example 
by throwing stones and fleeing--and then to spread rumors about what would happen to the 
constabulary members when marines were no longer there to protect them.
95
  Also by 1920, 
despite a lack of unity or cooperation with guerrillas in the East, a new armed resistance 
movement was on the rise through the region.  Second lieutenant César Lora, who excelled in the 
occupation military but was killed in 1924, gathered many reports of arms collections being 
hidden in the remote countryside, many of them rumored to have been brought in by shipments 
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along the north coast and then transported to the interior. and also included the escape of "old 
chiefs of bandit groups" gathering supplies in the area 
96
 
 Unlike in the East, constabulary officials working to build the intelligence networks and 
find collaborators did not have the availability of large foreign populations.  In fact, many 
provinces in the interior had almost no foreigners [See Table 4.2].  This meant a lower likelihood 
of disinterested individuals who might be loyal to and support the constabulary in its efforts to 
find intelligence about resisters.  Also unlike the east, despite the fact that the Cibao Valley was 
an important region for agriculture, most planters and land-owners were Dominican; this and the 
lack of guerrilla warfare meant that the constabulary did not have to focus its efforts on 
protecting plantations--reports of robberies from plantations were minimal, and actual attacks on 
agricultural land nonexistent here.  Until 1921, this also meant that most peasants in areas remote 
from urban centers were largely unaffected by the population throughout the Interior region.
97
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Table 4.2  Percentage of foreigners residing in the Dominican Republic, by province.
98
 
 Province      Percentage foreign residents 
 Provinces of the Interior and North:     
  Pacificador:        1.06% 
  La Vega:        1.06% 
  Espaillat:          .87% 
  Santiago:         1.53% 
  Puerto Plata:         5.16% 
 
 The East:  
  San Pedro de Macorís:    35.64% 
  Seibo:          9.08% 
  
 Other:  
  Santo Domingo:        3.58% 
  Azua:         5.11% 
  Barahona:        12.7% 
  Samaná:         4.32% 
  Monte Cristi:       20.17% 
 
 
   The mechanisms developed by constabulary officers to cope with resistance quickly 
came to match the traditional pattern in the region:  The military force in power avoided 
interference with rural peasants, based operations more heavily from urban areas, and 
preoccupied itself with balancing the use of military force with the ever-present criticism 
stemming from the intellectual and liberal tendencies of the area; it was at all times, even despite 
heavy censorship, accountable through a strong tradition of press and education and information 
networks.  The primary concerns of constabulary officers, both marine and Dominican, were to 
counteract the influence on constabulary members and to attempt to improve civil-military 
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relations so as to show the constabulary in a good light, especially in the region's urban areas.
99
  
Constabulary officers worked through the region to aid civil governors, sending multiple units to 
help fight fire in Santiago's business district, for example.
100
  Constabulary units in rural towns in 
the region, especially those in the north that were most isolated from the transportation networks 
to the capital city, spent many of their hours aiding the Public Works Office in public health and 
sanitation.
101
  These roles of the constabulary units through interior and northern provinces, at 
least until late 1920, seem to have somewhat eased direct attacks on the constabulary members, 
despite continued propaganda by intellectuals and elites against enlisting, and reinforced the 
heavier emphasis on attacking Marines rather than Dominicans in the constabulary.  
 
Samaná 
 The northeastern peninsula of Samaná was an area mostly dedicated to the production of 
coffee, sparsely populated with no major cities.  Long used as the location of a heavily 
garrisoned penal settlement to which political prisoners were exiled, it contained two heavily 
garrisoned penal forts and an assorted population of emigrants from throughout the Dominican 
Republic and from the Canary Islands, as well as French refugees from Haiti, and its provincial 
government carried out independent trade with the Turks Islands.
102
   It contained a portion of 
one of the few remaining usable railroads in the country, which made its southwestern city of 
Sánchez an occasional jumping-off point or site of sabotage for the guerrilla movements to the 
south, but was otherwise an area in which occupation forces generally spent few resources and 
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little manpower before 1920.
103
  Until after mid-1920, Samaná was neither a site of significant 
resistance nor an area of major concern to the constabulary.  Civil officials were not cooperative 
with the occupation, but before 1920 there are no reports of subversion against the constabulary 
as there are elsewhere.
104
  Rather, it remained largely isolated and apart through the early years 
of the occupation.  Three major causes led to this difference:  The first, as Gregorio Urbano 
Gilbert describes, is that Samaná was a province that was traditionally unconcerned about 
happenings elsewhere due to its natural abundance.
105
  Its interior population could easily 
support itself if cut off by rains or revolution.  In addition to this traditional autonomy, the 
location of Samaná is situated on the north side of the Samaná Bay, which meant that it also 
spent occupation years under the shadow of U.S. naval forces.  Another reason for an overall 
lack of resistance seems to have been the desperate need for medical care in the province.    
Early in the occupation, there was what Franck called "support," and what was at least heavy 
compromise, among those of Samaná in order to gain navy medical care due to a near-absolute 
scarcity of doctors there.
106
  The strong presence in Samaná of U.S. Navy forces mitigated this 
problem, as the navy provided the medical units for the constabulary and health improvement 
throughout the country.  
 Samaná also contained a community of English-speaking blacks from the 1800s 
colonization programs out of the United States, who emigrated to the peninsula during the 
Haitian domination in the 1820s.  They retained the English language, which was some help in 
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bridging the language gap for those units who worked in the region.
107
  This particular portion of 
the population seems to have been much more friendly toward occupation forces and the 
constabulary, and this might also help to explain the general lack of problems in the constabulary 
there as compared to other regions.
108
  U.S. reporter Harry A. Franck, who traveled through the 
area in early 1920, interviewed the Reverend James of the African Methodist Episcopal Church 
there; James was a supporter of the U.S. intervention, and opined that "aside from the 
politicians," all of the influential people of the region seemed to be in agreement.
109
  James's 
large community, however, seems to have been a non-integrated community in Samaná, and 
there is no evidence that the reverend's opinions include anyone outside of his community and 
church.  This particular community might well have been "influential" and supportive, as it 
seems to have enjoyed some favoritism from U.S. forces.
110
  Many of the Dominican 
constabulary members in Samaná's 13th Company spoke the "Samaná English" of this 
population rather than Spanish, and were used across the bay into the East as guides.
111
  Across 
the bay from the eastern provinces in armed resistance, small parts of Samaná sometimes became 
involved in the larger guerrilla warfare of the East, but the peasantry and politicians there 
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generally maintained outward neutrality before 1920, and the constabulary enjoyed enough local 
support to function with no major problems.  For this reason, its units seem to have most closely 
resembled the forces planned by those constabulary commanders authoring the national-level 
constabulary reform of these years.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 The constabulary reform intended with General Order 39 of 21 November, 1918, which 
stated that "More attention will be paid to General Orders issued from these Headquarters,"
112
 
was largely ineffectual due to regional differences and scarcity of resources and manpower.  
While many changes took place in the constabulary during these years, including major changes 
such as the entry of some Dominicans into officer ranks, the regional character of the country 
was too powerful to disregard.  Constabulary officers throughout the provinces, away from the 
central command, understood this reality and adjusted their priorities and orders to make their 
forces as tenable and effective as possible given the difficulties confronting them.  Among 
Dominicans across different regions and social groups who were not in the constabulary, the 
period of late 1918 to mid 1920 brought an increasing realization that the intervention was going 
to consist in a major re-making of at least certain aspects of Dominican society, including the 
need for national unification and a centralized approach to resistance.  Dominicans worked to 
balance their own and their communities' interests with the realities of the occupation, while 
constabulary officers--some of them Dominican--worked to  bring regional solutions to distinct 
regional difficulties.   
                                                 
112
 Folder 2, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. 
228 
 
 In some areas, these contentions were not as strong:  Much of the southwest and the 
interior were sparsely populated and not affected as much by the growth of constabulary or the 
intrusiveness of marine occupation.  The east, on the other hand, became one of the key areas of 
contention in the occupation--a reality that was not solely a product of the intervention, but one 
that had been continuous for decades when marine forces arrived there in late 1916 and early 
1917.  In local and regional negotiations throughout the country, those invested in regional 
Dominican society or economy worked through the intermediate years of occupation to insert 
themselves into new and changing power structures, working to consolidate power across 
regions.  The occupation imposition of change in power relations and administrative posts, 
however, was often a thin veneer.  From under it, Dominican traditions and culture seeped 
upward.  The results, as had historically been the case during times of change in the Dominican 
Republic, varied drastically in these years depending on local lore and culture and the character 
of regional economies. 
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Chapter FIVE 
Foundational Elements of Resistance: The Constabulary Across Regions, 1918-1920  
 
 The conclusion of World War One and the European preoccupation with recovery in the 
post-war world coincided with a new non-interventionist movement in the United States and 
brought major changes in U.S. foreign policy interests.  The reappraisal of foreign interventions 
and military occupations in late 1918 also demonstrated the absolute failure of U.S. plans to 
export democracy and create democratic governments through use of its military between 1915 
and 1918.  The U.S. State Department began to redirect its attention to its occupation 
governments throughout the Caribbean, and requested reports and explanations about their 
progress.
1
  A growing interest in military non-intervention among the U.S. public in the wake of 
the war also increased the need for naval planners to find a way to justify the occupations.
2
  
Administrators of the military government in the Dominican Republic and of the U.S.-created 
Dominican constabulary were largely unable to report any forward progress, either in the 
building of infrastructure or the promotion of "peace and stability" that was the primary stated 
goal of the occupations.  In the last months of 1918, two years after the occupation had begun, 
the country was in a state of disarray and was rife with violence.  Navy reports from the 
administrators, responding to questions about what the occupation had done, stressed 
accomplishments in planning and the need for funds to carry out changes.  The major successes 
they touted in those reports, the building of a native constabulary and the ending of armed 
resistance, were known among occupation forces to be mostly fiction at that point. Armed 
resistance continued, and the constabulary had, in reality, been one of the most public failures 
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within the Dominican Republic in the early years of occupation.  In late 1918 that planned 
beacon of order, stability, and Dominican support that had been such a high-priority aspect of the 
imperial experiment was, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, disorganized, widely hated by the 
Dominican population, comprised of lower-class and uneducated Dominicans, rife with 
desertions and perpetually short on recruits, and had become an inefficient and completely 
untrained supplement to marine forces fighting resistance throughout the country.  
 Because of external developments and clear failures of the occupation on the ground by 
1918, both the Navy Department and the State Department carried out major changes in the 
administration and functioning of the occupation and the Dominican constabulary in the period 
from late 1918 through 1920.  The review of occupation strategy, engaged after two years of 
occupation, resulted in a major shuffling of administration.  The Navy Department pulled from 
the occupation many navy officers who had carried out the functions of the military government 
during World War One, placing many of them, such as Military Governor Harry Knapp, in 
diplomatic positions in Europe.  Also, with the arrival to the Dominican Republic of large 
numbers of World War One draftees no longer needed in Europe came new marine officers.  In 
October of 1918, the Navy recalled Joseph H. Pendleton to the United States, placing the Marine 
Second Brigade in Santo Domingo under a succession of commanders who held different visions 
for the Brigade and the Dominican constabulary.  As the commandants of the constabulary were 
marine officers reporting to the commanders of the Second Brigade, this shifting command had 
as direct an impact on the constabulary as did the rapid overturn of constabulary commanders 
during this period.  While many of the new appointments consisted of officers who had extensive 
experience in overseas operations, and some who spoke Spanish, the shifting command also 
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meant the rapid influx of administrators and commanders who were ignorant about Dominican 
history and culture and the previous conduct of the occupation.
3
   
 In late 1918 and early 1919, newly arriving U.S. officers encountered a country whose 
infrastructure had been devastated through a decade of civil war and foreign occupation, whose 
population was largely hostile or uncooperative, and whose provinces continued to be isolated 
and disconnected from the central government.  Years of pre-intervention civil war, and lack of 
repair or maintenance since, had damaged roads and railroads, telephone and telegraph wires, 
and government buildings such as prisons and government offices.  Marines in charge of running 
and improving the constabulary were faced with attempting to bring and maintain relative 
stability to provinces despite lack of resources or cooperation from the local populations, and 
their only tools for doing so were command of constabulary forces and small and fluctuating 
funds given their units by the military government from national revenues.  While marines 
coming into the country were therefore moving into a difficult situation, Dominicans had been 
living it for years.  The daily lives of all Dominicans, especially in provinces further from the 
country's two major cities, had been changed first by civil war and then by an extensive military 
occupation that had brought little positive change and seemed to wear on indefinitely.  Even for 
those least affected by the changes in administration--such as small landholders in the 
countryside who continued to grow crops and bring them to local markets--the rise and fall of 
armed resistance movements meant constant fear that either guerrilla fighters or marines and 
constabulary would appropriate their goods to supply troops. 
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 The previous chapter demonstrated how the constabulary interacted with the distinct and 
factionalized resistances of various regions, abandoning the original hopes for a quickly 
centralized military and embracing a regional, and thus more Dominican, approach.  This chapter 
shifts focus to the more universalizing aspects of occupation during the same years.  While most 
occupation difficulties were settled in the early years by regional and local negotiation or force 
and resistance, the one objection to occupation that would prove to be common across regions 
was the constabulary.  In the years 1916 to 1920, occupation forces, primarily marine 
constabulary commanders, faced difficulties for which they had not been prepared, and in 
response they used the constabulary as the go-between for U.S. forces and the Dominican 
population.  With the exception of some individual relationships and negotiations, however, the 
constabulary--despite institutional changes--continued to be rejected by the majority of the 
country's population, and even by those who otherwise worked on some levels of cooperation 
with U.S. forces.  As the understaffed, under-trained, and unstable constabulary was used 
throughout the country in the execution of multiple duties as both military and police, 
controversy was constant as to its proper sphere of authority.  It was to become, in the 
subsequent growth of resistance movements, one of the central points of both rallying cries 
against the occupation and fears about the direction of the country's development.  This was true 
because of reports of brutality and corruption from the constabulary; many who worked in 
individual negotiations with constabulary members and even marine constabulary officers saw 
the brutality and the corruption first-hand, and despite negotiations, were not likely to see it as 
the legitimate source of authority after the occupation ended.  Occupation planners also failed 
widely in gaining cooperation for their initiatives or for the constabulary because they did not 
play to the needs of the traditionally powerful gente de primera, who continuously stood against 
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the constabulary from its founding until the beginning steps of withdrawal in 1922.  Even the 
most wealthy among Dominicans were likely to see their fortunes at risk from the incoming 
flood of U.S. investments and occupation patterns that gave such preference to the power of a 
military that was not obligated to cooperate with the upper classes.  The period of 1918 to 1920 
was an important transitional period in the occupation military both because of the adoption of 
regional approaches and because broader institutional change and infrastructural improvements 
begun in this period by the military government transformed the course of military operations 
throughout the country and gradually shaped the national-level institution of the constabulary.   
 
Institutional Change at a National Level, 1918-1920. 
 The military government, under successive leaders, initiated broad changes from late 
1918 through 1920, and attempted a reform of the Dominican constabulary that was meant to 
improve civil-military relations throughout the country.  In October of 1918, Marine Second 
Brigade Commander Joseph Pendleton was replaced by Brigadier General Ben H. Fuller in 
charge of Marine operations in the Dominican Republic.  Fuller, who would later become 
Commandant of the Marine Corps (1930-1934), was experienced in foreign interventions, his 
career paralleling the growth of U.S. interventionism and the new role of the Marine Corps as a 
tool for foreign interventions.  At the time of his arrival in the Dominican Republic, Fuller had 
served in the Philippine intervention, the Boxer uprising in China, and in Hawaii, and had 
commanded units in the Panama Canal Zone and Cuba (1910-1911).
4
  When Fuller arrived to 
take command of the marine Brigade, and to serve as interim military governor from November 
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of 1918 to February of 1919,
5
 he came to a country that in many ways looked much like it had 
when the official occupation began in November of 1916: civil administration was in disarray, 
and it remained unclear which cases would go before local Dominican courts or military provost 
courts run by the marines.  The Dominican population was decidedly hostile toward the marine 
presence and the constabulary, and local, armed uprisings continued to be of primary importance 
for marine planning throughout the country.  The majority of roads, railroads, public buildings, 
and communications infrastructure that had suffered damage through five years of civil war had 
remained unrepaired or had only been partially repaired, many to be damaged again in guerrilla 
warfare since the occupation began, and most areas of the country still lacked sewage or 
electricity.   
 Some real changes had taken place too, however.  Most changes by late 1918 were 
directly related to the attempt to build an efficient, centralized, national government in a country 
that had always been highly regional in its makeup.  Military government administrators in 1918 
began an overhaul of the national system of education and increased national government funds 
by initiating multiple national taxes--many planned under the Cáceres administration--meant to 
eradicate local taxes and centralize the functioning of the country.
6
  They had also increased the 
Dominican Republic's net domestic product by reorienting Dominican import-export trade away 
from war-torn Europe and toward the United States, and had negotiated a $1.5 million U.S. loan 
to the Dominican Republic in 1918 that increased available funds for infrastructural building in 
1919.
7
  U.S. navy and marine officers staffed a new and revised national government that had 
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been re-formed to increase efficiency, its departments consolidated and better supplied than 
those of previous governments.  The operations of marine and navy personnel in the Dominican 
Republic's government meant that much of the cost of government was paid by the U.S. military, 
making the strain of financial resources for central government independent of Dominican 
revenue and thereby lighter during these years.  In their capacity as Dominican government 
officials, these officers' salaries were paid by Dominican revenue, but many supplies used were 
U.S.-government-issue to supply troops abroad.  Even those administrative supplies paid for by 
Dominican revenue, such as typewriters and paper, were easily acquirable from the U.S. military.  
Furthermore, much of the policing of the country was carried out by marines under the pay of the 
U.S. government, leaving funds open for municipal development.  Finally, occupation 
administrators had by this time pushed Dominicans out of all higher levels of both government 
and military, allowing U.S. military administrators wide leeway and autonomy in decision-
making.  Multiple resistances, though persistent, were mostly limited to the local level by the 
combination of a strong system of censorship and the widespread disarming and marine policing 
of the population.   
 The changes in administration and command in October and November of 1918 also led 
to a reevaluation of the constabulary.  Fuller, and Major Charles F. Williams, who was appointed 
commandant of the constabulary in November, immediately reviewed the past and current 
problems with the organization.  The constabulary still lacked a general scheme for training, and 
was poorly organized and did not necessarily conform to Dominican law, despite the fact that it 
was meant to eventually take over marine duties.
8
  Fuller's first priority was to improve the 
constabulary's reputation, a goal that he hoped would also increase its efficiency.  Immediately, 
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Fuller called for the discharge of "undesirables," defined as those of poor health or criminal 
backgrounds and those who were illiterate or had undergone courts-martial in the early years of 
the constabulary.  Constabulary members with any of these undesirable traits, he argued, would 
lessen both the efficiency and reputation of the constabulary, and removing those enlisted men 
who had any of these traits would facilitate recruitment and decrease the amount of civilian 
complaints against the constabulary.
9
  Also, to address the frequency of desertions, he added to 
the medical examination an explanation to each recruit about the nature and duration of service 
before men committed to enlisting.
10
  While no full or consistent records survive concerning total 
numbers of desertions, the company records, communications, and prison lists demonstrate that 
desertions were extremely common in most regions.  In surviving records, almost every 
company reported at least one deserter for every six month period, and most in high-tension 
areas reported at least five.
11
  With companies totaling an average of thirty to eighty enlisted men 
during these years, the numbers are high, with desertion rates ranging by region so that some 
regions' companies had a desertion rate of 3% and others a rate as high as 15%-20%.  Deserters 
in these early and intermediate years of the occupation tended to be lower-class enlisted men, 
and desertions were understandably highest in the east, where guerrilla warfare was most 
prominent.
12
 
 From November, 1918 the new commandant of the organization, Colonel Charles F. 
Williams--who was only a major in the Marine Corps--worked to increase efforts to organize 
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constabulary companies and improve accountability.
13
  Williams had the advantage of being the 
only constabulary commandant, in the years 1917 to 1921, to remain in that position for more 
than seven months, and he ran the constabulary for two years, until September of 1920.
14
  This 
lent the constabulary a much-needed consistency, one that lasted long enough to allow Williams 
to see through some of the changes and orders he began.  One of his first goals, in line with 
Fuller's plans, was to improve record-keeping and accountability.  For example, Williams issued 
and enforced an order requiring each company to furnish a complete roster, including each 
person's name and rank, on the last day of each month.
15
  While this had been standard procedure 
in the pre-occupation Dominican military, for which records are extensive, no standard or 
thorough records of the constabulary had been regularly kept to this time in many constabulary 
locations, and Williams worked to improve the efficiency of record keeping.  The shortage of 
manpower at many posts, and the lack of emphasis on the constabulary during the first years, had 
meant that such record-keeping had not been enforced.  Williams also issued general orders of 
organization that were long overdue, such as the creation of savings account funds for 
constabulary posts to allow for troop rations funds, and standardization of forms sent to provost 
marshals for provost court cases regarding constabulary members.
16
  Another immediate goal 
was to discharge "undesirables" and open a new recruitment campaign.  The new recruitment 
campaign stressed that only U.S. and Dominican citizens and military personnel could be 
enlisted in the constabulary, a stipulation that had been implemented with the creation of the 
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constabulary in April of 1917, but that had not been followed.
17
  Because the reputation of the 
constabulary was so negative, and its units so inefficient, Fuller also facilitated the dismissal of 
constabulary members for reasons such as chronic indebtedness and “conduct unbecoming.”18  
He was optimistic that improved organization and efficiency would make Dominicans feel more 
inclined to enlist.  
 On 28 January, 1919, constabulary commandant Williams laid out new authorized 
enlistment strengths for the constabulary.  He decreased the total authorized strength for enlisted 
constabulary from 1,200 to 826 members.
19
  It renewed the budget for enlisted pay at fifteen 
dollars per month.  Most of the changes made turned out to be superficial, however, as 
discharges were not balanced by incoming recruits.
20
  The result was that, despite the discharge 
of many members of questionable action or foreign citizenship, the constabulary continued to 
suffer a lack of recruits.  Unfortunately, complete and consistent records of the total strength of 
the constabulary do not exist for the years 1917 to 1919; many reports discuss the general 
problems of recruitment, but companies were not held accountable for full rosters of their men, 
and the turnover of enlisted men from desertions and discharges, especially near the areas of 
highest armed resistance, meant that numbers fluctuated greatly.  A few reports were made over 
the years that worked to collect this information.  These reports show that the overall enlisted 
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strength of the organization was 575 in July of 1917, 691 in October of 1917,  600 in December 
of 1917, and that through 1918 enlisted strength remained in the 600s.
21
  Because of continued 
recruitment difficulties and the need for manpower, the constabulary also continued to recruit 
those who were illiterate and lower class, and many of poor health and criminal backgrounds.
22
  
Though discharges were easier to carry out, recruitment for Dominican citizens actually became 
more open at this time with Williams's attempts to increase the enlisted strength of the 
constabulary, with constabulary officers in local outposts recruiting illiterate men and criminals 
in direct contravention of Fuller's orders.
23
  Furthermore, the frequency and ease of discharging 
members led to constabulary units that were often understaffed in areas that were already short 
on manpower and police.  The cyclical purge of the military in search of "better" recruits through 
1919 thus shorthanded units throughout the country even as other aspects of the occupation, such 
as road-building and communications networks, were gradually advanced.
24
   
 One of the most effective methods that Williams introduced to increase enlistment was to 
make it possible, by late 1918, for Dominicans to be promoted to second lieutenant, the lowest 
rank in the officer corps.  The possibility of an officer rank for Dominican recruits, long 
promised but never a reality, did increase interest in joining, as demonstrated by the application 
of some Dominicans to the constabulary in December of 1918 to January of 1919.  Records 
indicate that a strong recommendation from a member of the U.S. forces or administration was a 
ticket into the constabulary; those who applied with such a letter were admitted.  Those applying 
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who were able to demonstrate social connections to U.S. citizens or military officers were even 
able to enlist despite criminal or debt-related problems in their records.
25
  The new recruitment 
campaign beginning in late 1918 thus re-emphasized the originally planned requirements that 
would make the body more respectable.  Continued problems in meeting desired enlistment 
strength led to the recruitment of a new force of Dominicans, one that emphasized health and 
dependability, but often recruited members of questionable reputation: the constabulary still 
recruited primarily from the lower and middle echelons of Dominican society. Dominican 
society was structured, at the time of intervention, in large part by a hereditary caste system that 
separated the gente de primera from those considered gente de segunda and lower-class 
peasants.
26
  The former had tended to be the military officers and the top one-hundred or so land-
owning families among Dominicans, those families that controlled the most wealth in the 
country not controlled by foreigners.  The gente de segunda consisted of lower-ranked military 
men or municipal guards, or nouveau riche and the rising merchant class.
27
  Despite growth in 
the wealth among the gente de segunda during the decades preceding the intervention, they 
continued to be excluded by upper-class Dominicans from the most elite social clubs and events. 
The new and more organized recruitment campaign initiated under Fuller and Williams, 
recognizing these distinctions among Dominicans and now increasingly attentive to the need to 
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improve the constabulary's reputation, sought to discharge many of those from the peasant 
classes and bring into the constabulary those of the higher classes.
28
   
 Due to a combination of continued elite rejection of the constabulary and marine 
unwillingness to recruit those from the pre-occupation officer corps, constabulary officers were 
unable to recruit Dominicans from the gente de primera, but did, in late 1918, obtain some 
applications for officer-hopefuls from among the gente de segunda.  This was a major shift from 
recruitment patterns of 1917 to late 1918, but one that left the constabulary under the command 
of foreigners and a class to which the traditional gente de primera considered themselves 
superior.  Some of the officer recruits were men who had been in the enlisted ranks in the pre-
occupation Guardia Republicana.
29
  Further, to meet recruitment levels, constabulary officers 
continued to enlist low-ranked recruits from the lowest classes of the population--those who 
were in the most financial need.  Most infamous among those enlisted into the constabulary from 
the gente de segunda in this period was Rafael Trujillo, whose application included a letter of 
support from the owner of a sugar plantation, and whose uncle was a close friend of Marine 
Major J.J. McLean.  Along with other enlisting gente de segunda, Trujillo gained quick 
admission at the rank of second lieutenant.
30
  Trujillo would use his career in the constabulary, 
and the Dominican military that stemmed from it, to rise and become the most notorious dictator 
of Dominican history (1930-1961).  Thus while the elite families of the country continued to 
boycott the constabulary, the changes did allow some opening for recruitment among a few from 
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the middle classes, some of whom became strong supporters of the constabulary.  By February of 
1919, Trujillo numbered among sixteen Dominicans in the officer rank of second lieutenant in 
the constabulary, all of whom seemed to have gained entrance as officers through political 
connections and the recommendations of marine officers who knew them.
31
   
 In addition to bringing low-ranking Dominican officers into the constabulary, the re-
shuffling in the occupation ranks brought change through the administration of the military 
government.  U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Snowden became Military Governor in February 
of 1919, and instituted major changes throughout his tenure in the position, many of which 
directly related to the constabulary.   Williams and Fuller's efforts to restructure the constabulary 
were therefore aided by changes and reforms initiated throughout the military government, from  
Snowden to the new cabinet he appointed to replace those who had served under Knapp.
32
  
Snowden, who had gained his rank commanding naval forces in the Atlantic Fleet during World 
War One, had originally rejected his superiors' request to serve as military governor in the 
Dominican Republic, and only agreed after receiving a verbal reprimand from Admiral Benson, 
First Chief of Naval Operations.
33
  When Snowden arrived, resentful of the position, he 
approached the problems of continued resistance and the occupation's failures with frustration 
and the assumption that the problem was one of racial and cultural inferiority among 
Dominicans.  He determined, based on these assumptions, to censor the population and to use 
harsh military rule to bring order to the country.
34
  He also changed many of the policies 
commonplace in the early years of military government, such as Knapp's attempts to give 
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preference to Dominican laborers and to employ some Dominicans as advisors to the 
government.
35
   
 Early 1919 claims that armed resistance had ended or was less of a problem quickly 
proved to be premature, and guerrilla warfare continued throughout the country.  By February of 
1919 it was clear that the armed resistance in the east was growing rather than diminishing.
36
   
As the armed resistance grew, government officials as high ranking as military governor 
Snowden, and those Dominicans cooperating with occupation forces, received death threats.
37
  In 
response to the guerrilla threat, the Marine Corps brought the 15th Regiment, including 1,041 
enlisted men and 50 Marine officers, to re-enforce the marine brigade and constabulary units 
fighting in the eastern provinces of El Seibo and Macorís [see table 5.1].
38
  To this time the 
country was divided into two military districts, the Northern District and the Southern District.  
This change added an Eastern District whose major concern was to deal with armed resistance.  
It also meant an increase in Marine forces so high that constabulary officials found it difficult to 
convince Dominicans that their work toward Dominicanizing the constabulary force were 
sincere.  With the arrival of the 15th Regiment came the introduction of the First Marine Air 
Squadron, positioned in San Pedro de Macorís to aid occupation forces with mapping and 
surveillance, and later in the fighting of guerrilla warfare.
39
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 Table 5.1. Total Marine enlisted strengths in the Dominican Republic 1916-1919.
40
 
     May, 1916      632 
     November, 1916  2,219 
     January, 1917   1,804 
     May, 1917   1,683 
     June, 1918   1,635 
     October, 1918   1,964 
     February, 1919  3,007 
     December, 1919  1,970 
 
 Snowden immediately implemented other changes that had direct effects on the 
constabulary.  For example, he initiated the long-planned establishment of a national penitentiary 
with a budget of $100,000.
41
  In the area of the capital city, where the national penitentiary was 
to be build, the constabulary supplied men for the building and guarding of this and other reform 
initiatives, such as schools.  With Executive Order 274 in April of 1919, Snowden also 
introduced the long-planned Medical Department of the constabulary.
42
  In May of 1919, 
therefore, Williams oversaw this addition to the constabulary, which included budget 
adjustments to allow each company commander to appoint two enlisted constabulary members 
for service with its company's Medical Corps, each to be trained on-site with U.S. Navy medical 
officers.
43
  Once each province's constabulary headquarters was able to carry out enlistments, the 
Medical Corps development within constabulary companies allowed for wider geographical 
recruitment.  Finally, by April and May of 1919, this wider geographical reach allowed an 
increase in maximum strength and began to increase overall enlistment.  In August of 1919, the 
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constabulary was able to report the overall strength of the constabulary at a height of 1,186 men 
and officers.
44
   
 The changes to this point also demonstrated the high importance placed on military 
control.  In addition to the 3,000 marines serving in the country, whose force was paid for the 
U.S. Marine Corps, the constabulary this year consumed 26.3% of the nation's growing budget.
45
  
This government emphasis on building a large military force gave Williams another advantage 
over previous constabulary commandants.  Throughout 1919, and especially in early 1920, the 
Military Government's budget would grow due to increasing revenue and the benefits accrued 
from infrastructural development and a tremendous post-World War One boom in the sugar 
economy [See Tables 5.1 and 5.2].  The budget allowed for developments such as the Medical 
Corps's establishment, but also allowed for the beginnings of repairs and improvements in 
constabulary structures and prisons that had long been neglected, and basic training supplies that 
had previously been lacking.  Because Williams had the marine manpower to emphasize 
infrastructural reform and minor basic training in some constabulary headquarters, he was able to 
oversee many of the changes that previous constabulary commandants had attempted in vain, or 
for which they had requested manpower or an increased budget.   
 
 Table 5.2  Expense of National Constabulary by Calendar Year.
46
 
     1917  $500,000 
     1918  $622,688 
     1919  $747,780 
     1920  $702,030 
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 Table 5.3 Value of Sugar Exports of the Dominican Republic, 1905-1920.
47
 
     1905    $3,292,470 
     1906    $2,392,406 
     1907    $2,009,679 
     1908    $3,092,429 
     1909    $3,304,931 
     1910    $5,590,536 
     1911    $4,159,733 
     1912    $5,841,733 
     1913    $3,650,556 
     1914    $4,943,452 
     1915    $7,671,383 
     1916  $12,028,297 
     1917  $13,386,463 
     1918  $11,991,399 
     1919  $20,697,761 
     1920  $45,305,620  
     1921  $14,338,354 
     1922    $9,192,172 
     1923  $18,722,912 
     1924  $21,682,556 
     1925  $15,447,036 
     1926  $14,699,613 
     1927  $16,668,385 
     1928  $16,911,925 
     1929  $12,258,831 
     1930     $9,910,289
48
  
 
 Table 5.4 Dominican National Commercial Balance, 1914-1920.
49
 
     1914    $3,859,780 
     1915    $6,090,547 
     1916  $10,780,443 
     1917    $5,044,516 
     1918    $2,636,192 
     1919  $17,582,765 
     1920  $12,205,365 
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 Military Governor Snowden was, by military standards, highly efficient in organizing the 
occupation.  He was not, however, diplomatic in his efforts.  On 8 June, 1919, two and a half 
years after the occupation began, Snowden gave a public speech that proved to be a major 
turning point in the way both occupation and resistance were conducted.  The Navy Department 
authorized Snowden only to state that "up to the present time nothing has occurred to alter in the 
slightest the present situation."
50
  Snowden embellished on this, announcing to the Dominican 
public that the occupation would continue indefinitely due to Dominicans' apparent inability to 
govern their own country; he expected the U.S. would be occupying the country for at least 
another ten to twenty years.
51
  Snowden's speech in the middle of these new recruitment efforts 
lent more credence to the widespread claim that those enlisting were betraying the sovereignty of 
their country by aiding occupation forces.  The event loudly spelled out the strong 
disillusionment among both occupation forces and Dominicans, and highlighted the failure of 
recent changes meant to improve relations by improving the marine-officered Dominican 
constabulary. 
 The controversies surrounding Snowden's speech and the spike in marine arrivals led 
constabulary commandant Williams to some new concern about the possibility of gaining 
Dominican support for the constabulary through the provinces.  At the same time, the increased 
marine forces in the Eastern district allowed Williams to balance out the numbers in constabulary 
companies from province to province.  He worked to spread constabulary forces more evenly 
throughout the country's regions, institutionalizing the changes in September of 1919 with 
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constabulary General Order 39 (Series 1919).
52
  Williams made this change with the hopes that it 
would make Dominicans see the constabulary as more representative of national policing forces, 
leaving fewer areas policed only by marines and thus improving the reputation of the 
constabulary and the general occupation.  This change worked better in theory than in practice, 
of course, as the military government ordered officers to pull many constabulary members from 
policing power to be used as hands in infrastructural building during 1919, and marines 
outnumbered constabulary by about three to one during that year.
53
  To increase enlistment 
enthusiasm, and in the hope of boosting re-enlistment for the many who would be eligible for it 
in the next year, Williams also issued an order in November of 1919 giving departmental 
directors the authorization to provide licenses for leave after certain terms of service (depending 
upon rank).
54
   
 As 1920 began, reactions to the constabulary were mixed.  Some real changes in the 
institutional structure of the organization had transformed some of the most problematic aspects 
of the constabulary: it now had Dominican officers, even if they were at the lowest officer rank, 
and recruited from a broader geographical population than it had been able to do previously.  
Higher levels of accountability, through the creation of an Inspector General's office and 
structured reporting, lessened blatant incidents of corruption among both marine and Dominican 
constabulary members.  The constabulary was spread more evenly through its outposts in each 
province, and was finally operating at near-full capacity.  Constabulary companies were still, 
however, led by inexperienced marine officers, and still lacked any consistent training.  In part 
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because of these problems, and the wider rejection of occupation conduct, it also still lacked the 
support of the elite families and still struggled against the rejection of most middle-class 
families.
55
  On 5 June of 1920, interim commandant George C. Reid complained that Dominican 
constabulary officers were a failure because they were not "from among the higher types of 
Dominicans," and therefore lacked stability, character, and natural aptitude.
56
  Williams agreed 
that the Dominican officers were inefficient, though he opined that it was due to lack of 
training.
57
  Despite many attempts to improve the constabulary, and even to bring in native 
officers, constabulary leaders still faced major challenges.  As late as 1920, U.S. Minister 
William Russell was demanding major change to the constabulary, stating that the military 
government was spending large sums of money for the constabulary's maintenance without 
proving its efficiency, and that complaints against constabulary methods were still "numerous.”58 
 When Williams was ordered back to the United States in September of 1920, the 
constabulary was briefly taken over by George C. Reid, and soon after by J.C. Breckenridge, 
reinitiating the rapid turnover of constabulary Colonel Commandants.
59
  Not surprisingly, the 
Dominican opinion of the constabulary seemed to change little or not at all in 1918 and 1919.  
Marine officers continued to refuse Dominican members any promotions above the rank of 
second lieutenant.  Still, constabulary Colonel Commandant J.C. Breckenridge argued that the 
result of the changes were good; before late 1920, he stated, the members of the constabulary had 
themselves had to be "watched," so that the fewer and more selectively recruited numbers of 
Dominican recruits was preferable to the previous riffraff.  Upon briefly taking command of the 
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force in late 1920, he explained away continued complaints, stating that the constabulary was 
simply "passing through a stage of reconstruction which requires patience and several months of 
time."
60
  His added clause that "there is no doubt as to the outcome" might have struck 
Dominicans as an empty promise by this time, had they heard it, after years of repeated promises 
of a reformed constabulary and friendlier military-civil relations.  New orders in 1920 
emphasizing the requirement that even U.S. constabulary officers must have a working 
knowledge of Spanish and be examined successfully on basic knowledge of Dominican history 
seemed to come as too little and too late, three years after the constabulary's founding.
 61
    
 
 
The constabulary experience. 
 Overall, the changes in the constabulary as it was experienced were modest and varied by 
region, despite the extent of efforts and institutional changes made by Fuller and Williams.  This 
was true for four primary reasons: 1) The period under which Fuller and Williams initiated 
changes began with a constabulary that had a very dark reputation throughout the country.  Re-
structuring did not bring widespread or even marginal support for the constabulary among the 
majority of the population, largely because of the disparity between central command and 
regional commands.  2) Despite many suggestions issued in general orders through 1919 for 
constabulary training in outposts and headquarters, training continued to be un-systematized and 
largely nonexistent; some company commanders had sufficient regional resources to allow for 
training while others did not.  The especially high number of marines in the country in early to 
mid 1919 was used primarily in the guerrilla warfare in the east, and to garrison marine 
headquarters in the face of continued resistance.  Their presence was large but temporary, 
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causing a reaction among a populace that rejected an increase in Marine strength, while not 
allowing constabulary commanders to use marines for training.  3)  Despite the high budget for 
the constabulary, equipment and provisions continued to be short throughout 1919 due to 
inefficiency and the incredible need for funds for buildings and repair, all of which had been 
neglected for nearly a decade.  Outlying regions farther from the major cities especially suffered 
from lack of supplies, as the military government emphasized military superiority especially in 
regions near the major cities: the high increase in the military government's budget in 1919 was 
directed mainly toward the improvement of the sugar industry and the building of infrastructure 
to show concrete improvements in reports to the U.S. Navy and State Departments.
62
  4) The 
changes in needed military infrastructure such as roads and telecommunications were extremely 
gradual until 1920, which combined with a year of intense rains in 1919 to make constabulary 
patrolling and reporting difficult, especially in more remote areas.  The country remained highly 
regional, and populations from one area to the next were distinct and accustomed to a high 
degree of regional autonomy.   
One of the key reasons that so many Dominicans rejected the constabulary was the very 
nature of the military government: From late 1916 to 1918, despite Knapp‟s attitude toward 
Dominicans as inferior, many Dominicans wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt during his 
time as military governor because he did include Dominican advisors in the government.  Yet the 
disorder caused by lack of budgeting or support from the U.S. State Department worked against 
him and against occupation goals, and Dominicans became increasingly disillusioned with the 
motives of the occupying force from the first months of the occupation.
63
  Despite Knapp‟s use 
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of Dominicans as advisors, eye-witness accounts of American advisors and travelers through the 
region constantly pointed out the lack of Dominicans in any positions in the official 
government.
64
  1918 and 1919 brought adjustments that allowed the beginnings of infrastructural 
reform and improvement in government oversight of health, sanitation, and education, but also 
complicated the Dominican reception of the military government through the appointment of 
Thomas Snowden as military governor.  Snowden was even less inclined either to trust 
Dominicans in their own self-governance or to include them as advisors in any fashion.  Thus 
even the appeasement of having Dominicans involved in minor aspects of the governance of the 
country was removed upon Snowden‟s entry into the office of military governor, which 
coincided with the first real efforts at improving the constabulary in 1918.   
 Marine constabulary officers were well aware of the problem of the constabulary's 
reputation, but unable to fix it.  From late 1918 until 1922, marines serving as constabulary 
officers continuously urged the development of a recruitment process and campaign that could 
help to remove the dark reputation of the organization and bring "better" recruits to enlistment.
65
  
Yet the main roles of the constabulary in many provinces during 1918 and 1919 continued to be 
in the fight against continual resurgences of armed resistance, patrolling around cities and 
throughout the countryside, prison guarding or escorting of officials, and basic policing duties.  
As Marine Colonel George C. Thorpe described it in late 1919, the constabulary  
 is expected to function under the War Department as well as under the Department of 
 Justice.  It not only combines the functions of army and police but has some of those of 
 the sheriff.  It is organized and trained and administered upon military principles.  As a 
 small army it fights battles against insurgents; as a police force it hunts down criminals, 
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 especially in the rural districts; it operates in the rôle of sheriff in serving summons and 
 other judicial writs and in furnishing guards at court sessions.  It also has some 
 connection with the Sanitary Department in enforcing sanitary regulations, and represents 
 the central government, more or less, in connection with quarantine and immigration.
66
 
 
For urban areas, the military government throughout 1919 began to allow the re-establishment of 
municipal police so that constabulary units could be freed up for the military duties that their 
military organization reflected.  The creation of municipal police, who officially answered to 
civil government, created its own problems for the constabulary and occupation forces.  Until 
late 1921, the exact lines were unclear in many cities between which duties belonged to the 
constabulary and which fell under the obligations of municipal police forces.  The latter also 
worked to distance themselves from the constabulary, and generally did not cooperate with 
constabulary or occupation forces.  The chiefs of the municipal forces encouraged this behavior, 
also distancing themselves from occupation authorities, leading to constabulary and Marine 
demands for local, civil governments to request resignations from stubborn police chiefs.  
Charles A. McLaughlin, marine commander of the constabulary in charge of the 10th Company 
stationed in the interior town of Moca, for example, reported disorder in the audience at a public 
show on 12 September, 1920.  The marine commanding officer requested that Chief Valario in 
charge of the municipal police there, do something, and Valario stood by and did nothing.  The 
following Monday, the ayuntamiento requested Valario's resignation.
67
  Such incidences, in 
which municipal police not commanded by marine officers were supported by large portions of 
the local populations in their rejection of marine authority, led to increasing instances of civil-
military clashes rather than lessening the problems.
68
  Even with the addition of some municipal 
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police forces, furthermore, the small constabulary was spread too thin.  Constabulary men 
employed as guards in civil prisons, for example, included more than eleven percent of the 
constabulary membership in 1919 and 1920.
69
   
 In an effort to improve the constabulary's interaction with the public, especially to deal 
with the isolation and lack of accountability in some constabulary command outposts, 
Commandant Williams emphasized the awarding of commendations to those constabulary 
members who distinguished themselves in service, and especially to those who worked well with 
the public.
70
  By mid 1919, after Snowden's speech and attempts by Fuller and Williams to 
reform the constabulary, the tensions between the military and the civilian population are clear in 
Williams's need to issue a General Order on 23 July, 1919 reiterating the authorized roles of the 
constabulary, and its obligations in dealing with the public.  All constabulary members were 
required and empowered to execute lawful warrants, and were authorized to make arrests upon 
reasonable suspicion without warrants.   He stressed, however, that they "must act in good faith 
and have reasonable grounds for suspicion of the guilt of the person arrested."  Furthermore, the 
order stated that arrests without warrants should only be made when immediate action was 
required to avoid disturbance of the peace, that arrests should be made "as quietly as possible" 
and using only "such force as may be reasonably necessary to accomplish the object," and even 
that "persons arrested will not be humiliated."
71
   
 The reasons bringing about the need for such an order are clear.  Instances of friction 
remained high, and from the beginning of the occupation, instances of military brutality occurred 
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especially in isolated locations.  One of the more infamous examples of excessive use of force 
came as early as October of 1916, while the occupation was just beginning, in the widely 
documented and publicized "Villa Duarte" incident.  In Villa Duarte, a neighborhood in Santo 
Domingo, marines went in to arrest a fugitive; they saw the area as a "harbor for insurrectos and 
criminals, whose insolence to and defiance of the American authorities had aroused considerable 
feeling" among marines.
72
  The event, like many others, led to a shooting exchange that killed 
non-combatant Dominican civilians, including a woman.  A number of marines in officer 
positions in the constabulary were arrested and tried for brutalities against the population, mostly 
in the east.   Constabulary Captains who were lower-ranking marines, such as Harry Seipel, 
Gustave Schmidt, and James Merkel regularly robbed locals of horses, food, and other supplies 
in addition to the seizure of arms.
73
   Schmidt, in his capacity as a Captain in a constabulary 
company was eventually arrested for the regular torture of local inhabitants.  Merkel, too, 
committed blatant torture, and encouraged his Dominican constabulary recruits to do the same.  
He was arrested for beating and disfiguring a prisoner and having four others shot.  During the 
investigation, while Merkel was confined awaiting trial, he committed suicide.
74
   
 Constabulary involvement with such men, especially when they were marine officers, 
and with the constant raids against the eastern population, caused growing numbers of violent 
incidents between local populations and constabulary members as the occupation wore on.
75
  
Marine and Dominican constabulary officers were also notorious for corruption, and even in the 
1920s commanding officers' memos to headquarters still repeatedly emphasized the problem of 
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reports of constabulary abuse of the peasantry and the frequency with which they stole from the 
native populations, especially in areas further removed from the capital city.
76
  Dominicans 
issued complaints to their local governments, rather than to the commanders of the constabulary, 
that constabulary members were corrupt and sometimes murderous but did not receive sentences 
equal to their crimes.  The result was that solutions were local more often than standardized 
across provinces, and judgments often tended to try to right the balance of power.  For example, 
constabulary commanders called for an investigation of sentences carried out by the local courts, 
where they reported that a man from Barahona received only six months for wounding a man 
five times with a knife, while a constabulary member was given a year for shooting a man while 
on duty.  The Secretary of the Judge of the First Instance there stated openly in court that the 
constabulary members were "vagabonds only good to assasinate [sic] people."
77
  In some areas, 
constabulary members complained that local residents would not extend credit to them, and 
General Order 22 of 14 August 1920 ordered constabulary medical officers to establish friendly 
relations with local dentists so that the constabulary men could be assured dental care.
78
 
 Despite the initiation of many institutional reforms in 1918 and 1919, the exigencies of 
guerrilla warfare meant that training was often neglected, especially in areas of high resistance in 
which both constabulary members and marines were fighting resistance.  The result was a wide 
regional variation in the constabulary's successes.  Calder points out that of the constabulary's 
marine field officers in mid-1919, not one had previously served as an officer, nor was there 
"one who had experience in that peculiar line of police work necessary for the success of the 
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Guardia."
79
  This meant that constabulary companies in the field lacked trainers.  Sixteen of the 
thirty-four marine non-coms serving with the Guardia had quit by mid-1919, and despite the 
need for training, the State Department refused to authorize more officers than were absolutely 
necessary for the basic staffing of the Guardia, so most marine duties were in the field with their 
Marine or constabulary companies.
80
  The large spike in marine numbers in early 1919, which 
predated improvements in housing, communication, and infrastructure also added to difficulties, 
straining the already insufficient support for troops of both the Marine Corps and the 
constabulary.  While some marine and constabulary units in the country's major cities were 
housed in the fortalezas, those in rural areas spent most of their time in field tents, and many 
constabulary members were housed in field tents on the grounds of the fortalezas even in the 
cities because sufficient barracks had yet to be built before 1920.  Morale among troops was thus 
often low, putting a strain on commanders who were in the process of attempting to better civil-
military relations.
81
   
 Fuller, concerned with morale among marine enlisted men, developed a system to cope 
with this problem while providing basic training to unprepared new recruits.  He opened a 
training center for marines in Santo Domingo City, assigning each marine company to a rotation 
of six weeks of standard marine training and special schooling in "occupation duties."  This 
improved the morale of marine officers from interior stations, who saw these periods as times to 
"see a little night life and do some dancing at the club."
82
  One might imagine the reaction of 
Dominicans already skeptical about the sincerity of efforts to improve the constabulary, which 
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still lacked training centers or any form of rotation.  The preference to training enlisted marines 
before  constabulary officers in those years was representative of the larger problem of 
Dominican recruits and officers not being taken seriously or prepared for the eventual takeover 
of the armed forces that was supposed to have been the purpose in creating the constabulary.  In 
1919, U.S. Minister to the Dominican Republic William Russell suggested a complete 
reorganization of the constabulary, preferably under “white officers and not native 
Dominicans.”83  This of course had been the reality since the constabulary's founding, but the 
continued determination of policy-makers to keep it that way led to a reaction among them 
against the opening of lower ranking officer positions for Dominicans.  
 Not until late 1921, with discussions about preparing for eventual U.S. withdrawal, would 
any systematic training of the constabulary or its Dominican officers begin. Constabulary 
recruits in most locations therefore were armed only with improvised training, often in the field 
and through a language barrier by marines who had "no special instruction in constabulary 
work."
84
  They came to the constabulary with knowledge of the local populations and landscape, 
and most had experience with the old firearms that the marines gained from disarmament and 
often used to supply the constabulary's enlisted members.
85
  Some marines, mostly in the center 
of the country and the capital city where armed insurrection was less common, enforced on-site 
teaching of basic drilling techniques, which were administered in English with physical 
demonstrations to circumvent the problem of the language barrier.
86
  Constabulary company 
reliance on recruit knowledge of the territory, people, and language was set side-by-side with a 
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foreign-language drill in an attempt to make constabulary units effective for local needs but also 
disciplined and respectable.  
  The result, in the middle years of the occupation, was a synthesis of Marine Corps 
organization and Dominican local traditions, the latter of which persisted as Spanish-speaking 
constabulary members inserted themselves into power relationships and negotiation with local 
populations in ways that English-speaking marine constabulary leaders could not do.  The 
tendency toward on-site training as possible at the discretion of various marine commanders was 
also the reinforcement of the same regional patterns that had plagued national militaries of the 
previous decades: the new military in areas such as the southeast and southwest were 
underdeveloped in training and discipline, and often cut off from supplies and medical care, due 
to local insurrections and guerrilla warfare.  Units in the area surrounding the capital city, where 
the largest numbers of marines were stationed, were well-supplied and better trained.  
Constabulary companies in the interior, especially in the Cibao Valley, were housed in remote 
outposts through the provinces there, and were focused mainly on rural patrolling.  As both 
armed resistance and the need to police urban populations were less notable there, company 
commanders were able to emphasize the drill and basic training.  In the northwest and along the 
Haitian border, the military continued to be focused on the policing of trade goods and border 
crossings, and spent much more time on long patrols and paperwork relating to the border.  
Despite the insertion of marine organization for the units, and the English drill, the exigencies of 
regional needs trumped a real re-making of the military, and the constabulary units settled into 
regional training and policing patterns that more resembled previous Dominican militaries than 
the national, unified constabulary of theory.   
260 
 
 Through 1919, the increase in the constabulary's budget gave commandant Williams the 
opportunity to begin some major apportioning of financial resources toward the construction, 
repair, and maintenance of buildings for constabulary barracks and outposts, as well as general 
supplies.  Since the units had not been supplied to this point, however, constabulary units in most 
regions lacked even basic military equipment such as firearms when the higher 1919 budget 
came into play.  Marines commanding the constabulary units, of course, had firearms provided 
by the Marine Corps.  Because the number of pistols available was only enough to arm officers 
and trumpeters, constabulary enlisted members were without.
87
  While those constabulary 
members serving in more remote outposts were supposed to be equipped with rifles as of 12 
December 1919, their lack of training in the cleaning and handling of the Krag-Jorgensen rifles 
meant that the weapons rapidly deteriorated.
88
  Though it was closely monitored that 
constabulary enlisted men were only to have access to arms while on duty or in the barracks, and 
never while off-duty, from 1917 through 1920 most were only carrying machetes and other such 
weapons that been captured in the disarmament campaign.
89
  Even as late as 1921, the entire 
constabulary organization had only three automatic rifles and no machine guns, and a lack of 
field equipment and vehicles or mounts.
90
   
 Despite the continued problem of lack of equipment and supplies, constabulary 
commandants were careful to keep the pay for enlisted men at a steady $15 per month.  This 
salary, twice that earned by most Dominican laborers and the same amount paid to enlisted 
marines in the period, was meant to guarantee enlistment and to guarantee loyalty among those 
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enlisted.
91
  Enlisted pay was also increased to $17 per month when Marine Corps enlisted pay 
was increased in 1919.  This pay level may well have seemed very high to laborers, but was too 
low to recruit many from among other classes.  As demonstrated in Chapter Three, it often 
proved to be insufficient to offset the dangers and pressures of being in the constabulary.  
Weather conditions in some years of the occupation, coupled with poor roads and the need to 
patrol in areas that had no roads, meant that some marine and constabulary battalions would 
become completely cut off from both central orders and supply, leading to the need to support 
their livelihoods from local populations.  Merchants extending credit to constabulary members 
ran the risk of being called traitors, or of being persecuted by the armed resistance for aiding the 
enemy.
92
  This often meant increases in constabulary theft from local populations, and made 
conditions in the units difficult in all but the best of times.
93
   
 
Complaints against the constabulary 
 One of the primary reasons that multiple resistance movements did not unite before 1920 
was the lack of movement across regions among intellectuals and politicians.  From 1916, 
censorship was one of the primary forms of control that the military government used to keep 
resistances from uniting, and it was also one of the strongest points of contention.  As nationalist 
resistance leader Henríquez y Carvajal would emphasize in 1920, the military government had 
long used World War One to justify strict censorship; the constabulary, from its inception, 
enforced censorship to facilitate the job of  “subduing” the population for civil and military 
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reform.
94
  Successive administrators adjusted levels of censorship to allow control while 
attempting not to incite rebellion, and the level of censorship also varied by region depending on 
local traditions and expectations.  As military governor in 1918-1919, however, Thomas 
Snowden instituted extreme censorship laws to shackle resistance.
95
  In 1919, though World War 
One was over, his military government forbade Dominicans from using the title "General," and 
prohibited the use of the terms "national," "rebellion," "freedom of thought," and "freedom of 
speech."
96
   
 Through the years of occupation, Dominicans in all regions were brought under court-
martial by marine provost marshals for publication of articles or statements that might do harm 
to the military control of the country.  The military government and constabulary, seeing the 
danger of possible unity across regions or from outside of the country's borders, was especially 
sensitive to any sign of unification in resistance after World War One.  In 16 December of 1919, 
for example, editor of Puerto Plata's Ecos del Norte Rafael Morel was brought in for reprinting a 
statement criticizing the military government that had been written by the Ladies Commission 
Pro-Santo Domingo in New York City.
97
  The marines and constabulary dealt most severely with 
publications that had strong potential to unite regions, but arrests and harsh fines would actually 
work to galvanize the resistance.
98
  Groups like the Ladies Commission Pro-Santo Domingo 
sprung up more and more after World War One, and de jure Dominican president Francisco 
Henríquez y Carvajal's movement from Cuba grew exponentially after the war ended.  Henríquez 
y Carvajal spoke at the Paris Peace Conference, could not get an audience with President Wilson, 
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and returned to the United States to pursue it.
99
  When Wilson still did not grant him an audience, 
the Dominican president brought complaints to the State Department.
100
  He suggested that the 
military governor call together a commission of Dominicans to make suggestions about how the 
occupation should be conducted.  When State Department officials suggested that he take these 
ideas to Military Governor Snowden, he responded that under Snowden the "thought and will of 
the people" were suppressed or forced into "underground channels of divulgation" due to 
censorship.
101
   
 Notably, Snowden himself opined that Henríquez y Carvajal's idea of a Dominican 
commission “would result in anarchy and early ruin" of occupation goals.102  With pressure from 
both the State Department and Dominican politicians and intellectuals, Snowden's administration 
did finally attempt to smooth public opinion in November, 1919 by appointing four prominent 
Dominicans to a junta consultiva that was charged with proposing reforms with the ostensible 
end of facilitating U.S. withdrawal.
103
  No actual plan for withdrawal existed, but rising 
resistance to continued occupation necessitated creating an appearance of eventual withdrawal.  
Snowden admitted the powerlessness of this commission in official and private correspondence, 
however, saying that he hoped that the nominal inclusion in government of prominent 
Dominicans would appease popular opinion.
104
  The commission consisted of Archbishop Nouel, 
previous Dominican Treasury Minister and political party leader Federico Velasquez, and 
prominent Santo Domingo lawyers Francisco Peynado and Jacinto R. de Castro, who quickly 
realized the impotence of the position: When they recommended a suspension of censorship as 
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one of the first key steps toward democratic government, Snowden responded by increasing 
censorship.  The commission members resigned in protest on 9 January of 1920.
105
  From there, 
resistance would turn into a growing nationalist movement that worked outside the bounds of 
military government laws and drew attention to the wide scope of problems such as censorship.   
 In addition to censorship, the nationalist resistance worked to draw attention to another 
major complaint that existed across regions, and one instituted by the military government 
specifically in order to centralize national government: military government interference in local 
and civil government, as enforced by the constabulary.  As described in Chapter Three, Knapp's 
original proclamation of Military Government reassured Dominicans that civil government 
would remain in the hands of the Dominican courts as long as it did not conflict with the goals of 
the occupation.  The latter clause, of course, left each case open to individual interpretation, and 
almost any case could be said to affect occupation goals.  Bruce Calder argues that authors of 
occupation reform sought "to eliminate inefficiencies and inequities, but they had no thought of 
radically changing the Dominican economy or society."
106
  This was true in some aspects:  For 
example, reformers reinitiated many changes begun under previous Dominican governments.  
Yet records demonstrate that many in the highest military government and constabulary posts 
had in mind exactly the goal of radically changing Dominican society, and that was one of the 
more powerful catalysts for growing resistance against the occupation and the constabulary that 
enforced its changes.  Racist and paternalist ideologies led many to come to the occupation with 
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the understanding that their role was that of modernizer and tutor, and occupation records are rife 
with Marine discussions of the need to radically change varying aspects of Dominican society 
and government.
107
   Many U.S. officials sought to rebuild the entire structure of Dominican 
government, enforcing the changes and surveillance of their results by use of the constabulary.   
 The constabulary, seen by most Dominicans as part of the occupation forces rather than 
as a Dominican military, carried out and enforced controversial civil reforms that fell outside the 
publicly stated goals of the occupation.  For example, many local positions such as 
ayuntamientos and municipal mayors were traditionally elected, but were appointed under the 
military government.
108
  The constabulary was given wide powers to arrest in cases that might be 
construed as relevant to military government objectives.  This became especially contentious due 
to the legal inconsistencies in the occupation's civil administration.  Rufus Lane, appointed 
Minister of Justice and Public Instruction, advocated major changes that would gradually phase 
out much of the power of regional civil government, centralizing the national government and 
military so as to empower central control in relation to traditional regionally based power 
structures.
109
  Prior to the occupation, Dominican civil governors in the provinces had 
traditionally been military generals and had held wide power, including the constitutional right to 
call up men in arms to defend local government.
110
  Although marine Brigade Commander 
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George C. Thorpe defended the occupation, stating that "the native courts never lost any of their 
authority," the record contradicts him.
111
   
 The problem was that the military government was charged first with bringing order, and 
it sought to do so by centralizing government and military power.  From as early as 1918, 
military government administrators had worked to revise the Dominican civil governmental 
system and consolidate multiple regions to centralize and facilitate military and administrative 
power.
112
  Joseph Pendleton, as marine brigade commander in the country through 1918, began 
the process of consolidating and centralizing government starting with the reduction of 
Dominican provinces.  He hoped to reduce the country's number of provinces from twelve to 
four or five, stating that "governors are a joke anyhow, and not really worth their keep."
113
  Lane 
called Dominican municipal governments by nature "highly inefficient and wasteful," and stated 
that they "seemed to be incapable of carrying responsibility in reformatory measures."  The 
military government therefore gradually took over the roles of those municipal governments, 
backing their authority through a combination of marine and constabulary policing, "with the 
prospect that at no distant date even the nominal independence [of regions] will disappear."
114
  
Pendleton, too, advocated the gradual elimination of local governments, and considered 
consolidation of comunes and districts throughout the country to be the most effective way of 
carrying out this change.
115
  The decreasing importance of civil governors, however, can be 
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explained by the character of the occupation; as Thorpe later explained it, the nature of the 
occupation government was military, and thus lent itself more to centralization that left civil 
governors "little authority and few functions."
116
  The apparent ineffectiveness of civil governors 
stemmed from the very centralization and militarization that the occupying government was 
carrying out, and from civil resistance against that centralized control.  Yet many in the military 
government worked to consolidate military control by such reforms despite the fact that they fell 
outside of the parameters of what the occupation had promised to do.  Military government 
interference in civil government increased popular dissatisfaction with those willing to be 
members of the constabulary that enforced such changes.  
 The Dominican population reacted to oppression and change carried out by the 
constabulary, and these reactions were often misunderstood or ignored by occupation planners 
and high-ranking U.S. officers of the constabulary.  One  of the most controversial reforms, and 
one in which the constabulary was most visible, was that of disarming the population.  The 
centrality of disarmament in clashes between the civilian population and the constabulary 
provides a useful case study of how occupation initiatives and failures in building military-civil 
relations affected the development and reception of the constabulary, and of the interplay of 
widening resistance with the attempted consolidation of constabulary control.
117
  Individuals 
working for the military government, most prominent among them previous U.S. Minister to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
a continuing goal of military government administrators, and became even more central with the need to abandon 
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Dominican Republic Sumner Welles, attempted to explain away the foreign imposition of 
disarmament by pointing out a proposal under the 1902 provisional government of Vásquez to 
begin a program of disarmament by prohibiting the import of firearms and ammunition with the 
eventual goal of disarming individuals.
118
  Welles's argument and that of the Military 
Government was that disarmament was not just a foreign imposition, but a sound and also 
Dominican policy.
119
  The Vásquez and Cáceres governments had not been successful in 
carrying out disarmament either, however, because of the ubiquity of arms in Dominican culture 
and because even under those governments the plan was heavily influenced by U.S. pressure.
120
   
 Disarmament also had cultural and psychological ramifications that occupiers did not 
understand.  As Dominican historian and contemporary occupation resister Luís Mejía points 
out, Dominican fathers had by tradition long  given revolvers to their sons as a sign of manhood, 
and the surrendering of such a weapon might be seen as tantamount to renouncing one's 
manhood.
121
  The museum in the Fortaleza in Santiago today contains a display of weapons with 
a placard describing the importance of this tradition in Dominican history from the time of 
independence and before.  The placard states that, traditionally, "the surrender of one's own 
sword has always been a demonstration of surrender or of submission, and its breaking, a 
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ceremony of degradation."   The occupation disarmament campaign was in many other ways 
different from campaigns initiated by previous Dominican governments.  It was an initiative 
begun and enforced by foreign military forces, and its objectives and targets were much wider 
than those of previous reforms. 
 The conduct of the disarmament campaign, listed among the immediate objectives of 
occupying forces, tended to highlight its character as a foreign initiative.  Marines in 1916 and 
1917 had begun carrying out disarmament as they fought their way into the country.  This, and 
the fact that a marine commanding officer held sole authority to revoke or sign arms permits, 
highlighted its foreignness.
122
  Provincial governors resented that arms were to be turned over to 
U.S. provost marshals and then to marine District Commanders, instead of passing through the 
channels of provincial Dominican civil government.
123
  It was not an order issued by a 
Dominican government, but an imposition by hostile and invading armed forces, an insult 
aggravated by the ease with which U.S. civilians in the country could obtain guns and permits.  
Disarmament was used by marines and later by constabulary units to justify forcible entry into 
Dominican homes when "an appreciable percentage" of Dominicans refused to voluntarily 
surrender arms.
124
  One Marine called disarmament “the most drastic and effective step in the 
restoration of domestic tranquility," stating that “these forcible measures while not tending to 
promote good feeling were unavoidable and wholly justifiable in the effort for an early return of 
peace and order” and that "this measure divested the inhabitants of the only physical means of 
protracting armed resistance, and conclusively convinced them of the futility of further 
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opposition in the face of the new order of things.”125  As the 1920 resistance emphasized, 
however, the extensive disarmament campaign did not restore peace and order throughout the 
country, nor did it "conclusively convince" Dominicans of the futility of resistance.  Instead, it 
only demonstrated the intrusiveness of the occupation and led to abuses and infractions on civil 
rights.  So great was the opposition to marine methods in the early disarmament campaign that 
marines sought to collect arms through the population's voluntary surrender to civil officials, and 
even offered money in exchange for arms.
126
  Civil officials did not effectively campaign for the 
surrender of arms, however, and some of them even encouraged populations to keep their 
weapons.
127
  From June of 1917, marine Brigade Commander Pendleton ordered that only 
constabulary and marines would be authorized to represent the military government in collecting 
arms.
128
 
 The 1920 resistance movements noted two other key differences between the military 
government disarmament and that of previous Dominican governments.  They were the inclusion 
of machetes and knives in disarmament, and the extent of the campaign across geography and 
class groups.  The machete and the knife were, in addition to being traditional symbols of 
manhood and independence, a major part of everyday peasant life.  They were a traditional tool 
of agricultural and home use among lower- and middle-class men.
129
  Reaction to the 
disarmament campaign also varied widely by region: in the fiercely independent eastern 
provinces, for example, marines had more difficulty securing the cooperation of civil officials 
and the general population.  There, guerrilla fighters such as the infamous Vicentico, who had 
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built support and operations bases during the previous civil war, demanded local surrender of 
arms to their own guerrilla campaigns before marines and constabulary could get them.  When 
one landowner refused to hand over his arms to Vicentico's band, and the arms were then 
gathered by marine and constabulary forces, the guerrillas executed the landowner as a traitor to 
his country.
130
  The disarmament campaign was also different from the city to the traditionally 
isolated countryside.  Rural traditions centered in large part around local autonomy with a lack of 
government interference--a cultural development that would aid resistance in bringing rural 
populations to its side as centralized government and military control became increasingly 
intrusive in 1920.  Finally, as Franks points out, the occupation disarmament campaign was 
distinct in that it included those upper-class Dominicans and civil government officials immune 
to pre-occupation disarmament.  Particularly galling was that lower-class Dominicans acting in 
the constabulary under marine Command sometimes confiscated arms from local officials 
themselves.
131
  As the efficiency of military enforcement increased with expansion of 
transportation networks in 1920, the intrusion into local and rural life created a population ripe 
for the unification of resistance and united rejection of the constabulary.
132
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 Disarmament in some areas caused unintended consequences, long unknown nationally 
due to censorship and the isolation of regions, that complicated life for Dominicans.  Farmers 
long protested disarmament on the grounds that it damaged their crops, for example.  One letter, 
addressed to the military government from Governor Octavio Beras of El Seibo Province, is 
indicative of one of the many unexpected problems brought about by disarmament in the 
Dominican countryside.  In addition to the inability of farmers to protect themselves from crime 
in areas lacking police forces, disarmament affected other aspects of Dominican society: 
 Sir: Many farmers frequently approach this dispatch stating that, as a consequence  
 of the rifles and shotguns having been collected, their plantations are imperiled by  
 birds such as the guinea that destroys the corn plantations and the carpintero who 
 is a terrible enemy of the cacao plantations.  Especially because the latter  
 prodigiously multiplies itself and destroys such a large and valuable percentage  
 of the harvests, I request that the Government permit this Gobernación to authorize  
 some farmers of good conduct and reputation to have a rifle or shot gun to defend  
 their plantations.
133
   
 
Beras, a long-time collaborator with the military government, suggested the creation of a registry 
allowing certain farmers to keep firearms.
134
  His suggestion was gradually carried out, with 
those who were permitted arms or armed guards given permits upon his suggestion.  This would, 
of course, mean that political and personal enemies of Beras would not be permitted arms, 
leaving their farms unprotected while those most friendly to Beras and the military government 
would be given preference in the permission to carry arms, and thus to defend their crops.   
 In addition to those complaints emphasized by 1920 public resistance movements, the 
population became more inclined to openly resist due to many controversial reforms that 
advanced with the centralization of power and growing efficiency of the constabulary.  
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Dominican constabulary and marines carried out some especially controversial reforms aiming to 
"improve" and "modernize" Dominican society.  As an example, attempts to initiate sanitary 
reform, enforced by the constabulary, met with little success and much resistance.  Suggested 
reforms were mild, and included the maintenance of clean streets.  Marines saw this type of 
reform as simple and non-controversial, the type of work they relegated to the constabulary.  In 
attempting to enforce the sanitation laws, however, constabulary members met with a reticent 
population.
135
  The practice of disposing of trash on the curbside was the norm, and Dominicans 
must have seen little incentive to cooperate with occupation forces' initiatives, initiatives 
imposed by a force of foreign officers flaunting their "superior" culture and enforced by an 
untrained, mercenary force of lower-class Dominicans.  The tensions surrounding such issues as 
sanitation control in the early occupation years were palpable in some places, and led to local 
resistance and arrests that damaged later attempts to enforce such reforms.
136
  Sanitary reform 
was, however, among the least intrusive of many reforms directly affecting cultural practice.  
Other attempted reforms carried out by constabulary and marines addressed many aspects of 
Dominican society, pushing controversial changes and trying to enforce them through 
censorship, the gradual centralization of power, and by giving the constabulary wide powers of 
arrest.  Many coming directly from the arguments of contemporary reformers in the United 
States, they emphasized a "moral" reform program that neither marines nor, especially, 
Dominicans serving in the constabulary could clearly explain or justify.  Many were, in a sense, 
arbitrary, products of the development of different cultures, but seen by marine reformers as 
                                                 
135
 This reform and reaction provide an example of the ways that sanitation reform has been used as one of the chief 
methods of modernizing Latin American countries, facilitating state expansion, and centralizing power.  It is also 
traditionally met with wide resistance, and, as Diego Armus points out, required strong and sometimes militarized 
state intervention.  Disease in Modern Latin America: From Malaria to AIDS, (Durham: Duke University Press), 7-
8. 
136
 "Forwarding Correspondence between Chief Sanitary officer and City Council of Santo Domingo," "Second 
Provisional Brigade, U.S. Marines, Santo Domingo City, D.R. April 27, 1917," Folder "1917," Box 26, "Gobierno 
Militar Americano," AGN1.  See also: Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," 43. 
274 
 
absolute necessities for modernization and "progress."
137
  Examples include the persecution and 
criminalization of such common and integral customs as cockfighting and gambling.
138
  Thorpe 
wrote that "the Dominican is fond of cock-fighting.  That is disgusting entertainment for 
Americans.  Our first inclination is promptly to illegalize cock-fighting.  We favor prize-fighting.  
No doubt we are right and that cock-fighting should not be.  The way to accomplish that is by the 
process of substitution instead of elimination."
139
  Gambling, too, was a central part of 
Dominican culture seen as a "vice" by those arriving from the United States.
140
  In Dominican 
culture, gambling was an essential component of Dominican civil society, used in lieu of 
centralized government taxes to fund education, charities, and social support programs to support 
community needs while also supporting local autonomy.  In addition to reforms seeking to erase 
traditions of gaming and replace local support systems with centralized governmental power, 
reformers attempted to eradicate prostitution, "obscene writings," and what the Chief of Naval 
Operations called "numerous other laws of a corrective liberalizing and constructive nature."
141
   
 While military government leaders flaunted their belief in the superiority of U.S. customs 
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and morality, Dominicans called occupation programs hypocritical and stressed the occupation's 
destructiveness to regional autonomy and Dominican society.
142
  Lawyer Pedro A. Pérez, for 
example, stated that: "We were more happy in our previous condition than in the present status.  
The Dominican Republic is administratively lost.  We do not know where the money of the 
nation goes nor from where it comes.  The Province of El Seibo, to which I belong, is completely 
ruined."
143
 Horace Knowles, in his capacity representing the Dominican people to the U.S. 
Senate in 1921, pointed out the hypocrisy of U.S. accusations that Dominicans were disorderly:   
 Never in the history of the country has there been a disturbance comparable to  
 the one that occurred recently at Tulsa, a short time ago at Springfield and  
 Boston, and that occur with increasing frequency in Chicago, New York, and  
 all the larger American cities.  In that country lynchings, burnings at the stake,  
 and tar and feathering, now pastimes in some parts of the United States, are  
 unknown and never practiced.  Life and property are more secure in any part  
 of that country than they are to-day or to-night in Central Park or on Broadway  
 in New York, and the total lawlessness for a year throughout the Republic is  
 less than that which is recorded in any one of the five largest cities of the  
 United States in 24 hours.
144
 
 
Many occurrences during the occupation must have reinforced the widely held Dominican 
rejection of U.S. claims of cultural or moral superiority.  After the enactment of U.S. Prohibition 
in January of 1920, for example, Santo Domingo would become a center for the smuggling of 
rum into the United States by some among the navy personnel traveling to and from the island 
country.
145
  Instances such as when marines stormed into a Seibo social club and drank the 
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champagne were so common, as Bruce Calder puts it, that many "probably went unrecorded."
146
 
  One of the complaints that most widely reached across regions was the extent of 
brutality, abuse and corruption in the constabulary.  Reports and investigations of torture and 
brutality were especially common in the East.  The most brutal nearly always involved Marines 
who were serving in leadership capacities within the constabulary, who enjoyed wide 
independence and few repercussions for actions that Dominican witnesses feared reporting.
147
  
Not until 17 February of 1919 did Military Governor Snowden issue the order for the 
constabulary not to use certain torture devices in interrogations.
148
  Though officials denied the 
use of torture in interrogations after this, evidence of its continued and widespread use is 
abundant in constabulary communications and court-martial records.
149
  James J. McLean, once 
an officer of the Frontier Guard and an acting commandant of the constabulary, was removed 
from his position as assistant constabulary commandant in late 1921 after loudly and publicly 
denouncing the use of torture by constabulary and occupation forces.
150
  What military 
government authorities neglected in their reporting, when forced to deal with the issue of such 
atrocities, was that they were not isolated incidents, and that the majority of those marines who 
carried out torture and other brutal acts of force were heading constabulary companies.  Some in 
these companies, especially in the East but also throughout the country, intimidated and tortured 
Dominicans for information about guerrillas or hidden arms, with the use of red-hot machetes 
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and other instruments of torture.
151
  Constabulary officers executed some natives without trial, 
robbed and burned homes; many of those tortured as prisoners in Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic were later found not guilty and freed.
152
  San Pedro de Macorís commercial agent 
Francisco Augusta Cordero, for example, was arrested on 20 August, 1918, but not charged for a 
month.  He was finally accused of being a traitor to the Dominican Republic and accused of 
conspiracy, a charge based on the testimony of one individual.  He was sentenced to twenty-five 
years of hard labor, and made to sweep streets and work as a laborer at the San Pedro de Macorís 
military camp, before being set free eight months later with a statement that he was not guilty of 
the acts for which he had been imprisoned.
153
 
 These abuses were much more damaging in the long term because of their involvement of 
Dominicans through the constabulary.  Nationalist leaders trying to unify resistance across 
regions seized on the glaring examples of abuses of the population by Marines and Dominican 
constabulary officers and enlisted men.  Abuses included torture, corruption, and bullying, and 
although they were more common in areas that reported high instances of armed resistance--
especially the eastern provinces--various constabulary members committed brutal and coercive 
acts against those uninvolved in armed resistance, too.  Brutality and corruption led to strong 
resentment against the occupation and the constabulary as an institution.
154
  Further, as the 
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resistance publicized, the majority of Dominicans were by 1919 and 1920 afraid to report even 
the most atrocious of acts committed by marines and the constabulary.
155
  When they did report 
illegal actions, military forces retaliated against them, whether by threatening, jailing, fining, 
attacking, or even killing them.
156
  Patterns of constabulary abuse were aggravated by the lack of 
unified leadership or checks on local power, and by specific reform issues.  Liquor, for example, 
became a strong point of contention.  From mid-1918, Executive Order 180 established the 
penalty of being tried in provost courts to any who sold liquor to a constabulary member in 
uniform.  This led to growing tensions between the constabulary and local populations, as did the 
prohibition of selling liquor to marines, because storekeepers were bullied into selling to the 
armed forces.  Those who did not were harassed and attacked, and if they tried to report marine 
and constabulary actions they were visited with retribution by those armed forces, and their 
shops were burned or their supplies destroyed.
157
 
                                                                                                                                                             
right to self-rule, but also the capability to it.  In an interesting twist, marines used the opposite tactic in some 
reports, emphasizing that Dominicans had committed torture while not mentioning that those Dominicans were in 
the constabulary working under Marine officers.  This occurred, for example, in the case of constabulary torture of 
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Whether or not Bautista did sell liquor to the constabulary marines in question, the pressure upon such Dominicans 
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  The resistance not only criticized constabulary actions, but also publicized widespread 
rejections of the constabulary itself as unnecessary and inefficient, and possibly a cover for the 
occupation administration's misuse of government funds.  In the U.S. Senate investigation of 
1921, former military government bookkeeper Rafael Isaac Pau stated that "the necessity for this 
body of national police remains yet to be justified, inasmuch as the service asked from it has at 
all times been very limited, due chifly [sic] to the lack of confidence on the part of its American 
directors to put arms in the hands of the Dominicans enlisted in the corps.  But if the service 
given by the national police guards has been scant, in return, the cost of maintenance has, since 
their establishment, been a heavy nominal charge on the treasury."  Pau called the force a 
"company of practically decorative police."
158
  While the lack of Dominican officers in the 
constabulary had been responsible for popular rejection in earlier years, the constabulary did 
contain Dominicans of officer rank by the time of Pau's statement.  At least one foreigner 
residing in the Dominican Republic provided a different take for this time period: Dominicans in 
the constabulary, officers included, were hated because they were working for the Americans.
159
  
Thorpe reported, too, that Dominicans did not respect the new officers because they were from 
outside the traditional military elite, and that for this reason they could not control their enlisted 
men, who abused civilian populations.
160
 
 One of the forms of resistance that constabulary leaders had most sought to keep isolated 
and hushed was guerrilla warfare, and in the first years of the occupation they were highly 
successful in discrediting armed resistance from one region to another.  The most damaging and 
                                                                                                                                                             
must have been incredibly strong, and the fact that his testimony was discounted and that the board consisted only of 
marines indicates the one-sidedness of such investigations and the continued pressure on store owners. 
158
 Statement of Rafael Isaac Pau, United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1104-1106.   Pau stated that "the aggregate 
amount of nearly $3,000,000 to entertain the livelihood of an almost purely ornamental police service would seem 
altogether disproportioned, if one did not stop to consider that the existence of the national Dominican police has at 
least been useful as a handy pretext for large disbursements that have been little, if at all, controlled."   
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 Vega, Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas, 12. 
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 Quoted in: Vega, Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas, 13. 
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long-lasting armed resistance, and the most studied, was that in the eastern provinces of El Seibo 
and San Pedro de Macorís.
161
  Armed uprisings throughout the country, however, affected the 
development of the constabulary and the wider occupation from the landing of marines in 1916 
until the final plan for withdrawal in 1922, increasing in the years 1920-1921.
162
  Occupier and 
constabulary accounts downplayed the significance and patriotic aspects of armed resistance in 
all regions, characterizing all uprisings as isolated and largely ineffectual.
163
  So thoroughly did 
reports emphasize the fiction that all armed resistance was isolated in the east, that many marines 
who reported about the occupation assumed that Olivorio's movement took place in the East 
rather than the southwest.
164
  The U.S. Navy worked to discredit guerrilla fighters, describing all 
armed resistance as "brigandage," claiming in the early years that most guerrilla warfare was 
simply the effects of "vagabonds or highway robbers in the eastern section of the country" 
                                                 
161
 Much more has been written about the conduct of the occupation and armed resistance in the eastern provinces of 
El Seibo and San Pedro de Macorís, in part because of interest in the intensity of the guerrilla conflict there.  Due to 
the lack of a larger study of the constabulary, these studies have said little about the interaction of the constabulary 
with the anti-occupation guerrillas, despite extensive records in the Dominican National Archive and Marine Corps 
archives.  The most detailed studies of the guerrilla warfare itself are Ducoudray, Los "Gavilleros" del este" and 
Calder, "Caudillos and Gavilleros," 649-675.  See also: Felix Servio Ducoudray, "Una epopeya ignorada: ¿Fueron 
bandidos los guerrilleros antiyanquis de 1916?" Ahora! No. 557, 15 July 1974, 37-43.  The phenomenon of rapid 
change and modernization of sugar plantations and their effects on a caudillo society are more well-researched.  
Wilfredo Lozano, Luis Mejía, and Tulio H. Arvelo have contributed vital historical examinations of economy and 
social realities surrounding the period before and during U.S. occupation, including the extent of oppression by U.S. 
occupation forces.  See also: Julie Cheryl Franks, "Transforming Property: Landholding and Political Rights in the 
Dominican Sugar Region, 1880-1930," PhD dissertation, State University of New York, 1997.  For a summary of 
the Marine explanation of armed resistance, see Fuller and Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican Republic, 35-37. 
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 Lundius and Lundahl provide a detailed and lengthy account of the instances of armed uprising in the West, 
under messianic leader "Dios" Olivorio from pre-occupation years to 1922, when he was killed by the constabulary.  
Peasants and Religion, 1-170.  Calder mentions the extent of armed resistance in the west in a footnote in his article.  
"Caudillos and Gavilleros," 657, fn 15.  Outside of Olivorio's movement and the eastern provinces, intermittent 
instances of armed resistance cropped up through all regions with the possible exception of Samaná throughout the 
occupation. 
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 As evident in Fuller and Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican Republic, the official Marine presentation of such 
resistance even fifty years after U.S. withdrawal still portrays all instances as “banditry.”  The July-September 1921 
Quarterly Report of the Military Governor referred to anything relating to armed resistance as "petty thievery and 
bandit activities," stating that some of those fighting armed resistance were "masquerading as patriots fighting for 
Dominican soveriegnty [sic.]" File 1921, Geographical Files, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical 
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 Reports, Files 1919-1922, Geographical Files, "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, 
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caused by criminals released from jails during the pre-occupation civil war.
165
  This argument, 
made to discredit armed insurgencies, was continued by the Dominican military following the 
occupation.  As they worked to consolidate power, marines de-emphasized armed resistance by 
reporting year after year that armed resistance had ended, giving the impression that each 
incidence was new and unrelated to the last.
166
   
 Many upper- and middle-class Dominicans and intellectual and political resistance 
leaders, sought to publicly distance themselves from any violent resistance so as to support their 
argument that Dominican sovereignty would bring social and political order.  They sought to 
demonstrate that Dominicans were not prone to violence or incapable of self-government, and 
therefore publicly discredited guerrilla warfare.
167
  The characterization of armed resistance as 
isolated in the East, also reported in the widely referenced works of U.S. diplomats who wrote 
about the occupation, was thus carried down in the historiography and continues in the most 
recent literature.
168
  Even in early years, however, guerrilla fighters in the East were not 
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Senate Inquiry. 
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completely isolated.  Many Dominicans who wanted to take up arms in resistance to the 
occupation came to the East to fight under guerrilla leaders.
169
  They were aided by local 
populations and many in civil government throughout the occupation.
170
  Despite their draw for 
those wishing to actively resist the occupation, and the on-and-off support of civil officials, 
armed resistance movements did not unite with each other or with other forms of resistance until 
1920 due to lack of funding and the same communication and travel difficulties encountered by 
the military government, but they were never as isolated or destructive as occupation forces 
made them out to be.  To those living in the East, it was generally clear that the marines and 
constabulary were causing at least as much of the trouble as the guerrilla fighters, and using 
many of the same tactics.  One of the marines' strongest criticisms of the guerrilla fighters, for 
example, was that they stole and requisitioned local arms and provisions for their own use.  But 
marines did the same, and used arms taken from the local population to arm the local 
                                                                                                                                                             
foreign control of their country, though he too focuses on guerrilla warfare in the eastern provinces.  For the most 
detailed descriptions of this guerrilla warfare, see: Ducoudray, "Una epopeya ignorada" 37-43; Ducoudray, Los 
"Gavilleros" del este,"; Calder, "Caudillos and Gavilleros," 649-675; Calder, The Impact of Intervention, chapters 5-
7.  Even these works, however, fall into some of the same historiographical patterns of examining the guerrilla 
warfare in the East alone.  Many Dominican publications have carried out the invaluable work of reprinting 
extensive political resistance works written during the occupation, which are discussed throughout this chapter.  
Many Dominican historians, such as Frank Moya-Pons and Roberto Cassá have addressed the occupation in the 
context of broad histories of the Dominican Republic, and Wilfredo Lozano, Luis Mejía, and Tulio H. Arvelo have 
contributed vital historical examinations of economy and social realities surrounding the period before and during 
U.S. occupation, including the types and extent of oppression by U.S. occupation forces.  See: Lozano, La 
dominación; Mejía, De Lilís a Trujillo, and Arvelo, Nuestras luchas Civiles.  For a general overview of the 
occupation, see Castro García, Intervención Yanqui. 
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 Gilbert, who was himself from Puerto Plata, was surprised to run into his friend Rafael Aguilar in the hills of the 
East.  Aguilar was from Puerto Plata, and came east to join the armed resistance when General Apolinar Rey 
dissolved his troops in Santiago.  Mi lucha,53.  Aguilar was one of many Dominicans from around the country who 
traveled to join armed resistance in the east; many also went to the west, where Olivorio's group accepted the 
growing number of fugitives from the military government.  In August of 1918, Russell claimed that the “bandits” in 
El Seibo were receiving aid from “the political malcontents to the north”; later in the year (November, 1918), 
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Dominican Republic During the United States Military Government—1916 to 1924,” fn 25, 73 and 74.   
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descriptions that demonstrate the cross-country networks of those aiding guerrillas and fugitives; Thomas E. 
Watson, "Report of inspection at Azua and Barahona" to "Chief of Staff," 22 February 1917, Biographical File, 
Thomas E. Watson.  File 3615, Box 1, Archives and Special Collections, USMC, Quantico; reports, File 1917, 
Geographical Files, “Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo,” USMC Historical Division, Quantico. 
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constabulary.
171
  In addition to discrediting guerrillas for their violence, occupation and 
constabulary forces characterized them as illiterate, uneducated peasants and criminals.  While 
many among the guerrillas, especially in the early years, were carryovers from the pre-
occupation civil war, or fugitives, a growing number had no criminal record, were literate, and 
joined the armed resistance specifically in rejection of the occupation; by 1920 and 1921, the 
latter group had become much more representative of armed resisters.
172
   
 Armed uprising in the East and throughout the country was largely responsible for the 
lack of Marine manpower to train new recruits to the constabulary, as marines were funneled to 
the eastern provinces in large numbers in attempts to end resistance there, and the urgency led to 
the trend of repeatedly sending new untrained and under-equipped constabulary recruits 
immediately into battle.  Constabulary leaders and occupation officials worked through 
propaganda not only to isolate and denigrate armed resistances, but also to set up the 
constabulary as the ideal against guerrilla insurgency.  They went to great lengths to attribute 
blame for the poor conditions of the East to the guerrillas, while guerrillas denounced the marine 
and constabulary presence as being responsible for poor conditions and violence.
173
  If armed 
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Crassweller also gives a profile of those resisting in arms in the east, explaining that they ranged from "patriot" to 
"bandolero."  Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: La trágica aventura del poder personal, (Barcelona: Bruguela, 1967), 
57.  As Calder points out, many pre-occupation guerrilla leaders who were operating in the beginning of the 
occupation were killed and captured in the first year of fighting.  "Caudillos and Gavilleros," 656, fn 14.  As 
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 Despite the fact that many Dominicans distanced themselves from the armed resistance throughout the 
occupation, they also did not accept claims that the constabulary was patriotic as holding any remote truth.  While 
the propaganda campaign was not successful in uplifting the public image of the constabulary during 1917-1922, 
later dictator Rafael Trujillo, who came to power through the marine-created constabulary, would pick up and 
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resistance directly affected the constabulary's development, the constabulary just as directly 
affected armed resistance.  Constabulary abuse augmented the growth of guerrilla warfare; 
Calder states that "overshadowing all other factors was that of personal hatred and fear of the 
Marines" and the marine-created constabulary, who frightened, abused, oppressed, injured, and 
killed "hundreds of Dominicans, combatants and noncombatants alike, who lived and worked in 
the area of hostilities."
174
  The eastern provinces were so devastated, and their populations so in 
danger of being suspected of cooperation with one side or the other, that most Dominicans in the 
region had no choice but to join the armed resistance or flee by 1920-1922. 
 Those who hoped to unite a resistance movement were stymied by the military 
government's increased focus on military consolidation through constabulary arrests of any they 
saw as "inciting rebellion."  Another difficulty stemmed from those who cooperated with 
occupation goals for various reasons, or who were hesitant to openly cooperate with either side.  
Throughout the course of the occupation, military government officials and constabulary leaders 
sought collaborators from outside the constabulary, a need that became more urgent by 1920 as 
popular opinion of the constabulary failed to improve.  As discussed in Chapter Three, they 
received the most initial cooperation from some generals of the old Dominican military.  This 
social group was split in the first year of occupation by those who rejected the occupation and 
those who cooperated in hopes of seeing real change or gaining command positions in the new 
force.  When the character of the occupation and the new military closed these hopes, many old 
military leaders from both groups joined or led armed resistance.  Some were generals of 
regional militaries, such as Vicente Evangelista ("Vicentico") and Salustiano Goicoechea 
("Chachá") in the eastern provinces.  Other members of the old military such as Fidel Ferrer first 
                                                                                                                                                             
embellish on the idea to lend his own regime further legitimacy.  See Crassweller, Trujillo, 61-62.  Trujillo's 
adoption of this propaganda campaign is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
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aided marines in hunting guerrilla fighters in the East, later to join the guerrilla movements 
themselves.
175
  Still others, most prominent among them Buenaventura Cabral and former 
Minister of War Desiderio Arias, settled into the patterns of the occupation, the former in the 
position of a civil governor to which occupation officials appointed him to appease him for his 
loss of military position, and the latter to tobacco farming under heavy surveillance in the 
Cibao.
176
   
 Occupation forces saw the lack of support for the constabulary and occupation from other 
groups as astonishing in its extent throughout the occupation, and sought to rectify the problem 
by offering salaries, official positions, or protection to those who would cooperate.
177
  Most 
cooperation still only existed at a superficial level.  One common pattern among Dominicans in 
the countryside was to report general guerrilla activity, and then to warn guerrilla leaders of the 
locations of marine and constabulary forces.
178
  This allowed peasants an extent of protection 
from the dangers associated with aiding either side, but also made the unification of resistance 
difficult.  Armed resisters and constabulary deserters alike were often harbored or supplied by 
the same Dominican civilians who outwardly seemed friendly to the marines.
179
  Many middle-
class, urban Dominicans were counted as friendly and supportive by occupation forces in the 
city, but withheld information from the constabulary and occupation forces, and were often 
feeding information to resistance forces.  Gregorio Urbano Gilbert, for example, provides 
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personal accounts of merchants who supplied arms and information to resistance groups, and 
then warned them to leave the cities because they had to report their locations to the constabulary 
the next day to avoid being accused of aiding "bandits."
180
  Those among the general population 
who did cooperate with occupation forces were widely labeled treasonous.
181
  Many, if caught 
collaborating, were disciplined by the armed forces of resistance, often by execution.
182
  The 
sensitivity of the names of those who collaborated was therefore so strong that military 
government communications seldom mention them by name unless they are deceased.   
 Constabulary leaders gained most of their cooperation from those who outwardly or 
conditionally cooperated, checked by what President Henríquez y Carvajal referred to as an 
"unmerciful system of espionage" that functioned through both the marine Brigade Intelligence 
Office and, later, the constabulary Intelligence Office.
183
  Marines with few allies and no 
background knowledge of the territory usually had to rely on unofficial, local informants.  For 
reasons that varied from political disputes to actual cooperation with military government 
objectives, or fear--often induced by torture, the marines and constabulary were often able to 
gather some intelligence by questioning locals.  From 1918, occupiers realized the need for 
improved intelligence, and began to put together the beginnings of what would become a 
centrally organized Brigade Intelligence Office that in 1919-1920 was passed to constabulary 
leadership.  All of its officers and informants, and the constabulary commandant, reported back 
to the current marine brigade commander, the military governor, and the Marine Corps General 
Commandant.  The Intelligence Office was run through, and staffed by, a combination of 
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marines, constabulary, and the Bureau of Naval Operations and Intelligence.  By 1920, the 
majority of intelligence patrols were headed by Dominican constabulary second lieutenants and 
patrol leaders, and its Chief Intelligence Officer in 1920, marine F.A. Ramsey, also served as a 
lieutenant colonel in the constabulary.  Extensive, if often unreliable, intelligence networks 
helped to keep regional movements from unifying, and carefully monitored those trying to unite. 
 While those leading intelligence initiatives were willing to be "unmerciful" to gain 
information and keep opposition down, the intelligence office only gradually became efficient.  
Before 1921, its reliability was hit-and-miss.  Marine Lt. Col. Charles J. Miller stated that "there 
were numerous channels of information, the sources of which were not always dependable."  He 
lists as dependable sources the provost department, the constabulary, civil officials, and "friendly 
inhabitants."
184
  Neither the provost department nor the constabulary had the manpower or 
knowledge in the first years to be of much help, and civil officials who were unfriendly to 
occupying forces were only gradually removed from their posts.  Further, some surreptitiously 
supported resistance for years while remaining in their posts.
185
  As Miller admits, "friendly 
inhabitants" were few and far between.
186
  The primary sources for collaboration in early 
attempts at intelligence networking came most often from three groups: minor criminals;
187
 
                                                 
184
 Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," 38. 
185
 When civil officials were not cooperative, or their level of loyalty seemed questionable, occupation officials 
dismissed them and replaced them with those openly friendly to the Military Government.  Executive Order 24 in 
January of 1917, for example,  dismissed Seibo's provincial governor Juan Esteban Ortiz with Octavio Beras, a man 
who would be highly controversial for his cooperation with the occupation forces. 
186
Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs," 37. 
187
 Some were released because they promised to cooperate with occupation officials, others were "forced" to work 
as guides and many were promised freedom if they proved their loyalty through work with the constabulary and 
Marines.  See: Lundius and Lundahl, Peasants and Religion, 109.  Many coerced or forced into guiding 
constabulary units against armed resistance, however, sabotaged the search efforts.  When many fugitives were 
captured, they were then used to find others.  Example of "Felix Castillo, alias "Dolce," who surrendered himself in 
La Vega to the 3rd Company in October 1921 and then worked with the constabulary to help find others.  Weekly 
memo to Colonel Commander, 3rd Company, "Guardia Nacional" Box 3, File 18, 1921, Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, 
I.T. 007908, AGN.  Victoriano Almanzar had by 16 July 1921 been an informant for the constabulary in Monte 
Cristi for three years and helped turn over many "criminals" to the constabulary; referred to as Hurst's "man in the 
bushes," and Hurst wanted to arm him so that he could capture someone they had been after, or even to enlist him in 
288 
 
foreigners;
188
 and some plantation owners.
189
  The first group included minor criminals who had 
been in collaboration with the military government from early in the occupation, when 
occupation officials released some prisoners for use in gathering intelligence.
190
  Foreign 
collaborators came from a wide variety of locations and were useful to the constabulary because 
of their lack of involvement in local politics.  They included adventurers and speculators from 
other Caribbean countries and islands, such as Puerto Rico.
191
   They also included many from 
the population of U.S. business investors that had been growing since the 1890s and grew 
exponentially during the occupation, when they were often given favored status in negotiations 
and many U.S. opportunists sought their fortunes in the Dominican Republic.
192
  Some new U.S. 
investors, in fact, were marines.
193
  One of the major points of resistance in 1920-1921 centered 
around the rapid growth of U.S. investments, and the Dominican press and intellectuals aimed 
                                                                                                                                                             
the 4th company without anyone knowing (Abraham Anpaller, one of Olivorio's men who they had been hunting 
"for some time" in the hills south of Sabaneta).  Weekly memo to Colonel Commander, 4th Company, "Guardia 
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one arm of their campaign toward making U.S. businesses accountable.
194
  Senator William H. 
King reported in 1922 that the chief visible results of the occupations on Hispaniola were the 
populations' hatred for the U.S. government "and the enhanced opportunities of American 
capitalists to loot the resources of the isand [sic]--of which they are promptly availing themselves 
under the protection of American guns and diplomacy.”195  It is no wonder that these 
collaborators were not successful in winning the loyalty of the Dominican population.   
 While even inconsistent cooperation did discourage a unified, national resistance, many 
Dominicans and foreigners working for the Intelligence Office were of such questionable 
background that marines and constabulary were often not sure for whom they were really 
working at any given time.
196
  The difficulty of finding Dominicans who would cooperate meant 
that the Intelligence Office often gathered information and compared notes so as to find 
inconsistencies, such as might come from those offering only superficial cooperation.  This 
technique, however, required centralization and organization that were highly inefficient before 
1920 reforms.  As part of the wider marine experiment in carrying out civil government 
initiatives during military interventions, the evolution of the Intelligence Office was carefully 
documented.  Miller later emphasized the importance of the lessons it taught for phases of future 
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 Dominican Antonio Draiby, for example, was armed in his intelligence position working for Major F.A. Ramsey 
and the constabulary.  He was known to be working solely for money and to be willing to work for both sides; 
George Thorpe reported the problem to Pendleton in a letter dated 16 May, 1918, saying that "there are too many of 
that type identified with the government already. . . Draiby's dashing around the hills of Seibo with a gun and a card 
of the Intelligence Office is not going to help things and whatever intelligence he sends in will be absolutely 
unreliable."  Letter from George C. Thorpe to Joseph Pendleton, 16 May 1918, "Pendleton Papers," box 2, USMC 
Archives and Special Collections, Quantico. 
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military occupations.
197
  Archival records, primarily in communications and often through veiled 
references, make clear the existence of intelligence activities through the early years, but not 
until the advent of improved communications and transportation in 1920 do standardized 
references to intelligence operations appear.  In late 1920, an increasing number of Dominicans 
in the constabulary were in charge of intelligence initiatives and intelligence reports, and 
Dominicans were often sent out on undercover work or even recruited into the constabulary 
secretly so as to have the ability to spy on local populations.
198
  Further, marines insisted on a 
large and growing budget for the intelligence office, so that by 1921 and 1922 it was budgeted 
about twenty-five thousand dollars, though most men working for it earned less than 
constabulary enlisted men.
199
 
 Although Miller describes early intelligence activities as pertaining solely to civil 
relations, and not to tactical considerations for combat preparation, intelligence reports 
demonstrate the emphasis on tactical considerations concerning the centralization of military 
power and the isolation of resistances.
200
   Though reports stressed morale among Dominicans in 
the cities and countryside, and closely followed economic and political situations, many of them 
are concerned with the locations of opposition groups and possible combat conditions.
201
  Miller 
describes the activities of constabulary intelligence officers, who were authorized and paid to 
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"interrogate inhabitants, and to search out and translate newspapers, periodicals, documents, and 
secret and confidential reports printed or written in Spanish.  The forces in the field secured 
information by sending out patrols or through the establishment of detached posts in the outlying 
districts."
202
  Central organization of the intelligence office was paralleled by organization of the 
constabulary.  Both worked on regional levels before 1920, and lacked the resources or 
organization required to work across regional lines.  When in 1920 constabulary officers began 
to centralize the intelligence office, they also faced growing tension between the Dominican 
population and the constabulary, making intelligence in many areas more difficult to gather.  The 
increasingly public character of resistance in 1920 also meant fewer Dominicans willing to work 
for the constabulary's intelligence office.  One of the common results was the continuation of the 
more brutal methods of gathering intelligence about local populations.
203
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Dominican regions had long been uninterested in uniting, and the occupation forces and 
constabulary by 1918 worked to reinforce this trend so as to bring about reforms and stability on 
at least local levels.  Complicated loyalties and Dominicans' attempts to locate themselves in the 
new order that was developing around them during the occupation made central unity even more 
difficult.  The U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic reached its fourth year in 1920.  To 
this point, the occupation had consisted of improvised actions, local solutions, and a mixture of 
compromise and forcible control or resistance.  These had played out primarily between an 
occupying force that hoped to centralize political and military power and an occupied population 
that sought to retain traditions of regional autonomy and reject foreign interference.  1920 would 
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bring change as multiple internal and international developments facilitated the development of a 
unified resistance movement.  The fundamental problems with the constabulary provided a more 
and more glaring complaint across region and class upon which Dominicans were able to agree, 
fueling the potential for unity.  Those who would struggle to consolidate resistance in 1920 and 
1921 used growing communications and transportation infrastructure to draw national attention 
to the universality of complaints against the constabulary and the broader occupation, arguing 
against regionalism by demonstrating the commonality of Dominican needs.  The concurrence of 
so many regional complaints against the constabulary would provide fertile ground for those 
finally seeking to unite resistances across the country from mid-1920 as the constabulary 
centralized military power and increased efficiency.  Most complaints universal across regions, 
after all, directly involved constabulary methods and the reforms that the constabulary enforced.   
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Chapter SIX 
Opposing Networks for Change: Consolidating Reform and Resistance, 1920-1922 
 
 
 International and economic changes in 1920 challenged the fragile regional system that 
had fallen into place.  The struggle between pro- and anti-occupation forces took on new 
meaning and character as in late 1920, under strong political pressure, Woodrow Wilson called 
for plans for early withdrawal.   As an end to the occupation became imminent, the system of 
regional compromise did not dovetail with the need for coordinated withdrawal.  Growing camps 
of Dominicans openly called for unconditional and immediate restoration of sovereignty, and 
U.S. forces and the Dominican constabulary struggled now with a new urgency to centralize 
military power and try to control the population.  Marine officers centralizing the constabulary 
worked, however, around a collapsing economy, increasingly public resistance movements, and 
the urgency of preparing for early withdrawal.  In this context, they overhauled military 
infrastructure, working to centralize it in the ways they had planned at the occupation's 
beginning, and gradually abandoning much of the failed experiment in attempting to reform the 
Dominican population.  One of the primary tools of centralization was rapid building of 
communications and transportation infrastructure, which gained primary importance in 1920 and 
1921 and were expected to handicap resistance through efficient military control.  The resistance, 
faced with the threat of a progressively centralized military force, did something drastic:  It, too, 
centralized.  Its members used the growing infrastructure to consolidate their own campaign in 
response and contradiction to the centralized power of the military.  Over the course of 1920-
1921, the constabulary became a more integrated force, and the resistance actively used 
constabulary improvements to build a national and unified campaign against the constabulary 
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and the occupying forces--sometimes even to call for the maintenance of Dominican tradition 
and regional autonomy.  As the constabulary tried to tighten its grip, the unification of nationalist 
resistance grew.  As resistance grew, constabulary officers worked harder to tighten their grip. 
 International changes of 1920-1921 were central to this process.  In these years, an 
international campaign composed of politicians and intellectuals fought to bring attention to the 
Dominican occupation; Dominican intellectual leaders involved in this campaign, having been 
conscious of the fact that World War One was top priority for the international community, now 
redoubled diplomatic and public relations efforts to bring attention to the illegal occupation.  
Countries were beginning to recover from the war's devastation, and many Latin American 
governments drifted away from the strong wartime alliance they had solidified with the United 
States, emphasizing anti-imperialism and calling for self-determination in Latin America.  Those 
countries whose governments had not allied closely with the United States during World War 
One likewise became more bold in their rejections of U.S. military supremacy in the hemisphere-
-especially World War One military interventions in countries like Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti and 
the Dominican Republic.  1920 was also a presidential election year in the United States.  
Politicians made full use of the contradictions between the occupation and Woodrow Wilson's 
calls for democracy and sovereignty around the world, and the Dominican-led international 
campaign gladly inserted itself into U.S. politics.  Within the Dominican Republic, too, 
resistance leaders invested themselves deeply in the politics of the U.S. election, arguing that a 
Republican-party win against Wilson's Democratic Party would spell change in foreign policy.  
If they could insert their voices into the politics of the presidential election, many believed, they 
might be able to influence the direction this change would take. 
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 Economic change was of equal importance to the process of consolidation and 
centralization of both the constabulary and the resistance.  The post-World War One economic 
downturn hit the Dominican Republic belatedly at the end of 1920.  Before this, the  country had 
benefitted from the devastation of European beet sugar, and the continued prospering and growth 
of the economy had supported the functions of the occupation government.  In October of 1920, 
however, concurrent with the U.S. presidential election, the Dominican economy began to 
collapse.  Over the course of the next year, the steadily declining economy aided the 
international campaign against occupation and allowed the nationalizing resistance campaign to 
bring a wider involvement of rural Dominicans into their movement.  Rapid economic decline 
seemed to demonstrate an absolute failure of the only bragging points that the occupation forces 
had been able to hold up to show their success: the improved Dominican economy and the 
growing, centralized education system, which the military governor literally closed down in early 
1921 for lack of funds.  The occupation forces had also invested a great deal in their claim to 
have brought political stability and an end to armed conflict, a fictional claim that they 
maintained through censorship, selective reporting, and the regional isolationism that kept 
incidents from reaching national attention.  In the changing international atmosphere of 1920-
1921, spurred by economic devastation within the country, the resistance used the radically 
improving communications and transportation infrastructure to highlight the falsities of such 
claims and to make their resistance--solid proof against those claims--more and more public. 
 As national and international resistance grew in scope and publicity, Dominicans and 
many in the United States called out U.S. forces for inefficiency and the brutality and illegality 
of the occupation.  By 1920, though, U.S. forces and the U.S. government were heavily invested 
in the country, and heavily invested in seeing no withdrawal without a successful culmination of 
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their stated programs and plans.  Dominicans in the constabulary, all from the middle and lower 
classes, were also invested in the constabulary's centralization and improvement and hoped to 
retain their newfound positions (and potential power) once the occupation ended.  Calls for 
withdrawal, and unifying resistance, stymied the military's efforts, and they tried to combat 
internal and international resistances with a growing reconstruction and strengthening of the 
constabulary.  Economic difficulties left constabulary planners and administrators short of funds 
to carry out their broad reform as they struggled against resistance to centralized military control.  
New loans from the United States allowed the military to build on infrastructural improvements, 
but also increased Dominican resistance.  
 Thus by late 1920, the haphazard, improvised structures in the constabulary were 
collapsing.  Local and regional power relations were being subsumed in an increasingly national 
discourse.  Over the course of 1920-1921, both the military government and the majority of the 
Dominican population gradually abandoned the regional approach to occupation.  World 
attention to the brutalities and illegality of the occupation made U.S. government planners urge 
the military government and those leading the constabulary to improve the situation of the 
country, build up the constabulary, create a good record of U.S. involvement, and begin to 
prepare to withdraw from the messy situation.  While the constabulary in the preceding period 
had evolved largely in continuity with Dominican tradition, it changed drastically in 1920-1921, 
and many aspects of Dominican society changed with it.  For power relationships in Dominican 
society, this was a major period of rupture.  The national aspects of both reform and resistance 
changed the relationships between regions.  It was also to be a major point of rupture in the 
power relationships between Dominican families and social classes.  The rise of the gente de 
segunda into the military officer ranks especially marked a strong departure from tradition.  Most 
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Dominicans would not have believed this to be a major rupture at the time, however; the new 
social order within the constabulary seemed only tenable while Marines were present to 
physically back it up.  As the resistance campaign mounted and united during 1920 and 1921, 
even many of those who had joined the constabulary with the hopes of potential social 
advancement, began to doubt that it would survive on its own after withdrawal, and looked for 
other avenues to power.  Some even left the constabulary and joined the resistance.  The result 
was a growing polarization in Dominican society, especially by late 1921:  On one side were 
those who remained in the constabulary or supported U.S. forces' efforts--almost all from the 
poorer classes or gente de segunda.  On the other side were the elite classes, intellectuals, 
politicians, and those who followed their campaign against the occupation and constabulary--
including, by 1921, most of the rural peasantry.  The result through 1921 and 1922 was a society 
that was increasingly unified across regions, but also increasingly polarized between military and 
civilians. 
 
 
Challenges to the Regional Approach; Change and Consolidation in 1920 
 
 Events of 1920 were a major turning point in the occupation and Dominican history.  
They forced a consolidation and centralization of constabulary administration, and brought about 
increased unification of nationalist resistance movements.  The two changes were intimately 
connected, their developments intertwined at all stages, each feeding off the other.  The whole 
regional system that military occupation administrators and constabulary leaders had embraced 
was only functional as a temporary fix based on traditions of regional autonomy, occupation 
censorship, and the lack of infrastructure connecting provinces.  It was crippled by the changes 
of 1920, a year during which many coinciding events helped provide avenues for the uniting of 
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previously shared, but isolated, complaints against the occupation and constabulary.  One of the 
most significant was the advent of new roads and telephone lines through 1919 and 1920, which 
brought openings to regionally unify distinct resistances even while international and national 
attention to the occupation created a safer, more open space to resist.  While regional resistance 
movements unified through 1920, the constabulary changed drastically, too.  Internal and 
external challenges to regional solutions brought about a major shift toward centralization in the 
new military and the wider Dominican population, which would last well beyond the occupation.   
 From 1919, Dominicans seeking to build a nationalist resistance movement actively 
advertised their cause to the international community.  After the Treaty of Versailles, with 
Wilson's calls for a League of Nations and national sovereignty for countries throughout the 
world, they had little difficulty drawing attention to the apparent hypocrisy of continued U.S. 
actions in the Dominican Republic.
1
  Henríquez y Carvajal, when deposed from his provisional 
presidency in 1916, had expressed the difficulty of diplomatically fighting the occupation when 
the world‟s countries were occupied with the war.  Due to world governments being distracted 
with the war, which also gave U.S. administrators an excuse for heavy censorship, he postponed 
most diplomatic initiatives.
2
  Diplomatic efforts to end the occupation therefore increased 
exponentially after 1918, especially as Europe began to recover from war.  The war's end 
brought an opening in inter-Latin American relations too, an increasing number of Latin 
American countries speaking out against the occupation.  Dominicans formed a commission in 
December of 1918 to advertise the crimes of the occupation internationally.
3
  While the 
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 It was aided in its cause by U.S. lawyer Horace G. Knowles, who brought the Dominicans' case repeatedly before 
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299 
 
Dominican commission to Versailles brought more international and especially Latin American 
attention to the occupation and its illegality, it also increased tension in the Dominican Republic 
between resisters and military government officials.  Just after the commission's presentation to 
the Peace Conference, the military government drastically cut the numbers of Dominicans in the 
constabulary and nearly doubled the presence of Marines in the country, partially in response to a 
spike in armed resistance [See Table 5.1]. 
 When the broadening international movement against the occupation reached a height in 
mid-1920, Dominican intellectuals, elites, and politicians highlighted the occupation's illegality 
and brutality in appeals to the international community.  In the interior of the country, they 
waged a war against those who collaborated, chief among them those who joined--and especially 
those who officered--constabulary units.  Those among previous collaborators who defected 
were welcomed into the resistance, and those who did not were continuously courted or 
threatened and harassed.  Many among the middle class and gente de segunda had worked back 
and forth between occupiers and resistance depending on opportunity, and many--such as future 
dictator Rafael Trujillo--saw potential future power in the U.S.-backed constabulary and 
remained in its ranks.  From 1920, as the resistance grew and began to take on more recognizable 
nationalist tones, larger numbers of this class moved toward the side of resistance, and many 
Dominicans who had been less involved, such as many peasants in far-removed areas, also came 
to join the resistance because of the nationalist campaign and economic distress.  Constabulary 
                                                                                                                                                             
the “degenerate militarism” of the military government's system and called for a program of “total reform aimed to 
free the soul of the people from all the oppressive, constrictive and restrictive bonds in which it has lived."  Perkins, 
Constraint of Empire, 119.   
300 
 
reports show, as early as January, 1920, that they recognized the appearance of secret political 
meetings and the beginnings of movement of illicit groups across provincial lines.
4
  
 Resistance varied widely, from the intellectual protest of ex-politicians, lawyers, and 
journalists who petitioned the government and circulated protests despite censorship laws, to 
artists depicting the destruction of sovereignty—often through plays and poems.  It also included 
Dominicans and their allies outside of the country, especially in New York and Cuba.
5
  The anti-
occupation campaign exposed torture and brutality that had been carefully hidden in the record 
and used international attention and improved communications and roads within the Dominican 
Republic to expose the constabulary's history in contradiction of the Navy reports yearly 
claiming the constabulary's efficiency and popularity.
6
  When U.S. Secretary of State Bainbridge 
Colby embarked on a post-war goodwill tour through Latin America, a commission of 
Dominicans used the opportunity to draw Latin Americans' attention to the hypocrisies of his 
speeches, following him from country to country and presenting their case in the wake of his 
diplomacy.
7
  Others traveled throughout Europe and the United States to plead their case.  By 
1920, wide international support for the Dominican cause was evident.  Many European and 
Latin American countries recognized Henríquez y Carvajal's government as early as 1917, after 
the U.S. occupation began, and many more joined in this official recognition and in protest in 
1919 and 1920.
8
  The damage  of the Dominican occupation to U.S. relationships with other 
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Latin American governments was clear by 1920; Colby wrote in November that "the increasing 
agitation among Dominicans during the last two years for the right to self-government, and the 
anxiety expressed by the governments of other American republics as to our intentions in Santo 
Domingo, have caused the Department of State to give very thoughtful consideration to the 
question of whether the United States might now well take the first steps in returning to the 
Dominicans the Government of their Republic."  He called for an announcement of rapid 
withdrawal, which he argued would be highly beneficial to U.S. relations throughout Latin 
America and "do much to dispel the misunderstandings and suspicions which have been largely 
occasioned by the unexpectedly protracted period of our occupation in the Dominican 
Republic."
9
 
 The protest resonated loudly within the United States, and was taken up and championed 
by growing anti-imperialist groups there.  Through 1920, publications against the occupation 
became a matter of interest to many sectors of the U.S. public, and groups such as the NAACP 
joined with prominent U.S. Senators to call out the U.S. government on its actions.
10
  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
resolutions on the anniversary of Dominican independence from Spain, and in October passed a resolution 
expressing its sympathy for the Dominican Republic and voicing a desire that the occupation would end soon.   
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9
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Chicago Defender published damning articles about the occupation and the lack of voice 
Dominicans had in civil government under the marines and constabulary.
11
  An anonymous 
author published an article calling Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels “Czar of Haiti and 
Lord Protector of Santo Domingo, by virtue of his office as Secretary of the Navy."  The author 
pointed out that the U.S. Congress and people were unaware of the absolute power the navy and 
marines held over the Dominican Republic, because "Mr. Daniels‟s duties are purely extra-
constitutional, and the censorship on Caribbean affairs has been so severe that that last American 
newspaper man to visit Haiti was compelled to assume the disguise of a sergeant in the U.S. 
Marine Corps….”12  U.S. speakers repeated allegations of cruelty and torture carried out by 
occupation officials and the constabulary, and protests within the United States reiterated the 
arguments of Dominican officials, reporting, for example, about the military government's 
authority being unchecked by public opinion either U.S. or Dominican.
13
  On 22 May, 1920, the 
Boston Globe published a story based on accusations of a former functionary of the military 
government who spoke of torture and the shooting of prisoners as "escapees," the intense 
unpopularity of the occupation troops, and parallels between the abuses in the Dominican 
Republic and abuses in the military occupation of the Philippines.
14
  Increased scrutiny from the 
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United States forced change in the constabulary by enhancing official supervision, under which 
constabulary leaders worked to centralize and increase constabulary accountability.
15
  
 As global attention was drawn to the hypocrisy of long-term U.S. military interventions, 
the opposition U.S. Republican Party under presidential nominee Warren Harding made good 
use of the glaring contradiction between theory and policy.  By December, 1920, Wilson's 
beleaguered Democratic party sought the most rapid withdrawal possible.
16
  The U.S. 
presidential campaign did not escape the notice of Dominican intellectuals and politicians.  
Those many groups that had long been fighting local battles to discredit the U.S. occupation 
forces capitalized on the 1920 U.S. election, publishing support for Harding and criticisms of 
Wilson's administration.  Wilson's call for approval of U.S. entry into the League of Nations, 
juxtaposed with the politics of the U.S. presidential election campaign, drew the occupation to 
the public eye.  Democratic Party vice-presidential candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt gave a 
speech in Montana on 18 August of 1920 ridiculing the Republican Party for its contention that 
Great Britain would have more votes than the United States on the League Assembly; he was 
reported to state that the United States would have the advantage because "the eleven small 
republics of the Caribbean area viewed the United States as a benevolent guardian and that at 
Geneva their representatives would align themselves with their big neighbor.”  He also claimed 
that he himself had written Haiti‟s new constitution.17   Roosevelt's speech drew protests from 
The Nation and the NAACP, the latter suggesting that the Republican Party could capitalize on 
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the hypocrisy in their election campaign.
18
  They did.  On 28 August, Republican presidential 
candidate Senator Warren G. Harding said: “If I should be elected President. . . I will not 
empower an Assistant Secretary of the Navy to draft a constitution for helpless neighbors in the 
West Indies and jam it down their throats at the points of bayonets borne by United States 
marines, nor will I misuse the power of the Executive to cover with a veil of secrecy repeated 
acts  of unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of the little republics of the Western 
Hemisphere, such as in the last few years have not only made enemies of those who should be 
our friends but have rightly discredited our country as a trusted neighbor.”19   
 U.S. voters and Dominican resistance leaders alike seem to have taken this strong 
language to mean that Harding's election would mean immediate withdrawal from the 
Dominican Republic.
20
  Dominican nationalists backed Harding's campaign, and rumors spread 
of a possible withdrawal upon his inauguration.  The language of the campaign in the United 
States, and U.S. public attention to the occupation, empowered the nationalist resistance from the 
outside and stirred up hope and attention in many parts of the Dominican Republic, facilitating a 
growing unity in resistance while causing the State Department to pressure occupation 
administrators to relax censorship.  Occupation forces and marine constabulary leaders were well 
aware of how these changes affected the issue of public relations in both the Dominican 
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Republic and the United States.  The U.S. Navy attempted to quell concerns by reporting that in 
late 1920 conditions in the Dominican Republic were “becoming stabilized," and that they hoped 
naval administration would need not last much longer before Dominicans could take over 
government "with such protection from the United States as may insure it against any threatening 
intervention of foreign nations or internal disorder.”21  Lane prepared a speech for all marine 
recruits entering the Dominican Republic in the last years of the occupation, in which he 
discussed Dominican and U.S. anti-occupation elements.  He pointed out that each assault on 
Dominicans by marines  "is published in the Dominican press and the Dominican people are 
astounded that American Marines should so abuse their people.  Prominent Dominicans forward 
the story to their friends in the United States and it is taken up by the American press, maybe in 
Congress, and the blame is laid upon the whole Marine Corps."
22
  It was not only an issue for the 
marines, however, but a clear problem for the consolidation of a Dominican constabulary that 
was already widely disliked by the population.   
 Marine commandants were concerned with the image of the constabulary among 
Dominicans, with its reputation for corruption, arbitrary methods, and robbing and abusing the 
peasantry; they were concerned that people associated the constabulary with previous Dominican 
militaries that had tended toward corruption and abuse, damaging its public image and reducing 
its "effectiveness in maintaining order.”23  Yet Dominicans across the country refused to accept 
the constabulary as a legitimate power because of its foreign leadership, its record of corruption, 
and its membership from among the lower classes.  One guerrilla in late 1920 sent word that he 
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would surrender, but not to anyone in the constabulary.
24
  As the international and national 
resistance campaigns mounted through 1920, reforms in the constabulary late in the year 
emphasized the urgent need to give the constabulary some respectability.  As they had done 
unsuccessfully in previous years, constabulary leaders attempted to enlist more respectable 
recruits by again discharging men "who were not good enough" and emphasizing that enlistment 
must bring men of more respectable backgrounds.
25
  The first general order of 1921 stated that 
recruiters might waive much in the way of "military smartness" in order to gain recruits who 
were more reliable and of "honorable character."  This order reiterated the importance of 
instilling in men that they were supported by the Dominican government for the purpose of 
enforcing law and order, that they were useless unless they themselves obeyed and set an 
example, and stated that "they must inspire the population with confidence and respect, and 
never with fear or dislike."
26
  An October order focused on improving respectability by ordering 
the placement of large mirrors at all constabulary posts, emphasizing the need to improve 
"personal neatness and military precision," and insisting that all constabulary officers have a 
working knowledge of Spanish.  Recognizing the level of difficulties in command and "control" 
that had arisen from the language barrier, it stated that any constabulary officer "who cannot do 
without the services of an interpreter is not fifty per cent efficient," and any constabulary officers 
remaining who could not conduct ordinary conversations in Spanish were to correct the problem 
immediately.  This order also tried to reverse the trend toward dealing militarily with civil 
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offenders, reminding regional headquarters of the constabulary's duties toward civil authorities; 
it called for reform in constabulary relations with civil officials by reminding constabulary 
members that "when fault is found with civil official in the way he performs his duties," it was 
not the constabulary members' job to correct it.
27
  A general order the following month reminded 
constabulary members that when they were administering prisons and jails "they will cooperate 
in every proper way with the official of the Civil Government having duty with prisons and jails, 
and will assist them in every way possible," and that the constabulary would help civil officials 
in their duties, but without interfering.
28
   
 Another response to constabulary-civil tensions was to publicly encourage civil officials 
to give suggestions.
29
  This was difficult to carry out in practice, however, when marine 
commanders did not respect the opinions of civil officials and the latter often worked to 
undermine the authority of constabulary units.
30
  For example, in the province of Monte Cristi, 
4th Company commander Harry Hurst reported in December, 1920 that the members of the local 
ayuntamiento in Dajabón were "doing all they can to cause trouble" in regard to the constabulary 
detention camp along the Haitian border, complaining that it was not clean enough and that it did 
not have sufficient constabulary guards.  Rather than adapt based on local officials' advice, Hurst 
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held an interview with the president of the ayuntamiento to "give him to understand" that the 
constabulary inspector and the chief of the constabulary-directed Public Works Department 
thought it to be in good order.
31
  Instead of incorporating the advice of civil officials, 
constabulary leadership often reinforced the trend toward stacking local governments with more 
cooperative Dominicans.  Headquarters encouraged constabulary and marines to suggest removal 
and replacement of "native" officials when they deemed it necessary.
32
  
 While the international campaign brought a frontal assault on occupation forces, internal 
developments increased difficulties in centralizing and consolidating control even while the 
international atmosphere made centralization more urgent by highlighting the need for 
withdrawal plans.  The powerful, global economic downturn that finally caught up with the 
Dominican Republic toward the end of 1920 proved to be another catalyst that forced both sides, 
military and resistance, to step up their efforts at centralization and improved efficiency.  It 
increased open resistance from civil officials.
33
  It brought many Dominicans, such as peasants 
from the remote interior, more directly into the debate, and brought a shift of many previous 
collaborators toward the resistance.  The economic crisis in late 1920 devastated all regions of 
the country, halting reforms and infrastructural building and leading Dominicans to blame the 
military government for the ruin of the Dominican economy.  Most of the occupation's 
infrastructural improvements were built during the 1919-1920 economic boom that caused the 
Dominican Republic to prosper when many countries were already suffering from the post-
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World War One recession.
34
  Occupation forces held these improvements up as proof that the 
occupation was a positive force in Dominican society.  When resistance leaders inside the 
country criticized the constabulary, the military government emphasized the extent of these 
improvements and claimed that a completion of infrastructural growth would bring greater 
efficiency in the constabulary.  The economic boom was short-lived, however, as European beet 
sugar quickly revived and was preferred to the cane sugar of the Caribbean.
35
    By late 1920 a 
severe economic downturn halted infrastructural growth and led to starvation and growing 
dissatisfaction in all regions. 
 With the financial crisis beginning in October, 1920, the military government cut the 
1921 budget from around $11 million to $6 million and practiced austerity measures that, to 
Dominicans, seemed to represent an absolute failure of the occupation's fiscal measures.
36
  New 
budget cuts were especially a problem for the constabulary, which was already practicing 
financial austerity measures since mid-1920 due to inefficiency.
37
  1921 began with a frustrating 
contradiction, marine constabulary leaders announcing plans to withdraw as soon as the 
constabulary was ready to maintain order, but then drastically cutting the constabulary force.  In 
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February, the commandant reduced the active enlisted force from an authorized strength of 1,200 
to only 346 men for lack of funds.  Austerity budgeting also meant worsening the constant 
problem of inadequate provisions and equipment.
38
  This was accompanied by a brief spike in 
the Marine presence in that month, which caused many to question U.S. intentions.
39
  This only 
highlighted the image of the constabulary as an arm of mercenaries working for marines. Marine 
constabulary leaders viewed the economically motivated reduction as a chance to push all but the 
most devoted/loyal/cooperative members and officers out of the constabulary.
40
  Rumors 
circulated throughout the country about what this extreme constabulary reduction might mean.  
Many held it to mean that the U.S. planned a full takeover of the country or that withdrawal was 
again to be pushed into the distant future.
41
  One rumor even circulated in Monte Cristi Province 
that all constabulary were to be discharged within three months and the property of each 
constabulary post sold at auction because the U.S. government had stolen funds from the country 
and were leaving so little that they had to "give up" the constabulary and Dominican schools.
42
 
 By April and May of 1921 the financial crisis was affecting the entire population.  In 
May of 1921, in Santo Domingo City alone, constabulary commandant F.A. Ramsey worried 
                                                 
38
 Fuller and Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican Republic, 47. 
39
 8th Company commander A.D. Ryan reported that "the people in Puerto Plata that want to see the troops leave 
were very much disappointed when the Henderson unloaded six trucks for Marines."  8th Company Weekly 
Intelligence Report, February 1921, Box 3, Folder 18, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 
007908, AGN. 
40
 General Order No. 1, 12 January, 1921, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, 
I.T. 007904, AGN. 
41
 Weekly Intelligence Reports, February, 1921, Box 3, File 18, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 
08, I.T. 007908, AGN. 
42 Harry E. Hurst, 4th Company Weekly Intelligence Report, Weekly Intelligence Reports, Feburary, 1921, Box 3, 
File 18, 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN.  In Barahona Province, another 
rumor spread that all of the sugar mills and other U.S.-run enterprises there were going to close down because the 
owners were afraid to invest anything until they were sure the Marines were going to remain.  This rumor led to 
panic and put the province in "an unsettled state" due to the potential for job loss if such a thing were to occur.  
Harry E. Hurst, 4th Co. Weekly Intelligence Report, 6 November, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y 
Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. 
311 
 
that 175 merchants had gone into bankruptcy since October of the previous year.
43
  One 
prominent San Francisco de Macorís merchant, Frances Guzman, father-in law of local 
resistance leader Luis Mejia, attempted suicide by cutting his own throat, reportedly due to his 
financial problems.
44
 April and May also saw an increase in robberies throughout the country as 
the economy continued to decline.
45
  By increasing crime, economic devastation weakened the 
constabulary and its tenuous hold.  The same devastation galvanized the resistance.
46
  Nationalist 
leaders pointed out that U.S. forces had intervened on the basis that they could improve the 
country's financial situation, but that by 1921 the Dominican economy was much worse than it 
had been before U.S. intervention in 1916; that occupation officials had claimed they would 
uplift the country by building roads, improving mail service and phone lines, and port 
improvements, but with the economic crisis all such reforms were halted; that occupation 
officials had promised to bring order through an efficient military, but the constabulary was 
neither efficient nor bringing order.  The economic crisis thus augmented problems for 
constabulary centralization while providing impetus for the unification of resistance.  Continuing 
economic problems through mid-1921 drove some among the rising merchant class to seek 
enlistment in the constabulary to pay off debts.
47
  Many more, however, joined armed groups 
throughout the provinces, emboldening armed uprisings not only the East and the Southwest, but 
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throughout the country.
48
  Reports from the Cibao indicated that merchants blamed the military 
government for hard times and the shortage of money, and that many said that they "may as well 
get revolvers and go join the bandits in the hills and try to drive the intruders out."
49
 
 The economic crisis also brought to the fore another controversial issue essential to the 
centralization of the constabulary:  The military government had requested loans from the United 
States through 1920 to aid in consolidation and help build infrastructure to improve military 
efficiency.  As the debt was charged to the Dominican government, which would owe it even 
after withdrawal, many protested.
50
  The economic crisis increased the constabulary's need for 
both money to centralize and for military efficiency to combat growing resistance, but requests 
for new loans in December of 1920 did their own part to increase resistance.
51
  In Samaná, which 
to that point had demonstrated only minor resistance, political leaders began a petition to 
Washington, protesting that they believed another U.S. loan would give the U.S. military a 
further hold on the country and delay the independence that Wilson was promising.  Dominican 
lawyer Pelegrín Castillo began making trips from San Francisco de Macorís to hold conferences 
with these political leaders in Samaná, and rumors spread that people were threatened with 
removal from their posts if they did not sign the petition.
52
  Military Governor Snowden reported 
to the Secretary of State, however, that nothing but the proposed loan of $10 million dollars 
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would allow resumption of public works, and that failure to approve the loan would "result in an 
economic disaster."
53
  The loan had been planned from earlier in the year, and much of the 
money spent in advance, but the State Department withdrew it once plans for early withdrawal 
began.  In early 1921 they extended a $1.2 million short-term loan to stave off the financial 
disaster Snowden predicted, and in June they authorized another loan of $2.5 million.
54
  Protests 
against both loans were widespread and public, a cause behind which large and diverse numbers 
of Dominicans could unite:  Many reported that the U.S. was the cause of the economic hard 
times, and that they would rather starve than accept another U.S. loan.
55
  A group of about 250 
protestors joined to hold a protest in Santo Domingo's Parque Independencia.
56
  The nationalists 
pointed to the increase in foreign indebtedness through five years of occupation, with no 
Dominicans in representation, and pointed out that it was a violation of the 1907 treaty.
57
  Most 
of the money was spent on roads and, with the prospect of withdrawal more real than ever, the 
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strengthening of the constabulary.  As Calder points out, such loans were an embarrassment and 
highlighted the double standard at work:  "They called into question the ability of the United 
States to manage Dominican affairs," and "Washington would have soundly condemned any 
Dominican administration which had found itself in a similar predicament."
58
 
 
 
1920-1921: Dominicanizing the Constabulary, Nationalizing the Resistance 
  
 Well before the economic crisis hit the Dominican Republic in October of 1920, the 
provinces were already being united by a combination of two powerful currents: military 
centralization and nationalization of resistance. Regional confluences of local resistance 
movements by early 1920 kept the constabulary battle alert, while public attention to its activities 
and conduct necessitated a stricter system of control and accountability.  Centralization, 
constabulary officials decided, would be the key to improving unit accountability to a central 
command structure and thereby combating the negative image and inefficiency of the earlier 
constabulary.  With the realization that regional solutions would no longer work due to growing 
resistance and international attention, constabulary officers and the military government focused 
reform on consolidation and standardization, to create a national system that would allow the 
constabulary to take firm control over the country by the late 1920s.  The centralization was 
gradual, however, and constabulary planners continued to battle long-standing regional patterns 
of power relations.  They did so in the context of many other difficulties.  When Charles 
Williams left command in September of 1920, the constabulary returned to the rapid turnover of 
commandants that had plagued it before his arrival.  Growing armed resistances continued to 
present a serious problem to constabulary development, and the general lack of cooperation 
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throughout the country made difficult even such basic requirements as the building and 
maintenance of infrastructural improvements that would aid the military.  Furthermore, as the 
constabulary worked to consolidate power, the resistance movements increasingly unified to 
counteract its growing presence and consolidation.  Using the same networks and infrastructural 
improvement that aided the reform and empowerment of the constabulary, those leading various 
resistance movements began to consolidate, too.  They traveled from region to region gathering 
funds and advertising their cause.   
 The nationalist resistance, which originally included many distinct groups and individuals 
with the shared goal of pushing U.S. forces from the country, comprised an unusual mix of 
Dominicans.  Ex-politicians, intellectuals, lawyers, merchants, clergy, youths, feminists, and 
upper-class families formed anti-imperialist groups throughout the country, and by 1920 some 
contingents began to work to unite the many disparate elements into larger, regional units.  
Secret gatherings of previous politicians and civil officials began in late December, 1919 and 
January, 1920, and became widespread enough to seriously alarm the constabulary command 
when resistance leaders heightened the campaign in March and April.  The sudden growth of the 
nationalist campaign coincided with three relevant occurrences: the growth and publicity of the 
international campaign, the increase in military government orders that centralized aspects of 
civil government, and the rapidly growing communication and transportation networks.
59
 Many 
specifically worked to create propaganda against the constabulary and military government, and 
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their efforts increased with the U.S. presidential elections in the fall.
60
  Dominican interest 
groups, politicians, intellectuals, and clergy actively addressed letters and petitions to U.S. 
senators and interest groups in protest of the occupation, and a group under such prominent, 
nationalist Dominican authors as Emiliano Tejera and Américo Lugo founded the Unión 
Nacional Dominicana (UND) in March to centralize and publicize protest.
61
   
 The UND, aided by the growth of other local Dominican organizations for independence, 
targeted the constabulary in its propaganda: it reinforced the condemnation as national traitor of 
any Dominican who accepted any charge or employment that cooperated with or supported the 
military government or otherwise slowed the return of absolute sovereignty.
62
  Many civil 
officials, determined to retain local and regional autonomy, resigned or threatened to resign as 
the military government published executive orders that centralized local governmental 
administration.
63
  Other prominent Dominican intellectuals founded the Junta Patriótica 
Nacionalista in San Francisco de Macorís, addressing handbills to "Dominicans who want to see 
national sovereignty restored and the enormous injustice committed upon la patria repaired."  
The handbills, which were reported to cause "considerable excitement among Dominicans" in the 
center of the country, called for collective actions such as the closing of all businesses for an 
afternoon.  They also reported that the U.S. Senate had ordered an investigation of Nouel's 
accusations of torture and the dis-occupation of all of the country except for Samaná, a rumor 
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that caused many in the cities and towns to parade in the streets and rejoice.
64
 The constabulary 
did not endear itself to the population by being the force that broke up such celebrations.
65
  
 Other Juntas Nacionalistas were founded in the country's cities through the year.  Efforts 
to build the resistance and gather funds for the fight for independence were highly successful in 
the cities, especially with the June 12-19 "Patriotic Week," but also continued on largely regional 
terms.
66
  Leaders of the resistance used the new infrastructure in the country through June to 
work to rectify these divisions, traveling frequently from province to province in the interior.
67
  
The countryside was another matter.  While constabulary reports in early 1920 discuss a growing 
strength in "unfriendliness toward occupation forces," and "contemptuous remarks by natives 
frequently heard in streets and public places," they reported that many peasants in the 
countryside told Dominican constabulary officers that they were afraid, and that if occupation 
forces were withdrawn they would abandon their farms as they were afraid of renewed 
revolutions.
68
  Despite divisions, the national campaigns emboldened other forms of resistance.  
Civil disobedience against the constabulary increased, and guerrilla campaigns picked up pace 
through 1920.
69
  After June, nationalist leaders enlarged their campaign across regions, involving 
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a growing number of other regional and local resistance leaders; many were reported to leave 
secret meetings and travel long distances along the newly built roads, and were visited by 
Dominicans who had recently traveled to New York and Cuba.
70
  Inspector Sheard was so 
impressed with the organization of the Patriotic Week and the ensuing campaign, in fact, that he 
thought it had been a "grand success in demonstrating their ability to govern themselves."
71
 
 When nationalist resistance unified enough to alarm the constabulary, its officers 
emphasized military standardization.  In early 1920, the constabulary was still a weak 
organization.
72
  With an eye toward unification of the constabulary and standardized 
communication across companies, officers made a number of changes from mid-1920.  The first, 
and one of the most effective, was centralized reporting to combat the strength of resistance.  
Before his departure, commandant Charles Williams ordered that by July all companies were to 
bring their lists of known fugitives up to date and share the information with the constabulary 
commandant's office.  He also instituted the practice by which each company sent in a weekly 
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memorandum describing the general state of the province.
73
  In addition to better and more 
regular reporting to central headquarters, Williams emphasized infrastructure.  The constabulary 
and military government also began to combine efforts to improve constabulary efficiency.  For 
example, they put enlisted men to work with military government forces on mapping the country 
and building roads and communication networks through mid-1920, and ordered units to use 
these reforms to their advantage:  Reports of operations against guerrillas were to use maps or, 
for those locations not yet mapped, to use local place names and distance and direction from 
more noted locations.
74
  
 By October, all constabulary companies were enlisted to aid in making regional maps, 
and headquarters emphasized the need to get constabulary members to cooperate with field 
engineers on other infrastructural improvements.
75
  The occupation government and constabulary 
leaders held up communication and transportation improvements as proof that they were there to 
help the Dominican people and improve the country, but constabulary and resistance alike knew 
that the emphasis on such infrastructure by 1920 had much more to do with the need to unite 
remote regions of the country and give "military control of the whole Republic to the 
government and its military police force."
76
  In late 1920, the military government reported 
success in the extensive building of roads and railways that it hoped would aid in consolidation 
of power and pacification of the population.
77
  While the clearing of roads was helpful, the 
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constabulary was still not equipped to deal with the storms and heavy rains.  The especially long, 
heavy rains of December washed out the dirt roads and trails, threatened livestock, damaged 
crops, and furthered economic decline.
78
  The constabulary was not equipped to travel across 
washed out roads, and its leaders had no choice but to sit back and wait for the weather to 
improve so that they could begin working on them again as soon as possible.
79
  The resistance, 
on the other hand, was able to use washed out trails.  Gilbert describes the cultural practice of 
extending aid to travelers during poor conditions, and the way that this practice aided guerrilla 
fighters--a service that was not open to constabulary units.
80
   
 Constabulary officers also worked to improve standardization in training and other 
aspects of the constabulary through 1920.  Reforms aimed, for example, to gain reenlistments as 
men's terms began to expire.  Early 1920 marked the constabulary's third year in existence, and 
thus the ends of terms of enlistment for some of the original members who still remained.  
Reports estimated that the constabulary "successfully overcame the difficulties incident to 
discharging, enlisting and reenlisting." Reenlistment of those whose original three-year 
enlistments had expired was approximately 65%.
81
 Reenlistment was indeed good during the 
financial success and general calm of early 1920, though the report does not mention an overall 
number of those reaching the end of their term of enlistment.  Due to the discharges and 
desertions of earlier years, the majority of the force's enlisted men were not up for re-enlistment 
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at the time of this report, as they were not from the original recruitment campaigns of three years 
previous.  When these men did come up for reenlistment, the next year, the majority opted to be 
discharged.
82
  Williams gained approval the military governor's approval early in 1920 for an 
optimistic increase in the authorized strength of the constabulary to 1,225 enlisted men and 82 
officers.
83
  In a (largely failed) attempt to initiate at least basic standard training in outposts and 
company headquarters, Williams mandated the introduction of specific athletic games to improve 
strict discipline in all company posts while avoiding the monotony of long military exercises, 
reforms that subsequent commandants continued.
84
  They emphasized improvement of basic drill 
actions such as saluting and coming to attention, and  ordered company commanders to send 
their weekly memoranda to other company commanders who might have interest in the 
information--and important step toward centralized efficiency.
85
  They also consolidated the 
constabulary by lessening the number of companies from fourteen to twelve, so that each 
province had only one company.
86
  With this change, to improve esprit de corps and be sure that 
all constabulary members had a vested interest in the good of the populations, they proposed a 
more careful program of keeping enlistees in their home provinces and of calling the companies 
by their province name rather than by number.
87
  J.C. Breckenridge, as commandant of the 
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constabulary from December of 1920 to April of 1921, stipulated that each company 
headquarters should keep half of its men in the field in selected permanent camps or outposts to 
patrol and "preserve law and order," while those in headquarters would receive "military and 
civil training."  Every constabulary outpost was for the first time marked with a uniform sign 
indicating what it was, and each was to have a clock, a calendar, and a set of the Official Gazette; 
they were even to fly the Dominican flag, so that surrounding residents and civil officials might 
come to look on the outposts as centers of information.
88
  Breckenridge also stipulated that each 
company headquarters would always have at least one marine line officer so as to improve 
training.
89
  These latter reforms came at the same time, however, as the economic decline, and 
successive declinations of the authorized enlisted strength of the constabulary began in 
November of 1920.
90
  Further, economic difficulties meant that the constabulary administration 
was no longer able to supply morale boosters such as baseball goods to companies, and had to 
continually decrease budgets, limiting rations to prisoners, for example, to bare sustenance.
91
 
 New centralization and efficiency in the constabulary was strongly tested beginning in 
December, 1920 by resistance, heavy rains, and a small pox epidemic that wreaked havoc on the 
un-vaccinated population.  In the midst of a severe financial crisis, and as nationalists increased 
their campaigns against the occupation and its collaborators, the constabulary found it difficult to 
convince people to agree to vaccinations.  The damage wrought by the disease was wide and 
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immediate, spreading quickly through occupied territory and back and forth over the Haitian 
border.  The military government used constabulary units to initiate a mandatory vaccination 
campaign and the quarantining of populations.  Dominicans widely rejected compulsory 
vaccination, seeing it as a threat and an unwanted imposition from the foreign central 
government.  The nationalist campaign distrusted military government motives, and seized on 
the protest as another way of harming the occupation's centralizing process.  Word spread 
quickly, especially in the interior where the nationalist campaign was strongest, that there were 
"very dangerous germs" in the vaccinations and that they were killing large numbers of 
Dominicans who agreed to get them.
92
  Within a month, constabulary officials trying to 
administer the vaccine reported that a "vicious propaganda campaign against vaccination was 
started in January and carried on by all the periodicals of the country and many prominent 
people, including doctors."
93
   
 In December, 1920, under pressure on all sides, Wilson officially announced the need for 
a withdrawal plan.  Constabulary leaders stepped up the work of consolidating control across 
provincial lines so as to prepare the constabulary to take over with eventual withdrawal.  As the 
constabulary centralized to prepare for withdrawal, however, so did the nationalists.  The 
resistance was stronger, as the constabulary and military government suffered severe budget cuts 
even while the resistance gathered funds and gained increasing numbers because of the poor 
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conditions of the country.
94
  From December to January, Dominican journalists and intellectuals 
founded groups such as Congreso de la Prensa to fight censorship, and growing numbers of 
Dominican newspapers joined the resistance, publishing the Congreso's decrees, editorials, and 
reports, first against censorship laws, and then as their pressure and that of the international 
community forced a relaxing of censorship.  Published reports became more hostile toward the 
constabulary as time passed.
95
  One December 1920 edition of Ecos del Valle published a long 
story about the actions of the UND and the Congreso de la Prensa, reiterating their insistence that 
no Dominican cooperate in any way with the occupation.  Both the UND and the newspaper 
reminded the population that the Dominican Constitution forbade any Dominican citizen from 
accepting employment by any foreign government on Dominican national territory without the 
authorization of the appropriate congressional official, and that therefore any Dominicans 
accepting any position under the military government were to be considered traitors.  It 
recommended that the Dominican people ostracize any Dominican national who cooperated in 
any manner to retard the immediate and complete return of sovereignty.
96
   
 Despite the remarkable amount of centralization in both the constabulary and the 
resistance movements by the end of 1920, however, both still struggled against persistent 
regionalism and divisions.  Many Dominicans rejected efforts toward centralization, whether 
they were urged by the constabulary and occupation forces or by leaders of the nationalist 
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resistance.  Regional differences, tradition, and the slow progress of infrastructural growth still 
confounded broader attempts to consolidate the country.  One of the most prominent regional 
questions for the constabulary was, of course, the border, where concern about loyalties of 
Dominican constabulary officers and local officials was especially acute.  Commandant Ramsey 
reported that the constabulary there kept a roster of "those Dominican officers and enlisted men 
who are preeminently qualified for service on the border and should not be transferred."
97
  The 
East continued to be a major exception as well.  Whereas elsewhere constabulary officers 
became increasingly accountable for their actions, and were discharged or asked to resign if they 
proved inefficient or committed too many infractions against local populations,  the constabulary 
continued to be more brutal in the eastern provinces.
98
  Those groups hoping to unite resistance 
also struggled with regionalism.  Samaná, with its large English-speaking and foreign 
populations, was slow to support resistance.
99
  Furthermore, both constabulary and resistance 
vied to gain the support of rural Dominicans who were far removed from either politics or most 
of the effects of occupation.  Many farmers in remote areas benefited from infrastructural 
building--especially roads, repair of railroads, and improvement of ports--and had suffered under 
the pre-intervention civil war.  While they did not directly cooperate with the occupation forces, 
they were also uninterested in joining a nationalist resistance that might bring about disruption.  
Some such farmers even reported to Dominican constabulary officers in early 1921 that they 
were "anxious to have [U.S.] troops remain."
100
  The many among the rural population who did 
resist, especially in areas where guerrilla warfare led to destruction of property and persecution 
                                                 
97
 General Order No. 35, 11 November, 1920, "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 
08, I.T. 007904, AGN. 
98
 See, for example: Translation of letter from Eliseo Acevedo at Yamasa," Second Lt. G.L. Rice, and Third 
Endorsement from Colonel Commandant GND, 19 February, 1921, Bundle #69, File “1921, Secretaría de Interior y 
Policía,” “Gobierno Militar Americano,” AGN; Vega, Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas, 10-13. 
99
 Report, McLaughlin, 13th Co. (Samaná), 19 June, 1920, File 1, "Informes," "Ordenanzas y Correspondencia, 
1917-1920," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007904, AGN. 
100
 Report of Patrols, 4 January, 1921, Folder "1921, 19," Box 3, 1921, Ejército Nacional, AGN1. 
326 
 
of neutrals by both sides, were more likely to join armed resistance.  The nationalist groups 
continued to distance themselves publicly from guerrilla resistance, constructing a careful 
publicity strategy that sought to prove to U.S. senators and the U.S. public that Dominicans were 
capable of non-violent self government. 
 For constabulary leaders, one of the primary answers to resistance and all of the 
continued problems through 1921 was to emphasize enlistment, retention, and gaining more 
cooperative recruits.  They focused on recruiting rural elements, even to the exclusion of those 
from the city.
101
  Not only had rural populations been generally less interested in directly 
resisting occupation rule, but they also contained many of the poorest and those who were 
excluded from even the most remote possibility of achieving high status in Dominican society, 
and thus were seen as more likely to join the constabulary.  By tradition, even those of the rising 
merchant class were always gente de segunda or campesino, and could not become part of the 
elite.  Trujillo, for one, seems to have weighed this in his own decision when he joined the 
constabulary in 1919.
102
 As officers rebuilt the constabulary after the drastic cuts of early 1921, 
they placed more attention on supplies, and worked to try to bring some among the elite class 
around to supporting the constabulary.
103
  After the failures of the reenlistment period early in 
the year, they were concerned with retention, heavily emphasizing company spirit, reducing 
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terms of enlistment from three to two years, and allowing men to live in their company quarters 
while they were on extended furlough during the cutbacks at the beginning of the year.
104
 
 The resistance, struggling against the constabulary, had the advantage in early 1921 due 
to economic difficulties, weather and roads, and international opposition--one of Harding's first 
actions upon becoming U.S. president was to order a Senate investigation into the occupations of 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic.  The Senate investigation began in February of 1921 and 
received extensive press coverage in both the United States and the Dominican Republic.
105
  At 
the same time, the nationalists actively recruited people across regions to their cause, and the 
newspapers continued to support them. Throughout 1921, Ecos del Valle reported extensively on 
investigations and repeatedly published damning articles about the occupation.
106
   In February, 
it closely covered the U.S. Senate Inquiry and the Third Congress of the Pan-American Workers 
Confederation--where Samuel Gompers championed the Dominican cause.  As international 
attention continued to increase through 1921, and even limited censorship was more difficult for 
the constabulary to enforce, Ecos del Valle published increasingly harsh language against the 
occupation,  calling the U.S. forces "brutal invaders" and outlining the course of actions taken by 
Dominican nationalists.
107
  Resistance leaders also used the continued military government 
requests for loans to help galvanize resistance, and Dominicans throughout the country showed 
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great interest in loan negotiations.
108
  By mid-1921, they united all patriotic with the Junta 
Nacionalista, which had headquarters in each province.
109
  
 Finally, while the loans were still being negotiated in May, the financial crisis in the 
government became so bad--and the need to continue improving the constabulary so high a 
priority--that the military government closed the schools rather than losing money for the 
constabulary or transportation infrastructure.  Resistance exploded, and just in time to begin 
preparations for the June 1921 Patriotic Week.  The usually careful Santo Domingo newspaper 
El Listín Diario reported that "there is at least something that still floats victoriously over the 
shipwreck that is the American employee, the beloved son of the good father, who can not lose 
his fat salary," stating that Public Works projects had been abandoned but that U.S. employees 
were all sent to the constabulary "so that they may receive a good salary to help them along and 
enable them to reach home safely and contented."
110
  The Dominican Republic prided itself well 
before the occupation on its superior education system, reformed in previous decades by Eugenio 
María de Hostos and always supported locally by lottery.  With the lottery and other such forms 
of local funding outlawed and the constabulary patrolling against them, Dominican civil officials 
had no alternative funding to continue the schools.  The constabulary increased intelligence with 
attention to reactions against the school closings, and opined that the general lack of arms was 
the only thing causing people from uniting in resistance.
111
  Many argued that the closing of 
schools was not about finances at all, but about social control, censorship, or even punishment of 
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Dominicans for the ongoing boycott of property taxes.
112
  President Henríquez y Carvajal 
believed that the school closing was for economic reasons, but protested it strongly, and U.S. 
businessman in Santo Domingo H.P. Krippene reported that "schools will be closed indefinitely 
because of lack of funds--and this despite our boast that the landmarks we leave are pre-
eminently schools and education."
113
  More Dominicans began to come forth against the 
occupation, speaking publicly, joining the nationalist societies, or writing books.
114
 
 While this criticism of the military government opened across a national arena, and 
helped to unify resistance, the constabulary struggled to maintain any semblance of control in 
many areas, especially in the cities.  Snowden reported that as military governor he had 
"faithfully" tried to uphold the U.S. Navy Department's policy of building a military police force 
officered by Dominicans that could serve as a Dominican military upon the withdrawal of 
Marines.  Many changes, he reported, had to that point been required in working to "obtain good 
and competent men for these positions."  As of April, he reported that there were still U.S. 
civilians as permanent officers in the constabulary, though, that when it had been impossible to 
find natives to fill these positions, he had requested marine officers or medical navy officers to 
temporarily fill the positions.
115
  The explosion of resistances in May seem to have heightened 
the priority of recruiting Dominicans as officers to appease the population, and constabulary 
                                                 
112
 Fiallo, La Comisión Nacionalista, 30; Garrido, En la ruta, 118; Juárez, "United States Withdrawal," 161.  For a 
summary of the boycott on property taxes, see: Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 106-107. 
113
 Juárez, "United States Withdrawal,"161.  Rufus Lane, as Secretary of Justice and Public Instruction, had loudly 
and frequently made this claim. 
114
 Some such books were published in Havana, but others seem to have only been circulated through the 
population; some are mentioned in constabulary reports, especially where they accuse constabulary and Marines of 
torture, and then are lost in history.  See, for example, "Information" from P.M. Rixey, Jr. to Commanding General, 
USMC, 29 June, 1921, File "1921 9," Ejército Nacional, AGN1. 
115
 "Appointments of officers to the Guardia Nacional Dominicana," to the Chief of Naval Operations, 19 April, 
1921, File 1921, Geographical Files "Dom. Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico. 
330 
 
leaders throughout May focused on recruiting non-criminal Dominicans as officers.
116
  They 
focused too, on centralizing efforts to deal with resistance, sending Dominican officers to lead 
patrols and report any unusual activities back to their district commanders and the commanding 
officer of U.S. Marines at the nearest station.
117
  The constabulary continued to struggle, 
however, because trails were still washed out as late as April, those in the interior "almost 
impassable due to heavy rains and mud" and nothing was being done to improve the problem.
118
  
Further, constabulary correspondence turned increasingly to the problem of propaganda by 
middle- and upper-class Dominicans against enlistment in the constabulary.  The military 
government once tried to increase censorship in response, but this was short-lived when it only 
increased resistance and further harmed enlistment.
119
   
 In June of 1921, the Navy Department and State Department instituted major changes.  
They replaced military governor Snowden with Samuel Robison, who they believed would be 
more cooperative with the State Department, and appointed Presley M. Rixey Jr. commandant of 
the constabulary with the mandate to improve it in preparation for withdrawal.
120
  For the 
resistance, this change did not have the effect of calming complaints or slowing unification.  In a 
speech on 14 June, 1921, Robison proclaimed a withdrawal plan, the "Harding Plan," that 
brought what Henríquez y Carvajal called unanimous protest among the Dominican 
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population.
121
  Unilaterally created by U.S. officials, the plan demanded that an incoming 
Dominican government accept another loan of $2,500,000 for the completion of public 
improvements begun under occupation, agree to ratify all actions of the military government, 
"agree to a further guaranty to protect the payment of the public debt in case the customs 
revenues are not sufficient” and to leave the constabulary under the command and organization 
of U.S. officers, who would form a military mission and receive compensation from the 
Dominican government.  The military officials to lead this mission would be appointed by the 
new Dominican president, but "on designation or recommendation of the President of the United 
States."
122
  Robison, as military governor, was to convoke regional assemblies for the selection 
of electoral college delegates to vote for a congress, while he appointed a commission of 
Dominicans to negotiate a withdrawal agreement and worked with the electoral college to select 
a provisional president.  U.S. military forces would remain to train the constabulary, with U.S. 
officers remaining in the constabulary's highest command ranks until training was complete.
123
  
The Ecos del Valle published an article of protest signed by a number of prominent Dominicans 
against the continuance of so much control in U.S. hands, stating that by the withdrawal plan 
Dominicans would be "abject and enslaved under the omnipotent power of the North American 
nation."  The paper also reported the preparation of a "monstrous nationalist manifestation" of 
protest in the capital city.
124
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New Alliances and Polarization 
 
 When the military government attempted to carry out elections under the proposed plan, 
nationalist groups and Dominican elites worked together to carry out an anti-election campaign.  
New Juntas Patrióticas were formed and others revived or strengthened.  Dominicans in 
prominent civil government positions in Santo Domingo created the Anti-election League of 
Santo Domingo Province, circulating a petition drawn up by the Electoral Board of Abstention.  
The petition called for Dominicans not to take part in the elections, stating that:  
 the Antielection League of the Santo Domingo Province is composed  
 of Dominican citizens who are determined not to submit to the criminal brute  
 force being employed here by the United States of America . . . [who] commit  
 murder, burn, and concentrate the poor peasants of entire regions, depriving  
 them of their lands and water for the benefit of despicable Yankee corporations;  
 they weigh the people down with burdensome taxes, squander and rob the public  
 funds to the extent of bringing the country to bankruptcy, suppress public  
 instruction throughout the land, and, lastly, commit all kinds of unjust abuses  
 before the eyes of the world, which witnesses such acts in consternation; Whereas  
 the United States of America is haunted by the incessant and increasing clamor  
 of protest from Spain, Latin-America, and England, and, goaded by its insane  
 desire to possess the treasures of the Dominican soil, as well as Dominican  
 funds and police, on the 14th of June last it issued a proclamation in which it 
 hypocritically expressed a desire to withdraw from Santo Domingo, and  
 ordered the Dominican people to hold an election to the end that sovereignty  
 might be placed in the hands of the United States..."
125
  
 
The military government dismissed all Dominican employees in their service who signed the 
petition from their positions, pushing them even more toward the growing opposition.
126
  The 
armed resistance was on the same page:  In the eastern provinces, guerrillas threatened the lives 
of anyone who went to polls in the planned elections.
127
   
 Newspapers called for unification across regions, emphasizing the need for a truly 
national movement to rid the Dominican Republic of occupiers.  They called out the occupation 
                                                 
125
 United States, "Senate Inquiry," 1121-1122. 
126
 Ibid., 1098-1100 
127
 Report, P.M. Rixey, Jr., 29 June, 1921, File 9, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007900, 
AGN. 
333 
 
administration for the suffering of the many unemployed throughout the country and encouraged 
Dominicans to unite, decrying any hints of partisanship.
128
  One pointed out that some, guided 
either "by error or bad faith," continued the "criminal tendency" of taking actions that supported 
"the forces that oppress us."  The author emphasized the need for Dominicans to take action 
against traitorous Dominicans, stating, "we have a popular expression that we can with an 
overwhelming certainty apply in this case, and that is "dirty rags are washed at home.""
129
  One 
journalist wrote a tract that was published throughout many papers of the country stating that:  
 In these most psychological moments that threaten the Dominican people after  
 winning a difficult civic battle against the hardened colossus of the United States,  
 through passive resistance by not ceding any of their attributes as an absolutely  
 free and sovereign nation, and absolutely independent, the most delicate and 
 transcendental hour has come to pursue with self-sacrificing patriotism the  
 torturous path laid out since foreign forces have been in our territory.
130
 
 
Such calls were picked up by more newspapers throughout 1921 and into 1922.
131
  An article in 
El Cibao recommended that Dominicans be on the alert, that after resistance leaders had 
threatened the "mercenaries and traitors" with vengeance at the hour of justice, "the liberty of a 
people ought not to be obtained through concessions nor by treaties of subordination."
132
 
 In the East, prominent Dominicans even formed a group calling for national unification 
with the express purpose of recovering local autonomy, which they believed would return as 
soon as the U.S. forces had left the country.
133
  The rise of such movements as this and the 
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Antielection League in Santo Domingo are demonstrative of a growing right-wing anti-
Americanism and anti-imperialism that in mid-1921 allied itself with diverse sectors of 
Dominican society to push their call for an absolute and immediate withdrawal.  They worked, 
often through the press, in collaboration with intellectuals and politicians from the interior to 
demand withdrawal of U.S. troops on Dominican terms.
134
  Nationalists, in turn, were able to use 
the continued economic problems and Robison's speech to widely recruit rural populations into 
the resistance.  Now backed by Dominican elites and using new roads and improvements to send 
representatives to the countryside, they worked to convince peasants not to vote in any elections 
that were not called by a Dominican government.  The movement of nationalist leaders through 
the countryside grew parallel to the consolidation of the constabulary, increasing as the 
constabulary became more efficient and working to counteract the potential power of the 
constabulary among peasants.
135
  They were generally well received everywhere they went by 
mid- to late-1921.
136
  In turn, constabulary and intelligence reports became increasingly focused 
on the movement of politicians and nationalists through the provinces, and the noted that areas 
through which prominent nationalists passed were directly thereafter connected with new and 
different types of resistance.
137
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 These representatives spread extensive rumors that the U.S. forces would be withdrawing 
very soon, so as to convince them that elections could wait.
138
  While in January of 1921 
Dominicans in the countryside were reported to have largely given up hope of U.S. withdrawal 
happening any time in the next four years, by the middle of the year the nationalist campaign had 
convinced many that withdrawal could occur at any time.
139
  At first, the constabulary reported 
that rural people reported great interest in elections and voting even while all other segments of 
the population outside the constabulary were increasingly hostile.
140
  As the nationalist 
recruitment campaign picked up through the countryside, however, peasants throughout regions 
became less cooperative with the constabulary and occupation forces, and began to demonstrate 
against the occupation and join in calls for withdrawal, reiterating the statements made by 
nationalist speakers.
141
  Constabulary second lieutenant Bruno Zapata reported in August that 
groups representing the nationalist resistance left Dajabón "almost daily to the countryside to 
introduce in the souls of the campesinos the idea that should not agree to any elections unless 
they were called by a Dominican government."
142
 Politicians and other resistance leaders also 
used the Anti-election League's propaganda in their speeches to demonstrate the weakening of 
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the military government.
143
  By mid-year, constabulary reports in all provinces complained that 
even the peasants were now blaming the United States for all economic problems, and claiming 
that all Public Works projects would be halted; the reports demonstrated special concern that 
these rumors passed back and forth between people in both city and countryside, and concluded 
that "the people as a whole, are against the military government."
144
  Other Dominicans, such as 
those who worked in the occupation-run Public Works Department, also joined in protest and 
began to work with nationalist leaders in spreading propaganda against the occupation.
145
 
 Around all of these protests, in light of expectations to begin the proposed withdrawal, 
the constabulary underwent major changes toward centralization and continued hope of de-
politicization.  The State Department charged Robison with improving U.S.-Dominican and 
military-civil relations and thereby gaining cooperation for withdrawal plans that would be 
agreeable both to the United States and Dominican nationalists.  One of Rixey's first actions 
under command of Military Governor Robison was to change the constabulary's official name 
from Guardia Nacional Dominicana to Policía Nacional Dominicana.  The change was intended 
to emphasize the organization's police functions.  Rixey hoped that, despite the clearly military 
function of the force, this change would emphasize de-politicization and improve the 
constabulary's reputation by distinguishing it from politically involved pre-occupation militaries 
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such as the Guardia Republicana.
146
  Dominicans, however, widely lambasted the revisions and 
drew attention to the continued low social status of the officers and recruits, calling it by names 
such as Pobres Negritos Dominicanos and Pobres Negros Descalzos.
147
  Other reforms at the 
time did not do more to improve the constabulary's reputation, and resistance leaders spread 
rumors that popular nationalist Dominicans would soon take command of the constabulary and 
stop the abuses.  Rixey reported, in a summary of such reports, that many were looking forward 
to natives "holding important posts" in the constabulary, continuing their objections of the 
command of the Dominican military by U.S. officers.
148
  A group calling itself the Association of 
Young People of Macorís held a parade that culminated in a speech in which Licenciado Jafet de 
Hernández stated that the constabulary was "no more than a menace to the inhabitants of the 
country as long as it is officered by Americans."
149
 
   The constabulary reforms of the second half of 1921 did, however, rapidly improve its 
centralized command and general military efficiency, and its leaders often settled into acceptance 
of simply having more efficient military control over the country.  The large new loan of June 
paid for the re-opening of the schools, but otherwise went to a renewal of road building and 
constabulary improvement.  The constabulary improved mail service, bridges, and roads rapidly 
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through July and August.
150
  Rixey quickly developed detailed plans for the force, increasing 
mobility.  He gave the two larger units sufficient truck transportation to be able to move quickly 
from their bases to areas in which they were needed, and proposed the creation of a network of 
strategically placed combat outposts to provide early warning of armed resistance.
151
  Reforms in 
the constabulary tried to encourage friendlier military-civilian relations, including an extensive 
indoctrination program for Marines and constabulary members in the best ways to deal on 
friendly terms with the civilian population.  Commandant Rixey also ordered newspapers to 
publish a notice about the constabulary that responded to the criticisms of the resistance.  The 
notice reminded the population that the constabulary was organized with the objective of taking 
over for the forces of occupation, that it was a force necessary to maintain peace and that the 
sooner it could take control the sooner the occupation could end and leave the Dominican 
Republic in peace.
152
  These efforts were much less successful, however, than those centralizing 
military power, largely because of the effectiveness and extent of the nationalist campaign.
153
  
Despite the fact that constabulary enlisted pay was increased to seventeen dollars a month 
(parallel with a Marine enlistee pay increase of the same amount), a higher pay supported by 
loans from the United States, numbers continued to be much lower than authorized strength.  In 
late 1921, the actual strength of the organization--including its many marine officers and navy 
medical officers, remained between 569 and 577, less than half of the authorized number.
154
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 Rixey also tried to carry out reforms that would bring rural guards (guardacampestres) 
and municipal police into cooperation with the constabulary forces, but met continued resistance 
on both fronts.  Guardacampestres, who were to be accountable to the constabulary for their 
appointments as of November 1920, continuously refused to cooperate.
155
  In August of 1921, 
when the resistance was building and uniting through the country, the constabulary began 
collecting many guardacampestres' arms, submitting many to courts martial for refusal to 
comply with constabulary orders.
156
  Civil governor of Santo Domingo Province Juan Francisco 
Sánchez, however, ordered that owners and administrators of property had the right to appoint 
rural guards to defend their crops, and that the constabulary was not to intervene in such 
appointments, thus openly working against the military government and constabulary to maintain 
Dominican traditions of local autonomy.
157
  The military government was caught between this 
insistence of Dominican leaders on local decision-making and the growing concern of 
constabulary leaders, who worried about the damage that such continued appointments would 
cause to military consolidation in the constabulary.
158
  Municipal police authorized by the 
military government in some cities also refused to cooperate with military government orders, 
such as by protecting prostitutes from arrest throughout the country.
159
  In response, constabulary 
commanders arrested prostitutes instead, and had men working in civilian clothing at night to 
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arrest men for petty robbery, etc.
160
  Over time, such actions increased the urban power of the 
constabulary while complicating planned reforms to keep the force from intervening in civil 
affairs.  In San Juan, the constabulary even disarmed municipal police due to suspicions that they 
collaborated with Haitians in an attack on constabulary barracks.
161
  Military consolidation 
continued to be paralleled by growing unification of resistance.  Planters in the East responded 
from late 1920 with a traditional regional response: When the constabulary could not stop attacks 
on agricultural lands, large landowners there ceased reporting guerrilla activity to constabulary 
authorities and worked out a traditional agreement for "protection," provisioning guerrilla units 
twice a month.
162
  Nationalists, in response to the amount of funding being funneled toward the 
constabulary, simply renewed and magnified their protests against U.S. loans and any who 
enlisted in the constabulary. 
 By mid-1921, the polarization between a widely comprehensive resistance, on one side, 
and the military government and constabulary, on the other, was conclusive.  The economic 
problems through the year augmented the polarization when some joined the constabulary and 
many more joined the stronger and more united movement to end the occupation immediately 
and unconditionally.  Those joining the constabulary were in the clear minority, and those 
collaborating with the occupation forces were increasingly ostracized by broader society, forced 
to depend on the protection of marines and constabulary forces.  The resistance, by the middle of 
1921, comprised elements from all sectors of Dominican society demonstrating a remarkable 
unity against the constabulary and occupation.  They broadened their campaign by the month, 
continuing the international work of publicizing their cause while gathering support through the 
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country, often very creatively.  For example, they adopted the use of baseball.  Occupation forces 
had worked in previous years to build solidarity through the popular spread of baseball, funding 
and encouraging inter-regional games, but in July, 1921 had to cut funding for baseball due to 
the poor economy.
163
  One constabulary officer in the north warned the commandant in August 
of 1921 that the Junta Nacionalista was holding baseball games to raise funds in protest of the 
occupation and to increase popular support for their cause.
164
 
 In addition to those like Rafael Isaac Pau who signed the anti-election petition and were 
removed from their posts, and thus pushed toward the resistance, many notable previous 
collaborators moved into the resistance as it united from late 1920 through 1921.  Notably, some 
of the most widely reported protestors who were in previous collaboration with the military 
government included former constabulary second lieutenants and patrol leaders.  The most 
notable of these was former second lieutenant Alejandro Kunhardt, who had been entrusted as a 
patrol leader in Puerto Plata Province through 1920, and who joined his brother César and father 
Eugenio in leading parades and speeches against the occupation toward the end of 1920.
165
  
Kunhardt became one of the most visible leaders of the growing labor movement in 1921, and 
was instrumental in bringing the labor movement to national attention and unifying it with 
various nationalist resistance groups.  The Kunhardts led parades and gave speeches against the 
occupation, criticizing the constabulary and gaining a great deal of followers as they moved 
through the interior.  Such followers included civil officials.
166
  They called for the end of U.S. 
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dominance, which they argued was responsible for the wide unemployment and the deplorable 
state of labor in the country.
167
  Alejandro Kunhardt often spoke more about the occupation and 
constabulary than he did about labor.  He tied the two together by arguing that the occupation 
was responsible for deplorable economic conditions, stating that "no power or government in the 
world had the power to force themselves and developed the unwarranted conditions" such as 
those present in the Dominican Republic.
168
  Constabulary intelligence reports demonstrate both 
disdain for his message and astonishment at the extent of support Kunhardt enjoyed, one Marine 
officer stating that "not even the better class of Dominicans here realized that this man is not 
sincere in what he is advocating."
169
  Emboldened by support, the Kunhardts attempted to 
assassinate the Civil Governor of Puerto Plata Province for his cooperation with the military 
government.
170
  They planned attacks on constabulary barracks, and fired on constabulary 
members.
171
  After these actions, Alejandro Kunhardt's following only grew, more people in the 
north and interior publicly supporting him and parading with Dominican flags after his 
speeches.
172
  Another previous second lieutenant who had served in the constabulary was none 
other than Francisco X. Billini, the rabidly anti-occupation and anti-constabulary director of the 
newspaper Ecos del Valle.
173
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 Despite claims to the contrary in the contemporary and current literature, the extent and 
unification of resistance by 1920 and 1921 also created new and unexpected alliances between 
different resistance groups.  While the historiography discusses the general growth of the 
nationalist campaign as it exploded outward from the Cibao, for example, it continues to hold 
that armed resistance was separate and isolated.  Franks argues that "as their conflict with the 
Marines wore on, gavilleros [guerrillas] lost their capacity to articulate a compelling political 
position.  While some continued to announce themselves as “The Revolution,” many others hid 
their identity and took the name of certain Marine officers, or represented themselves as 
members of the Policia Nacional [constabulary].”174  Constabulary reports made the same claim.  
Yet the argument could just as well be made that they found it easier to articulate a compelling 
political vision in 1921.  While earlier armed resistance leaders like Vicentico had tended toward 
brutality and robbery, the guerrilla leaders of 1921 articulated their political position clearly 
through abduction of mail, returning mail carriers unharmed to cities with written versions of 
their political program--a call for absolute sovereignty.
175
  Some even established schools in their 
districts of operation, and forced storekeepers to sell at low prices during the economic crisis.
176
 
 In addition to the fact that armed and nationalist resistances inadvertently worked 
together to end the occupation and harass the constabulary, numerous patrol reports show that 
despite a lack of public unity, the two often directly united after 1920.  Though they publicly 
continued to distance themselves from armed resistance, many nationalist leaders and civil 
officials were aiding guerrillas by 1921 by withholding information on their whereabouts or 
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actively by supplying them or helping them obtain or hide arms.
177
  Many farmers in the interior 
provided arms and supplies or helped guerrilla leaders hide.
178
   Constabulary forces reported 
that this aid came only from poor and desperate farmers, but some of them, such as Tilo and Luis 
Germán, were wealthy and had a great deal to lose.
179
  Though the military governor reported 
that the increase in "bandit activity" was tied to the eastern provinces, greater numbers were 
actively joining in armed resistance not only in the war-torn eastern provinces, but throughout all 
provinces with the possible exception of Samaná by 1921.
180
  Many had no previous criminal 
records.  Growing numbers of middle class merchants and farmers in various regions were 
reported to be giving direct aid to the armed resistance and were kept under close surveillance by 
the constabulary, and civil officials were more and more often submitted to justice for aiding 
armed resistance.
181
  Even the exclusive social clubs of the elite were implicated in aiding armed 
resistance.
182
  This type of support may go a long way in explaining the "increasing boldness" of 
armed resistance movements through 1921 that so baffled the constabulary.
183
   
 Intelligence reports by Dominican constabulary officers recorded increasing numbers of 
new alliances and coalitions against occupation among different resisting populations and groups 
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through 1920 and 1921.  For example, as early as May of 1920 Dajabón merchants used the 
illicit cross-border trade to smuggle in gunpowder for a prominent resistance leader in 
Santiago.
184
  Parties of Haitian and Dominican anti-occupation groups also met frequently along 
the border from June of 1920, and in Monte Cristi repeated arsons against storekeepers were said 
to have been set because the owners would not contribute funds to the Junta Nacionalista 
campaign.
185
  Demonstrating a growing acceptance of armed struggle against the occupation, 
many who had not been involved in guerrilla warfare began plans for armed revolution from 
1920 to early 1922, stockpiling arms and making plans.
186
  The entire constabulary in the 
Northern Department was reorganized and dispatched to new posts in September of 1920 due to 
increasingly strong reports and evidence of a large, united armed resistance movement that was 
gathering arms and planning to march inland from the north coast to overcome the constabulary 
and overthrow the military government.
187
 There also existed a growing number of men who 
regularly crossed the border as go-betweens for Haitian and Dominican revolutionaries and also 
met with "prominent Dominican officials: in Santo Domingo.  When the constabulary caught up 
with one such man, who was Cuban and was thereafter deported to Cuba, they found 
"revolutionary papers implicating some high Dominican officials, the Clergy and some Haitian 
officials."
188
  Evidence throughout constabulary reports also points to the likelihood of increased 
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sabotage by elements of the growing nationalist resistance, such as the beginning of a rumor near 
the Haitian border that stated that the marines were going to turn over part of Haiti to the 
Dominican Republic; constabulary officers along the border believed that the rumor was 
intentionally started to frighten Haitians and stop all work and planting along the border.
189
  
Other reports of apparent sabotage against the constabulary, are common in reports through 
1921, especially after the events of June.  For example, when the constabulary band gave a 
concert at Parque Independencia, the lights suddenly went out and the concert had to be stopped, 
but the municipal band's concert at Parque Colón the same night had no trouble at all.
190
 
 Due to polarization and the strength and unity of resistance, 1921 was a dangerous and 
uncomfortable year to be working for the military government, and especially to be officering a 
constabulary unit.  The resistance actively recruited among the constabulary even as its leaders 
worked to consolidate, centralize, and empower it.  Many within the constabulary responded to 
the tension by remaining in the constabulary but also working for the resistance, whether by 
helping resisters gain supplies or by feeding information about the constabulary to guerrillas.
191
  
While some middle class men joined the constabulary during mid-1921 out of apparent financial 
need, the difficulties, dangers, and discrimination that constabulary members and officers faced 
caused some to rethink their positions, and many others left it or sought to.
192
  Among those 
considering leaving the constabulary in 1921 was Rafael Trujillo, who expressed in private 
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correspondence that he felt the constabulary was going nowhere and was under a constant state 
of siege, and that he might try to get a different job with the Marines rather than remain an 
officer in the constabulary.
193
  Many who rendered service to the constabulary  or the occupation 
government during 1920 and 1921 were attacked, and some killed.
194
  General harassment of 
those wearing the constabulary uniform was common throughout the provinces.  In Puerto Plata 
in June of 1921, one constabulary member was at his station when two Dominicans walked up to 
him and asked why he continued to wear the uniform; they offered him some money to buy 
civilian clothes and go with them.
195
  Even as early as December of 1920, on his way home after 
a leave of absence, constabulary second lieutenant César Lora was accosted by a group of men 
shouting "here comes an American!"  He ignored the group until they shouted "throw out the 
Americans," and began to throw stones at him, at which point he fired on them and they fled.
196
  
Rumors in the cities greatly exaggerated the pay that constabulary members were receiving 
under occupation forces, and some merchants refused to cash constabulary checks.
197
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 Many constabulary members and officers in mid-1921 came to their superior officers in 
the constabulary with fears that, upon withdrawal, they would be thrown out of the military for 
having worked under U.S. officers.
198
 Others were increasingly concerned that if a Dominican 
were made commandant of the constabulary that those who had served the longest under 
American officers would be discriminated against, and rumors spread widely that those 
Dominicans would be lucky if they only lost their jobs, and that many were likely to be killed.
199
  
Rixey reported that "the term 'chulas' has been applied freely to those who have been in the 
service of Americans, particularly the Guardia Nacional."
200
  One Marine constabulary officer, 
Harry Hurst, received three death threats between June and July of 1921.
201
  Constabulary 
leadership responded to many such threats and fears by putting arms in the hands of Americans 
and others they believed they could trust.
202
    
 
 
Conclusion 
 The speed with which the resistance movements united baffled military government 
officials and constabulary officers--even the Dominican officers--who had never seen all regions 
of their country united behind any one cause.  It pulled even a tenuous and partial control of the 
country out of the grasp of the constabulary at the same time that the force gained more funding 
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and supplies, and was therefore able to recruit an increasing number of financially struggling 
citizens.  The result was, in 1920-1922, a drastic polarization of society between the military and 
the majority of Dominican society.  Combined with economic problems and negative 
international attention, etc., this had the effect of forcing U.S. authorities to compromise and 
initiate steps toward rapid withdrawal.  It also forced them to shore up the widely disliked and 
disrespected constabulary.  As military men, those administering the occupation put their faith in 
a military solution for safeguarding rapid withdrawal and saving their own reputations and that 
of their government.  A de-politicized and highly mobile Dominican military that had the 
training to halt insurgency must be the answer for maintaining calm upon the removal of U.S. 
forces that had policed the island since 1916. 
 The nationalist insistence on unconditional withdrawal juxtaposed with the Marine and 
constabulary insistence on further military training brought about a compromise solution, one 
that would allow the United States to save face while ultimately driving the country toward a 
long military dictatorship.  The question that historians must ask, and the same question that both 
Dominican and marine constabulary officers were asking by late 1921 and early 1922, was how 
such an intensely hated and disrespected military could come to control such a resistant--and 
now widely unifying--population.  Unification of the population across regions and classes in 
support of U.S. withdrawal meant that the constabulary continued to be attacked as an element of 
the U.S. presence.  By late 1921 and early 1922, despite nearly two years of constabulary efforts 
to improve the military's reputation, the attacks were increasing rather than decreasing, and more 
and more of the population was taking part in the anti-constabulary aspect of the growing 
military-civilian polarization.  Official disarmament and the building of infrastructure were by 
this time clearly an insufficient solution, however, and had even done their part in aiding the 
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unification of resistance.  Occupation officials recognized this issue by 1922, and sought to 
augment forceful military control with some more complete solution. 
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Chapter SEVEN 
Products of Compromise: Legitimating State and Military, 1922-1924 
 
 
 In late 1921, the alliance of groups demanding unconditional withdrawal of U.S. troops 
and an immediate return of Dominican sovereignty was strong, and growing with a momentum 
that seemed destined to push U.S. troops out.  The U.S.-created constabulary was weak, 
untrained, under-equipped, and hated--a symbol of treason among Dominicans.  One year later, 
in late 1922, a provisional Dominican government had taken the place of the military 
government, the resistance was effectively broken, and the constabulary--though still small--was 
larger, more efficient, better supplied, and widely accepted, even if only as a necessary evil.  By 
the time of complete withdrawal of U.S. forces in mid- to late-1924, the constabulary was a 
fixture of Dominican society, not widely respected, but supported by the constitutionally elected 
Dominican government.  The strong show of united Dominican resistance to occupation in 1920-
1921 empowered Dominican politicians to demand withdrawal.  As popular opinion in the 
United States geared up and publicized protests against both the occupation and its costs to the 
United States, the State Department decided that U.S. forces were fighting a losing war.  State 
Department representatives butted heads again with the Navy Department, which under 
successive military governors insisted that with just enough funds and time they could improve 
the constabulary and thereby quell resistance.   
 The events of 1921, though, had belied the idea that a strong military force alone could 
end resistance and bring order.  Through 1921, it became clear to occupation forces that the 
united nationalist resistance now included wide sections of the peasantry, the clergy, 
intellectuals, politicians and lawyers, many urban middle-class merchants, guerrilla forces, and 
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even large landowners, who had long become disillusioned with occupation forces' inability to 
end guerrilla warfare in the East and with the general disruption in the country's economy.  
Resisting groups were working together, sometimes in collaboration with Haitian resisters, while 
the hated constabulary came under increasingly public, and sometimes violent, attack.   The 
Harding administration's early attempts to impose a unilateral withdrawal plan brought such 
increased resistance that the focus shifted, in 1922, to a compromise withdrawal.  Many on the 
Dominican side, led by ardent nationalist de jure president Henríquez y Carvajal, were unwilling 
to accept any compromise, but the leaders of the strongest Dominican political parties, who had 
supported the united resistance, gradually began to talk with U.S. representatives in 1922 to 
negotiate a compromise.  Prominent lawyer Francisco J. Peynado worked secretively with U.S. 
representatives to negotiate a withdrawal that would be acceptable to the Dominican people, and 
he and other party leaders signed an agreement before its details were made public.   
 I argue that the compromise withdrawal itself is what made the constabulary a tenable 
force.  First, the combination of another U.S. loan and the subsequent signing of the Hughes-
Peynado Plan effectively broke the resistance.  The withdrawal agreement marked the first time 
that Dominicans had officially signed any agreement with occupying forces.  Once the plan was 
in place, there was little that nationalists could do, and no justification for guerrilla warfare that 
would disrupt a provisional Dominican government.  Furthermore, the gradualness of the 
withdrawal plan gave U.S. forces two years to train and improve the constabulary and to find 
ways to increase its legitimacy and its physical presence.  Political action and division among 
Dominicans led to a shifting of concerns and of blame: Those compromising blamed nationalists 
for complicating imminent withdrawal, while nationalists blamed party leaders for 
compromising the nationalist movement.  Through a long two years, while these arguments and 
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preparations for an eventual presidential election divided Dominican politics, the constabulary 
worked actively to present itself as apolitical while still under two years of marine protection. 
   The constabulary was still a hated institution.  Its officers were not respected and it did 
not enjoy the support of any significant sectors of the Dominican population in any region.  The 
task of working to make it viable was a daunting one, made urgent by the need to withdraw all 
U.S. forces from the country in 1924.  The historiography has skimmed over the development of 
the constabulary in this period, pointing out only that occupation disarmament and training and 
improvement of infrastructure gave the constabulary a great deal of power.
1
  With the wide 
public disdain for the constabulary and occupation institutions, however, this explanation is 
insufficient for understanding the growth of constabulary  power during the 1920s.  The relative 
power of the resistance over the constabulary and the absolute lack of respect for constabulary 
members in 1921 prove that disarmament and improved military efficiency were not enough to 
make the constabulary a tenable force for maintaining order.  A close examination of the record 
demonstrates that changes during the years 1922-1925 were instrumental in making the new 
military viable.  Compromise that led to gradual withdrawal had three vital effects on the course 
of constabulary history:  First, it gave marines two years in which to train and shore up the new 
military with no attention to anything else, because a Dominican provisional government took 
                                                 
1
 This aspect of the constabulary's rise to military power throughout the country is important and widely accepted, 
though it has been put forth with the post-occupation return of caudillo politics as the only real reason for the 
constabulary's later power.  The standing argument maintains that the power of the constabulary in Dominican 
society came from the creation of a powerful and unified military force alongside the removal of any effective 
counterforce by disarming of the Dominican population.  Moya-Pons, The Dominican Republic, 336-337; Calder, 
The Impact of Intervention, 61; Bosch, Causes de una tiranía, 144; Turits, Foundations of Despotism, 80.  
Crassweller, in his important biography of Trujillo, states simply that the withdrawal of Marines was bound to make 
the constabulary a more important and prestigious force.  Crassweller, Trujillo, 49.  Valentina Peguero also stresses 
the importance of the military in Dominican society from independence, but her claim that tradition made the new 
military the natural conveyer of culture is problematic and incomplete because the constabulary was in 1922-1924 
by no means seen as either a legitimate or a traditional Dominican armed force.  Peguero, The Militarization of 
Culture.  Luís F. Mejía deals only with the strengthening of the constabulary after 1924.  Mejía, De Lilís a Trujillo, 
210, 215-218.  Bernardo Vega provides a vital addition to the history by tracing Trujillo's individual friendships 
with Marines, but in so doing also contributes to the explanation of the constabulary's power after 1924, and 
especially after Trujillo takes office in 1930.  Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas.   
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over the administration of government; it gave them time to work on military-civil relations 
under the umbrella of a domestic, Dominican government, thereby lending further legitimacy to 
the military and allowing the population to come to gradual acceptance over time.  Second, 
although a large portion of the Dominican population supported only unconditional U.S. 
withdrawal, the signing of a compromise agreement effectively broke resistance.  Further armed 
resistance would only cause the potential for further U.S. intervention, especially with the 
marines still in the country.  Third, the extension of withdrawal for a period of two years left 
ample time for politics and historical revision.  This chapter traces the ways that politics widened 
the gap in the national unity of previous years, which had after all only been a loose alliance 
based on trying to push the United States out.  National unity was silenced over the course of the 
long withdrawal period, and those national party leaders who had signed the agreement were 
pitted against those who had hoped to see extensive change in society.   
 The sheer length of time under which Dominican politicians or nationalists were still 
fettered by the presence and threat of marines and possible further intervention gave time for 
many things to occur: the economy improved while the U.S. forces were still on the ground in 
the country, histories were revised, tempers cooled and political attention was re-directed toward 
the concerns of a post-occupation Dominican Republic.  During the withdrawal period, those 
who were in the political pilot's seat because of their 1922 agreement with the U.S. government 
were interested in mild change, and therefore enjoyed the support of elites, whose power in 
society would have been under further threat from an overhaul of the Dominican system.  Those 
who were militarily in the pilot's seat--the marines and the constabulary--sought change based on 
building and maintaining a powerful, popular, and apolitical armed force.  The result of these 
developments was a withdrawal period that brought gradual abandonment of governmental and 
355 
 
political centralization alongside a growth of military centralization.  The constabulary, built and 
protected by marines who believed that the military could effectively change Dominican society, 
gained in power through the period.  Institutions and trends that congealed during these years 
also facilitated the constabulary's course toward legitimacy and power.   
 
 
From Resistance to Compromise 
 
 In 1921, as the Dominican economy continued in rapid decline and a nationally uniting 
Dominican population stood firm against the occupation, Warren Harding's June proposition for 
withdrawal sparked an outcry that solidified resistance.  Harding's plan called for a Dominican 
government ratification of all military government laws, approval of another U.S. loan, U.S. 
supervision of 1922 elections, and continued U.S. troop officer-ship of the constabulary through 
marine "military missions" to be approved by the new Dominican president.  The proposed 
military missions were to remain in the country after withdrawal of U.S. military government--a 
clear indicator of U.S. officers' faith in military might.  The Harding Plan and its military 
missions sparked heavy popular resistance through 1921.  Dominicans were well aware of the 
potential power of military leaders who were not accountable to popular opinion.  Party leader 
and former president General Horacio Vásquez, one of the key leaders of the nationalist 
resistance of the time, argued that these missions would give U.S. officers the potential to 
become effective dictators.
2
  To strengthen and institutionalize opposition, Vásquez, Henríquez y 
Carvajal, and other major party leaders joined with prominent members of urban society such as 
lawyers, clergy, and journalists to create the Comité Restaurador.  The Comité began in Puerto 
Plata in December of 1921, headed by de jure president Henríquez y Carvajal, and put forward 
                                                 
2
 "Lo que dijo el Contraalmirante Robison," Ecos del Valle, 17 November, 1921, page 1.  Reprinted from Diario 
Nacional.  This protest against the military missions was picked up by other prominent Dominicans, including 
Federico Velásquez, Ramón Báez, and Luis Felipe Vidal. Vega, Trujillo y las fuerzas armadas, 22. 
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the Pact of Puerto Plata, seeking to unite Dominicans against Harding's plan.
3
  The pact called 
for a boycott to any elections called by the military government, and specifically invited all 
officers who performed military service in the country from 27 February 1844 to 28 November 
1916 to register their names and make a formal declaration that they would not serve as members 
nor help in the formation of any military force that the occupation government made on 
Dominican territory.
4
   
 Concurrent with the work of the Comité Restaurador, and with the U.S. Senate 
investigation into the occupation of the Dominican Republic and Haiti in late 1921 to early 1922, 
was the strong push toward improvement of the constabulary that came with U.S. planners' 
realization of impending withdrawal.  While controversies and arguments escalated as to how 
withdrawal would be carried out, occupation planners shifted their focus from the building of 
schools and hospitals toward building a viable military force.  This was difficult when no one 
knew when or how withdrawal would occur, and under the weight of a continued lack of funds.  
It was also doubly charged by events and rumors in the resistance of 1921, in which nationalists 
and many throughout society threatened to take over the constabulary upon withdrawal and to 
punish those in it who had worked for the military government.
5
  From his appointment in charge 
of the marine Second Brigade in mid-1921, Brigadier General Harry Lee worked feverishly to 
improve the constabulary.  Reporting that constabulary "officers and men were without training" 
and that "their value as a military force was nil," he focused on rapid training.
6
  Marine 
Lieutenant Edward A. Fellowes, who served as a Captain in the constabulary in 1921, estimated 
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 The only significant party leader to reject the pact was Federico Velásquez.  Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 
214. 
4
 "Instalación del Comité Restaurador," El Diario, 31 March, 1922, quoted in: Intelligence Reports, File 8, 3 April, 
1922, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN. 
5
 See Chapter Five. 
6
 Quoted in: Calder, The Impact of Intervention, 59. 
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that in mid-1921, no systematic constabulary training or organization existed; previous reforms 
had all functioned at local levels, and were seldom enforced systematically.
7
   
 Even when standard training began in late 1921, it was slow and inadequate.  Lee and 
constabulary commandant Rixey established two training centers, one at Haina near Santo 
Domingo to train officers and one at Santiago for basic recruit training.  The program 
intentionally brought constabulary members from far-flung regions to participate, in a rotational 
cycle, in standard training.
8
  The first officer training took place in late 1921 at the height of 
Dominican nationalist resistance.  Marine Lt. Fellowes was charged with building an officer 
training school to train the force's first thirty Dominican constabulary officers.
9
  The partially 
developed agricultural school at Haina, abandoned like many other projects due to lack of funds, 
provided a ready location.  When the first officer trainees arrived, the school already contained 
necessities such as a mess-hall, a "well-equipped" kitchen, office space, class rooms, and 
dormitories.  It was by no means ideal, however.  Its commanding officer openly disdained 
Dominicans, and spoke little Spanish; water was scarce; the school's windmill broke down 
repeatedly.  Lacking funds for necessary repairs, the school often did not receive daily rations 
because they were delivered from the capital city by an old truck that frequently broke down.
10
  
Fellowes's description of the officers and their arrival makes clear his racist and degrading 
approach, and he made light of officer complaints.  Dominican officers, for their part, were 
                                                 
7
 Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 216. 
8
 General Order No. 44 (1921), 6 September, 1921, Box 3, File 15, year 1921, "Guardia Nacional," Ejército 
Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007908, AGN. 
9
 The choice of locations in itself was significant, though it is unclear whether U.S. planners recognized the fact.  
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10
 Fellowes, "Training Native Troops," 218-220, 225-226. 
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unsurprisingly loath to trust his sanitation regime and sick bay.
11
  Training was made possible 
only by the addition of constabulary Major Joseph M. Feeley, who had served four years as a 
constabulary officer, spoke Spanish fluently, and was more familiar with Dominican customs, 
and by Fellowes's enlistment of officer trainees to correct his Spanish for lectures.
12
   
 Despite the many problems in the program, the first twenty-one officer trainees out of 
Haina passed the basic officer training course and were reattached to their units in December.
13
  
The other nine were recommended for dismissal during the course of the training, a message to 
the others that Marines leading the training "meant business."
14
  Training consisted of "military 
administration, tactics, musketry, topography, first aid, hygiene, and agriculture," and "guard 
duty, discipline, personal cleanliness and hygiene, and above all, marksmanship," to give them "a 
clear tactical advantage over the average Dominican bandit."
15
  Marine commanders expected 
officer training to go a long way toward improving Dominican opinions of the constabulary.  
Standard training, they hoped, would also give the constabulary a sorely lacking image of 
legitimacy, while improving the men's effectiveness.  Rixey also insisted that, due to the lack of 
accountability and control of enlisted men, company officers must be quartered in the barracks 
with their men at all times.
16
  Even with training, however, one of the biggest controversies 
continued to be that the constabulary's top officers were U.S. rather than Dominican.  The 
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 Ibid., 219-220.  Second lieutenant José Arias complained the first night that someone had stolen his pillow, and 
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constabulary continued to follow then-commandant Thorpe's 1919 prescription for high-ranking 
constabulary officers: that they be "100 per cent" American.
17
  As 1922 dawned, and withdrawal 
was imminent, all of the constabulary's commissioned officers were still U.S. forces, and they 
continued to be regularly ranked higher in the constabulary than they were in the Marine Corps.
18
   
 The second training period, to begin in January of 1922, took lessons from the mistakes 
of the first training period.  To move men more quickly through the training centers and possibly 
begin to promote more Dominicans into higher officer positions, training centers at both Haina 
and Santiago were to bring in two companies each of enlisted men for this training period. The 
sheer numbers of men moving through the training centers brought new difficulties, especially as 
funds and supply lines had not been improved since the first.  Fellowes, for his part, went into 
the training period with an attitude that cannot have impressed the recruits who showed up for 
training.  He called the new arrivals two hundred "wild bushwhackers, who had never been in a 
military camp, knew nothing of the meaning of discipline, and were bound to be difficult to 
manage."
19
 The military government sent a contractor from the Marine Intelligence Office to 
grade land to make room for housing the two hundred recruits at Haina.  He carried the work out 
quickly by use of prison laborers from the nearby National Penitentiary at Boca Nigua.  
Constabulary headquarters sent back the two "most promising graduates" from the first training 
period, José Navarro and Luis Alfonseca, to serve as assistant instructors.
20
  Due to the 
difficulties and slow progress inherent in establishing national training centers for the military, 
Lee and Rixey planned rotating phases of training for the men.  This first phase of training was 
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to focus on elementary military principles.  After two months of drill, guard duty, and target 
practice, troops would be detached to their posts, and rotated through later for further training.   
 Through 1921 and early 1922, the military government administration was unable to 
carry out major change while facing wide protest and lack of funds.  Plans for the constabulary 
focused foremost on training, recruitment, road building, and surveying.  As Fellowes noted, 
orders were to build the constabulary so that it would be "sufficiently large and efficient to 
support the Government established when the new Constitutional President will have been 
elected," though no one knew when that would be.
21
  One marine who took part in this training 
said that the goal was "ninety officers and twelve hundred men" adequately trained in military 
and civil duties with infrastructure sufficient to make them nationally efficient, and stated that 
"this comparatively small total was conditioned on the completion of the main highways, which 
with the proper transportation facilities would make the Policia a highly mobile force."
22
  In 
addition to improved roads, marine constabulary officers began to plan a more strategic 
geographical placement of constabulary outposts.  While they emphasized first the need to try to 
recruit "the right sort of men" and pass them through basic training, they also began to plan the 
establishment of outposts at road and commercial centers.
23
  As a system developed through the 
course of the second training period, supplies became more regular despite the severe shortage of 
funds.  Dominican constabulary members worked with improvised targets built from scratch, and 
continued to use Krag-Jorgensen rifles and ammunition that were in "very poor condition," some 
from production as far back as 1898-1899.
24
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 Under such conditions, especially with the hostility that the nationalist resistance 
demonstrated toward those in the constabulary, the men's morale was a major concern for 
constabulary leaders.  Despite extensive financial difficulties, headquarters issued a general order 
that authorized the awarding of medals and the extra pay of $1 per month to those who qualified 
as marksmen.  This served the dual function of improving morale and encouraging efficiency--a 
necessary military element in fighting the expansive armed resistance throughout the country at 
that time.  Fellowes demonstrated his condescending lack of respect for the men when he stated 
that "the men didn't value the extra pay as much as they did the new shiny silver medal, which 
they could pin on their breasts and exhibit before the dark eyes of the señoritas who paraded their 
dusky charms in the lighted plazas in the evening."
25
 But the morale-boosting initiative did help.  
For the first time in the constabulary's history, the men could boast some actual military 
knowledge, had semi-regular supplies, and were being recognized for their achievements.  In 
addition to increasing morale and pay, the training and the marksman program seem to have had 
a powerful effect on the solidarity of the men, who cheered together at the successes of other 
men in their details.  Twenty-four of the first 200 enlisted men passing through Haina made 
marksman.  Fellowes admitted with apparent surprise that some of the men were so good that he 
would put them up against any marine expert, and pinpointed the lack of marksmanship training 
among Dominicans as responsible for the low marine casualties in the battles of 1916.
26
 
 The second training period moved four entire companies through basic training--the first 
time in its five years of existence that the majority of enlisted men had any standard training.  As 
agitation for withdrawal grew in early 1922, Lee quickly pushed the next group of full 
companies through in a third training period.  The rapid training system, which guaranteed that 
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all men had an introduction to basic drill, hygiene procedures, and marksmanship, presented 
advantages and disadvantages.  By giving enlisted men hope that the organization would provide 
them a possible future in a military career, it heightened morale.  It also led to the first 
commissions of Dominican officers, enabling some of them to gradually take command of 
constabulary companies as captains through 1922.  The constabulary still battled resistance, and 
its prestige was incredibly low.  The shuffling of four entire companies at a time through training 
centers left many posts guarded completely by marines at the same time that the resistance was 
carrying out a campaign against the suggested post-occupation marine military missions.  After 
the second training period, constabulary headquarters adjusted so that only one company at a 
time was moved through training centers.
27
  U.S. approval for another loan of $10 million in 
March significantly improved training in the third period, and increased pay and incentives did 
bring an increase in recruits [See Table 7.1].  $1.6 million, a significant portion of the first $6.7 
million to be remitted, was immediately slated for the completion of roads and the improvement 
of the constabulary.
28
  It was with this loan that the constabulary training improved in earnest. 
 The timing of the March, 1922 loan was not coincidental.  It was a product of the desire 
of both U.S. government and Dominican party leaders to begin negotiations toward an 
acceptable compromise withdrawal, and thereby end the long stalemate that was crippling the 
country.  The 1921 resistance had handicapped the military government administration and  
made the State Department hesitant to authorize any new loans, because loans were one of the 
central points of protest.  Despite the strength of the December Puerto Plata Pact and the 
nationalist movement, growing signs of a U.S. withdrawal had also re-awakened partisan 
interests.  Party leaders, who now had the ability to travel quickly through the country and had 
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the ear of the majority of the Dominican population, began planning for their futures.  They 
could likely count on the support of many Dominican elites if they secured a reasonable 
compromise, as the unification of resistance in the previous year had united a peasant base and 
begun to include more radical elements of the population--such as the growing labor movement--
and to include calls for fundamental change in society.  Horacio Vásquez was in a strong 
position to gain followers for the Partido Nacional (previously the Horacista Party), both as a 
respected pre-occupation general and former president, and as one of the major leaders of the 
nationalist resistance movement.  As early as August and September of 1921, and increasing 
through the same months that brought the Comité Restaurador together and into action, 
gatherings throughout the country began to focus on future politics as well as demanding U.S. 
withdrawal.
29
  October constabulary intelligence reports even noticed partisan maneuvering in 
civil government, where civil officials sympathetic to Vásquez removed from office alcaldes 
who were not, replacing them with alcaldes who would be more sympathetic to the party.
30
     
 Those trying to maintain a unified resistance demonstrated rising concern about 
partisanship as withdrawal discussions began.  Led by Henríquez y Carvajal, they recognized the 
fragility of their movement and emphasized that the attention of the U.S. and international 
community was vital.  They pointed out that U.S. forces had justified intervention as 
"humanitarian" aid to a country that was historically fraught with political instability and civil 
disorder that led to violence, and insisted that growing partisanship, rather than solid national 
unity, might be used to prove the point and to justify present and future intervention.  
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Partisanship would kill nationalism and destroy the country.
31
  One anonymous author wrote that 
the resurgence of partisan interests that had sadly been resuscitated was breaking the pure 
patriotism of the resistance, an occurrence that "is only going to demonstrate to the eyes of the 
intervening power the continued existence of the consummate caudillos who brought our 
unfortunate Republic into the abyss from those mournful days of 1916."
32
  President Henríquez y 
Carvajal, fully aware of the growing breakdown in national unity in late 1921, believed that the 
successive proclamations and proposed plans for withdrawal from the military governor were 
issued intentionally to perpetuate partisanship and break unification.  Promising that he would 
not submit his name for any public office, so that his words could not be discredited as political 
maneuvering, he argued that the Harding Plan's proposed military missions were meant to set 
caudillismo against nationalism.  The latter, he held, was the only possible salvation; if the 
military governor succeeded in breaking it, the Dominican Republic would find itself in a 
situation like the one in Nicaragua.
33
 
 When U.S. representatives seemed willing to work toward eventual withdrawal, 
especially in late 1921 and early 1922, political leaders worked with the resistance while also 
approaching U.S. representatives to make clear their interest in negotiating toward a withdrawal 
acceptable to the Dominican people.  When withdrawal negotiations seemed more possible, the 
rift between Dominican groups widened as Henríquez y Carvajal had envisioned.  A definite 
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split formed in the early months of 1922.  On one side were the nationalists, led by Henríquez y 
Carvajal and composed of prominent intellectuals such as novelist Tulio Cestero, poet Américo 
Lugo, and journalist Fabio Fiallo.  They called for withdrawal pura y simple, unconditional and 
absolute, and many among them insisted on punishment for those who collaborated with the 
military government and constabulary.  The nationalists were ready to accept major change for 
modernization, but refused to do it by U.S. rules or under U.S. supervision.  On the other side 
were party leaders who split with Henríquez y Carvajal's nationalists.  These party leaders saw 
unconditional withdrawal as unrealistic, and hoped to take the reins of Dominican government 
upon an end to the occupation.  When party leaders began to communicate directly with U.S. 
representatives to bring about withdrawal negotiations, they insisted that the compromise be an 
agreement that would not be political suicide for them.  Mutual promises between party leaders 
and U.S. forces to keep the new constabulary apolitical, for example, made discussions possible. 
 Nationalists were concerned by rumors that political leaders were negotiating with U.S. 
forces.
34
  While both sides in the debate were united in their desire for withdrawal, the language 
of the two groups was divisive through January and February.  Nationalists reiterated the 
importance of not signing any agreement with the occupying forces.  The strongest legal claims 
against the occupation, and a major source of inspiration for resistance, had always been that no 
Dominican government official had ever signed an agreement to occupation.  Any agreement for 
withdrawal, unless it demanded unconditional withdrawal based on the illegality of the military 
government, could retroactively legitimate the occupation.  El Diario's 18 January editorial, for 
example, criticized the tendency of some Dominicans to advocate cooperation with occupation 
forces.  The author argued that U.S. enemies of Dominican sovereignty worked to effect the ruin 
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of nationalists and the country, to bankrupt the Dominican treasury, contracting loan after loan as 
a means of keeping the Dominican Republic under "an enormous weight of debt," and sought to 
impose a false independence under the conditions of a protectorate.  The Harding Plan, the 
author argued, would create a puppet government like the one that  "Dartiguenave, the celebrated 
Haitian traitor," consented to have.
35
  Henríquez y Carvajal, too, repeatedly drew attention to 
how compromise and agreements had led to the situations of occupation in Haiti and Nicaragua, 
and condemned Dominican cooperation with occupation forces: 
 Gentlemen, should we, at some unguarded moment, convert ourselves into a  
 Haiti or a Nicaragua, such a thing would not only be a shame but the height of  
 ignorance, as we would completely lose all the rights of a free government.   
 Our presidents would then be puppets like Dartiguenave.  This man has the  
 title of President, but is deprived of all rights.  If by chance he finds himself on  
 the streets late at night, he cannot enter his palace because martial law prohibits  
 it; that he is nothing else but a prisoner, incapable of doing right or  wrong.
36
 
 
Henríquez y Carvajal's speeches were well received by many throughout the country, and one 
Dominican proclaimed him the apostle, a man who would "give us a republic in which the 
president will have no need to obtain permission from a Yankee Sergeant, dressed in khaki, 
before entering his palace; a republic we want in our hearts, and as we dream of, rid us of those 
elder brothers, who have converted Santo Domingo into a gallows."
37
  
 With strong language that drew on Dominican patriotism, the nationalists were a 
powerful force for change in society, and by early 1922 their broad base of support seemed 
increasingly dangerous to moderates.  Already removed from leadership positions in the military, 
elite families sought to maintain some control and halt rapid change.  Old powerful elite families 
like the Ramírez in the Southwest, who had been strong allies to the 1921 resistance, began to 
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work with occupation forces.
38
   They could justify the cooperation as long as the apparent end 
was withdrawal of U.S. forces and return of local autonomy.  Nationalists' alliance with the 
peasantry, which empowered the lower classes and rural populations and gave force to their 
voices, must have also seemed threatening to the elite classes.  As 1922 dawned with rumors of 
secret negotiations and plans spreading throughout the country, nationalist calls for punishment 
of collaborators increased.  Some stated that a return of an unfavorable ruling by the U.S. Senate 
Inquiry might lead to a widespread armed uprising; others feared that the U.S. government might 
appoint a de facto Dominican government.
39
  Prominent nationalist Cibao lawyer Rafael Estrella 
Ureña--who would later be a pawn in Trujillo's rise to power--gave a speech in February, stating 
that it was the duty of every native government employee to resign as long as the military 
government was in place.  He argued that any employee failing to resign should be ostracized, 
his friends and acquaintances refraining from greeting him, native merchants refusing to sell him 
the necessities of life, and that even the air that he breathes should be denied to him.
40
  Calls to 
punishment for cooperation appeared more and more dangerous to those hoping to bring about 
an orderly end to the occupation.  They were also a clear threat to the military forces being 
trained to take over the constabulary.  Only a carefully constructed compromise agreement for 
withdrawal could calm fears and guarantee the possibility of order under the constabulary.  
Nationalists' fiery language therefore served to strengthen the U.S. forces' argument that 
withdrawal must be gradual.  Further, on the eve of withdrawal negotiations, the divisions arising 
from these arguments came to seem more frightening to many than the occupation itself.  Even 
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among those who stood firmly with the nationalists for unconditional withdrawal, some began to 
condemn calls to denationalize collaborators upon the return of sovereignty.
41
 
 Discussions were complicated by the nature of the military government itself.   In 
February, the State Department issued orders for Robison to reach a compromise.  He called a 
meeting of Dominican party leaders and other prominent citizens, including politically active 
lawyers and Archbishop Nouel, to bring about a negotiation acceptable to all parties.  
Unsurprisingly, the gathering reached no such agreement.  Robison was concerned primarily 
with military aspects of withdrawal, and insisted on continued U.S. officer-ship of the 
constabulary and the two-year prolongation of the marine presence, as well as the Dominican 
government's agreement to another large U.S. loan.  When agreement failed, he announced that 
the military government would continue until at least July of 1924.
42
  Horace Knowles, who had 
represented Dominicans during the Senate Inquiry, wrote to the State Department in February 
that he found it strange that Military Governor Robison and U.S. Minister Russell still failed to 
understand the wishes of the Dominican people.  The language in his letter was harsh, and he 
pointed out proofs that the "Military Occupation has been unjustified and that the administration 
of the Military Government has not only been deficient but in many cases shameful and 
ignominious."
43
  The publicity surrounding Knowles approach, and that of many nationalists and 
U.S. anti-imperialists, made acknowledgement of their arguments dangerous for the U.S. 
government and the Navy Department.  The need to withdraw without international 
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embarrassment, and to legitimate the U.S.-created military, weakened the direct effect of 
arguments such as that made by Knowles even while the publicity that he and others received 
made clear the urgency of a compromise withdrawal. 
 Discussions for withdrawal were also, of course, complicated by Dominican politics and 
the country's poor financial condition.  Despite their initial willingness to discuss a compromise 
withdrawal, party leaders could not agree to another U.S. loan, especially after they had taken 
part in centering so much resistance against the proposed loans of 1921.  U.S. government 
representatives realized the need to push a loan through unilaterally before Dominican politicians 
could negotiate any agreement.
44
  Before early negotiations for a bilateral withdrawal began, 
therefore, the State Department finally authorized the loan of $10 million in March.  The passage 
of the loan without the signature of any Dominican politicians furthered the breakdown of 
resistance on two major levels.  First, it opened the possibility of negotiation for compromise 
withdrawal, which deepened the split between nationalists and party leaders.  Second, the 
infusion of funds improved the economy.  After so many months of stalemate between military 
government and resistance through the continual decline of the economy, the country was in 
incredibly poor economic condition by March.  Farmers in the Cibao could not find markets for 
their crops or had to sell cacao at less than one third of value.  Many throughout the country had 
nothing to sell at all:  a growing drought in the Northwest killed livestock in such numbers that 
their carcasses could not be efficiently removed, and starvation spread through the area.
45
  After 
the drawn-out suffering of the past eighteen months, any solution that answered to immediate 
concerns such as hunger would appease much of the population.  Protests to the loan were loud 
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and immediate, but came from intellectuals, politicians, and many among the elite class.  Those 
concerned with immediate survival began to withdraw from political activity after their brief 
unity with the resistance movement.  Funds for the nationalist movement had declined, and 
attempts to rebuild nationalist finances failed in the poor economy, which gradually brought an 
end to the nationalist publicity campaign in the countryside.  When the U.S. loans returned the 
military government to normal functioning, resistance became much less attractive to the rural 
population through much of the country.
46
   
 As a respected Dominican lawyer who also had important connections in the sugar 
industry, Francisco J. Peynado was a logical choice of representatives for negotiation.  He 
traveled to the United States at the end of March to begin working toward signing a compromise 
withdrawal, thereby circumventing both the reticent military government--which rejected 
negotiations on the grounds that they would weaken the constabulary and training--and the 
adamant nationalists with their calls for unconditional withdrawal.
47
  Peynado worked closely 
with Secretary of State Hughes, State Department representatives, Horace Knowles, and Sumner 
Welles.  Welles, a diplomat with extensive Caribbean experience, mediated between the U.S. 
State Department and Navy Department.  During these secret discussions, various political 
groups in the Dominican Republic began to come forward to try to reach compromise with the 
military government.  Rumors, controversy, and reaction flourished in the coming months while 
party leaders--primary among them the heads of the two largest political parties, Horacio 
Vásquez and Federico Velásquez--stepped forward to negotiate, and gradually quit going to the 
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meetings of the Comité Restaurador.
48
  Military Governor Robison and the upper-class 
Dominicans of Santo Domingo's local government began discussions, in which Robison 
proposed a national convention of ayuntamientos.  His proposal at this convention would not 
only elevate the power of the ayuntamientos beyond any power they constitutionally held, but 
would include their approval of a municipal military commission, a withdrawal plan that would 
leave marine military missions in provincial capitals during a gradual evacuation.  
 Welles's later history of the Dominican Republic demonstrates the continued lack of 
understanding among U.S. forces and representatives about the problems of such military 
missions.  Welles stated that of all objections to the Harding Plan, the strongest was against 
military missions after withdrawal which, he argued, "might have seemed the least offensive of 
the proposals made."
49
  The reasons for such a strong reaction against the idea were not kept 
secret; reactions were widely publicized in the press.  They were not, as Welles conjectured, 
unfounded fears that the military missions were a trick to continue occupation or control the 
post-occupation military through the U.S. government.
50
  Certainly, both of those were possible--
and legitimate--concerns.  But the problem with military missions also related to much more 
fundamental issues.  Missions would form another step in the long-term military government 
effort to rearrange power relations, this time through the elevation of power of the 
ayuntamientos, and they might call into question the very possibility of a democratic future by 
destroying the centralization of government that had occurred during previous years.
51
  They 
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would also, many argued, invest too much political power in the military, giving U.S. officers 
powers of representation that they possessed neither institutionally nor popularly, "entitling them 
to form economic and political plans which will never receive the sanction of a people who are 
instinctively defending themselves from the snares which the invader and his emissaries are 
continually preparing for the purpose of carrying out their plans of economic slavery and 
political influence."
52
  Another article, calling for ayuntamientos to abstain from meeting with 
the military governor, called the idea "sinful."
53
  The possibility of an agreement between the 
military governor and the ayuntamientos that left military missions in the country actually 
seemed poised to become the spark that could reignite a unified nationalist resistance.
54
   
 Other protests grew concerning foreigners' salaries paid by the Dominican Republic 
under the military government.  Dominican money paid out by the military government to 
foreigners was already as controversial as occupation loans contracted without Dominican 
representation.  Before the approval of the March loan, when the military government suggested 
the reduction of the salaries of public employees by 50%, many reacted against the suggestion as 
long as the Dominican treasury paid foreigners without Dominican representation.  This 
controversy had broad potential implications for the constabulary due to its leadership by foreign 
officers, who were being paid from the Dominican treasury through the occupation government 
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despite wide disdain for the constabulary.  One editorial decried the plan to economize by 
reducing the salaries of public officials as long as the Dominican treasury was paying the high 
salaries of so many U.S. officials: "we are in favor of a reduction of the very large salaries paid 
to foreign employees whose services are by all means unnecessary.  This is the measure with 
which the Military Government ought to initiate its programs of economy."
55
  The proposal for a 
reduction in civil officials' salaries, though eventually unnecessary due to the loan, was still fresh 
in the public mind when the military government authorized increased expenditures in the 
constabulary through March and April which seemed to demonstrate continued prioritization of 
military power over that of civil government. 
 March, after all, marked the beginning of the constabulary's third training period.  Events 
of February and March only intensified the urgency of rushing forces through training.  At the 
same time, the breakdown of the efficient and unified resistance, which had so roundly attacked 
the constabulary in 1921, allowed occupation forces to place a greater focus on the military.  The 
third training period was therefore accomplished quickly, and included added programs to 
increase constabulary morale.  Constabulary headquarters made use of the new infusion of 
money to authorize contests with cash prizes for neatness.
56
  They also reinstated constabulary 
funding for inter-company baseball programs, rewarding the most efficient officers and enlisted 
men with positions on the teams.
57
  Over the months, they added a rifle team competition, 
creating further incentive for improvement and impetus for improved morale.  Each constabulary 
department was to provide its top twelve baseball players and its top twelve riflemen for the 
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competitions.
58
  Through the first half of 1922, before the official announcement of the Hughes-
Peynado withdrawal plan in June, the military focused on morale boosters, incentives, and 
establishing programs to improve training and military transportation and communications.  
While headquarters funneled a large number of troops through the third training--which would 
last two months and complete basic training for all companies--they used others to rapidly 
complete infrastructural projects while the marines were still in their posts throughout the 
country and able to help police populations.  Once out of training, constabulary units were sent to 
patrol areas experiencing armed resistance, and also finished the extensive mapping and 
surveying programs that marines had begun in mid- to late-1921.
59
 
 As withdrawal discussions became more public and more urgent, constabulary 
headquarters opened wide a recruitment campaign for early May, as soon as all present members 
were through the basic training.  They advertised $17 per month pay, incentives and training, and 
the fact that the constabulary was to be the force for control in society after withdrawal of U.S. 
forces.  With a goal of 1,200 enlisted men and 90 officers by the end of the year, they planned to 
outfit and give preliminary instruction to all new recruits at department headquarters, move them 
through training centers as possible, and then detach men to company posts.
60
  Marines 
acknowledged, however, that even the constabulary's planned numbers were small.  As Miller 
pointed out, they knew that the total planned, 1,290 out of a population of nearly one million, 
was not enough to protect the sovereignty of the country when marines were gone.  Furthermore, 
actual numbers were only half of the authorized strength [see Table 7.1].  He later wrote that, 
during 1922 withdrawal negotiations, the constabulary was "in no position to recruit and train 
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some ninety officers and twelve hundred men, let alone garrison the Dominican Republic, a 
mission which formerly called for the services of twenty-five hundred marines," and even that 
the "facilities and means to attain a high state of military efficiency were not to be found within 
the Policia" as late as June of 1922.
61
  How the constabulary would deal with these problems was 
unclear through 1922.  Economic problems continued, and increases in authorized strength were 
unlikely due to budgeting, lack of interest among the population, and even a possible reaction to 
any increased prioritization on the military.  Constabulary officers raised pay and offered 
monetary incentives where possible, but cut some corners when it came to cost.  For example, all 
constabulary officers were to provide their own Colt automatic caliber 45 model 1911 and their 
own ammo from May 1922, thus insisting on better weaponry, but having officers pay for it--a 
practice that reinforced the tendency to elevate the middle class in the officer ranks.
62
    
 Marine and Dominican constabulary officers worked to build up the constabulary's 
image.  The majority of the civilian population still refused to take any actions that               
demonstrated approval of the military government or constabulary.  For example, in an attempt 
to stimulate positive press the military government planned a grand ceremony to celebrate the 
opening of the long-awaited and delayed Carretera Duarte, named after the Dominican 
independence hero Juan Pablo Duarte.  The road would effectively connect all traffic, civilian as 
well as military, between north and south.  U.S. officials invited Dominican civil officials to take 
part in the celebration of 29 April and 6 May.
63
  Nationalists refused to attend the celebration, 
and insisted that Dominicans abstain from attending.
64
  One author stated in his call to abstention 
that if Dominicans attended the celebration it would validate occupying forces' actions, proving 
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that those who received only a "filthy and loathsome pittance there, thrown at them like scraps of 
food at hungry dogs can celebrate as a sign of their gratitude with the kicks and blows received 
from that ruffian."
65
  Photos of the highway's opening show very few in attendance, mostly navy 
engineers, marines, and constabulary.   
 In spite of difficulties with press, the constabulary recruitment campaign in May was so 
successful that by the end of the month some companies were full, to the point that in the regions 
with strong military traditions such as Santo Domingo and Monte Cristi men were turned away 
because companies had met recruitment quotas.
66
  One of the reasons was that, as peasants 
throughout the country withdrew from politics, constabulary recruiters worked specifically to 
draw in rural enlistees.
67
  They also accepted men with backgrounds in the pre-occupation 
military and the early years of the constabulary.
68
  By May of 1922, each company had a radio 
outfit and access to plane service if needed, maps or partial maps for most areas of the country 
made with the help of marines and the Public Works Office, all of which improved the 
constabulary companies' military efficiency, cooperation and mobility.  Marines and 
constabulary in separate posts used mounted squads and telephone to communicate regularly 
about intelligence and troops movements--a drastic change from previous years.
69
 By August, the 
constabulary topped out at just over nine hundred men, its highest number since early 1920.   
 The changes made the constabulary a new force in many ways, which probably did more 
for the recruitment campaign than any propaganda.  The military government was gradually 
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answering to all of the major complaints against the constabulary.  The strongest complaints had 
been lack of training or Dominican officers, the presence of so many foreigners in the force, and 
lack of control.
70
  Systematically, with withdrawal imminent, they worked on each of these 
problems through early 1922.  Lee also gave the constabulary more prestige by diminishing the 
police role, and envisioning it as a military.  Before 1922, the constabulary's units had been set in 
provincial capitals with most detachments along the border.  "Its principal duties were those of a 
constabulary force," defined as "the suppression of outlawry and other crimes, apprehension of 
fugitives. . . prevention of smuggling, execution of court orders, care and custody of civil 
prisoners," general law enforcement, and working with marines in areas experiencing guerrilla 
warfare.
71
  The vision of constabulary commandant George Thorpe for the force in mid-1920 
also made clear his disregard for the resilience of Dominican military tradition.  This was a 
common mistake among occupying forces, who argued that the country had no real military 
before the occupation and therefore did not account for the power of military tradition.  Thorpe's 
earlier vision for the constabulary emphasized that that "This organization being new, has no 
traditions to live up to, but has maintained a very satisfactory espre-de-corps [sic.] . . . In a few 
years this organization will have behind it a tradition to live up to and will be classed with the 
highly efficient Canadian Mounted Police, Pennsylvania State Constabulary and the Capetown 
Mounted Police."
72
  While it still held the name Policía Nacional Dominicana, 1922 changes 
decided once and for all the long-standing argument between marines and navy administrators 
over whether it would serve as a military or a police force.  The force gradually turned policing 
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duties over to municipal police, and the constabulary's military functions became the center of 
planning and training.  Concerns about potential "disorder" with upcoming marine withdrawal 
forced marine constabulary officers to see the situation as Pendleton had argued in 1916 and 
1917:  unless marines planned to return to the country regularly, and unless Dominicans wanted 
to accept a very limited sovereignty, a small police force was not sufficient.   
 Marines, constabulary, elites, and party leaders also all knew that before the U.S. forces 
could withdraw, guerrilla warfare had to be ended.  New doors for cooperation were opened with 
discussions of withdrawal between Dominicans and the U.S. government, while the population's 
support for guerrillas was withdrawn.
73
  In the Interior, North, and Northwest, guerrilla 
movements had never been consistent or unified, and fell apart as the year progressed.  Their 
network was largely broken by decreasing cooperation from other population sectors, and their 
loss of aid and coordination were mirrored by a growth in coordination among the constabulary.  
Without sufficient support, they were powerless in many areas as constabulary and marines used 
improved roads, communications, and maps to capture and imprison many armed resisters during 
early 1922.
74
  While many fugitives continued to hide in the mountainous interior for years, 
refusing to surrender to the constabulary for crimes committed during the occupation, one group 
of disillusioned rebels justified raids on the local civilian population to sustain their effort.  This 
group, led by fugitive Perun de la Cruz, functioned around Santiago through 1922 and until after 
the final withdrawal of U.S. forces. Perun refused to surrender to U.S.-officered forces, and 
carefully worked to negotiate his surrender in 1923 through Dominican officers, when U.S. 
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forces still held strong influence.
75
  The group's machete-armed raids on Dominican populations 
actually seem to have provided local Dominican-officered constabulary units with legitimacy.  In 
the largest clash between his group and the constabulary, in August of 1922, a 10th Company 
constabulary unit under Lt. Pedro Nicasio captured nine of Perun's men, including Benjamin 
Almanzar, who had been one of Perun's top leaders.
76
   
 Olivorio's movement in the southwestern provinces had long presented a unique 
challenge to the constabulary, the military government, and local inhabitants.  While the armed 
forces under Olivorio and his men accepted fugitives from around the country, and were 
connected with fugitive networks in the central mountains, they remained largely isolated and 
separate from the other insurrections.  A messianic movement made up of lower- and middle-
class segments of the population, they struggled against rapid modernization and became a target 
for occupying forces.  Olivorio and his followers enjoyed the support of the area's most 
prominent elite family through the occupation and, although many merchants saw the movement 
as backward and threatening, most refused to cooperate with the constabulary persecution of 
Olivoristas.  The changing atmosphere of early 1922, however, led to the forceful realignment of 
political relationships.  Many "progressives" among the middle and elite classes who had 
withheld direct support from the occupation stood to benefit a great deal with the modernization 
of Barahona and Azua Provinces.  The growing public split among nationalists--who they had 
stridently supported in 1921--allowed for a changed approach toward the occupation forces and 
constabulary.  Maneuvering to erase the "backwardness" of such traditions as Olivorismo, and to 
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gain positions of power in the new, post-occupation power structure, prominent Dominicans in 
the area began to provide intelligence to constabulary forces.   
 The constabulary hunt for Olivorio and his followers thus took a major turn in May of 
1922.  With intelligence that had been impossible to gain in earlier years, when even anti-
Olivorio elites were loath to work with the constabulary, a detachment of the 7th Company from 
Santo Domingo began a new campaign.  With new marksmanship and basic training, and led by 
Marine constabulary officer Captain George Morse and Dominican Lieutenant Luna of the first 
Haina-trained group, they quickly came upon an unsuspecting camp of Olivorio's followers, 
opened fire from the bushes and shot indiscriminately.  They killed twenty-two, including eight 
women and two small children.
77
  Fellowes bragged about the efficiency of training 
demonstrated by this encounter, saying that with training the constabulary was finally able to 
make "a big impression on the natives."
78
  The constabulary troops' improved training no doubt 
had a strong effect on their growing successes against Olivorio's followers, but the most 
significant change in those months was the local population's support.  In previous years, 
residents not only refused to give constabulary information, but developed systems to alert the 
fugitives' of the constabulary's movements. 
 The devastation of the eastern provinces after so many years of extensive guerrilla 
warfare made the situation there much more complicated.  Calder provides an extensive and 
accurate portrayal of the ending of guerrilla resistance in these eastern provinces in 1922, 
arguing that the real end to guerrilla warfare in the East was primarily due to highly publicized 
withdrawal negotiations and the flexibility of new military government leaders and a Dominican 
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population seeking to re-examine the war.
79
  Ducoudray uses the words of surrendering guerrillas 
to make a similar argument: the final negotiation for withdrawal was what led to the heavy 
surrenders of guerrillas in mid-1922.  With the occupation ending, a continuance of guerrilla 
warfare would mean Dominican attacks against Dominicans, rather than outside invaders.
80
  As 
elsewhere in the country, the pending reality of withdrawal had a much stronger effect on the 
ability of the marines and constabulary than did any training, improved supplies, or new 
approaches.  That Dominicans could no longer justify carrying out civil war in those provinces is 
highly significant in itself, and demonstrates real change brought about by the occupation.  
Caudillos and others had fought in the East in pre-occupation years in reaction to rapid 
modernization and capitalization of sugar, and in defense of traditional autonomy.  Alliances to 
end resistance, of which these guerrilla fighters had become a strong part, paved the way for a 
change in their political ideology so that an end to occupation also meant an end their call to war.  
Guerrilla warfare that was begun to defend local autonomy and keep out a centralized state and 
military apparatus was brought to a conclusion even while the modernization of sugar and the 
destruction of traditional communal land tenure advanced more rapidly than ever. 
 The state of the eastern provinces after protracted guerrilla warfare was as much 
responsible for this change as was ideology.  As Calder describes, the eastern provinces had 
settled for years into a stalemate that devastated economy and a way of life, with populations 
abandoning their land and entire towns to avoid the conflict, and the production of sugar in 
severe decline.  "The east," he states, "became the barracks, and an occasional battleground, for 
an army of occupation." The two provinces held twenty marine posts concentrated mostly around 
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the sugar centrales, and marines there had long settled into a policy of containment.
81
  The 
warfare was not only between guerrillas and an army of occupation, however.  Dominicans in the 
constabulary played a large role in patrols.  In Calder's research and other studies, the 
constabulary is left almost completely out of the discussion.  The constabulary was, in fact, less 
progressive or powerful in the East due to the high concentration of marines in the region and the 
fear of giving leadership positions to Dominicans there.  Furthermore, the majority of 
constabulary records are missing from the archives for this period, during which later-dictator 
Rafael Trujillo was a subordinate officer in the area.
82
  For the question of how the constabulary 
became a tenable force in those provinces, however, it is necessary to understand their role in the 
guerrilla warfare and its ending.  The conspicuous lack of involvement of the constabulary in 
new eastern initiatives in 1922 actually helped its later reputation.  Marine withdrawal would 
allow new eastern Dominican constabulary officers to distance themselves from many of the 
most recent atrocities and devastation of the East, while their presence in patrols still made them 
a visible force.
83
  During all new initiatives, the constabulary played a central role in the 
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coordination of measures to seek out guerrilla leaders, though its officers were less directly 
involved in the special initiatives of early 1922 that so angered the population.  Importantly, the 
constabulary formed much of the manpower in beginnings of infrastructural development there 
during 1922.  Whereas previous years had been notable for the lack of cooperation or 
communication between marine and constabulary posts, early 1922 brought serious efforts at 
coordination that included (for the first time) important members of the region's population.  
With real discussions for withdrawal, many sugar central managers gradually began to give 
prompt reports to Marines, who then communicated them to constabulary officers. 
 As elsewhere, major changes in the conduct of the resistance and guerrilla warfare did 
not take place directly after the entry of Harry Lee as commander of the marine brigade and P.M. 
Rixey as constabulary commandant in June of 1921.  Rather, Dominican initiatives forced 
changed approaches.  In the East, the diplomatic initiative of the most powerful guerrilla leader 
of the time, Ramón Natera, brought about forced change.  Natera, in September of 1921, 
kidnapped Thomas J. Steele, the manager of La Angelina sugar estate, for having refused to 
concede to Natera's demands for five thousand dollars in support.  Natera did not harm Steele, 
but released him two days later on the condition that he and other estate leaders bring his 
message to U.S. officials.  Under threat of death if he did not transmit the message, Steele joined 
with the managers of the six most important U.S.-owned sugar centrales to send the message to 
Washington.  Natera's message explained the patriotic goal of his movement, demanding only 
that the United States withdraw its forces and return Dominican sovereignty.
84
  The immediate 
response among the military leaders of the marines and constabulary in the East was to step up 
the hunt for Natera.  Marine units were reformed to be sure that each unit working the East 
included a marine who could speak Spanish--still a rarity in those provinces.   
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 From the end of 1921 through March of 1922, marines and constabulary initiated a new 
campaign that included drastically improved radio communications and the use of air service for 
"strictly confidential or secret messages" so as to counteract guerrilla interceptions.
85
  They also 
worked to improve roads in the East, using prisoners to cut paths where no roads existed.
86
  With 
a growing number of informants and a system to protect their identity, marines carried out 
intrusive sweeps of the population aimed at identifying those who were serving as part-time 
guerrillas or collaborating.  This "systematic drive" was initiated specifically to end guerrilla 
warfare with an eye toward upcoming withdrawal.  In nine coordinated, large-scale cordon 
operations, using air-dropped communications, military units "rounded up" all adult males and 
brought them to a "central collecting point" at which "the detained men would be lined up under 
bright lights while native informers, hidden in tents or behind canvas screens, identified known 
bandits."  Over 600 men were arrested through this cordoning system before March of 1922, 
when Brigade commander Lee called a stop to the system because the system and subsequent 
trials of men caused an uproar among the population.  Meanwhile, it had also failed to capture 
guerrilla leaders of importance, and it even led to an increase in guerrilla activity.
87
    
 The solutions that the marines and constabulary finally put in place in March and April of 
1922 came from Dominican suggestions, another indicator of the opening of cooperation.  The 
first was a general amnesty to those who surrendered, a recognition that "bandits" were 
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revolutionaries with political grievances.
88
  The second, long suggested by Dominicans and 
clearly related to the tradition of local power from the sugar centrales, was the organization of 
civil home guard units from the plantations.  Lee's authorization of these civil home guards, 
under the leadership of marines, was a drastic shift from previous attempts to keep all power and 
arms out of the hands of Dominicans.  The units were, in fact, assembled and funded by 
plantation administrators and local civil authorities, each consisting of about fifteen Dominicans 
deemed reliable by local authorities.
89
  It was, in other words, a Dominican solution suggested 
and implemented largely by Dominican planners.  At first, the authorization for the training and 
use of civil home guards was rare, but once it was accepted, civil authorities pushed for more of 
them as the solution to problems in the eastern provinces.
90
  By April, they were in wide use.
91
  
Throughout May, Dominican elites and civil authorities in the region negotiated the surrender of 
the most prominent guerrilla leaders--with whom, of course, they had regular contact.
92
  Upon 
the surrender of major guerrilla leaders who had been cooperating with civil officials and elites, 
marines and sugar plantation administrators found it easier to recruit for civil home guard units 
to bring in those guerrillas who had not surrendered.  Ramón Natera surrendered on 4 May 
through negotiation.  Ramón Batía surrendered four days later.  Cabo Gil, the last of the 
strongest guerrilla leaders in the East, surrendered on 20 May, leading the marines to report an 
"end to organized banditry."  Those who surrendered were placed on immediate parole.
93
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 With the surrender of the guerrilla leaders by late May, marines laid claim to the 
successes, and began to train and increase civil home guards.  They organized the forces from the 
largest sugar plantations, detailing to each a marine officer, a marine non-com officer, and a 
marine private.  With Lee's approval, marines in the East began to institutionalize the approach 
in June.  Lee called for a "perfection" of the organization of civil guards, forming four standard 
patrol units at major guerrilla areas of operation, and rifle training for those Dominicans working 
with the marines.
94
  Lee even called for improvement of the civil guards' efficiency "against the 
time of any coming emergency that may require their service."
95
  The system, and the 
authorization of further use of such civil guards, encouraged the primacy of military force as an 
answer to problems, and brought a new set of problems.  Some marines recognized that the 
practice, despite leading to some important arrests, was problematic.  It contradicted the 
occupation aim of divorcing civil authorities and politicians from military connections.
96
  The 
ad-hoc nature of this program on the eve of departure, and the problems stemming from it, are 
clear in an example given by one marine:  A prominent Dominican in Seibo Province, authorized 
to gather fifty followers for patrols to find a certain "bandit leader," did irreparable damage, his 
group an embarrassment to the military government that made enemies among all classes of 
Dominicans; the leader abused the position and committed “depredations” against peaceful 
inhabitants, a story reported to be characterized by “pillage and lawlessness.”97  The marine 
response in such situations was to immediately disband and disarm the groups and place the 
leaders under surveillance, but as in other initiatives, the damage was done. 
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 The use of civil home guards drew on long Dominican traditions of local autonomy and 
the rights of landowners to hire their own militias.  Yet it was also an institutionalized 
perpetuation of the civil war in those provinces, one in which marines helped to re-empower 
landowners and their employees.  Landowners and marines specifically sought out Dominicans 
for these units who had personal grudges against certain guerrilla leaders.  Marines also 
understood how the changing atmosphere surrounding withdrawal negotiations made this 
technique possible.  As one marine argued, the system would probably not have worked in the 
“early days of the Occupation in the face of the general opposition to the Military Government 
and the mistrust of its purposes.”98  Dominicans in the area had long sought to take control of the 
situation, eventually doing so by dealing with guerrilla leaders behind the backs of military 
government officials and the constabulary.  Occupying forces failed to see the potency of the 
culture and tradition behind this system, and seem to have believed that they could erase it 
through organization.
99
  Civil home guard units were accepted mainly due to their Dominican-
ness and their empowerment of Dominicans to control the situation in the east, which many had 
argued for years that they should have the right to do.  The major differences that led to a change 
in marine attitudes in 1922 were not an improved trust for the population, but a combination of 
the provinces' devastation and the urgency of finding a solution, an opening for compromise and 
conciliation similar to those occurring throughout the country in the same months. 
 The most important facet of these new approaches for the constabulary was that its 
members were kept out of the population sweeps and civil home guards.  While they shared 
intelligence and helped coordinate information, those actions were not public, and the 
constabulary was therefore not visible in these more controversial aspects of ending guerrilla 
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warfare.  Rather, in maintaining regular patrols while the sugar companies and marines 
conducted a series of experimental techniques to try to end conflict, the constabulary was 
actively distanced from the controversy.  The new techniques, the tangled negotiations, and the 
constabulary's role all had major long-term implications for the shifting balance of powers in the 
region.  The events of 1922 in the eastern provinces had the effect of encouraging, rather than 
discouraging, regional response to regional problems; the centralized military in the form of the 
constabulary remained largely outside of the specific regional fixes--ironically, with the intended 
goal of keeping its members out of any direct connection to political questions.  Such distancing, 
while it had the end result of encouraging some aspects of regionalism, was instrumental in the 
gradual shifting of blame over time from the constabulary and its forces to other groups. 
 
The Hughes-Peynado Plan and the Constabulary 
 
 The effects of the new loan, widespread concerns about growing political divisions, and 
concerted efforts to publicize the illegality of the occupation were all eclipsed in June by the 
sudden announcement of the Hughes-Peynado Plan.  By the time the Dominican population 
learned the details of the plan, a tentative agreement had already been signed--though as yet it 
had no legal basis.
100
  The plan called for the establishment of a provisional government 
composed of and selected by representatives of the Dominican people, to plan for a new 
constitutional government "without the intervention of the authorities of the United States."  The 
military government was to cede all administrative power over the country upon installation of 
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the provisional government, with a Dominican provisional president chosen by party 
representatives.  The new provisional president would appoint Dominicans to all Cabinet 
positions, and all marine forces would be concentrated in three centers, ceding the military power 
throughout the country to the constabulary.  The provisional government would then designate 
Dominicans to negotiate a new convention that would recognize all legal changes made and 
loans contracted under the occupying government.  Elections for the constitutional government 
would not be held until the National Congress approved the agreement's clauses.
101
 
 The agreement contained important clauses intended to mollify both sides of any 
potential debate, but that also had significant implications for the withdrawal period.  First, it 
contained careful language with regard to Dominican nationalist sentiment, including the words 
"the Dominican Republic has always maintained its right to self-government, the disoccupation 
of its territory and the integrity of its sovereignty and independence," and " although the 
Dominican Republic has never delegated authority to any foreign power to legislate for it...."  
The  power of these words was dulled, however, by the act of signing itself.  The Hughes-
Peynado Agreement sparked immediate controversy and reinvigorated anti-election groups 
rejecting compromise, leading to a more decisive split between nationalists and the party leaders, 
who now spoke for the growing number of moderates across the country.
102
  Reactions to the 
withdrawal plan were mixed, and many chided Peynado and party leaders for what they saw as 
traitorous action.  In an important way, however, the damage was already done.  To this point, 
one of the strongest and most inspiring facts uniting the resistance had been that--unlike in Haiti-
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-no Dominican had signed a formal agreement allowing the United States to occupy their country 
or otherwise intervene militarily. This had been the strongest measure of the occupation's 
illegality, and had been one of the essential elements of the nationalists' campaign.  Dominican 
party leaders' signing of the agreement robbed Dominicans of that source of inspiration.   
 The extensive campaigning and growing split between nationalists and intellectuals on 
one side and party leaders and moderates on the other had the effect of lessening hatred of the 
constabulary over time.  While the economy continued to present difficulties in the countryside, 
pockets of armed resisters could no longer find support; party leaders moved through the country 
giving speeches in favor of the withdrawal plan and in preparation for eventual elections; and 
rumors spread widely about the future of the military.
103
  By July, with preparations to install a 
provisional government in October, party leaders denounced any who spoke out against the plan.  
Many politicians, while supporting the plan and the upcoming provisional government, also still 
used political opponents' past or current collaboration with the U.S. forces to discredit them.
104
  
Many in the rising middle class cooperated once the withdrawal was signed, taking advantage of 
the atmosphere surrounding withdrawal to build up their businesses, seek U.S. investment, and 
maneuver politically within their provinces.  Regional elites, too, were able to take advantage of 
the atmosphere to work to maintain their regional power while dealing cautiously with 
Dominican politicians.
105
  All of these groups thus became increasingly interested in a 
maintenance of political order that would please the United States enough to allow successful 
withdrawal.  They still widely disdained the constabulary and saw it as a source of trouble, but 
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fewer sought to sabotage it openly as they had the previous year.
106
  Those signing and 
supporting the agreement gave every indication that they believed they could control the military 
with U.S. and politicians' assurances of keeping it apolitical.  Months of political maneuvering 
and widening cooperation therefore gradually allied many groups loosely with the constabulary. 
 Nationalists, meanwhile, shifted blame gradually from the occupiers and constabulary to 
those who had signed the withdrawal agreement.  That such a number of well-known and 
politically active gente de primera had put their signatures to an agreement with the U.S. 
government brought a new focus for blame.  They held that party leaders had compromised the 
position of a resistance movement on the verge of achieving unconditional withdrawal.  The 
argument they made is summarized well in the words of poet and nationalist Américo Lugo.  
Lugo argued that the withdrawal plan doomed the country, that when wide public opinion 
rejected North American propositions, "when our miniscule state shone with brilliant light over 
the heart of America like a beautiful diamond; when all that remained, to triumph, was slightly 
more passive resistance," some Dominicans "renounced at that moment their ancestry and their 
history" by accepting a compromise withdrawal plan.  The result, he argued in 1932, was that "as 
always, the Dominican people continued blindly following their resuscitated caudillos."  Lugo 
set himself as an enemy of the withdrawal agreement in 1922 with the foundation of a new 
newspaper that denounced U.S. destruction of Dominican institutions, including the Dominican 
military.
107
  Instead of taking advantage of the moment for change and improvement, the 
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nationalists argued, self-serving Dominicans had doomed the country to repeat its past 
perpetually.   
 Party leaders had the backing of U.S. forces and the constabulary, which worked together 
to discredit nationalist publications against the withdrawal plan.  While nationalist leader 
Henríquez y Carvajal reiterated his promise not to become involved with any political party, or 
to seek any political office, constabulary reports repeatedly refer to the nationalists as the 
"Carvajal Party."
108
  Welles toured the country as Harding's representative in the months after the 
plan's announcement, and reported “overwhelming” approval for the program, with exceptions 
only in Santo Domingo and Santiago, which he attributed to being a case of “extreme agitators” 
with no following.
109
  In reality, the opposition did lack wide popular support in many regions.  
While they enjoyed support in much of the Cibao, the idea of prolonging occupation to demand 
unconditional withdrawal  was upheld by a shrinking group of intellectuals and elites in areas 
such as Santo Domingo.  Intelligence and operational reports in the constabulary demonstrate 
that wide segments of the population in some regions were, in fact, very strongly against the plan 
in the months between its signing and the installation of the provisional government.  Santiago's 
constabulary company reported sabotage and "quite a lot of feeling shown against" Peynado, 
Vásquez and Velásquez upon their return to the country.  "Unknown parties" burned two bridges 
between Santiago and Monte Cristi in July to keep them from reaching the city to speak about 
the plan.  When the constabulary repaired the bridges and the three arrived and spoke, 
constabulary members attending reported that "their speeches were not received very 
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enthusiastically and the audience was very divided.  The representatives did not appear to be in 
popular favor."
110
    
 Disapproval was not limited to the major cities.  In Monte Cristi, for example, the 
majority demonstrated open resistance to the plan, and held that party leaders signing of the plan 
without the consent of the republic made them traitors; some argued that Peynado, Vásquez and 
Velásquez should be hung, and constabulary reports record rumored attempts to assassinate 
Peynado.
111
  Juntas Nacionalistas continued to hold meetings denouncing the plan, and 
outspoken labor leaders such as Eugenio Kunhardt spoke to wide audiences against it.  
Nationalist groups had the open support of prominent members of society in Puerto Plata, which 
had long allied itself with the Cibaeño elite, including the provincial governor, clergy, and author 
of the Dominican national anthem Dr. Emilio Prud'homme.  Despite the strong, public, and 
geographically diverse reaction against the plan by such prominent members of society, 
constabulary reports disparage the nationalists and minimize their importance, saying that they 
"have more or less a following among a certain class of people.  The better class of people and 
the majority of the politicians are in favor of the plan as they understand it."
112
 
 The wording of the Hughes-Peynado Plan also had repercussions on military 
development through the withdrawal period, in large part because it connected the signatures of 
prominent Dominicans to an agreement that guaranteed the continuation of the U.S.-created 
constabulary as the sole and permanent armed forces of the country.
113
  The plan was a strong 
compromise not only for Dominicans, but also for U.S. forces, especially in that it called for 
complete Dominican officer-ship of the constabulary immediately upon the installation of the 
                                                 
110
 10th Co. Report, 20 July, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN. 
111
 6th Co. Report, 20 July, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN. 
112
 8th Co. Report, 10 August, 1922, File 8, "Correspondencia, 1922," Ejército Nacional Dep. 08, I.T. 007898, AGN. 
113
 Bosch, Trujillo, 128. 
394 
 
provisional government.  It left the military government in place as a separate entity, however, 
stipulating that Marines would remain in the country, under severe restrictions of movement, 
until mid-1924 to train the military.  When military leaders protested that they could not promise 
military efficiency without keeping the constabulary under U.S. officers, the compromise 
solution stipulated that the force would be broken into two parts at the installation of the 
provisional government: field forces and training-center forces.  Marines were to hand over 
officer-ship of all constabulary field units to Dominican officers, and marine constabulary 
officers would hold authority only in training centers.  The military government would be placed 
under the control of Brigadier General Harry Lee with the sole function of overseeing training-
center forces.  While in training, Dominicans would be under the command of U.S. officers until 
marine withdrawal.  The plan contained another important clause to appease U.S. military forces 
fearing a breakdown of order with the plan's implementation:  While it adhered to the wide 
Dominican refusal to accept military missions, it specified that  the constabulary would maintain 
peace and order "except in the case of serious disturbances which, in the opinion of the 
Provisional Government and of the Military Government, cannot be suppressed by the 
Dominican national police [constabulary]."
114
  The events of the following year would show that 
the open threat that of intervention by U.S. forces inherent in this clause was to have a strong, 
indirect effect on how gradual withdrawal played out. 
 The negotiations for a final signing of the Hughes-Peynado Plan were contentious 
through the year.  Robison continued to see the entire set of negotiations as a purely military 
matter.
115
  He and the U.S. Navy Department insisted on military changes to the plan, including a 
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longer U.S. control of the constabulary and marine supervision of presidential elections, but 
Dominican representatives rejected such changes.  Robison's demands were shut down by the 
State Department, represented by Sumner Welles. Nationalists continued to refuse participation 
in the discussions, publishing texts against the plan throughout the year.  Welles wrote, in fact, 
that the extent of contention from different groups was so strong that the plan of evacuation 
could not have been carried out at all without the close cooperation of the Dominican 
Commission of Representatives.
116
  Between the 30 June announcement and the September 
ratification, nationalist continued to publish strong opposition, but lacked funding.  Too many of 
the elites and merchants who had provided nationalist funds were now cooperating with the U.S. 
forces, the constabulary, and Dominican parties to effect withdrawal.  Disillusioned with the 
inability to gather sufficient funds and with the growing divisions in the resistance movement, 
nationalist spokesman Henríquez y Carvajal withdrew back to Cuba and gradually became silent, 
many of his supporters coming to accept the agreement by September and October.
117
  With 
some opposition to continued U.S. controls over Dominican economic affairs, especially 
regarding repayment of loans, the final version of the Hughes-Peynado agreement was accepted 
and signed by the Dominican Commission of Representatives in September of 1922.   
 By the terms of the Hughes-Peynado Plan, Dominicans were soon to be given control of 
all internal and military affairs with the exception of the marine training schools.  Further, 
remaining U.S. marine and navy officers were to wear Dominican uniforms, but be paid strictly 
by the U.S. government and not the Dominican one—a drastic and mostly effective change made 
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to decrease resistance to their continued presence.
118
  The official end of the military occupation 
would not come until July of 1924.  Until then, marines in the training schools would try to carry 
out all officer training that was to have been done over the previous years.
119
  While negotiations 
between the U.S. government and the Dominican Commission of Representatives were under 
way, the military government had just under four months in power, at the end of which all 
constabulary field forces would be under the exclusive command of Dominican officers.  Around 
plans for the concentration of marines and the transfer of constabulary leadership, marine 
Brigade commander Lee worked to clearly define goals for the constabulary.  June to October of 
1922 was a period of balancing Dominican opinion and interests with U.S. interests.  For 
constabulary planners, it was a time for training and improving the constabulary while trying to 
guarantee its disassociation with politics.  Under increasingly Dominican leadership, companies 
also focused on building military infrastructure begun in previous years. 
 By the time the Hughes-Peynado Plan was announced, marine constabulary officers had 
carried out a massive basic training program and laid plans for successive waves of more 
advanced training, had begun a broad recruitment campaign, and had improved the equipment 
and coordination of constabulary units.  Throughout the year, constabulary units took the place 
of marines in posts throughout the country.  Thus the opening of withdrawal also allowed for 
growing cooperation between armed forces and other segments of society.  The earliest posts 
from which marines withdrew were in those areas that civil officials first showed strong 
cooperation. Marines pulled first out of small posts in the interior provinces of Espaillat and La 
Vega, then out of the southwestern provinces of Azua and Barahona, and then out of Monte 
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Cristi and Samaná.
120
  The next major goal for the constabulary was institutional reform and 
development.  To facilitate this, the military government approved an amendment of the 
constabulary's annual budget from $500,000 to $666,664.
121
  In company posts, constabulary 
officers--some marine and some Dominican--even appointed private tutors to enlisted men.
122
  
They increased emphasis on recruitment and incentive programs.
123
  While marine planners had 
initially hoped to bring the next group of officer recruits for a year of training, and use them 
during the last half of that year to help train enlisted men, they revised the arrangement when the 
withdrawal plan was put into motion, shortening the proposed training.
124
  The late 1922 training 
of a new officer group managed to bring sixty officers from "the older and more experience non-
commissioned officers" of the constabulary and even from civil positions throughout the country.  
About half of them graduated as second lieutenants after having passed a course identical to the 
one given to the first officer trainees in late 1921.
125
  Those from the first group were promoted 
to the ranks of first lieutenant and captain as this second group was reattached to posts.   
 Lee also initiated major changes to the constabulary as an institution, with the goal of 
increasing the visible legitimacy of the constabulary as a Dominican government entity with a 
carefully defined role in society.  The months before the provisional government's installation 
were crucial because changes made during that time might be included in withdrawal promises to 
maintain the laws put into place under the military government.  Executive Order 800 of 
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September 1922 revised the 1917 laws and those military institutional laws that had been passed 
under previous governments--specifically the organizational laws of 1876, 1885, 1910, and 1912, 
setting future enlistment at two years and specifying that enlistment was to be voluntary.  Lee 
also set up the plan to eventually allow enlargement of the force to 3,000 men.  Executive Order 
800 emphasized the imperative of demonstrating the absolutely apolitical nature of the 
constabulary.  During withdrawal implementation, no other gradual effort was more instrumental 
in making the constabulary acceptable than its active distancing from political connections or 
concerns.  This executive orders therefore worked to guarantee a change considered vital by both 
Dominican Commission representatives and U.S. forces.  Article four of Order 800 provided that 
the top officers of the constabulary were to be appointed or promoted by the executive power 
with the advice and consultation of the Secretary of State of the Interior and Police.
126
  The irony 
of this clause and other September and October orders aimed to depoliticize the force, of course, 
is that they would in the end be the tools by which later dictator Trujillo would come to power.
127
   
 As the prospect of imminent withdrawal affected constabulary plans through 1922, 
officers knew that one of the most urgent facets of constabulary design would be this attempt to 
guarantee an apolitical military.
128
  From the announcement of the Hughes-Peynado plan to the 
installation of the provisional government, efforts to depoliticize the actions of constabulary 
members and officers increased.  Political questions surrounding withdrawal and the post-
occupation balance of power became increasingly contentious through the year, and political 
meetings in different regions sometimes resulted in violence.  When political divisions increased 
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in September and October as groups vied for power, the constabulary even reported machete 
battles between some political opponents.
129
  Rather than despair about disorder, constabulary 
leaders took advantage of this potentially damaging situation by promoting the apolitical reaction 
of the constabulary during such events and insisting that it not interfere with any public or 
political meetings unless they resulted in public "disorder."  Inspector Watson went as far as to 
order no constabulary interference in any political meetings "other than to see that feeling does 
not run so high that there will be danger of any armed resistance."
130
  Instead of breaking up 
meetings, as the constabulary had done in past years, they simply required twelve-hour advance 
notice of meetings and watched for signs of violence.
131
 
 Marines were convinced that the primary source of problems in previous Dominican 
governments had been a disorganized military that involved itself in politics; they believed that 
they could fix the problem by training Dominican soldiers to embrace the military mission of 
upholding stability while staying removed from politics.  During the withdrawal period, they 
made this argument in internal constabulary and navy-marine communications, but also to the 
public, seeking to quell concerns about the post-occupation military and to build popular 
legitimacy for the force.  One marine stated that "no other feature of the disoccupation plan 
received greater consideration, or was more discussed, or the subject of more varied and 
diversified opinion" than the constabulary.  His estimation of both the problems at hand and the 
highest priorities of constabulary-building in those months summarizes the primary marine 
argument:  pre-occupation military forces had led to armed revolutions, and that the destiny of 
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the country now depended on the creation of a permanent, efficient military force.  Without such 
a force, he argued, it was unlikely that any constitutional government could remain in power.
132
  
Arguments focusing on the need for a strong, apolitical military were a central point of 
agreement between U.S. forces and political leaders.
133
  In an effort to guarantee this promise, 
the U.S. government left a large force of marines in the country during the intermediate period of 
withdrawal, from 1922 to 1924.  Throughout this period, despite their concentration, the number 
of marines remained steady until after the installation of the constitutional government in 1924 
[see Table 7.2].  The continued presence of marines, and the strong U.S. interest in the new 
government's success, all indicated that there would be external checks on the political power of 
the new military.  The provision that left higher promotions in the executive's control also 
provided what seemed a strong internal check on its power, thus making the agreement 
acceptable to those Dominicans involved in the negotiations.  While actively distancing 
constabulary units from any political tensions was meant to improve civil relations and make the 
withdrawal functional, it also had the gradual effect of removing the constabulary from political 
and nationalist discussions in which it had so highly figured throughout the occupation.   
 As one of the commanding marine officers in the training centers, Fellowes emphasized 
the need for a more powerful military before the withdrawal of U.S. forces, arguing that the pre-
occupation armed force "was undermined by politics," and therefore weak and inefficient.
134
  He 
combined a racist approach--in which he held that Dominican society suffered from a lack of 
responsibility and initiative and a "moral sense"--with the belief that military training made 
Dominicans "as a whole courageous and dependable."
135
  The byproduct of this approach, of 
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course, was the sentiment that Dominicans who did not have military training were inferior, less 
qualified to keep order or maintain a government.  In a sense, the thrust of his approach left the 
unstated theory that a force undermined by politics would be worse than politics undermined by 
an armed force.  Over-correcting for what he saw as the political problem, Fellowes and other 
marines made evident their distrust of the political element.  The constabulary and its 
intelligence office thus closely monitored the actions of politicians and nationalists, and whether 
members of the pre-occupation military attempted to involve themselves in politics.
136
  
Meanwhile, they strengthened the military and put faith in the ability of a well-organized and 
trained military to maintain order.  Miller estimated in 1935 that "any failure of the organization, 
should it occur, will not come from within, but will emanate from sources over which the Policia 
will have no control."
137
  As this statement was made five years after the constabulary's 
commandant had carried out a coups d'état and placed himself in power as a military dictator, 
Miller clearly did not see a military take-over of politics as a failure of the organization. 
 While trying to demonstrate an apolitical character, the constabulary also had to deal with 
the populace and civil government during the adjusting of laws that accompanied withdrawal.  
The atmosphere of compromise and the effective breaking of unified nationalism made it  
possible to push laws through before the provisional government took office.  For example, 
despite efforts in previous years, it was not until August of 1922 that an executive order made 
guardas campestre directly responsible to the constabulary.
138
  Before withdrawal was in motion, 
traditions of local autonomy and land-owners' sovereignty had frustrated attempts to do so.  In 
August, the constabulary also began to work toward greatly reducing civilian arms permits that 
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had been granted through the course of the occupation.  The order's language demonstrates the 
prioritization in the new balance of power: merchants, high-ranking government officials, and 
the military were to have control of firearms in the country.  As the constabulary took control of 
localities from marines, arms permits were reevaluated, with the goal of leaving arms only in the 
hands of municipal police, civil officials who needed them, banks, "reputable business houses," 
and "reputable American [sic.] engaged in business or in the service of the government."
139
   
 High-ranking constabulary officers and marines struggled with the fact that Dominicans 
saw even the occupation marine forces as a more legitimate force than the constabulary.  On the 
eve of the provisional government's installation, Dominicans were still petitioning U.S. forces 
rather than the constabulary for help.
140
  Attempts to get Dominicans to turn instead to the 
constabulary revealed the urgent need during the period to stress reforms that improved the 
reputation and general legitimacy of the constabulary.  The progressive "Dominicanization" of 
the constabulary through the year, allowing trained constabulary units to take over interior 
garrisons, answered to the strongest charges against the foreign-officered military.
141
  It did not, 
however, drastically improve the institution's reputation.  Only time could have that effect, and 
the gradual withdrawal plan guaranteed such time for the constabulary during which marines 
would be present in large numbers in case of any civil disorder that threatened the constabulary's 
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power.  Before the beginning of the provisional government, marine constabulary officers took 
one last action designed to help Dominicans accept the constabulary as something other than a 
foreign imposition: Rather than appointing the institution's new commandant from among the 
ranks, they recruited the highly respected pre-occupation Colonel Buenaventura Cabral.
142
  
Cabral, military officer and gente de primera from one of the old elite families, was the grandson 
of former president Buenaventura Báez.  Many nationalists could also accept him due to his 
progressive record as governor during the occupation.
143
  As Vega points out, Cabral's 
appointment as commandant allowed the constabulary to claim some legitimacy and continuity 
from the pre-occupation past.
144
  His appointment probably had a large impact on nationalists' 
gradual acceptance of the constabulary.  To justify this appointment after claiming that the 1922 
development of the constabulary had been "the greatest advance in the military government in 
several years," Marines reported home that the man they had made commandant was "a 
Dominican who has risen up through the ranks" under U.S. training.
145
 
 
Conclusion 
 The constabulary was not turned into a legitimate national armed force simply upon the 
withdrawal, and nor was it a rapid transition during the occupation.  Instead, the constabulary's 
growing success began by default with the breakdown of the nationalist camp, improved little by 
little over time as changes were made, and was still an issue of contention upon marine 
withdrawal from the country.  The breakdown of unified resistance over the course of many 
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months was  a product of various factors and of the conduct of the many national and 
international actors involved in the occupation.  The compromise agreement to end the 
occupation, which itself could only come together through gradual alliances and negotiations, 
bred further alliances and negotiations.  The sheer length of time during which these negotiations 
played out under the protection of U.S. marines allowed many other processes to evolve.  It was 
only through these sets of processes and compromises that the constabulary came to be seen as 
legitimate, and to gain the guarantee of future U.S. military and Dominican political support in 
its rise to power.  The gradualness of the compromise withdrawal allowed the newly infused U.S. 
loans to begin an improvement of the Dominican economy over time, so that the economy did 
not appear to improve at the moment that U.S. forces left the country.  Two years of incremental 
withdrawal allowed the marines to improve their standing among the population and, more 
importantly, to build their relations with and empower the Dominican constabulary.  It allowed 
time for the guerrilla movements to fizzle and be largely forgotten, and for the less accurate 
versions of the guerrilla warfare to become common-place.  It gave marines time to train their 
recruits, and the latitude to allow the appointment of a pre-occupation and largely nationalist 
Dominican officer over the constabulary with the knowledge that his command would be limited, 
and that their trainees would be in the highest officer positions and ready to take control of the 
constabulary. 
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 Table 7.1. Total Actual Constabulary Strengths, 1916-1924.
146
  
     Jul, 1917      575 
     Oct, 1917      600 
     Aug, 1919   1,186 
     Feb, 1921      346 
     Aug, 1922      902 
     Nov, 1922   1,201 
     Dec, 1922   1,213  
     Jan 1923   1,227 
     Feb 1923   1,268 
     Mar 1923   1,183    
     May 1923   1,252  
     Jul 1923   1,249 
     Sep 1923   1,270 
     Nov 1923   1,270 
     Jan 1924   1,266    
     Mar 1924   1,272 
     May 1924   1,243 
     Jun 1924   1,243 
 
 Table 7.2 Total Marine strength in the Dominican Republic 1920-1924.
147
 
    Mar 1920  1,838 
    Nov 1920  2,267 
    Jul 1921  2,323 
    Oct 1921  2,811 
    Jan 1922  2,576 
    Nov 1922  2,189 
    Feb 1923  2,305 
    May 1923  1,946 
    Mar 1924  2,076 
    Jul 1924     890 
    Sep 1924     133 
    Oct 1924          0
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(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962), 12; Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 
1917, 840; Special Reports, "Development of Policia Nacional," from Commanding General, 2nd Brigade to Major 
General Commandant, USMC, 13 September, 1922 and 11 December, 1922, Geographical Files "Dom Rep. Santo 
Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico; Fuller and Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican Republic, 47, 88. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Constabulary under Dominican Government: Legitimacy, Revision, and the Tools of 
Dictatorship 
 
 
 
 With the combination of new alliances of convenience that came together to end the U.S. 
occupation of the Dominican Republic in the years 1921-1924 came compromise groups 
necessary to make withdrawal possible.  As a side product, the same set of relationships 
combined with Dominican leadership to make the constabulary a mildly acceptable institution in 
society.  Those Dominicans who had the ears of U.S. authorities--meaning those party leaders 
and constabulary officers who cooperated with the efforts of Commissioner Sumner Welles and 
Minister Russell--were clearly to have a say in the construction of a post-occupation society.  As 
this fact gradually became more clear through 1922, those who cooperated increased, and those 
who dissented were silenced or discredited as possible--a trend that continued to build 
momentum through the withdrawal period, and after withdrawal, would be carried with the 
growing power of the constabulary in the Trujillo Era.  For those who increasingly cooperated in 
withdrawal efforts, or even those who sought to be uninvolved and stay outside of controversy, 
cooperation with the withdrawal effort became synonymous with at least surface cooperation 
with the constabulary.  During the final years of the occupation and withdrawal, a growing 
number of elites, merchants, and politicians fell in line with the withdrawal plan.  In so doing, 
with the long-extant potential threat of marine intervention (a potential both real and imagined), 
they allowed the constabulary to become what U.S. forces insisted it must become: a permanent 
institution serving as guarantor of basic political order. 
407 
 
 Many Dominicans were reassured by promises that the force would remain out of 
politics, especially over the course of a seventeen-month withdrawal period that included 
improved training, professionalization, and Dominicanization of the force and its leadership.  
The process of building and maintaining alliances for acceptable withdrawal, and thus against 
those who demanded unconditional withdrawal, strengthened through 1922, but solidified with 
the final signing of the Hughes-Peynado Plan on 23 September and the 21 October installation of 
the long-awaited Dominican provisional government.  While the constabulary continued to focus 
its resources and men on training and on presenting itself as apolitical, the Dominican 
Commission of Representatives settled upon Juan Bautista Vicini Burgos as provisional 
president, and set to work on campaigning for the March, 1924 elections for a constitutional 
president.  Politicians and U.S. forces alike agreed that Vicini Burgos was a good choice, as he 
was a Dominican elite with no previous political affiliation, a wealthy man from a traditional 
family that owned extensive sugar estates.
1
  The actual moment of appointment of a Dominican 
president had as much effect on compromise and legitimizing of the new authority as did the 
appointment of Cabral at the head of the constabulary.  For example, most of the guerrillas 
remaining in the field turned themselves in as soon as his government was in place.
2
  Vicini 
Burgos worked closely with marine and navy officers who had staffed cabinet positions, and 
worked well with Sumner Welles, facilitating the delicate task of switching governments. 
 Despite the optimism that accompanied the installation of a Dominican government, the 
military question continued to be contentious.  While the new provisional government got its 
bearings, marine and constabulary officers struggled with the inherently difficult task of splitting 
the force into two parts with two different commands.  The return of sovereignty and the prestige 
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of a military now run by a respected Dominican officer of the elite class improved enlisted 
constabulary morale and aided recruitment, and it was with the installation of Cabral and the 
Vicini Burgos government that the constabulary finally reached full recruitment numbers and 
maintained them [See Table 7.1].  The installation of an actual Dominican government, as much 
as negotiations and discussions for withdrawal, was a clear step toward making the constabulary 
seem legitimate to those it might recruit.  Those who joined during the withdrawal period and 
provisional government could not be accused of working for the foreign occupying government, 
nor for accepting the command of foreign officers.  Further, once again apparently under the 
command of one of the old elites, the constabulary seemed a well-armed and organized 
Dominican military, a potential source of pride.
3
   
 Those who had been accused of working under the Americans, or of being 
"Americanized," were also safely in the highest officer ranks below commandant before 
withdrawal, responsible for command of department headquarters, company posts, and the 
Intelligence Office.  At the time of the provisional government's installation, all of the 
Dominican officers who had passed the first officer training in Haina the year before were in 
high leadership positions of the constabulary, most in administrative officer ranks.  Four of them, 
including Rafael Trujillo, commanded companies.
4
 Widely respected Dominican nationalists like 
Américo Lugo published denunciations of the constabulary and its claim to continuity with the 
past, insisting that the old military and all it represented had been destroyed by occupation.  
Constabulary officers' morale was high, however.  They had gained rapid training and 
promotions, and now looked to a near future with wide possible increases in rank and prestige.  
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4
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Earlier threats to overthrow the constabulary or its leadership vanished as the political questions 
of election--or rejection of elections--took precedence, and constabulary officers' ranks were safe 
due to both the tacit support of so many groups in society and the long-continuing presence of 
marines in the country after the installation of Vicini Burgos's government. 
 Many groups of men enlisting before and during 1921, who had worked together through 
and after the constabulary cutbacks early in that year,  had developed some esprit-de-corps.  This 
was perhaps strengthened by remaining together through the trial of remaining together against 
the extensive resistance against the constabulary.  Indeed, one of the goals of passing entire 
companies through training together was to build camaraderie.  Marine commanding officers in 
the training centers were re-indoctrinated to adopt a different, and less blatantly racist, attitude 
when working with Dominicans, and were reminded that they were in the country as friends and 
not as an occupying or oppressive force.
5
  The praise that they lavished on those moving through 
the training centers reminded those men that they had remained loyal to their force and stuck 
together while so much of the population had been against them.  
 The sustained presence of marines until late 1924 was not the only continuing U.S. 
influence.  As many anti-compromise nationalists would point out, the influence of the wishes of 
U.S. diplomats and military forces played a strong role in the political and institutional 
development of the withdrawal period despite the agreement's promise that they would not.  The 
gradualness and extent of compromise involved in making the withdrawal work allowed 
continuous U.S. interference outside the military training centers.  From Vicini Burgos's close 
working relationship with Sumner Welles, and the latter's work with U.S. Minister Russell, came 
continued gradual compromise.  The provisional president's exact responsibility for allowing 
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Welles an active role is unclear.  Regardless of whether Vicini Burgos requested intervention in 
elections plans or was pressured to allow it, Welles remained in the Dominican Republic and 
played a decisive role in moderating between the desires of Dominicans and occupation forces.
6
  
He traveled the country at length, authorized as a minister and representative of the U.S. 
president, speaking to Dominicans and working to balance the desires of U.S. business and 
military forces with what he thought might be acceptable among the Dominican population.
7
  His 
main goal, in addition to making the withdrawal work as smoothly as possible, was to foster 
more friendly relations between Dominicans and the U.S. businesses and government.  His 
presence and authority in the construction of a withdrawal and a new electoral process were 
decisive, but also problematic.  Welles had no official authority within the Dominican Republic, 
in that his active role was not authorized in the Hughes-Peynado Plan.  It was, therefore, a highly 
influential but unofficial position, validated only by the lack of protest from the president.  As 
one Dominican scholar describes, Welles's plan left the electoral review process in the hands of a 
small number of Dominicans who would cooperate with his vision.
8
  
 In addition to making the gradual withdrawal process function more smoothly while 
guaranteeing the strength of U.S. interests, this contentious (and unofficial) cooperation between 
Welles and the provisional government was the center of a wider atmosphere of unofficial U.S. 
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8
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involvement in the shaping of the post-occupation Dominican Republic.  This was evident, too, 
in marines' continued advising of military forces outside the training centers, in the East, through 
communications, and with the continued presence of marines in administrative constabulary 
posts.
9
  Advising marines argued that the transfer of power had to be gradual rather than hasty.  
"The provisional government has a great deal to do in order to establish a constitutional 
government which will be insured of stability and success.  The provisional government is 
therefore more or less on trial in the eyes of the Dominican people and in the eyes of the world.  
The Policia Nacional Dominicana [constabulary] is on trial in maintaining peace and order in the 
Republic.  That military body is a product of our own labors, and its success will be our 
success."
10
  Marines in the country therefore felt they had a strong stake in the success of the 
military.  In part, they were able to convey their aims during training, as the training program 
was still the top military priority for the provisional government.  The constabulary 
correspondence of 1923 demonstrates a heavy emphasis on transporting men for training and 
returning them to their companies, and on how the movement was facilitated by the improved 
infrastructure, the lack of guerrilla warfare, and the population's general focus on the political 
scenes and upcoming final withdrawal of U.S. troops.
11
  Marines estimated that the end result 
was a resounding success.  Fellowes argued in 1923 that during the years of training and 
withdrawal the force had "progressed from a stagnant body of underfed, badly equipped" force to 
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an efficient, well-trained, and well-armed force of  1,200 men with sufficient vehicles and the 
ability to move across the country from Santo Domingo to Santiago in four hours time.
12
 
 While moving companies through training centers in 1923, however, the "well-trained 
and loyal" force that Fellowes describes continued to be plagued by discipline problems and an 
overall lack of respect for civilians.  Throughout the year, reports by civilians demonstrate that 
many constabulary members continued to abuse their power, and that civilians continued to be 
afraid to report incidents.  The attacks on civilians included physical attacks on literate and 
middle class civilians, and on women, as demonstrated by the case of Señora Petronila 
Almanzar, who was physically attacked at a dance in February by constabulary Sergeant Mario 
Santos of the 3rd Company.
13
  Constabulary members also continued to be accused of extorting 
money from the populace.  In one case in August, a sixty-year-old farmer who said he had been 
afraid to report the incident for a month came forth to report that a constabulary unit had brought 
a gun into his home while searching it for arms, and then demanded $35 to pay the fine.
14
  
Similar incidents were common, and many accusations came with multiple witnesses.
15
  In turn, 
many Dominicans continued to lack respect for the force.  Company reports for the year include, 
for example, frequent problems with civil authorities refusing to cooperate with constabulary 
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efforts.
16
  Further, when civil authorities did make arrests, constabulary officers sometimes 
overturned the arrests without explanation.
17
 
 With many men removed from companies for training or in transit at any given time 
throughout the year, and around the continuance of such accusations, Cabral struggled to 
improve military-civil relations.  He reprimanded the force for outrages against Dominican 
civilians and U.S. engineers working for the Office of Public Works.  His memoranda reminded 
commanding officers of the need to demonstrate Dominican ability to self-govern, a problem 
brought to his attention by the central government.  He stated that disparaging conduct and 
disrespectful actions against Public Works officials, which sometimes included violent 
demonstrations by constabulary officers, would "be seen as anti-patriotic and a demonstration of 
ineptitude."
18
  Due to the especially sensitive nature of such interactions with a department that 
included U.S. engineers, he also had the constabulary officers in charge of the regional 
departments specifically designate appropriate officers for interaction with the Office of Public 
Works.
19
  As part of the focus on military-civil relations and withdrawal, the constabulary also 
brought all officers through an instructional program in Santo Domingo for marine-aided training 
in civil-military relations and the portrayal of the occupation status to Dominican.
20
 
 The constabulary also struggled with continued difficulties of insubordination within the 
chain of command.  The attitudes of subordinates in constabulary posts was as chaotic after the 
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installation of the provisional government as it was the year before.  Investigations of blatant 
insubordination were still common in 1922-1924.  With the gradual removal of marines from 
constabulary posts, Dominican constabulary officers had great difficulty getting men to obey 
orders.  In Samaná, for example, a long investigation was begun due to the typical 
insubordination of a private.  Sergeant Marcelino of the 13th Company ordered to Private Juan 
González to clean the barracks, at which the latter promptly returned to his house to drink coffee 
instead.  When Marcelino and another private went to disarm and arrest González for 
insubordination, the latter ran for the barracks, took up a rifle, and pointed it at his superior 
officer.  A gun-fight was stopped only by the intervention of a citizen.  After the incident, 
Marcelino snuck up on González to arrest him, and hit him on the back, leading to a fist fight 
between the two.  When two privates broke up the fight and took González to the prison, the 
jailor refused to confine him, and he returned back outside and began to throw rocks at Sergeant 
Marcelino.
21
  Such incidents continued to be common over the course of the next year, 
insubordination common in constabulary barracks.
22
   
 By the middle of 1923, in addition to general insubordination, a clear division had formed 
within the ranks between those who had served in the constabulary longer and under U.S. 
occupation, and those who joined in 1922.  Many of the new constabulary officers of the second 
officer-training program, second lieutenants and some first lieutenants, found themselves quickly 
at odds with the earlier officers who had worked under marines before the withdrawal period had 
begun.  One reason was that newer officers tended to try to apply traditional regional fixes to 
problems in ways that the 1921 period had discouraged.  Along the border with Haiti, especially, 
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constabulary men who knew the area continued to authorize now illegal cultural festivals and 
celebrations, whether for monetary gain or the smoothing over of tensions with the local 
populations.
23
  More sinister to the success of the constabulary's chain of command, however, 
was a growing power struggle in which the newer officers and enlisted men exchanged warnings 
about their superiors.  The communications that survive in the record demonstrate a strong lack 
of trust, and accuse the higher ranked officers of being untrustworthy or poor friends and of 
committing illegal acts.  Second Lieutenant Manuel M. Santamaría reported in an investigation 
that first lieutenant Bruno Zapata had told him that Captain Rafael Trujillo was a poor friend, 
and that Santamaría and others should not trust him.
24
  One private reported to Colonel García 
denouncing acts of violence, drunkenness, and immorality by Captain José Navarro, who 
insulted and outraged "humble people."  The private demonstrated his concern not only that these 
actions disgraced the name of the constabulary, but also a concern for his own position because 
he believed that Navarro had a personal grudge against him.
25
  Such internal power struggles and 
concerns were widespread through 1923, and tapered off in 1924; many of those making the 
complaints chose not to re-enlist in 1924, while officers such as Trujillo and Navarro continued 
to gain rank--the first constabulary officers being the clear winner in the power struggle by the 
time of U.S. troops withdrawal in mid-1924.  Those constabulary officers who had worked 
longest with U.S. officers, many since before 1920, were clearly in positions of relative power--
and not only by rank.  As Vega points out, even the aging Cabral was appointed as a temporary 
figurehead, to be replaced upon his retirement by one of the U.S.-trained officers.  The officer 
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under him who had the most friends among marines was guaranteed promotion beyond his ranks 
when César Lora, the Director of the Department of the North, was killed in early 1924.  Vicini 
Burgos, pliant as always, was persuaded to elevate Trujillo over his superiors to replace Lora.
26
  
 Through compromise and gradual development, the withdrawal period generally allowed 
a great deal of U.S. intervention, and the constabulary was shaped as the marines who had 
created it hoped it would be.  During the withdrawal period, many processes were at work that 
affected the balance of power in the post-occupation military.  While various actors worked to 
make the constabulary respectable and apolitical, many forces were also elevating it to increased 
authority, and political currents were already running through it.  Its officers struggled for power 
while marines supported the careers of some over others.  Many within the ranks saw the 
constabulary as a continuance of the traditional Dominican military path to social power, but it 
came with significant changes, from the lack of involvement by the gente de primera and the 
support of marines--both characteristics that made many Dominicans not take the constabulary 
seriously.  The gente de primera and political party leaders did not take it seriously as an 
authority, but neither did they seem to perceive it as a serious threat to their position.  Party 
leaders maneuvered for power in the country's wide political division during a long and 
contentious withdrawal process, but worked against the counter currents of the demands and 
concerns of marines and the military government, nationalist literature, and a pliant central 
provisional government with a president who was uninterested in politics.  Welles got statements 
from both candidates guaranteeing that the military would be kept out of politics.
27
  Party leader 
Horacio Vásquez already had plans, however, for how to use the constabulary to his benefit in 
the event of his election.    
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 When national presidential elections were held on 15 March, 1924, they occurred with a 
lack of disturbance and a high voter turnout.
28
  As per Welles's intervention, marines remained in 
their barracks during the voting, quelling Dominican fears of further intervention.  The clear and 
unsurprising winner in the election was General Horacio Vásquez of the Partido Nacional, who 
had formed an alliance with the Partido Progresista that made Federico Velásquez his vice 
president.
29
  Vásquez, an old general and caudillo from the pre-occupation era, was a man who 
used traditional methods of building alliances, and whose traditional background seemed 
comfortably Dominican.  His traditional military background probably played an important role 
in the success of his presidential campaign.
30
  Marines, for their part, seemed confident that the 
constabulary would be able to restrict his power.  Despite his use of the infrastructural change 
and new physical unity of the country during the nationalist campaign and then his presidential 
campaign, Vásquez did not understand the extent of change that had occurred and how it would 
affect his presidency.  This played well into the immediate desires of U.S. forces, who had hoped 
to set changes in motion that would be continued by the new constitutional government.  
Vásquez took office on 12 July, 1924, and the marines ended their direct involvement in training 
and withdrew from the country.  Yet many scholars have called the post-occupation government, 
at least to some extent, "merely an extension of the U.S. occupation," so completely did it follow 
the programs put in place under the occupation.
31
  For his part, Vásquez was glad to continue the 
programs that improved the country's infrastructure, and oversaw a government with wide 
respect for civil liberties and a broadly involved electorate.   
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 Vásquez knew from experience with the nationalist movement that Dominicans would 
not accept a continuation of the marine training mission, and turned down the request when U.S. 
officers proposed it.
32
  He also knew from experience that the best way to assure his 
government's stability was to promote the power of the military and befriend its officers, and 
made a strong point of offering the highest constabulary ranks to those officers he thought would 
be most loyal.  Already, in 1924, he planned to push Cabral into retirement and elevate either 
Jesús García or Rafael Trujillo.  His Secretary of Interior and Police, Angel Morales, was a long-
time Horacista who had also been Minister to Washington.  Morales was quick to see to the 
promotion of Trujillo by helping to push Cabral into retirement.
33
  The power of the executive to 
handle promotions in the military, of course, gave Vásquez the power to choose for the 
commandant's replacement the officer he believed most loyal to him.  The ambitious Trujillo 
made himself that man.  Through 1924 and 1925, many noticed that the constabulary was 
already becoming politicized. U.S. Minister Russell stated in mid-1925 that "politics is fast 
destroying the efficiency of the Dominican National Police," and pointed to several "purely 
political" personnel decisions--especially the forcing out of Cabral and the promotion of pro-
Vásquez officers Simón Díaz and Rafael Trujillo.
34
  The process begun with the withdrawal 
agreement by which party leaders gradually became allied with the constabulary ironically had 
the effect of guaranteeing the constabulary's involvement in politics after the removal of U.S. 
forces.  In other words, the process by which Trujillo and Vásquez worked together to politicize 
the constabulary was unintentionally built into the gradual withdrawal compromise in 1922-
1924. 
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 Another gradual process at work during the withdrawal period, which contributed to the 
symbiotic relationship of military and politics by gradually helping to build the legitimacy of the 
constabulary over time, was the revision of important aspects of the occupation's history.  The 
sources of revision were multiple, sometimes accidental, and emanated from various sources, 
many of whose motivations for revision had no direct relation to the constabulary.  The process 
had begun, of course, with the occupation forces' discrediting of guerrilla fighters and their 
downplaying or ignoring of any patriotic or nationalist aspects within the guerrilla movements.  
Their effort was unintentionally aided by the refusal of nationalists to support the armed 
resistance openly.  The publicity strategy of even the most unified nationalist campaign in 1921 
had sought international legitimacy through demonstrating the more "civilized" use of passive 
resistance, leading some of its members to support guerrilla movements only secretly.  Similarly, 
as the nationalist strategy emphasized the desire and capacity for self-rule, they drew attention to 
complaints against marines and foreigners while often de-emphasizing complaints against 
Dominicans--even those in the constabulary.   
 The two-pronged process of silencing many aspects of the constabulary-guerrilla warfare 
multiplied in force with compromise for withdrawal.  By 1922, it quickly became clear that the 
withdrawal set in motion would not occur without the constabulary, and of course would not 
occur with any continuation or justification of armed resistance.  In this sense, nationalist 
opponents of compromise withdrawal were right in their argument that the compromise 
vindicated some aspects of the hated occupation.  As even the most respected guerrilla leaders 
surrendered and were placed on parole and monitored by extensive constabulary intelligence, 
their presence and power in society passed into historical silence.  Already, with surrenders in 
May of 1922, newspapers were beginning to discredit the guerrillas and their movements.  
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Newspaper stories began to repeat the marine characterization of the "bandits" who had caused 
such great destruction in the eastern countryside.
35
  Marines described the guerrillas as "armed 
groups who preyed upon the Dominican people and lived in the countryside.  Some of these 
styled themselves as patriots or revolutionists opposed to the American occupation.  Whatever 
their status, they were preying upon the Dominican people. . . Our forces have kept them on the 
run and made life pretty uncomfortable for them, until finally, the remaining few decided that 
banditry was not such a great life after all and surrendered themselves and their arms."
36
  This 
description, widely repeated, made no mention of the pre-occupation guerrilla warfare in the 
East.  It made no mention of the significant involvement of the constabulary, or the Guardia 
Republicana, sugar estates, or civilian home guards.  In fact, the description left all Dominicans 
out of the equation except for those who had fought the armed resistance, making it easy to write 
off the entire affair as a product of occupation, the fault only of occupation and disorderly 
forces.
37
  Over the course of the constabulary's rise to power through the 1920s, backed by this 
disregard for the complexity of the history of guerrilla warfare, the previous guerrilla fighters 
were physically silenced, as well.  Ramón Natera, for example, was killed in 1923 in an 
altercation with a guarda campestre sent by an official of the local constabulary post. Reports 
were based solely on the testimony of the officials.
38
  Those guerrilla leaders who did survive the 
1920s remained under close watch of the constabulary intelligence office, and were killed in the 
early 1930s after Rafael Trujillo rose to the top ranks of the constabulary and overthrew the 
constitutional government.    
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 During the withdrawal period and thereafter, marines had a strong interest in providing an 
over-simplified portrait of the guerrillas mainly due to the need to improve marine morale and 
cover the blemish that the occupation had caused on the marines reputation.  Both of these needs 
had defined marine descriptions in earlier years, and both increased and were expanded to 
descriptions of the general occupation in the 1922-1924 period.  The maintenance of around 
2,000 marines in three concentrated areas in Santo Domingo, Santiago, and Puerto Plata also 
made the situation very difficult for the men.  Their activities and authority were greatly 
restricted.  While the forces maintained provost courts for incidents involving direct assaults on 
U.S. military personnel or thefts of property, even then their jurisdiction excluded clergy or 
employees of the Dominican government.  They "could not carry arms outside their assembly 
areas and could travel on liberty only in the vicinity of their camps."  They required permission 
from Dominican authorities to move troops.
39
  In addition to the restrictions and new and very 
limited official role, they were still widely hated.  Through 1922 as they concentrated their 
forces, and even for months after the installation of the provisional government, marines were 
regularly attacked and insulted by Dominicans.
40
   
 In their frustration, marines also initiated attacks on Dominicans, beginning fist fights in 
restaurants in the cities, for example.
41
  Such tension was a great source of concern to the 
commanding marines.  At the same time that withdrawal made urgent the centralization, growth, 
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and improvement of the constabulary and its training, the marines and navy--embattled 
internationally and at home from the publicity the occupation and brutalities received in 1920-
1921--were on a reputation-saving mission during these years.  Marines faced scrutiny from the 
United States as well as the Dominican population, and the gradual character of withdrawal 
allowed them to focus on this problem and on legitimating their primary claim that they had 
restored order.  The gradual withdrawal gave marine commanders time to work on improving 
both morale and the marines' reputation, which they did through a partial revision of history.  
First, they explained away the "slow start" of the constabulary experiment.  Fellowes blamed it 
on "the lack of funds, the absence of practical ideas, the usual procrastination found in tropical 
countries and the effort required to get any idea past the barrier of limited native intelligence."
42
   
 Rufus Lane and Harry Lee also wrote detailed speech for re-indoctrination of marines 
that sought to address the problems by accentuating the importance of improved relations with 
Dominicans during the withdrawal period.  Brigade Law Officer Kilmartin prepared lectures 
explaining marines' new mission, and "before distribution to unit commanders, these lectures 
received the personal examination and approval of Major General Commandant John A. LeJeune 
and other high officials.”43  To aid the indoctrination, commanders restricted marine contact with 
Dominican civilians and built new recreational facilities to improve marine morale.
44
 Lee 
emphasized, from 1922 to 1924, the importance of good conduct at the end of the occupation as 
being much more relevant than conduct over the course of previous years of occupation.  He 
stated that "any action resulting in adverse criticism at this time would be fatal to the Occupation, 
and would greatly tend to destroy our splendid achievements," a statement that both warned 
about negative perceptions and offered the impression that marines previously in the country had 
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brought about noteworthy change.  He reminded enlisted marines that  "from now on our 
conduct and attitude towards the inhabitants will be accentuated for good or evil; the impressions 
gained during the last days of the occupation by the Dominicans, and people of other nations 
interested in the future welfare of the Dominican Republic, will not only be measurable to our 
past performances, but will be the basis on which future generations will judge the military rule 
of the Dominican Republic by the United States Marine Corps."  He added, on the eve of 
withdrawal, that "the inhabitants in the past have viewed our intervention with suspicion and 
grave misgivings, but this feeling has been fast disappearing, due primarilly [sic.] to the 
exemplary behavior of the Occupying forces...."
45
  The re-indoctrination had an apparent effect 
on the conduct of marines in the country, and--as Fuller and Cosmas report--instances of friction 
between Dominicans and marines dropped off through the course of the withdrawal period.
46
   
 Gradual withdrawal also allowed the marines to focus on improving their relations with 
the constabulary--a move that allowed them to intervene as advisors through the months in which 
Cabral headed the organization's field forces.  This priority was also intended to improve the 
poor reputation of the constabulary.  While the constabulary worked to distance itself from 
politics and more controversial aspects of withdrawal, it also worked closely with the Marine 
Corps.  Through the withdrawal of marines, Lee commended the cooperation of constabulary 
officers, addressing them as equals rather than subordinates:  "In relinquishing control of the 
Policia Training Centers, the Military Governor desires to express his admiration to the officers 
and men of the Policia for the cheerful, apt and responsive manner in which they submitted 
themselves to training, without which they could never acquired [sic.] a high standard of military 
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excellence.  He is convinced that this same spirit will be instrumental in preserving the future 
peace and integrity of the Dominican Republic, and moreover is assured that these same officers 
and men will hold duty, loyalty and love of country above all other consideration."
47
  Marine 
commanders stressed the changing role of marines from “that of an occupying force in full 
control to that of allied troops temporarily stationed in a friendly sovereign nation.”48  Lectures 
to marines particularly stressed the need for marines to show respect to the constabulary; they 
were in the country to lend "moral support," and should therefore never interfere with 
constabulary members or municipal police.
49
  This was, therefore, a greatly empowering two-
year moment for the constabulary. 
 With the upcoming withdrawal of U.S. troops from Dominican soil, the military forces 
commanding those troops issued statements about the withdrawal and history of the occupation, 
extolling the occupation's positive contributions.  U.S. newspapers, placated perhaps by 
compromise and a withdrawal plan, reported these statements in 1922 with little attention to their 
veracity, or to the fact that they contradicted the stories of years previous.  In effect, the gradual 
and compromise character of withdrawal dulled the U.S. national protests and many other 
international protests.  Because of the decreased international media attention, the disposition of 
reporting changed, and marine statements were often published without investigation.  One 
highly unfortunate result of this was that these reports gave the U.S. public the impression that, 
in the end, the occupation had been successful and was now coming to a close.  Equally 
important, the vague reporting and general lack of understanding of Caribbean geography among 
                                                 
47
 Memo from Harry Lee, "Turn over of Training Centers and Military Hospital to the Constitutional Government," 
2 July, 1924, Geographical Files, "Dom Rep. Santo Domingo," USMC Historical Division, Quantico. 
48
 Fuller and Cosmas, Marines in the Dominican Republic, 65. 
49
 Kilmartin, "Indoctrination," 381, 384.  Marine officers also emphasized the moral imperative of being the "bigger 
man," using the continued belief in U.S. superiority in order to train Marines in relations with the new constabulary.  
Part of the lecture asked Marines: "Don't you pride yourself that your intelligence is superior to theirs?  Then isn't it 
up to you to avoid trouble?"  Kilmartin, "Indoctrination," 384.  Italics in original. 
425 
 
the U.S. public meant that reports also gave the false impression that Haiti was de-occupied at 
the same time as the Dominican Republic.  This decrease of attention contributed, therefore, to a 
decline in Haiti's struggle to end marine occupation there. 
 Ironically, the most glaring example of how the press inadvertently legitimated the claims 
of the U.S. military came from the Chicago Defender, whose confusion in reporting the 
withdrawal led its journalists to entitle their August 1924 article "U.S. Troops to Evacuate San 
Domingo," and then to sub-title it "Haitian Government is Free Again."  The report is rife with 
such conflation of the two countries.  For example, it begins: 
With the announcement by the United States government that the marines and all 
American forces have been ordered to evacuate Haiti, beginning next week, a feud of 
long standing between the two countries has been brought to a close.  While the island 
actually has been a self-governing community since the election of President Horacio 
Vasquez and Vice-President Federico Velasquez, in July, it will find itself entirely 
independent of all American interference and influence after the first of next month, if 
present plans are carried out.
 50  
 
 
As the report continues, the fact that it makes no distinction at all between the two countries is 
increasingly evident.
51
  Forgotten in the article are the years-old reports of atrocities, printed 
frequently in the Chicago Defender of 1921, of the occupying countries being made up of 
liberty-loving patriots.  In their place readers now found only the reassurance that the 
countries—again, conflated into one—were but a financially stricken and “rebellion ridden 
island” when the military government was installed.  Forgotten are discussions of the illegality 
and forced nature of the occupation governments, replaced by the claim, made twice in this 
article, that Dominican President Jimenes requested the military governorship of the Dominican 
Republic—and even claiming that he requested it to “prevent further bloodshed and protect 
American property and life.”  In place of the stories of brutality, torture, and the usurpation of the 
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free will of the people, readers found only praise of the military government, which had “done 
for the Dominicans what it did for Cuba,” a description of a country connected by a network of 
American roads, American methods of education, hospitals, a treasury department (as though the 
Dominican Republic had not previously had one), and sanitation systems.  The article claims that 
Dominicans were guilty of having not kept their end of the 1907 treaty, and even that “the treaty 
was soon forgotten.  Gradually the impoverished people drifted into a state of revolution.”  It 
elides the realities of Dominican care to the 1907 treaty, which was central to government 
policies in the worst of civil wars, and it elides the reality of a Dominican population that was 
involved and interested in the occurrences of 1922.  The article claims that “the four political 
leaders” came to the United States to negotiate in 1922, simplifying to an extreme the politics of 
the entire situation, and touts the U.S. reduction of the Dominican foreign debt.
52
   
This article, much like others, ends with two equally loaded statements.  The first is that 
with the recent election of President Vásquez and Vice-President Velásquez, “the United States 
determined to evacuate,” removing all Dominican initiative in the matter, and ignoring the years 
of national and international struggle—much of it carried out by the press of this very 
newspaper—that had brought about that evacuation.  As final proof that it reported according to 
the statement of involved military officials, it ended with that statement that “most remarkable of 
all American accomplishments in the Dominican republic has been the organization and training 
of a national police force of some thousands of men who will be able to keep peace and enforce 
order, should the departure of the United States from off Dominican soil lead to a return of the 
old-time conditions.”53  In the end, the picture presented to the American public by the press was 
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one that erased any past problems with the occupations and also covered up current ones, such as 
the continuing occupation of Haiti and the relative power of the Dominican military.   
 In the end, the general Dominican hatred of marines and poor relations between marines 
and constabulary were eased enough, through the long course of withdrawal, to allow the 
frequent return of marines as advisors and guests through the 1920s.  In addition, the lessening of 
hatred for the marines aided the lessening of hatred for the constabulary that replicated so many 
of their institutions.  U.S. reporting affected not only the U.S. public's awareness and 
understanding of the occupation, and not only the subsequent historiography of the occupation as 
presented from the United States, but also broadly affected the Dominican Republic in two major 
ways.  First, this perception in the United States ended condemnations and--with them--scrutiny 
of the U.S. military's involvement in the country, thereby leaving the marines a free hand to 
continue to involve themselves unofficially in the course of the Dominican military's 
development through the 1920s.  This new perception in the United States also paved the way for 
the U.S. government's acceptance of Trujillo's coup d'état in 1930.  When Trujillo's overthrow of 
the constitutional government prompted the U.S. government to send former constabulary 
commandant Richard M. Cutts over from Haiti, Cutts met secretly with Trujillo and seems to 
have informed his former mentee that the U.S. State Department would accept his government if 
it were constitutionally elected.  He informed the State Department that Trujillo would most 
likely establish a dictatorial government, but that the head of the Dominican military was more 
popular than the concerned U.S. legation believed, and that he would run the country and 
maintain order well.
54
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 The sets of alliances and relationships built through 1922-1924 allowed a continuation of 
withdrawal processes even after the marines were no longer in the country.  Vásquez saw in 
Trujillo a guarantee for maintaining himself in power, while also believing the repeated promises 
and propaganda--and continued assurances of both U.S. representatives and the constabulary--
that the constabulary would be forced to be apolitical.  In December of 1924, Vásquez promoted 
Trujillo to Lt. Col, giving him drastically increased power in the organization.
55
  Over the next 
two years, many U.S. observers noted with concern that the constabulary was rapidly becoming a 
political instrument, and in 1926 Vice President Federico Velásquez pointed out that the 
constabulary was deeply involved in the political process, that Trujillo's constabulary 
intelligence service set spies on meetings and other political events.
56
  In June and August of 
1927, with Trujillo's continued assurances that he was uninterested in politics, and even that he 
might retire within a year or two, Vásquez promoted him twice. 
 One of the primary authors of the constabulary's rise to dominance after the marines 
withdrew their last U.S. flag and their last troops, Rafael Trujillo seized on patterns of oppression 
learned during guerrilla warfare in the East, on the centrality of having a wide intelligence office, 
on the pattern of military control of the civilian government.  He also proved adept at using the 
purposeful revision of history to maintain power.  It was through a similar effort at revising 
Dominican history while controlling the population through an efficient military that Trujillo was 
able to build a legacy for himself that both declared intense nationalism while silencing the 
nationalists; to generally condemn foreign intervention while having come to power as a product 
of it; it allowed him to incorporate elements of the pre-occupation military and show off his pride 
in a long continuity of Dominican tradition, such as in his uniforms' imitation of those of 
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previous dictator Ulíses Heureaux, while patterning operations and intelligence after the reforms 
brought by the marines.  He worked to increase the legitimacy of the organization, renaming it 
the Dominican National Army in 1928 and gradually increasing its numbers to over 3,000 by the 
time Vásquez fell ill in 1929.  His organization was therefore ready in 1929 and 1930 to be the 
tool by which he orchestrated his rise to power as military dictator of the Dominican Republic 
for thirty-one years.  The only tool he used in this rise to power that had not been set in place 
during the gradual withdrawal was his call to the sovereign Dominican past and the glory of 
Dominican military tradition. 
 U.S. occupying forces led by the Department of the Navy in the years 1914-1916 sought 
to initiate a full military occupation both to expand and increase U.S. military control in the 
Caribbean region and to perform an experiment in government that was intended to bring U.S.-
defined "progress" and political stability through the creation of a new government.  Multiple 
forces and motivations went into the making of this occupation, justified to the public as a 
generous gift of U.S. tutelage that would open new land for U.S. markets and investment.  These 
plans were quickly and continually revised on the spot, however, as the intervention and 
occupation unfolded over the years.  Primary among the forces affecting U.S. plans was 
Dominican reality and widespread rejection of occupation forces' goals and methods.   
 For Dominicans, the long-term effects of the U.S. occupation included broad change in 
society, which was restructured through the military and compromise agreements for withdrawal.  
The highly regional country exited the occupation in 1924 with a more centralized government 
and national infrastructure and a centralized and largely professionalized military.  Stability by 
any definition was, however, lacking, the old structures of political power relationships 
overthrown and new ones only beginning to solidify to take their place.  Even as the withdrawal 
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brought about the occupation's end, and the heavily supported new Dominican military was 
professionalized and able to move long distances quickly, stability remained a precarious 
balancing game backed by further threat of U.S. force.  It in many ways united rural and urban 
areas, especially in terms of opportunities that it opened for poorer rural groups who were 
previously un-integrated into many of central society's structures.  This was, of course, a two-
pronged process: It stimulated some new forms of social mobility and involvement, but also 
meant central state encroachment on previously isolated areas, and decreased the mobility of 
many peasants who--before the occupation--had maintained the possibility of simply moving to 
new and unoccupied land throughout the country.  While it increased social mobility by class 
through the military, therefore, it decreased physical mobility and people's ability to avoid 
centralized imposition.   
 Over the course of the occupation, these changes influenced and damaged the country's 
regional traditions, but withdrawal agreements and the revisions undertaken by Trujillo's 
government used a combination of occupation military structures and traditional Dominican ones 
to consolidate and maintain centralized governmental and military power.  Trujillo co-opted 
regionalism to try to make it work to his benefit through structures created under the occupation 
constabulary.  This process began during the occupation, through processes of adaptation and 
negotiation by which occupation constabulary units adopted combined aspects of U.S. plans and 
regional cultures.  The ideas and structures being pushed by the first commissioned Dominican 
officers of the constabulary were those worked out in tandem with U.S. forces over the course of 
the occupation.  Revisions of occupation history, carried out especially during the 1920s, led to 
the blending of U.S. imperatives and Dominican traditions through an invested military that was 
centralized and powerful enough to dominate the reinstated central government. 
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 For many in the United States, including political actors and some military and economic 
planners, the occupation's end and result came to represent a clear need for change in foreign 
policy.  With the hindsight of political ramifications of such occupations clearer in hindsight, 
Warren Harding was one among many who urged a revised approach to U.S. relations with Latin 
American governments.  Taft's Dollar Diplomacy, and the U.S. military intervention that had 
risen to back U.S. investment and influence, needed to be redefined as global diplomacy changed 
following World War One.  This was especially true as groups throughout Latin American 
countries began to unite against U.S. military pressure, and as many within the United States 
called for anti-imperialist politics.  From the original U.S. occupation plans, then, through the 
structures of compromise bringing about withdrawal, the Dominican occupation of 1916-1924 
provides a window onto a changing international diplomacy and the wide redefining of Latin 
American identities in opposition to U.S. attempts at wide hegemony. 
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